Haupt v. State

BELL, Judge. Once again we are required to construe the restrictions on actions provision, § 12-106 of the Maryland Tort Claims Act (“MTCA”), Maryland Code (1984, 1993 Repl.Vol.), § 12-101 et seq. of the State Government Article. 1 On this occasion, we address an issue left open by Leppo v. State Highway Administration, 330 Md. 416, 431 , 624 A.2d 539, 546 (1993), the most recent case to construe § 12-106: When does the 180-day clock begin to run in the case of third-party claims? ⁴⁶⁶ I Sandra Lee Haupt, the appellant, was involved in an automobile accident with Margaret Lynn Keehan, the plaintiff, which occurred on August 1, 1989. There was a collision between the appellant’s car and the plaintiffs car when the appellant pulled out of a parking lot and entered Mayo Road. Just prior to the accident, the plaintiff’s car was proceeding on Mayo Road from the left of the parking lot.

Almost three years after the accident, on August 17, 1992, the plaintiff filed suit against the appellant in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, alleging that the appellant’s negligent operation of her car was the cause of the physical injuries that the plaintiff sustained. The appellant filed a timely answer to the complaint and, subsequently, a third-party complaint against Anne Arundel County, seeking contribution and/or indemnification. The third-party complaint alleged that the appellant’s view of Mayo Road was obstructed by trees and brush on the County’s property, which the County had negligently failed to trim. The County moved to dismiss the third-party complaint on the grounds that the property in question was owned by the State of Maryland and not the County.

Subsequently, on March 5, 1993, the appellant filed a third-party complaint against the State, the appellee, for indemnification and/or contribution, premised on the same allegations that had been made against the County. The third-party complaint against the County subsequently was dismissed. The third-party complaint against the State was served on the State Treasurer on March 18,1993. The State’s motion to dismiss that complaint was filed on March 23, 1993.

The State, which had not received notice of a claim pertaining to the underlying accident prior to being sued, argued, in the motion, that the appellant failed to comply with the 180-day time requirement in the MTCA. Following a hearing, the circuit court dismissed the third party complaint, adopting the State’s position that § 12-106(b)(l) requires that written no ⁴⁶⁷ tice of the claim, which is the subject of the underlying action, be filed within 180 days of the accident. After the court’s ruling had been certified as final pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-602, 2 the appellant noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. Prior to the intermediate appellate court’s consideration of the matter, we issued a writ of certiorari on our own motion. 3 II In Leppo , this Court was presented with the question whether third-party claims were excepted from the notice provision of § 12-106.

Id. at 419, 624 A.2d at 540-41 . We concluded that they were not. Id. Specifically, we held: The 180-day requirement is a condition precedent to the institution of a third-party action against the State---[T]he only exceptions designated are cross-claims and counterclaims.

The General Assembly could have added third-party claims to this short list, but it chose not to do so. Id. at 423 , 624 A.2d at 542 (citations omitted). Having so held, the Court made clear what it had not decided: “From the start, the parties have focused on the question whether a third-party claimant is within the exceptions of § 12-106(a). They both have clearly indicated that the time the 180-day clock began to run was not ‘before the court.’ ” Id. at 430-31, 624 A.2d at 546 .

Pointing out that the matter was not argued in the circuit court, nor addressed by that court, that the parties never attempted to establish the ⁴⁶⁸ legislative intent, as to that issue, and that the circuit court did not explain in what respect the appellant did not meet the notice requirement, the Court remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings to determine whether there had been compliance with the notice requirement in that case. It opined that: Our procedures permit third-party actions but just how they fit into the MCTA is far from evident. Absent clear legislative direction, third-party actions and § 12-106(b) must be reconciled to reflect the best interests of justice—fairness both to the third-party plaintiff and to the State. Although the matter of compliance vel non with § 12-106(b) is a matter of law, we are reluctant to resolve it prior to the parties having the opportunity to folly brief and argue the issue.

We think that it should first be argued and decided below, thereby giving the third-party complainant and the State the opportunity to be heard. In the event of an appeal they could fully express and support their respective views by way of brief and argument. Id. at 431, 624 A.2d at 546-47 . The case at bar provides this Court with the opportunity to address that issue.

Ill The appellant contends that the State’s motion to dismiss her third-party complaint should have been denied because the third-party complaint was timely filed. Since, she argues, the plain meaning of § 12-106(b) is that the 180-day limitation period does not begin to run until after there has been injury to the person or property that is the basis for the underlying claim, and her complaint is for contribution and/or indemnification, she is injured only when the plaintiff has been awarded a final judgment against her. Stated another way, the appellant’s position is that, in the third-party context, the claim to which § 12-106(b) refers is that of the defendant in the underlying action, i.e., the third-party plaintiff. Consequently, therefore, she contends that the injury referred to is the injury to the person or property of the third-party plaintiff, ⁴⁶⁹ not, as the State maintains, the injury directly resulting from the accident.

