Hartman v. State

²⁸⁶ Hotten, J. We consider whether a plea agreement entered into in the District Court of Maryland remains binding once a defendant files a de novo appeal to the circuit court, pursuant to Courts & Judicial Proceedings (Cts. & Jud. Proc.) § 12-401. 1 Keisha Ann Hartman (“Petitioner”) pled guilty to a theft charge in the District Court in exchange for the State’s recommendation that she receive no executed jail time. Both parties satisfied the terms of the plea agreement, but the District Court judge did not follow the State’s recommendation, instead imposing a sentence of thirty days’ incarceration. Thereafter, Petitioner ²⁸⁷ filed a de novo appeal to the circuit court.

Prior to the de novo proceeding, the State offered a new plea agreement whereby, in exchange for Petitioner’s guilty plea, the State would recommend Petitioner receive thirty days’ incarceration. Petitioner subsequently filed a Motion to Enforce the Plea Agreement that was presented to the circuit court. After a hearing, the circuit court denied Petitioner’s motion. For the reasons that follow, we shall affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for Allegany County.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On June 14, 2014, Petitioner was observed stealing several t-shirts, hair color, and screen protectors, valued at approximately $82.51, from a Walmart in Allegany County. Petitioner was arrested and charged with theft under $100. In the District Court, Petitioner and the State entered into a plea agreement whereby Petitioner agreed to plead guilty to theft, in exchange for the State’s agreement to recommend no executed jail time. Both parties acknowledged that the plea agreement was not binding on the District Court.

During the District Court proceeding, the District Court judge found Petitioner guilty. During the sentencing phase of the hearing, the State recommended Petitioner not serve any jail time. The State advised the court that in 2018, charges against Petitioner for theft and credit card fraud were placed on the stet docket; in 2011, charges for false imprisonment and disorderly conduct were also placed on the stet docket; and in 2007, bad check charges were also placed on the stet docket. Finally, the State indicated that in 2006, in West Virginia, Petitioner was convicted for writing a bad check and fraud.

Petitioner’s defense counsel noted that Petitioner paid $205 to Walmart after receiving a demand letter from Walmart’s attorneys and that she was a single mother with three children. Petitioner testified that “[it was] just something that happened, [a] mistake.” In response, the District Court judge remarked that Petitioner had “made a lot of mistakes[,]” and sentenced Petitioner to thirty days’ incarceration. Thereafter, Petitioner ²⁸⁸ noted a timely de novo appeal to the Circuit Court for Allegany County. On June 2, 2015, Petitioner entered a plea of not guilty and requested a jury trial.

The State subsequently offered Petitioner a new plea agreement whereby Petitioner would plead guilty in exchange for the State’s recommendation of 30 days’ incarceration. On July 2, 2015, Petitioner filed a Motion to Enforce the Plea Agreement in the circuit court, arguing the State violated the terms of the District Court plea agreement by altering its sentencing recommendation from no incarceration to thirty days’ incarceration. During a hearing scheduled on July 28, 2015, Petitioner argued that the terms of the District Court plea agreement remained binding on the State during the de novo appeal to the circuit court. In response, the State argued that since the trial was de novo, the circuit court considered the case anew, and therefore, no plea agreement existed between the parties.

The circuit court agreed that on de novo appeal, the case began anew for both the prosecution and the defense, and that the District Court plea agreement was no longer enforceable. Petitioner timely filed an interlocutory appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. Prior to briefing, the Court of Special Appeals sua sponte transferred the case to this Court, pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-132. 2 Additional facts shall be provided, infra, to the extent they prove relevant in addressing the issues presented. STANDARD OF REVIEW For questions of law, we “undertake an independent review of the legal correctness of the [cjircuit [ejourt’s ruling, ²⁸⁹ without according it any deference.” Oku v. State, 433 Md. 582, 593 , 72 A.3d 538, 544 (2013).

Whether a plea agreement has been violated is a question of law which this Court reviews de novo. Tweedy v. State, 380 Md. 475, 482 , 845 A.2d 1215, 1219 (2004). DISCUSSION Petitioner argues that the State violated the terms of the District Court plea agreement by offering a new plea in the de novo proceeding, whereby Petitioner would plead guilty in exchange for the State’s recommendation of thirty days’ incarceration, instead of no incarceration as the parties originally agreed. I. Plea Agreements as Contracts a.

