Hitchins v. Mayor of Cumberland

Mitchell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The single question presented upon this appeal is whether the title to chapter 23 of the Acts of 1939 meets the constitutional requirements of art. 3, sec. 29, of the Constitution, which, among other things, provides that: “Every law enacted by the General Assembly shall embrace but one subject, and that shall be described in its title.” The title to chapter 23 of the Acts of 1939 is as follows : “An Act to authorize the Mayor and City Council of Cumberland, Maryland, to borrow the sum of One ⁷⁴ Hundred and Fifty Thousand ($150,000.00) Dollars and to issue Coupon Bonds for payment of the same to be known as ‘Water Improvement Bonds of 1939,’ and to sell the same and to use the proceeds thereof for the purpose of paying expenses incident to the construction of a ‘Cross-Town Water Line,’ and to provide for payment of said Bonds and the interest thereon and declaring this to be an emergency law.” Section 3 of the above Act in part provides: “And be it further enacted, That upon the sale of said bonds or any part thereof, the proceeds thereof shall be placed in a separate fund and used by the Mayor and City Council for the purpose of paying any expenses of any kind incurred by it in connection with the construction of a ‘Cross-Town Water Line,’ and other necessary purposes heretofore or hereafter affecting the water supply of the City of Cumberland, and for no other purpose or purposes.” As indicated by its title,,the above Act authorizes the Mayor and City Council of Cumberland to borrow the sum of one hundred and fifty thousand ($150,000) dollars and to issue and sell coupon bonds in that amount for the purpose of making certain improvements to the existing water system of the city; and, in pursuance of the authority conferred by the Act, Ordinance No. 1689 was passed by the Mayor and City Council of Cumberland, providing for the issue and sale of the bonds. That ordinance, in substance, authorizes the issue of bonds to the extent of $150,000, the same to be known as “Water Improvement Bonds of 1939”; limits the interest rate to be paid on the indebtedness; fixes the denomination in which the bonds shall be issued; provides for the manner in which they shall be offered for sale, and the ways and means by which a sinking fund for their redemption will be established, and their ultimate payment effected. Section 3 of the ordinance, among other things, provides: “That upon the sale of said bonds or any part thereof, the proceeds thereof shall be placed in a separate fund and used by the Mayor and City Council for ⁷⁵ the purpose of paying any expenses of any kind incurred by it in connection with the construction of a ‘CrossTown Water Line,’ and other necessary purposes heretofore or hereafter affecting the water supply of the City of Cumberland, and for no other purpose or purposes * * In pursuance of the authority vested in it by the Act, and by the ordinance to which references have been made, on May 8th, 1939, at a regular meeting of the City Council of Cumberland, duly called and held, bids were received for one hundred and thirty thousand ($130,000) dollars, par value, of the bonds so authorized; the highest bid received and the one accepted being from George M. Farris & Company, Inc., of Washington, D. C. According to the allegations of the bill of complaint, and as admitted by the answer filed in the case, the successful bid was submitted and the bonds purchased “upon condition that they be approved as to legality by counsel of its own choosing,” and it is further alleged and admitted, “that said purchaser having purchased said bonds upon condition that they be approved as to legality by counsel of its own choosing, has declined to accept said bonds, according to its contract of purchase, for the reason that counsel for said purchaser have advised said purchaser that they have serious doubts whether said Act of Assembly is valid authority for the issuance of said bonds, since the title of said Act is inadequate in that it misrepresents the purposes set forth in the body of said Act, in violation of the provisions of Section 29 of Article 3 of the Constitution of the State of Maryland which requires that the subject of a statute shall be described in its title.” Specifically, it is averred that the title of said Act states that the proceeds of the sale of said bonds are to be used for the purpose of paying expenses incident to the construction of a Cross-Town Water Line, only; but that as will appear by reference to section 3 of the Act, the Mayor and City Council of Cumberland is authorized to use said proceeds for the purpose of paying any ex ⁷⁶ penses of any kind incurred by it in connection with the construction of a Cross-Town Water Line, and also for “other necessary purposes heretofore or hereafter affecting the water supply of the City of Cumberland.” And that, as set forth in the ordinance passed by it, it is the purpose of the Mayor and City Council to use the proceeds of the sale of the bonds, not only for the construction of the Cross-.Town Water Line, but also for other necessary purposes affecting the entire water supply of the city, whether the necessity existed prior to the passage of the Act, or afterwards develops.

The question as to the validity- of the Act is raised by a resident taxpayer and water consumer of the City of Cumberland, who filed the bill of complaint against the Mayor and City Council of Cumberland, a municipal corporation, and the Mayor of the city and certain other designated officials, praying an injunction to restrain the said officials from issuing said bonds and consummating the sale thereof. The answer of the city admits all allegations of fact contained in the bill of complaint, but, nevertheless, denies all allegations found therein tending to challenge the constitutionality or validity of the Act. The case was submitted below upon bill, answer, exhibits and an agreed statement of facts, and from a decree dismissing the bill of complaint this appeal was taken. While, as observed by the learned chancellor at the hearing below: “No statement of facts can be received to contest the question of law involved in the construction of the Act, the statement as a whole can be received or accepted as supplemental to or amplifying the allegations of both bill and answer.” As thus amplified, the record shows that the Mayor and City Council of Cumberland, Maryland, owns and operates a municipal water system, through which it supplies water to the inhabitants of the city, its industries and places of business, and likewise supplies water in adjacent suburban communities.

That the source of ⁷⁷ the supply of water for the city’s system is located in Evitt’s Creek, Pennsylvania, where the city owns and operates, through the Evitt’s Creek Water Company, two large impounding dams. That the water is piped through a large concrete conduit which connects the source of supply with a storage reservoir, known as Fort Hill Reservoir, located at Cumberland, and that from Fort Hill Reservoir lateral water lines extend in and across the city. It is further shown that the reservoir was constructed in 1912, and is located at the extreme eastern edge of the city. In 1920, the facilities and storage capacity of the Fort Hill Reservoir became overtaxed, and the water system of the city was augmented by the construction of an additional storage reservoir, known as the Ridgedale Reservoir, located on the extreme western edge of the city.

Since 1920, the latter reservoir has been stored with water which first passed through the Fort Hill Reservoir, and reached it through a lateral pipe line which lacked the capacity necessary for a balanced supply of water between the two sections of the city. The purpose of the Act now under consideration, therefore, is to authorize the Mayor and City Council of the city to borrow sufficient money to enable it to correct the above situation, by constructing a twenty-four-inch water main across the city; the primary plan being to tap the large concrete conduit before it connects with Fort Hill Reservoir, and supply the Ridgedale Reservoir with a greater and more direct flow of water, through the instrumentality of an adequate main line. It is also the purpose of the city authorities to connect the CrossTown Water Line with lateral lines now laid in the section of the city through which the proposed main line will pass; and in some cases, it is conceded that, in order to join these lateral lines with the proposed Cross-Town Line, it will be necessary to.extend them at different points; the extensions varying in length from 200 to 800 feet, and it being intended that the cost of such exten ⁷⁸ sions be paid out of the proceeds of the proposed bond issue. Counsel for the appellant, in their brief, conceded that both the title and the body of the Act deal with