Hof v. State

MOYLAN, Judge. This appeal poses a most basic question: Does there even exist such a thing as a law of confessions? Or is it the case that there are, rather, many laws of confessions? Be the law of confessions single or multiple, the burden is, in any event, indisputably on the State to satisfy the trial judge in the first instance that a challenged confession is admissible.

It is a legitimate and increasingly popular defense strategy to exploit that allocation of the burden by constructing as arduous an obstacle course as possible for the State to negotiate. In pursuit of that strategy, the resourceful defense attorney may well challenge a proffered confession, giving as grounds therefor: 1) that it did not satisfy the common law requirement of voluntariness; 2) that it did not satisfy the general due process requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment; 3) that it did not satisfy the parallel due process requirement of Article 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights; 4) that it did not respect the defendant’s Fifth Amendment’s privilege against compelled self-incrimination; 5) that it did not respect the defendant’s parallel privilege under Article 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights; 6) that it did not abide by the constitutionally imposed implementing rules of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and 7) that it did not guarantee the assistance of counsel secured by the Sixth Amendment. ²⁴⁶ Having designed such a multi-layered defense in depth, the defense attorney may then sit back and watch. Somewhere in the course of its Herculean labors, the State may fail to clear a barrier. A more likely scenario is that somewhere along the way, the State or the judge may neglect even to notice the presence of a hurdle.

The strategy is legitimate. The mischief, of course, is that some of the proposed hurdles may turn out to be redundant. The trial may trip over an obstacle that should never have been in its path. Just as it is the adversarial prerogative to lay a procedural mine field, it is the appellate responsibility to clear the ground of gratuitous hazards.

The law should vigilantly guard against needless proliferation of ultimately indistinguishable rules, tests, doctrines, and burdens. The law need not suffer two or three explanations for two or three seemingly different phenomena to remain in the field if it can construct a single explanation for what are but specific instances of the same general phenomenon. For those who mold the law, an ongoing mission should be to eliminate clutter whenever possible by reducing to the lowest common denominator — by searching constantly for a unified field theory. This is the challenge set for us by. the appellant’s first contention in the present case.

Lest the hypothetical obstacle course suggested above be dismissed as unrealistic, we draw attention to the omnibus gauntlet tossed down before the trial judge by the appellant here: “Well, I am alleging all of the grounds, your Honor. The violation of the Maryland Confession Law, Article 27, Declaration of Rights, 5th and 14th Amendments and Miranda.” The appellant, Robert Alan Hof, was convicted by a Baltimore County jury, presided over by Judge Leonard S. Jacobson, of armed robbery and a related handgun offense. He raises, inter alia, the contention that Judge Jacobson erroneously failed to instruct the jury adequately on the subject of the common law voluntariness of a confession. ²⁴⁷ Stating the Problem At a pretrial suppression hearing, Judge Jacobson had ruled that the confession was admissible. At trial, the jury was informed of the circumstances surrounding the taking of the confession.

At the close of the case, Judge Jacobson instructed the jury as to what it must find to determine for itself the acceptability of the confession. The first part of that instruction covered the giving of the familiar Miranda warnings and the waiver thereof: “You’ve also heard evidence that the defendant confessed that he committed the crime with which he is charged or the crimes with which he is charged. You are instructed that you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was clearly advised of each of his rights before making a confession while in custody and while undergoing interrogation; otherwise, you are to disregard the alleged confession. The defendant must have been specifically advised that he has a right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney during any questioning and that, if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning, if he so desires.

You must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant understood his rights and knowingly and willingly waived his rights prior to making a confession.” Judge Jacobson then turned to the closely intertwined concepts of 1) the confession’s being voluntary 2) by virtue of the Miranda waiver’s being voluntary. He concluded with the admonition that the State’s proof of the voluntariness of the confession had to satisfy the jury beyond a reasonable doubt: “The fact that warnings were given does not automatically render a subsequent confession valid. The defendant must have knowingly and intelligently waived his rights. If such a waiver was not made, a confession made during custodial investigation is not a voluntary one.

If you have a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant was properly ad ²⁴⁸ vised of his rights and waived or gave up those rights, then you must not consider the confession as part of the evidence in arriving at your , verdict. And the burden is on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged confession was freely and voluntarily made” (emphasis supplied). The appellant was not satisfied. He requested a further instruction cataloging an assortment of factors that might bear on voluntariness: “And tell them what they have to consider — the length of time the defendant was questioned, physical and mental condition, period of time that elapsed between being advised, other persons present at the time of making the alleged confessions, all the other circumstances surrounding, including the age, background, education, experience, intelligence.