Reasonable Interpretation of Terms This Court has repeatedly acknowledged that plea bargains are akin to contracts. See, e.g., Cuffley v. State, 416 Md. 568, 579 , 7 A.3d 557, 563 (2010) (“Plea bargains are likened to contracts.”) (quoting Tweedy, 380 Md. at 482 , 845 A.2d at 1219 ); see also Solorzano v. State, 397 Md. 661, 668 , 919 A.2d 652, 668 (2007) (“Because plea bargains are similar to contracts .... ”). In considering whether a plea agreement has been violated, appellate courts “construe the terms of the plea agreement according to the reasonable understanding of the defendant when he [or she] pled guilty.” Solorzano, 397 Md. at 668 , 919 A.2d at 656 (citations omitted). In Cuffley , we concluded that: [A]ny question that later arises concerning the meaning of the sentencing term of a binding plea agreement must be resolved by resort solely to the record established at the [Maryland] Rule 4-243 plea proceeding.

The record of that proceeding must be examined to ascertain precisely what was presented to the court, in the defendant’s presence and before the court accepts the agreement, to determine what the defendant reasonably understood to be the sentence the parties negotiated and the court agreed to impose. The test ²⁹⁰ for determining what the defendant reasonably understood at the time of the plea is an objective one. It depends not on what the defendant actually understood the agreement to mean, but rather, on what a reasonable lay person in the defendant’s position and unaware of the niceties of sentencing law would have understood the agreement to mean, based on the record developed at the plea proceeding. Cuffley, 416 Md. at 582 , 7 A.3d at 565 (emphasis in original). “[I]f examination of the terms of the plea agreement itself, by reference to what was presented on the record at the plea proceeding before the defendant pleads guilty, reveals what the defendant reasonably understood to be the terms of the agreement, then that determination governs the agreement.” Baines v. State, 416 Md. 604, 615 , 7 A.3d 578, 585 (2010).

Further, “[i]f the record of the plea proceeding clearly discloses what the defendant reasonably understood to be the terms of the agreement, then the defendant is entitled to the benefit of the bargain, which, at the defendant’s option, is either specific enforcement of the agreement or withdrawal of the plea.” Cuffley, 416 Md. at 583 , 7 A.3d at 566 (internal citations omitted). If the plea agreement is ambiguous then the ambiguity should be construed in favor of the defendant. Solorzano, 397 Md. at 673 , 919 A.2d at 659 . Petitioner argues that the plea agreement neither limited the State’s obligation to the District Court proceeding nor indicated that the State’s obligation would cease if Petitioner noted an appeal.

The State disagrees, gnd argues that because the plea agreement did not include a provision that the State would make the same no-jail recommendation on a de novo appeal, no reasonable person in Petitioner’s position would interpret the agreement to apply in the circuit court proceeding. The parties agree that the terms of the District Court plea agreement were simple: Petitioner would plead guilty to the crime of theft, and in exchange, the State would recommend she receive no jail time. Under Cuffley , however, our interpretation of the original plea agreement occurs within ²⁹¹ the context of the District Court proceeding, and we must examine the record from the April 30, 2015 hearing, including “what was presented to the court, in the defendant’s presence and before the court accepts the agreement, to determine what [Petitioner] reasonably understood to be the” terms of the plea. See Cuffley, 416 Md. at 582 , 7 A.3d at 565 .

This review is an objective analysis based on the plea proceeding’s record. See id. at 582 , 7 A.3d at 565; see also Baines, 416 Md. at 615 , 7 A.3d at 585 . The record reflects that at the commencement of the April 30, 2015 hearing, the State informed the District Court of the parties’ intent to enter into a plea agreement with the previously referenced terms. After entering her guilty plea, Petitioner’s counsel explained to Petitioner that: [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: If you want to, you can enter a plea of not guilty and have a trial.

If you have a trial, you’d [sic] presumed innocent and the State would have the burden of trying to prove your guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. They would do that by calling witnesses and presenting evidence and testimony. If we went to trial, you would have an opportunity to present your case, to challenge the State’s case, and you could call any witnesses you wished. If you wanted to, you could testify.

You also have an option not to testify. If you remain silent, your silence would not be taken as a sign of guilt. Upon entering a guilty plea you’re waiving these trial rights; do you understand that? [PETITIONER]: Yeah. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Do you understand the State is making a recommendation for not [sic] actual jail time in this matter, just a suspended sentence. But that’s only a recommendation.