In support of her position, the appellant argues that most defendants/third-party plaintiffs would be denied the opportunity to sue the State if a third-party plaintiff were required to file a lawsuit within 180 days of the accident giving rise to the action in which he or she is the defendant. She points out that rarely does a plaintiff file suit within such a short time after the accident; therefore, she maintains, application of the § 12-106(b) notice requirement to third-party plaintiffs would be patently unfair and in direct violation of the third-party plaintiffs due process rights. Alternatively, the appellant asserts that she has shown good cause for not complying with the 180-day requirement. Not unexpectedly, the appellee takes the opposite position.

It argues that dismissal was proper. The appellee contends, in that regard, that, as there would be no third-party action without injury to the plaintiff, it is the timing of the plaintiffs injuries, rather than the entry of judgment against the appellant, that determines when notice in compliance with § 12-106(b) must be given. It reasons that, because the claim against it derives fi”om the plaintiffs injuries, ie., those injuries resulting from the accident, the appellant was injured when the plaintiff was injured. That this is so is made manifest, the appellee asserts, when one considers that the appellant’s third-party claim would not exist without the plaintiffs injury and that the recovery of monetary damages, in respect of that claim, depends necessarily and directly on the extent of those injuries.

Thus, the appellee concludes that the fact that the appellant failed to comply with the 180-day requirement of § 12-106(b) is evident; the appellant did not file a claim with the treasurer within 180 days after the accident in which the plaintiff was injured. The appellee argues, in the alternative, that the appellant’s third-party action was filed prematurely and, hence, the court was without jurisdiction to adjudicate it. It notes the appellant’s argument that her “injury” occurs when judgment is ⁴⁷⁰ rendered against her and that the third-party complaint was filed prior to that time. The appellee points out that § 12-106(b)(1) requires submission of a written claim “within 180 days after the injury to person or property that is the basis of the claim.” (Emphasis added).

IV The purpose of the notice requirement of § 12-106 is patent. Requiring that notice be given to the State within 180 days after incurring the injury to which the claim relates obviously is designed to give the State early notice of claims against it. Johnson v. Maryland State Police, 331 Md. 285, 296 , 628 A.2d 162, 167 (1993). That early notice, in turn, affords the State the opportunity to investigate the claims while the facts are fresh and memories vivid, and, where appropriate, settle them at the earliest possible time.

Section 12-106(b) sets forth the conditions precedent to filing suit against the State of Maryland: 1. submission of a written claim to the Treasurer within 180 days after the injury to person or property that is the basis of the claim; 2. final denial of the claim by the Treasurer; and 3. filing suit within the later of one year after the claim is finally denied or three years after the cause of action accrues. The requirements of subsections (b)(2) and (b)(3) are clear and unambiguous. They require the Treasurer’s final denial of the claim and the filing of suit within a prescribed time period. Subsection (b)(1), on the other hand, is not so clear.

It requires that there be a nexus between the claim made and the injury incurred. Thus, while its provisions make clear that a claim must be submitted, in writing, within a specified time and must relate to “injury to person or property that is the basis of the claim,” the meaning of the latter phrase is not at all clear with respect to the injury to which the phrase refers. No differentiation is made between claims by third-party plaintiffs, those made by the defendant in the underly ⁴⁷¹ ing action, and those made by the plaintiff in the underlying action. Whether, and if, a party may be a claimant within the meaning of § 12-106(b) and whether, and if, a claim is timely are matters to be determined according to the circumstances.

As it relates to third-party actions—when a third-party plaintiff is involved—the phrase is simply ambiguous. To resolve ambiguities, it is well settled that we may consult interpretative aids other than the words of the statute. See City of Baltimore v. Cassidy, 338 Md. 88, 93-4 , 656 A.2d 757, 760 (1995); Gargliano v. State, 334 Md. 428, 439 , 639 A.2d 675, 680 (1994); State v. Thompson, 332 Md. 1, 7 , 629 A.2d 731, 734-35 (1993); Harris v. State, 331 Md. 137, 146 , 626 A.2d 946, 950 (1993); Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 514-16 , 525 A.2d 628, 632-33 (1987). The purpose of the statute, its legislative history, and “other material that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of legislative goal or purpose” are among the interpretative aids to which we look in determining the meaning of ambiguous statutory language, Id. at 515 , 525 A.2d at 633 ; see also Mustafa v. State, 323 Md. 65, 73 , 591 A.2d 481, 485 (1991); however, the statute must be interpreted reasonably, avoiding an interpretation that is illogical or incompatible with common sense.