And then say that the burden is on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was freely and voluntarily made and without any threats, implied or direct, and that it’s not voluntary if there’s any inducement or promises of leniency, and unless this is done, that it must be disregarded.” The thrust of the appellant’s argument is that for a confession to be admissible, it must satisfy not only the dictates of Miranda v. Arizona, but also the demands of common law voluntariness. Thus far, of course, the appellant is right. The more pertinent question, however, is whether in the. context of custodial interrogation, the satisfaction of Miranda does not, ipso facto, satisfy the requirements, of common law voluntariness in the process. The procedural obligation to touch all the bases does not include an obligation to touch third base twice.

Reducing the Field To answer that question, it is necessary to make several comparisons. As we prepare to make those comparisons, it will be helpful if we reduce some of the clutter. A challenge to a confession in Maryland today could theoretically be made ²⁴⁹ on any of at least seven ostensibly different grounds. It could be alleged that there was a failure to satisfy: 1.

Common law voluntariness (applicable in Maryland) 2. Due process under the federal Fourteenth Amendment 3. Due process under Article 23, Maryland Declaration of Rights 4. The Fifth Amendment privilege not to be compelled to be a witness against oneself 5.

The privilege against compelled self-incrimination under Article 22, Maryland Declaration of Rights 6. The judicially devised implementing rules of Miranda v. Arizona 7. The right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment 1 To what extent are those seven criteria no more than different ways of testing the same thing, on the one hand, or ways of testing quite different things, on the other hand? At the outset, we can eliminate from any further comparison the challenge to a confession based upon the Sixth Amendment’s right to the assistance of counsel.

It is unique. It possesses virtually no overlap with any of the other grounds for challenging a confession. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2204 , 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991). It has its own triggering mechanism (the fact of accusation).

Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 , 97 S.Ct. 1232 , 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 , 106 S.Ct. 1135 , 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986); Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 , 110 S.Ct. 2394 , 110 L.Ed.2d 243 (1990). It is indifferent to whether the ²⁵⁰ suspect being questioned is or is not in custody. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 , 106 S.Ct. 477 , 88 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 , 100 S.Ct. 2183 , 65 L.Ed.2d 115 (1980). It may be violated by the most voluntary of confessions under the most noncompelling of circumstances.

Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 , 84 S.Ct. 1199 , 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964). It is, truly, sui generis. We may also eliminate from any further comparison, for a very different reason, challenges to a confession based on either Article 23 or Article 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. As a practical matter, they are never used.

Substantively, moreover, they are redundantly coterminous with their federal counterparts. Article 23 is Maryland’s due process clause, notwithstanding its more archaic usage of “the Law of the Land.” Numerous cases over the decades have held Article 23 to be in pari materia with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (and, incidentally, with the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment as well). Balto. Belt R.R. v. Baltzell, 75 Md. 94 , 23 A. 74 (1891); Solvuca v. Ryan & Reilly Co., 131 Md. 265 , 101 A. 710 (1917); Oursler v. Tawes, 178 Md. 471 , 13 A.2d 763 (1940); Anne Arundel County Commrs. v. English, 182 Md. 514 , 35 A.2d 135 (1943) overruled on other grounds, Weaver v. Prince George’s County, 281 Md. 349, 363 , 379 A.2d 399 (1977); Colgan v. Bd. of County Commrs., 21 Md.App. 331 , 320 A.2d 82 (1974).

We are aware of no case that has actually utilized Article 23 as the basis for determining the admissibility of a challenged confession in Maryland. Although there is no theoretical reason why it is not available as a basis for challenge, it is coterminous with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is, therefore, clear that the fortunes of a confession would rise or fall under Article 23 precisely as they would under the Fourteenth Amendment. Article 22 is Maryland’s privilege against compelled self-incrimination.

It also, over the decades, has been held to be in pari materia with its federal counterpart, the Fifth Amend ²⁵¹ ment privilege against being compelled to be a witness against oneself. Blum v. State, 94 Md. 375, 382-383 , 51 A. 26 (1902); Bass v. State, 182 Md. 496, 500-501 , 35 A.2d 155 (1943); Adams v. State, 202 Md. 455, 460-463 , 97 A.2d 281 (1953), rev’d on other grounds, 347 U.S. 179 , 74 S.Ct. 442 , 98 L.Ed. 608 (1954); Brown v. State, 233 Md. 288, 296 , 196 A.2d 614 (1964); State v. Panagoulis, 253 Md. 699, 707 , 253 A.2d 877 (1969). We are aware of no case that has actually utilized Article 22 as the basis for determining the admissibility of a challenged confession in Maryland. Although, as in the case of Article 23, there is no theoretical reason why it is not available as a basis for challenge, it is coterminous with the Fifth Amendment privilege now binding on the states.