The Judge can impose whatever penalty he feels is appropriate under the circumstances up [to] the maximum meaning 90 days in this case; do you understand that? [PETITIONER]: Yes. The State then explained the underlying facts it would have presented had Petitioner pled not guilty and proceeded to ²⁹² trial. Once the State presented the facts, the District Court judge held that “[i]t will be a finding of guilty.” At that point, the terms of the plea were satisfied and the agreement was complete. We hold that, based on the above-referenced record, a reasonable person in Petitioner’s position would not have expected the plea agreement to extend beyond the District Court proceeding.

During defense counsel’s colloquy with Petitioner, he explained what trial rights Petitioner was foregoing by pleading guilty, but provided no notice to Petitioner that her appellate rights remained intact or that an appeal of her conviction would result in a de novo proceeding. Absent any evidence in the record to the contrary, we conclude the plea agreement was limited to the District Court proceeding. b. Oku v. State as Precedent for Extending District Court Plea Agreement to De Novo Proceeding i. Under Oku, De Novo Proceedings Are A “Do Over For Findings of Fact and Judgment of Guilt” Petitioner quotes Oku v. State for the proposition that “[o]ur de novo trial system provides for what is essentially a ‘do over’ in terms of the findings of fact and judgment of guilt.” Oku, 433 Md. at 595 , 72 A.3d at 545 .

Petitioner argues that in Oku we rejected the notion that the nature of a de novo appeal either precluded the State from presenting the defendant’s District Court trial testimony in the circuit court or eliminated what occurred in the District Court. Based on this interpretation of Oku , Petitioner argues that the original plea agreement did not expire when the de novo appeal was filed. The State disagrees, and argues that Petitioner ignores the fact that the judgment of guilt in the District Court rested entirely on her guilty plea. The State contends that once Petitioner sought the de novo appeal of her conviction, the District Court plea agreement was also subject to a “do over.” We agree with the State’s characterization of Oku and its applicability to this case.

In Oku , we concluded that filing a de novo appeal from the District Court to the circuit court ²⁹³ does not extinguish the District Court judgment. See Oku, 433 Md. at 592 , 72 A.3d at 544 . “Rather, ‘the District Court’s judgment remains in effect pending the appeal to the circuit court, unless and until superseded by a judgment of the circuit court or a disposition by nolle prosequi or stet.’” Id. (quoting Stone v. State, 344 Md. 97, 104 , 685 A.2d 441, 444 (1996)). 3 Additionally, we have interpreted de novo to mean “afresh” or “anew,” and that a de novo trial affords a criminal defendant a “brand new bite at the applet,]” Id. 433 Md. at 591 , 72 A.3d at 543 (citations omitted). A de novo appeal to the circuit court is treated “as a wholly original proceeding as if the charges had not been heard before and no decision had been rendered.” Garrison v. State, 350 Md. 128, 136 , 711 A.2d 170, 173 (1998) (quoting State v. Jefferson, 319 Md. 674, 681 , 574 A.2d 918, 921 (1990)).

On de novo appeal, the circuit court “receive[s] evidence and make[s] determinations of facts as though no prior proceeding had occurred.” Oku, 433 Md. at 592 , 72 A.3d at 544 (quoting In re Marcus, J., 405 Md. 221, 234-35 , 950 A.2d 787 (2008). The parties to the de novo proceeding are neither limited by the evidence presented at the District Court trial nor required to present the same evidence on appeal. Id. (citing Garrison, 350 Md. at 136 , 711 A.2d at 174 ).

Our holding in Oku does not, therefore, support the proposition that because the District Court judgment remains in effect, the factual and procedural underpinnings that led to the judgment—the plea agreement—also remain in effect on de novo appeal. ii. Effect of Petitioner’s District Court Guilty Plea Because we hold that the District Court plea agreement does not extend to the de novo proceeding, it is pertinent ²⁹⁴ to clarify the impact Petitioner’s guilty plea in the District Court may have in the de novo proceeding. The facts in this case are similar to those in Oku . In Oku , we considered whether the de novo system contemplated by Cts. & Jud.