D & Y, Inc. v. Winston, 320 Md. 534, 538 , 578 A.2d 1177, 1179 (1990); Blandon v. State, 304 Md. 316, 319 , 498 A.2d 1195, 1196 (1985); Erwin & Shafer, Inc. v. Pabst Brewing Co., 304 Md. 302, 315 , 498 A.2d 1188, 1194 (1985). Moreover, the language of the statute must be interpreted in context, Kaezorowski, 309 Md. at 516 , 525 A.2d at 633 , citing Potter v. Bethesda Fire Department, 309 Md. 347, 351-55 , 524 A.2d 61, 63-4 (1987) (quoting State v. Fabritz, 276 Md. 416, 421-22 , 348 A.2d 275, 278-79 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 942 , 96 S.Ct. 1680 , 48 L.Ed.2d 185 (1976)), and given full effect, State v. Bricker, 321 Md. 86, 93 , 581 A.2d 9, 12 (1990); Board of Education of Garrett County v. Lendo, 295 Md. 55, 62 , 453 A.2d 1185, 1189 (1982), neither adding nor deleting words to obtain a meaning not otherwise intended, as evidenced by the words actually used. Id. at 63 , 453 A.2d at 1189 ; Smelser v. Criterion Insurance ⁴⁷² Co., 293 Md. 384, 389 , 444 A.2d 1024, 1027 (1982); Pappas v. Pappas, 287 Md. 455, 465 , 413 A.2d 549, 553 (1980). V When the tort claim is made by the plaintiff in the underlying action, it is patent that the 180-day period begins to run as soon as the plaintiff or the plaintiffs property is injured, i.e., from the time of the accident.

See Condon v. State, 332 Md. 481, 494 , 632 A.2d 753, 759 (1993); Lopez v. State Highway Administration, 327 Md. 486, 492 , 610 A.2d 778, 781 (1992); Simpson v. Moore, 323 Md. 215, 230 , 592 A.2d 1090, 1094-95 (1991). Where, however, the claim is made by the defendant in the underlying action, whether by way of, as in this case, a third-party complaint, or an action for contribution or indemnification, the question becomes, whether the injury to which the statute refers is the injury directly resulting from the accident, as the State maintains, or, as the appellant contends, the injury which, although derived from the accident, may not manifest until later. Does it refer, in other words, to the injury to the person or property of the plaintiff in the underlying action or the injury which gives rise to the derivative third-party action or the action for contribution or indemnification? The statute’s ambiguity can be illustrated by hypothesizing an accident for which the State potentially is responsible and in which only one of two non-State parties to the accident suffers an injury to person or property.

In this scenario, only one of the non-State parties may file a claim with the Treasurer. A “ ‘claimant’ is one who claims a right, or asserts a right, demand or a claim.” Black’s Law Dictionary at 225 (5th Ed.1979). Among the definitions of “claim” are “[t]o demand as one’s own or as one’s right” and “cause of action.” Id. at 224 . Section 12-106(b)(l) contemplates a claim based on an injury to person or property.

The non-State party who has sustained personal injury or property damage in the accident has a § 12-106(b)(l) claim. ⁴⁷³ Although involved in the accident and aware of the injuries to the other party, the uninjured party does not have a claim against the State at that time. He or she has not suffered the required injury; only a party who suffers an injury in the accident can immediately state a claim for injury to person or property. In order to proceed against the State, a party must give notice to the Treasurer pursuant to § 12—106(b)(1). As we have seen, this involves the submission of a written claim within 180 days after the injury that is the basis of the claim occurs.

Giving it its ordinary and commonsensicai meaning, a claim is a broad and comprehensive term encompassing all species of legal demand. Leppo, 330 Md. at 427 , 624 A.2d at 545 , citing White v. Land Homes Corp., 251 Md. 603, 610-611 , 248 A.2d 159, 163 (1968). Therefore, “[a] claim in the context of civil litigation, is a substantive concept, defining the moment at which a litigant may seek judicial recourse.” Id., citing Edmunds v. Lupton, 253 Md. 93, 100 , 252 A.2d 71, 75 (1969). The Maryland Rules permit the filing of third-party claims by defendants and the litigation of third-party actions.

Maryland Rule 2-302 allows for, among other pleadings, a complaint and a third-party complaint. Maryland Rule 2-332, provides in pertinent part: (a) Defendant’s Claim Against Third Party. A defendant, as a third-party plaintiff, may cause a summons and complaint, together with a copy of all pleadings and motions previously filed in the action, to be served upon a person not previously a party to the action who is or may be liable to the defendant for