It is, therefore, clear that the fortunes of a confession would rise or fall under Article 22 precisely as they would under the Fifth Amendment. For purposes of present analysis, then, our field of study is reduced to four objects: 1. Common law voluntariness 2. Fourteenth Amendment due process 3.

Fifth Amendment privilege 4. The implementing rules of Miranda v. Arizona A Tentative Further Reduction As a temporary facilitation, we may reduce the field of study yet further by placing to the side, for the moment at least, Miranda v. Arizona. The other three standards— common law voluntariness, due process, and the privilege against compelled self-incrimination — protect basic liberties deeply imbedded in the Anglo-American tradition. Miranda , on the other hand, is, by its own terms, an expedient, serving a need until some equally effective means of implementation should be developed.

It is a set of judicially created rights, warnings, and advisements, having no inherent vitality of their own but designed to implement something else that does have independent vitality. Again, by its own express terms, Miranda is designed to implement the Fifth Amendment privi ²⁵² lege against being compelled to be a witness against oneself. It does not, to be sure, implement that privilege in all circumstances. It is fashioned, rather, to implement the privilege only in the special circumstance of custodial interrogation, a special circumstance, to be sure, of broad concern to the criminal law.

If it should be the case that common law voluntariness and Fourteenth Amendment due process are distinct, in terms of their ultimate content, from the Fifth Amendment privilege, Miranda does not pretend to implement them, even in the circumstance of custodial interrogation. If, on the other hand, our comparison should reveal that the common law voluntariness requirement, the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause, and the Fifth Amendment privilege are but three different ways of expressing the same protection, then the implementation of one of them in the setting of custodial interrogation would, ipso facto, implement them all in that setting. What, then, is the relationship, if any, among common law voluntariness, Fourteenth Amendment due process, and the Fifth Amendment privilege? The Common Source The common source of all Anglo-American law — common law and constitutional law alike — regulating the admissibility of challenged confessions is the English common law on the subject, which began developing in the early 1600’s and began taking on many of its present characteristics in the latter part of the 1700’s.

Dean Wigmore traces the history of confession law in III Wigmore on Evidence §§ 817-820d, at 291-308 (Chadbourne Rev.1970) (hereinafter Wigmore). After describing how confessions were generally admitted with little question during the 1600’s and up to the middle of the 1700’s, Wigmore notes a sea change in attitude illustrated by Rudd’s Case, 1 Leach Cr.C. 115, 118, 168 Eng.Rep. 160, 161 (1775) and Rex v. Warickshall, 1 Leach Cr.C. 263, 265, 168 Eng.Rep. 234, 234-235 (1783). ²⁵³ In Rudd’s Case, Lord Mansfield observed, “The instance has frequently happened, of persons having made confessions under threats or promises: the consequence as frequently has been, that such examinations and confessions have not been made use of against them on their trial.” Wigmore notes, at 297, that in Rex v. Warickshall, “the modern rule received a full and clear expression, and confessions not entitled to credit because of the promises or the threats by which they had been obtained were declared inadmissible in evidence.” In Rex v. Warickshall, 1 Leach Cr.C. at 263-264, Baron Eyre had observed: “[A] confession forced from the mind by the flattery of hope, or by the torture of fear, comes in so questionable a shape when it is to be considered as the evidence of guilt, that no credit ought to be given to it.” Between the latter part of the 18th Century and the middle years of the 19th Century, one further change occurred. It did not, however, affect the criteria for admissibility. The change was in the undergirding rationale for excluding involuntary confessions.

During the earlier period, that exclusion had been based exclusively on the notion that a confession induced by threats or promises was likely to be untrustworthy. By the middle of the 19th Century, however, the English and American courts alike acknowledged that involuntary confessions would be excluded because of their involuntary character alone, quite aside from any question of whether they were untrustworthy. Although Wigmore was critical of the change in rationale, he described the controlling criterion: “Thus by the middle of the 1800s the phrase came to be regarded, by many judges, as sufficient in itself; and the test was frequently laid down that any threat or promise, any fear or hope, would exclude a confession made in consequence of it — that is, would exclude the confession irrespective of any attempt to measure its influence to cause a false confession.” (emphasis in original). Wigmore § 825, at 346.