Proc. § 12-401 (f) barred the State from using a criminal defendant’s admission—made during the District Court trial—in the State’s case during the subsequent de novo trial. Oku, 433 Md. at 593 , 72 A.3d at 544 . We emphasized in Oku “that a de novo appeal has the effect of ignoring the judgment below, but only for the limited purpose of granting a defendant, who was convicted upon trial in the District Court, a second trial.” Id. at 594 , 72 A.3d at 545 (emphasis in original). We concluded that “[a]t the second trial, no deference is accorded to the District Court’s factual findings or legal conclusions.” Id. at 594 , 72 A.3d at 545 .

We also noted that the United States Supreme Court, in describing another state’s two-tier trial system, 4 explained that in a trial de novo the “[pjrosecution and defense begin anew” and “neither the judge nor jury determines guilt or fixes a penalty in the trial de novo is in any way bound by the [District Court’s] findings or judgment.” Id. at 595 , 72 A.3d at 545 (quoting Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 113 , 92 S.Ct. 1953, 1958 , 32 L.Ed.2d 584 (1972)). We concluded that a de novo trial “does not call for the exclusion of testimony voluntarily given in the District Court trial, as long as that testimony is admissible under our rules of evidence.” Oku, 433 Md. at 595 , 72 A.3d at 545 . We also noted that, in contrast to appeals from the District Court that are reviewed “on the record,” 5 there is a ²⁹⁵ new fact finder in the de novo proceeding who owes no deference to the District Court’s findings or conclusions. Id. at 595-96 , 72 A.3d at 546 . “Both parties are free to present new evidence or a new theory of the case[,]” and the circuit court “must decide the admissibility of the proffered evidence by resort to the applicable evidentiary rules.” Id.

We held: the factfinder at a trial de novo makes a fresh determination of the weight to be accorded to any evidence that is admitted. In short, applying the rules of evidence to [cjircuit [cjourt trials that are the result of a de novo appeal in the same manner as they are applied in a trial that originates in that court does not deprive a defendant of the second “bite at the apple” mandated by [Cts. & Jud. Proc.] § 12-401, nor does it convert a trial de novo into a record appeal. The de novo trial system in Maryland affords the defendant many benefits, for example, a quicker, less costly resolution of minor offenses, a chance to preview the State’s case against him [or her] in District Court, and, if the defendant chooses to appeal, a second chance at acquittal.

But the purpose and structure of our de novo system, as laid out in our statutes, rules, and caselaw, do not require the feature [petitioner seeks, that is, to have his [or her] District Court testimony ignored by the State during its case-in-chief in [c]ircuit [c]ourt. Id. at 596, 72 A.3d at 546 .

II

Due Process 6 Concerns in This Case a. Preservation of Due Process Claims Before addressing the merits of Petitioner’s due process claims, we must first address the State’s argument that ²⁹⁶ those claims are not preserved for appellate review. First, the State argues that Petitioner did not preserve her argument that due process requires the plea agreement to be construed to extend to the circuit court. Specifically, the State avers that, in the circuit court, Petitioner only argued that under a plain contractual interpretation of the original plea agreement and under our holding in Oku , the State was obligated by the same plea terms that it agreed to in the District Court proceeding.

The State acknowledges, and the record reflects, however, that Petitioner also argued in her Memorandum in Support of her Motion to Enforce the Plea Agreement that, [ujnder due process, a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to some form of remedy for a broken agreement. (Santobello v. New York, [ 404 U.S. 257 ,] 257[, 92 S.Ct. 495 , 30 L.Ed.2d 427 ] (1971)). “When a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.” [Id] Thus, Petitioner preserved her claim that due process requires the enforcement of the terms of a plea agreement agreed to by the parties. See Maryland Rule 8-131(a). Second, the State argues that Petitioner never advanced a claim in the circuit court regarding her due process right to avoid prosecutorial vindictiveness in noting a de novo appeal.

Petitioner instead first raised this issue in her brief to this Court. Petitioner argues—in her reply brief—that “[t]he due process concern discussed in [Petitioner’s] brief is not a separate issue. It is merely one more reason why the plea agreement should be construed in the manner consistently advocated by [Petitioner].” We disagree. Although Petitioner raised a due process claim before the circuit court, the claim advanced before this Court was outside the scope of the earlier claim.

