Hebden v. Keim

Delaplaine, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The purpose of this suit is to construe the will of Mrs. Sallie May Carter, a resident of Caroline County, who died in September, 1921. The suit was filed by the Denton National Bank, administrator d.b.n. c.t.a. of her estate. Mrs. Carter executed her will on April 3, 1919.

At that time she was 59. Her only heirs at law were her husband, Edward B. Carter, 61, and an unmarried brother, Caleb Scattergood, 67. The clause to be construed bequeathes the sum of $8,000 to her husband for life, and then provides: “and from and after his death, I give, devise, and bequeath said sum of $8,000 to my brother, Caleb Scattergood, absolutely, provided, however, if my said brother, Caleb Scattergood, should die before both myself and my said husband, Edward B. Carter, then in that event, I give, devise and bequeath said sum of $8,000 as a part of my residuary estate.” Scattergood died in 1928, leaving his entire estate to his two intimate friends, Caleb Scattergood Hebden and William Hebden. Carter died in 1948.

It was contended by Scattergood’s legatees that, since the testatrix gave the principal sum of $8,000 to her residuary estate in the event that her brother should die “before both” herself and her husband, and since she died before her brother, the bequest belonged to her brother’s estate. ⁴⁸ But the chancellor held that the testatrix intended the bequest to go to her residuary estate if her brother died before the time when both she and her husband were dead; and he accordingly decreed that the bequest went to the residuary legatees, Howard Keim, Mary Keim Wagner, Frank Keim, Jr., and Helen Keim Wilson, cousins of the testatrix. Caleb Scattergood Hebden and Martha Hebden, widow and sole heir of William Hebden, appealed from the decree. The cardinal rule for the construction of a will is to give effect to the intention of the testator according to the meaning of the words he has used deduced from a consideration of the whole will read in the light of the surrounding circumstances existing at the time of its execution. Women’s Foreign Missionary Society etc., v. Mitchell, 93 Md. 199, 202 , 48 A. 737 , 53 L. R. A. 711; Ridgely v. Ridgely, 147 Md. 419, 422 , 128 A. 131 ; West v. Sellmayer, 150 Md. 478 , 133 A. 333 ; Gent v. Kelbaugh, 179 Md. 343 , 18 A. 2d 595 ; Jones v. Holloway, 183 Md. 40 , 36 A. 2d 551 , 152 A. L. R. 933; Inasmuch Gospel Mission v. Mercantile Trust Co., 184 Md. 231 , 40 A. 2d 506 ; Colton v. Colton, 127 U. S. 300 , 8 S. Ct. 1164, 1168 , 32 L. Ed. 138 .

In some legal instruments the use of technical words and phrases is required by the long usage of the law to accomplish particular effect. But the law does not require a testator to use technical words or any particular form of words in his will to convey his intention. This difference grew from the fact that many wills had been made when testators were in extremis and without the aid of counsel. Beall’s Lessee v. Holmes, 6 Har. & J. 205, 207 ; Zimmerman v. Hafer, 81 Md. 347, 358 , 32 A. 316 .

In approving the liberal American testamentary construction in preference to the strict construction of the English courts, Chief Justice Taney said in Bosley v. Wyatt, 14 How. 390, 397, 398 , 55 U. S. 390 , 14 L. Ed. 468 , 471: “Undoubtedly there are fixed rules of law in relation to the construction of certain words and phrases in a will, which have been established by a long course of judicial decisions; and which have become land ⁴⁹ marks of property and cannot be disturbed. * * * It has not been the disposition of courts of justice, in modern times, to extend the application of these rigid technical rules; but rather to carry out the intention of the testator, when no fixed rule of legal interpretation stands in the way. And this is, and ought to be, more especially the case in this country. For wills here are most frequently drawn by persons unacquainted with legal phraseology, and ignorant of the meaning which the law attaches to the words they use. The property devised is, perhaps, in the greater number of cases, the fruits of the testator’s own industry.” In this case the testatrix left her husband the income on $8,000 during his lifetime.

She then gave the entire sum to Scattergood, with the proviso that if he should die before both herself and her husband, then the sum was to become a part of her residuum. It is entirely clear that if her husband had died before her death, the money would have belonged to Scattergood absolutely upon her death. It is also beyond question that, since she died before her husband, the remainder, i.e., the principal sum of $8,000, vested in Scattergood, subject to divestment in the event that he died before the death of the widower. We are of the opinion that it was not the intention of the testatrix to give the sum of $8,000 to her brother’s