In addition to citing numerous English cases, Wigmore quoted from the two leading authorities on the Law of Evi ²⁵⁴ dence in the early 19th Century: Starkie, 2 Evidence 48-49 (1824) and Phillipps, Evidence 11 (1814). McCormick on Evidence § 146, at 372 (E.W. Cleary 3d ed. 1984) (hereinafter McCormick), retraces the same history and arrives at the same verdict. Before turning to what he calls “the federal ‘constitutionalization’ of the voluntariness requirement,” which caused the same standard at the state level to suffer an inevitable academic and judicial neglect, he notes the near universal acceptance of the common law standard of voluntariness: “In most if not all jurisdictions the requirement of voluntariness became and probably remains a mandate of nonconstitutional evidence law.” W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 6.2, at 264 (1985), describes the common law voluntariness test: “[I]t became more common for the courts simply to ask whether the confession had been made ‘voluntarily,’ that is, without certain improper inducements. These included actual or threatened physical harm, a promise not to prosecute, a promise to provide lenient treatment upon conviction, and deceptive practices so extreme that they might have produced a false confession.” This general common law on the voluntariness of confessions was first received in Maryland in 1873 in Nicholson v. State, 38 Md. 140 (1873), and was first received by the Supreme Court, eleven years later, in Hopt v. People of Terr, of Utah, 110 U.S. 574 , 4 S.Ct. 202 , 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884).

It is the intention of this opinion to show that both Maryland in 1873 and the Supreme Court in 1884 received and accepted precisely the same common law test with respect to the voluntariness of confessions. The Federal Reception The first occasion the Supreme Court had to consider a challenge to the admissibility of a confession was in Hopt v. Utah. It adopted as its standard the general common law of evidence in that regard. It quoted with approval Baron Eyre ²⁵⁵ in Rex v. Wanckshall, one of the key authorities relied on by Wigmore in describing the common law as it had by then developed.

In addition to 1 Greenleaf, Evidence § 215 and 1 Archibald, Criminal Pleading 125, the Supreme Court relied upon the early English masters later cited in Wigmore: Starkie, Evidence 73 and 1 Phillips, Evidence 533-534. A key authority utilized by the Supreme Court, and also relied on heavily in the early Maryland cases, was Baron Parke in Regina v. Baldry, 2 Denison Cr.C. 428, 443 (1852). The Supreme Court clearly utilized the standard common law test of voluntariness, as it recited: “So far as witness knew, the bill of exceptions states ‘the confession was voluntary and uninfluenced by hopes of reward or fear of punishment; he held out no inducement, and did not know of any inducement being held out to defendant to confess.’ This was all the evidence showing or tending to show that the confession was voluntary or uninfluenced by hope of reward or fear of punishment.” Hopt, 110 U.S. at 584 , 4 S.Ct. at 207 . The Court stated that a “confession, if freely and voluntarily made, is evidence of the most satisfactory character,” Id., but then pointed out that a confession would not be received in evidence if it “appears to have been made either in consequence of inducements of a temporal nature, held out by one in authority, touching the charge preferred, or because of a threat or promise by or in the presence of such person, which, operating upon the fears or hopes of the accused, in reference to the charge, deprive him of that freedom of will or self-control essential to make his confession voluntary within the meaning of the law.” Hopt, 110 U.S. at 585 , 4 S.Ct. at 207 .

The Supreme Court found the confession in that case “to be voluntary.” It is undisputed that the test adopted by the Supreme Court was the general common law test of voluntariness. McCormick, at 372, characterizes Hopt v. Utah as having done just that: “In its first confession case, Hopt v. Utah, the Supreme Court of the United States accepted — apparently as a mat ²⁵⁶ ter of federal evidence law governing the conduct of criminal trials in federal court — the well-developed, common law requirement of voluntariness.” (footnote omitted) (emphasis supplied). To the same effect, see Note, Developments in the Law— Confessions, 79 Harv.L.Rev. 935, 959 (1966): “In Hopt v. Utah, the Court affirmed a murder conviction resting in part on a challenged confession. Relying on Regina v. Baldry and several text writers, it held the confession ‘voluntary within the meaning of the law,’ and therefore admissible, because not given ‘in consequence of inducements of a temporal nature, held out by one in authority, touching the charge preferred, or because of a threat or promise by or in the presence of such person....” (footnote omitted) (emphasis supplied).

Saltzburg, American Criminal Procedure 410 (1980), described the action of the Supreme Court in Hopt v. Utah: “It explicitly recognized that there was a common law rule prohibiting the use of confessions obtained by inducements, promises and threats. Because of their inherent unreliability, such confessions were not admitted into evidence. The same desire to prevent erroneous convictions led the Court to cite treatises on evidence and to follow the common law rule. ” (emphasis supplied). In the wake of Hopt v. Utah, the Supreme Court continued to use common law voluntariness as its test for the admissibility of a confession.

In Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 55 , 15 S.Ct. 273, 275 , 39 L.Ed. 343 (1895), the Supreme Court held that several confessions were admissible because they were “entirely free and voluntary, uninfluenced by any hope of reward or fear of punishment.” The Court there relied on Hopt v. Utah, Regina v. Baldry, and Rex v. Warickshall. See also Pierce v. United States, 160 U.S. 355 , 16 S.Ct. 321 , 40 L.Ed. 454 (1896); Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 623 , 16 S.Ct. 895, 899 , 40 L.Ed. 1090 (1896) (“[T]he true test of admissibility is that the confession is made freely, voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement of any sort.”). ²⁵⁷ What the Supreme Court was utilizing as of 1884 was indisputably the general common law as to voluntariness, which had developed in England between 1775 and 1850 and the history of which has been thoroughly chronicled by Wig-more. The Maryland Reception A. 1873-1936: In receiving the English common law on the required voluntariness of a confession, Maryland preceded the Supreme Court by eleven years. In affirming the decision of a trial judge to admit a confession, Nicholson v. State, 38 Md. 140, 153 (1873), articulated for the first time in this state the general common law test for admissibility: “[I]t is very clear upon all the authorities, that if the confession of the appellant had been induced by any threat of harm, or promise of worldly advantage held out to him ..., it ought to be excluded.” The Court of Appeals went on to point out that the law was also well settled that the burden was upon the prosecutor to show that the confession “was not made in consequence of an improper inducement.” Id.

The relatively summary adoption by Maryland of this general principle cited only as its authorities the opinion of Baron Parke in Regina v. Warringham, 2 Denison Cr.C. 447 (1851), and 1 Taylor § 796. (Judge Pitt Taylor was a widely recognized English authority on the Law of Evidence, whose first edition was published in 1848 and whose work ultimately went through no less than eleven editions.) In P. Taylor, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence, as Administered in England and Ireland (with illustrations from the American and other foreign laws) § 796, at 777-778 (6th ed. 1872), both the common law test of voluntariness and the allocation of the burden of proof with respect to it were well stated: “Before any confession can be received in evidence in a criminal case, it must be shown to have been voluntarily made; for, to adopt the somewhat inflated language of Chief ²⁵⁸ Baron Eyre, ‘a confession, forced from the mind by the flattery of hope, or by the torture of fear, comes in so questionable a shape, when it is to be considered as the evidence of guilt, that no credit ought to be given to it; and therefore it is rejected.’ The material question, consequently, is, whether the confession has been obtained by the influence of hope or fear; and the evidence to this point, being in its nature preliminary, is, as we have seen, addressed to the judge, who will require the prosecutor to show affirmatively, to his satisfaction, that the statement was not made under the influence of an improper inducement, and who, in the event of any doubt subsisting on this head, will reject the confession.” (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original). Wigmore, in the monumental third edition, cites Nicholson v. State, as one of a dozen American state decisions utilizing the absence of a “threat or promise” as a measuring rod for common law voluntariness. 3 Wigmore on Evidence § 826 at n. 2 (1940). It also cites as an example the Supreme Court decision of Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613 , 16 S.Ct. 895 , 40 L.Ed. 1090 (1896), confirming that Maryland and the Supreme Court were, indeed, both utilizing the same English common law test.

Fourteen years after the Nicholson decision, the Court of Appeals next utilized the common law test for voluntariness in Biscoe v. State, 67 Md. 6 , 8 A. 571 (1887). It cited as its authority not only the Nicholson decision but also the prominent English decision of Regina v. Baldry, 2 Denison Cr.C. 428 (1852), a case referred to frequently by Wigmore in its analysis of the common law test. The case of Regina v. Warringham, which had been relied on by Nicholson , was, indeed, a summary decision published as an addendum to Regina v. Baldry simply because of the references to it in Regina v. Baldry. Regina v. Baldry was also replete "with references to Judge Pitt Taylor and his work on evidence, also one of the authorities relied on by Nicholson.

Biscoe v. State additionally relied on the English decision of Regina v. Garner, 2 Carr. & K. 920, a decision that received a full discussion ²⁵⁹ in Regina v. Baldry. Two other authorities on which Biscoe prominently relied were Rex v. Kingston, 4 Car. & P. 387 (1830) and Rex v. Partridge, 7 Car. & P. 551 (1836), both of which were cited by Dean Wigmore in his description of the common law test. In Biscoe, 67 Md. at 7 , 8 A. 571 , the statement of the rule was in full accord with the general common law version of the rule: “Now all agree that a confession is not admissible in evidence against the prisoner, unless it was freely and voluntarily made. There is no difficulty in regard to the rule itself, the trouble is in the application of the rule to the facts of each particular case, that is, whether it was a free and voluntary confession, or whether it was procured by the influence of another under a hope of favor or advantage if made, or fear of harm or disadvantage of some kind if withheld.” Ross v. State, 67 Md. 286 , 10 A. 218 (1887) and Rogers v. State, 89 Md. 424 , 43 A. 922 (1899), were routine applications of the common law test, citing only Nicholson and Biscoe as their authorities.