Petitioner’s circuit court due process claim relied on the Supreme Court case Santobello v. State, where the Supreme Court held that when “a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement ²⁹⁷ or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled,” Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262 , 92 S.Ct. at 499 . The Santobello Court concluded that if the defendant did not receive the benefit of his or her bargain, then he or she can either: (1) have the bargain specifically enforced, or (2) withdraw his or her plea of guilty. Id. at 263 , 92 S.Ct. at 499. We subsequently relied on Santo-bello for the conclusion that “when either the prosecution breaches its promise with respect to a plea agreement, or the court breaches a plea agreement that it agreed to abide by, the defendant is entitled to relief[]” under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

See Solorzano, 397 Md. at 667-68 , 919 A.2d at 656 (citations omitted). Thus, the basis for Petitioner’s due process claim in the circuit court was that a defendant has a due process right to enforce the terms of his or her plea agreement when the State or the trial court violates the terms of that agreement. On appeal, Petitioner’s due process claim instead relies on the Supreme Court case Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 , 94 S.Ct. 2098 , 40 L.Ed.2d 628 (1974), In Blaekledge, the Supreme Court considered whether a felony indictment brought after the defendant exercised his statutory right to appeal constituted a penalty in contravention of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 25 , 94 S.Ct. at 2101 .

The Supreme Court held that, “since the fear of [ ] vindictiveness may unconstitutionally deter a defendant’s exercise of the right to appeal or collaterally attack his first conviction, due process also requires that a defendant be freed of apprehension of such retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge.” [North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 , 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2080 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969) 7 ]. We think it [is] clear that the ²⁹⁸ same considerations apply here. A person convicted of an offense is entitled to pursue his statutory right to a trial de novo, without apprehension that the State will retaliate by substituting a more serious charge for the original one, thus subjecting him to a significantly increased potential period of incarceration. Id. at 28, 94 S.Ct. at 2102-03 .

Thus, Petitioner’s due process claim before us is not based on enforcement of the plea agreement. Rather, Petitioner’s claim is based on whether the State’s action—recommending a harsher sentence after Petitioner exercised her statutory right to appeal—created a “fear of vindictiveness” that could deter defendants like Petitioner from exercising their statutory right to appeal in contravention of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We conclude, therefore, that Petitioner’s claim regarding her due process right to avoid prosecutorial vindictiveness in noting a de novo appeal was not preserved. b. Discretion Under Maryland Rule 8-131(a) Maryland Rule 8-131(a) governs our scope of review in considering issues on appeal.

Sub-section (a) states: The issues of jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject matter and, unless waived under [Maryland] Rule 2-322, over a person may be raised in and decided by the appellate court whether or not raised in and decided by the trial court. Ordinarily, the appellate court will not decide any ²⁹⁹ other issue unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court, but the Court may decide such an issue if necessary or desirable to guide the trial court or to avoid the expense and delay of another appeal. Maryland Rule 8-131(a). We made clear in State v. Bell, 334 Md. 178 , 638 A.2d 107 (1994) that our review of arguments not raised at the trial level is discretionary, not mandatory.

See Bell, 334 Md. at 188 , 638 A.2d at 113 . We also noted that the primary purpose of Maryland Rule 8-131 (a) is to “ensure fairness for all parties in a case and to promote the orderly administration of law.” Id. at 189 , 638 A.2d at 113 (quoting Brice v. State, 254 Md. 655, 661 , 255 A.2d 28, 31 (1969)) (other citations omitted). In Chaney v. State, 397 Md. 460 , 918 A.2d 506 (2007), we concluded that the discretion authorized by Maryland Rule 8-131 (a) is a discretion that appellate courts should rarely exercise, as considerations of both fairness and judicial efficiency ordinarily require that all challenges that a party desires to make to a trial court’s ruling, action, or conduct be presented in the first instance to the trial court so that (1) a proper record can be made with respect to the challenge, and (2) the other parties and the trial judge are given an opportunity to consider and respond to the challenge. Chaney, 397 Md. at 468 , 918 A.2d at 511 . “We usually elect to review an unpreserved issue only after it has been thoroughly briefed and argued, and where a decision would[:] (1) help correct a recurring error, (2) provide guidance when there is likely to be a new trial, or (3) offer assistance if there is a subsequent collateral attack on the conviction.” Conyers v. State, 354 Md. 132, 151 , 729 A.2d 910, 920 (1999).

