Quinan v. Schneider

Hammond, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The appellant filed a bill asking for a declaration that he was not the father of an illegitimate child by the appellee, and for other and further relief. Judge Proctor sustained the mother’s demurrer to the bill primarily on the ground that § 6 of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (Code (1967 Repl. Vol.), Art. 31A) provides that “When, however, a statute provides a special form of remedy for a specific type of case, that statutory remedy must be followed,” and that a special form of remedy for a specific type of case had been provided by Code ³¹² (1966 Repl.

Vol.), Art. 16, §§ 66A to 66P, codified under the subtitle Paternity Proceedings and, with § 66 included, hereinafter referred to as the Paternity Act. Appellant’s secondary contention was that his complaint could be considered as a petition for relief under Code (1966 Repl. Vol.), Art. 16, § 66, considered without reference to §§ 66A-66P immediately following. Judge Proctor, finding that § 66 had been repealed and reenacted as § 1 of Ch. 722 of the Laws of 1963, the chapter which enacted the Paternity Act, and that it is an integral part of that Act, rejected the secondary contention and held, correctly we think, that the jurisdiction conferred on the equity courts by § 66 “in all cases relating to the custody, guardianship, maintenance and support of legitimate and illegitimate children” had, under the explicit words of the section, to be invoked by the “bill or petition filed by the father,” so that appellant, having expressly alleged that he was not a father, could not invoke its relief.

We turn to consideration of whether declaratory relief properly was withheld. Appellant’s bill alleges that the appellee had notified appellant that she had given birth to a child on May 23, 1966, and had notified him “that said child is illegitimate and that she intends to impute its paternity to [him] * * *” and that she “has threatened to bring judicial paternity proceedings against [him] in order to attempt to impose upon him the duty to support the aforementioned illegitimate child,” and that he is not the father of said child. The demurrer alleges that the Paternity Act provides “exclusive remedies to determine the paternity of illegitimate children,” and that on June 15, 1966, “prior to the filing of this Bill of Complaint” the respondent had filed her complaint in the Domestic Relations Division of the Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City and that the court had assumed jurisdiction, setting the petition for hearing on August 25, 1966. The mother also answered, repeating the statements as to the institution of paternity proceedings, stating that their purpose was to have the appellant adjudged to be the father of the illegitimate child and alleging that the appellant was the father of the child.

The appellant argues that while the Paternity Act may give an exclusive remedy to the mother of the illegitimate child or ³¹³ to a public welfare official or other complainant on behalf of the mother or child, it does not offer any remedy to one claiming not to be the father of an illegitimate child, who desires to have that status judicially determined, since such a one may not effectively initiate a proceeding thereunder. He says that the General Assembly, by the passage of the Paternity Act did not intend that he should be required to “squat upon his haunches and await the pleasure of the Appellee, in order to discover whether or not he will be saddled with the support of the Appellee’s child.” He argues that there was nothing before the chancellor when he sustained the mother’s demurrer