Young v. State, 90 Md. 579 , 45 A. 531 (1900) was also a routine application, but in addition to its reliance on Biscoe, Ross, and Rogers , it also cited as authority Regina v. Baldry, and, significantly, Pierce v. United States, 160 U.S. 355 , 16 S.Ct. 321 , 40 L.Ed. 454 (1896), one of the Supreme Court’s applications of the common law test. Green v. State, 96 Md. 384, 386 , 54 A. 104 (1903), expressed the voluntariness test in slightly different words without altering in any respect the content: “The law imposes the condition, upon the admitting of [confessions] in evidence, that they be not induced by threats or by promise of advantage to be derived from making them; and the burden of showing affirmatively that they were not so induced to be made in any given case is upon the prosecutor. Nicholson v. State, 38 Md. 140 .” Watts v. State, 99 Md. 30, 35-36 , 57 A. 542 (1904), is interesting not so much because it reversed a conviction for ²⁶⁰ the failure of the State to prove that the confession in issue was “freely and voluntarily made” but for the authorities it cites. In addition to routine reliance on Green v. State from the year before and on Nicholson , it quoted, with approval, Baron Parke in Regina v. Warringham, 2 Denison Cr.C. 448, and then, for the first time in Maryland law, cited as authority for the common law test in Maryland the then recent Supreme Court decision of Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 , 18 S.Ct. 183 , 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897).

From 1906 through 1936, when the Supreme Court in Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 , 56 S.Ct. 461 , 80 L.Ed. 682 (1936), first used the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to review a challenged confession in a conviction coming from a state court, Maryland continued to apply the common law test of voluntariness without altering it in any way. Birkenfeld v. State, 104 Md. 253 , 65 A. 1 (1906); Toomer v. State, 112 Md. 285, 292 , 76 A. 118 (1910); Deems v. State, 127 Md. 624, 630 , 96 A. 878 (1916); Cothron v. State, 138 Md. 101 , 113 A. 620 (1921); Robinson v. State, 138 Md. 137 , 113 A. 641 (1921); Dobbs v. State, 148 Md. 34, 58-61 , 129 A. 275 (1925); Rosin v. State, 153 Md. 431, 440-441 , 138 A. 338 (1927); Carey v. State, 155 Md. 474, 477 , 142 A. 497 (1928). During that period, the most interesting case, for present purposes, was McCleary v. State, 122 Md. 394, 401 , 89 A. 1100 (1914), for its citation of Sparfv. United States, 156 U.S. 51 , 15 S.Ct. 273 , 39 L.Ed. 343 (1895) and Pierce v. United States, 160 U.S. 355 , 16 S.Ct. 321 , 40 L.Ed. 454 (1896), as authority for the common law test in Maryland.

Those were cases applying the common law test as adopted by the Supreme Court in Hopt v. Utah. In discussing the burden upon the State of “showing that a confession of crime has not. been obtained by improper means, that it is the voluntary action [of the suspect], uninduced by hope of favor or fear of harm,” McCleary cited five cases as authority: the four earlier Maryland decisions of Nicholson, Green, Watts, and Toomer , and the Supreme Court decision of Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 , 18 S.Ct. 183 , 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897). ²⁶¹ If we belabor this early history of confession law and the frequent cross-references among the English cases, the academic authorities, the Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeals, it is to underscore the point that the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals had both adopted and were both applying precisely the same English common law. B. 1936-1966: It was in 1936 that the Supreme Court for the first time undertook to review the issue of challenged confessions in convictions coming out of the state courts. Brown v. Mississippi 297 U.S. 278 , 56 S.Ct. 461 , 80 L.Ed. 682 (1936), utilized the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to reverse a conviction resting in significant measure on a coerced confession.

The Due Process Clause, of course, is, by its very terms, binding on the states. During the twenty-eight years that followed, through the decision of Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 , 83 S.Ct. 1336 , 10 L.Ed.2d 513 (1963), the Supreme Court decided thirty-five cases involving challenged confessions that had been admitted in trials in the state courts. Notwithstanding the arrival of a new constitutional standard on the field, for more than a decade following Brown v. Mississippi Maryland continued to rely exclusively upon common law voluntariness without so much as mentioning the Due Process Clause. Markley v. State, 173 Md. 309 , 196 A. 95 (1938) ; Wright v. State, 177 Md. 230, 235-236 , 9 A.2d 253 (1939) ; Lubinski v. State, 180 Md. 1 , 22 A.2d 455 (1941); Taylor v. State, 187 Md. 306 , 49 A.2d 787 (1946); Jones v. State, 188 Md. 263, 268 , 52 A.2d 484 (1947); Cox v. State, 192 Md. 525, 532-537 , 64 A.2d 732 (1949).