In Jones v. State, 379 Md. 704 , 843 A.2d 778 (2004), we held that when presented with a plausible exercise of discretion under Maryland Rule 8-131(a), “appellate courts should make two determinations concerning the promotion or subversion of [Maryland Rule] 8-131(a)’s twin goals.” Jones, 379 Md. at 714 , 843 A.2d at 784 . First, we consider whether ³⁰⁰ the exercise of discretion will work an unfair prejudice to either of the parties. Id; see also Bell, 334 Md. at 189 , 638 A.2d at 113 (“[Discretion should be exercised only when it is clear that it will not work an unfair prejudice to the parties or to the court.” (citations and footnote omitted)). Part of our determination of whether unfair prejudice would exist is consideration of the rationale for the default or waiver and whether the failure to raise the issue was a considered, deliberate one, or whether it was inadvertent and unintentional.

Jones, 379 Md. at 714 , 843 A.2d at 784 . Second, we consider whether the exercise of discretion will promote the orderly administration of justice. Id at 715, 843 A.2d at 784 . We noted that Maryland Rule 8-131 (a) “seeks to prevent the trial of cases in a piecemeal fashion, thereby saving time and expense and accelerating the termination of litigation.” Id In determining whether to consider the merits of this issue, our precedents recognize that constitutional issues raised for the first time on appeal, and not raised in the trial court, are not automatically entitled to consideration on the merits under Maryland Rule 8-131(a).

See, e.g., Oku, 433 Md. at 588-89 , 72 A.3d at 541-42 (declining to consider petitioner’s Sixth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment claim because petitioner failed to raise either issue in the trial court, and therefore did not properly preserve them for appellate review); see also Balt Teachers Union v. Bd. of Edu., 379 Md. 192, 205 , 840 A.2d 728, 736 (2004) (“Since the constitutional issue raised in the [petitioner’s] brief was not raised in the trial court, we shall decline to address it.”). Our “established policy is to decide constitutional issues only when necessary,” Burch v. United Cable Television of Balt. Ltd. P’ship, 391 Md. 687, 695 , 895 A.2d 980, 984 (2006) (quoting Mercy Hospital v. Jackson, 306 Md. 556, 565 , 510 A.2d 562, 566 (1986)); see also Balt. Teachers Union, 379 Md. at 205-06, 840 A.2d at 736 (“It is particularly important not to address a constitutional issue not raised in the trial court in light of the principle that a court will not unnecessarily decide a constitutional question.”). ³⁰¹ The State argues that Petitioner’s failure to assert the prosecutorial vindictiveness due process claim in the circuit court created unfair prejudice for two reasons: (1) we do not have the benefit of the circuit court’s consideration of this due process argument, and (2) had the circuit court concluded a presumption of vindictiveness should govern construction of the plea agreement, the State would have had an opportunity to present facts that refuted the presumption of vindictiveness.

Petitioner notes in her reply brief that the State explained to the circuit court that its reasoning for offering a harsher sentence in the de novo proceeding was because the prosecutor saw no reason to deviate from the District Court’s sentence. Petitioner also argues that the State’s subjective reasons for recommending a harsher sentence after she noted her de novo appeal are of no consequence because, in her view, when a prosecutor recommends a harsher sentence after a defendant notes a de novo appeal, there is a presumption of vindictiveness that renders the prosecutor’s subjective intent in recommending the harsher sentence irrelevant. Since both parties briefed the issue before this Court and the trial record below is sufficient for us to consider the merits, we may consider Petitioner’s prosecutorial vindictiveness due process claim, pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-131(a). Additionally, deciding this due process claim will promote the fair administration of justice because it will dispose of Petitioner’s concerns regarding the State’s conduct in this case.

Considering the merits of this issue will also provide important guidance regarding the constitutionality of prosecutorial conduct during plea bargaining in Maryland’s two-tier trial system. See Chaney, 397 Md. at 468 , 918 A.2d at 511 (considering petitioner’s unpreserved challenge to a restitution order because it constituted plain error and the issue “transcends this case; it is one that may affect hundreds of cases that flow through our criminal and juvenile courts and that implicates important Constitutional and statutory rights, and guidance is needed.” (footnote omitted)). ³⁰² c. Contract Principles and Concerns of “Fairness and Adequacy of Procedural Safeguards” 8 In considering the enforcement of plea agreements, we have consistently held that in addition to considering contract principles, “[d]ue process concerns for fairness and the adequacy of procedural safeguards guide any interpretation of a court approved plea agreement.” See Cuffley, 416 Md. at 580 , 7 A.3d at 564 (quoting Solorzano, 397 Md. at 668 , 919 A.2d at 656 ). Notably, in considering our jurisprudence in this area, however, the central issue was not whether the plea agreement itself