Hayes v. Wang

GARRITY, Judge. In this matter, we shall examine the length of time allowed a workers’ compensation claimant to initiate an action against a third party who, purportedly, was responsible for the injuries sustained by the employee. In doing so, we shall consider section 9-902(d) of Ann.Code of Md., Labor and Employment Article. FACTUAL BACKGROUND The appellant, Frances R. Hayes, and the appellee, You S. Wang, were operators of motor vehicles involved in an accident on June 27, 1991, in Prince George’s County.

As a result of the accident and the alleged negligence of Mr. Wang, Ms. Hayes sustained property damage and personal injury. Ms. Hayes, who was operating her motor vehicle within the scope of her employment with Safeway Stores, Inc. at the time of the accident, filed a workers’ compensation claim on July 19, 1991. She received her first award on November 4, 1991. Ms. Hayes filed a complaint, sounding in negligence, against Mr. Wang on August 19, 1994 in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County.

As the dates indicate, the complaint was filed three years and fifty-three (58) days from the date of the accident. In response to the complaint, Mr. Wang filed a Motion to Dismiss based on the general three-year statute of limitations period. Upon hearing, the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County granted the motion. DISCUSSION OF LAW As an exception to the general three-year statute of limitations involving a tort complaint, pursuant to Ann.Code of Md., ⁶⁰⁰ Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article § 5-101, the Legislature provided an extended period of time within which an injured employee, who has filed for an award of compensation, may file a complaint against a third party responsible for such injury.

The statute, Md.Code (1991 RepLVol.), § 9-902(d) of the Labor and Employment Article, adds a two month tolling period to the general three year statutory limit. As enacted in 1991, the statute states: The period of limitations for the right of action of a covered employee or the dependents of the covered employee against the third party does not begin to run until two months after the first award of compensation made to the covered employee or the dependents under this title. 1 In interpreting the intent and meaning of § 9-902(d), through its predecessor, Article 101, § 58, as applied to third party claims, the Court of Appeals defined its scope in Smith v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 303 Md. 213 , 492 A.2d 1286 (1985). The plaintiff in Smith , who had discovered on March 12, 1979 that he had asbestosis, attempted to amend his complaint on November 30, 1983 to join three additional defendants. Unlike the matter sub judiee, he had filed his civil complaint prior to receiving a workers’ compensation award.

The three added defendants contended that the three-year statute of limitations had run on plaintiffs personal injury claim against them. In opposition, plaintiff argued that section 58 literally provided that the three-year period did “not begin to run until two months after the first award of compensation.” Rather than adopt the literal meaning of section 58, the Court chose a less disruptive construction in order to avoid “so ⁶⁰¹ great a fragmentation of third party actions.” Id. at 228 , 492 A.2d 1286 . Speaking on behalf of the Court, Judge Rodowsky explained: We therefore construe the second paragraph to effect, ‘as to such employee,’ a tolling of the otherwise applicable statute of limitations during the two months after award when the employee is excluded from instituting a third-party action. Thus ‘the period of limitations for such action, as to such employee, shall not [resume or] begin to run [again]