Hammond v. State, 174 Md. 347, 354-355 , 198 A. 704 (1938), not only looked to all of its predecessor Maryland decisions on the subject of voluntariness but nostalgically reinvoked the old English stalwart of Regina v. Baldry, 2 Denison Cr.C. 428 (1852). In Smith v. State, 189 Md. 596, 603-604 , 56 A.2d 818 (1948), Judge Gray-son articulated what became thereafter Maryland’s standard definition of the common law voluntariness: ²⁶² “The law regarding the admissibility of a confession has been stated by this court many times. We will restate the rule. Before a confession can be admitted in evidence, the State must show, to the satisfaction of the court, that it was the free and voluntary act of an accused; that no force or coercion was exercised by the officers obtaining the confession, to cause the accused to confess; that no hope or promise was held out to an accused for the purpose of inducing him to confess.” For the next decade, that became the standard definition of common law voluntariness that was regularly quoted with approval in the case law.

Linkins v. State, 202 Md. 212, 222 , 96 A.2d 246 (1953); Glover v. State, 202 Md. 522, 525 , 97 A.2d 321 (1953); Cooper v. State, 205 Md. 162, 168 , 106 A.2d 129 (1954); Kier v. State, 213 Md. 556, 561 , 132 A.2d 494 (1957). The standard statement of the rule then became Abbott v. State, 231 Md. 462, 465 , 190 A.2d 797 (1963): “The rule regarding the admissibility of a confession is that the State must prove that it was freely and voluntarily-given and that it was not the product of force or of a promise, threat or inducement whereby the accused might be led to believe that there would be a partial or total abandonment of prosecution.” The statement from Abbott was quoted verbatim in Bean v. State, 234 Md. 432, 439 , 199 A.2d 773 (1964), and cited with approval in Combs v. State, 237 Md. 428, 435 , 206 A.2d 718 (1965); Mercer v. State, 237 Md. 479, 484 , 206 A.2d 797 (1965), and Mundell v. State, 244 Md. 91, 93 , 223 A.2d 184 (1966). For the entire three decades between Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 , 56 S.Ct. 461 , 80 L.Ed. 682 (1936), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the time when Fourteenth Amendment due process was the standard by which the Supreme Court assessed the admissibility of confessions in state trials, the overwhelming majority of Maryland appellants did not raise the constitutional claim, although references were frequently made to some of the prominent Supreme Court decisions as persuasive authority. ²⁶³ The vast majority of the Maryland cases were decided exclusively on the basis of common law voluntariness. To be sure, some of the more prominent Supreme Court opinions such as Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 , 65 S.Ct. 781 , 89 L.Ed. 1029 (1945); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 , 68 S.Ct. 302 , 92 L.Ed. 224 (1948); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 , 69 S.Ct. 1347 , 93 L.Ed. 1801 (1949); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 , 69 S.Ct. 1352 , 93 L.Ed. 1810 (1949); Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 , 69 S.Ct. 1354 , 93 L.Ed. 1815 (1949); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 , 80 S.Ct. 274 , 4 L.Ed.2d 242 (1960); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 , 81 S.Ct. 1860 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961), and Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 , 83 S.Ct. 1336 , 10 L.Ed.2d 513 (1963), were periodically cited as persuasive authority in line with the Maryland voluntariness standard.

Throughout the three decades, the Maryland cases assessing common law voluntariness entertained as sweeping and varied a totality of circumstances as did the Supreme Court under the Due Process Clause. Before the 1930’s had waned, the Court of Appeals evaluated voluntariness in Markley v. State, 173 Md. 309, 316-319 , 196 A. 95 (1938) (assurance of secrecy had been offered as an inducement); Hammond v. State,' 174 Md. 347, 354-355 , 198 A. 704 (1938) (low I.Q. of confessing suspect); and Wright v. State, 177 Md. 230, 234-236 , 9 A.2d 253 (1939) (twenty hours of solitary confinement before the confession coupled with the threat of seven years in jail if no confession given). In the 1940’s, common law voluntariness was the basis for decision in Lubinski v. State, 180 Md. 1, 4-8 , 22 A.2d 455 (1941) (inducement of “It will help you a lot”); Taylor v. State, 187 Md. 306, 310-312 , 49 A.2d 787 (1946) (threat of violence and claim of actual beating); Jones v. State, 188 Md. 263, 268-271 , 52 A.2d 484 (1947) (suspect held under arrest and without counsel; threat of mob violence); Smith v. State, 189 Md. 596, 603-606 , 56 A.2d 818 (1948) (claim of threatened beating); and Cox v. State, 192 Md. 525, 531-537 , 64 A.2d 732 (1949) (defendant not taken promptly before committing magistrate). ²⁶⁴ The 1950’s produced a variety of decisions based on the voluntariness standard: White v. State, 201 Md. 489, 491-493 , 94 A.2d 447 (1953) (prolonged interrogation and physical violence over three-day period); Linkins v. State, 202 Md. 212, 218-224 , 96 A.2d 246 (1953) (youth of confessing suspect); Glover v. State, 202 Md. 522, 525-532 , 97 A.2d 321 (1953) (claim of actual violence); Cooper v. State, 205 Md. 162, 167-169 , 106 A.2d 129 (1954) (fear based on earlier threats); Kier v. State, 213 Md. 556, 559-563 , 132 A.2d 494 (1957) (implied threat of physical harm); Merchant v. State, 217 Md. 61, 69-70 , 141 A.2d 487 (1958) (prolonged questioning and admonition to “tell the truth”). Even the truncated decade of the 1960’s prior to the promulgation of Miranda in 1966 was prodigious in its production of decisions based on common law voluntariness: Glaros v. State, 223 Md. 272, 277-278 , 164 A.2d 461 (1960) (general questions about absence of threats, violence, or promises enough to satisfy State’s burden); Presley v. State, 224 Md. 550, 558-562 , 168 A.2d 510 (1961) (denial of telephone call to lawyer); Ralph v. State, 226 Md. 480, 485 , 174 A.2d 163 (1961) (prolonged questioning); Jones v. State, 229 Md. 165, 168-174 , 182 A.2d 784 (1962) (threat to arrest common-law wife); Bryant v. State, 229 Md. 531, 535-536 , 185 A.2d 190 (1962) (suspect under influence of heroin); Miller v. State, 231 Md. 158, 161-162 , 189 A.2d 118 (1963) (absence of counsel); Bagley v. State, 232 Md. 86, 92-94 , 192 A.2d 53 (1963) (confession made while suspect bound or handcuffed); Bean v. State, 234 Md. 432, 439-444 , 199 A.2d 773 (1964) (lack of sleep, food, or drink by fifteen-year-old with I.Q. of 74); Wiggins v. State, 235 Md. 97, 101-103 , 200 A.2d 683 (1964) (alcoholic suspect with delirium tremens); Thiess v. State, 235 Md. 541, 543-544 , 201 A.2d 790 (1964) (denial of telephone call); Combs v. State, 237 Md. 428, 435-436 , 206 A.2d 718 (1965) (intellectual deficiency and emotional imbalance); Mercer v. State, 237 Md. 479, 483-484 , 206 A.2d 797 (1965) (physical abuse); Smith v. State, 237 Md. 573, 580-582 , 207 A.2d 493 (1965) (threat to arrest common-law wife); Streams v. State, 238 Md. 278, 281-282 , 208 A.2d 614 (1965) (promise to take youthful suspect ²⁶⁵ home); Campbell v. State, 240 Md. 59, 61-64 , 212 A.2d 747 (1965) (suspect on painkilling drug); Mundell v. State, 244 Md. 91, 93 , 223 A.2d 184 (1966) (suspect advised of right to silence and right to seek a lawyer).

Beginning by the mid-1940’s, however, the Due Process Clause also made its appearance in the Maryland decisions. Peters and Demby v. State, 187 Md. 7, 14 , 48 A.2d 586 (1946) and Day v. State, 196 Md. 384, 396-398 , 76 A.2d 729 (1950), were two cases that, in discussing the admissibility of confessions, amorphously combined the Maryland voluntariness cases and the federal due process cases with random interchangeability. James v. State, 193 Md. 31, 37-45 , 65 A.2d 888 (1949) , produced a somewhat muddled discussion, mixing recent English and Canadian cases, federal due process cases, federal cases construing a federal statute and the so-called McNabb-Mallory rule, and the prior Maryland cases. Without any clear statement of what law was being applied, the Court of Appeals simply found “no basis for reversing the trial judge’s finding of fact that this confession was voluntary and admissible.” James, 193 Md. at 44 , 65 A.2d 888 .

Grear v. State, 194 Md. 335 , 71 A.2d 24 (1950), was an opinion in which a discussion of Maryland case law was intermingled with the decisions of three Supreme Court due process cases. In the last analysis, the Court of Appeals rejected the defendant’s contention that his confession should not have been received in evidence, essentially holding that the Due Process Clause had not been violated. In Edwards v. State, 194 Md. 387, 391-393 , 71 A.2d 487 (1950) , the Court of Appeals used an essentially due process approach in holding that a confession was not vitiated by the failure of the police to take the suspect promptly before a magistrate. The Court of Appeals, however, utilized common law voluntariness to hold that the confession was admissible.

Edwards, 194 Md. at 396-398 , 71 A.2d 487 . The Court undertook an extensive review of the early English cases and of the earliest Maryland authorities. Interestingly, the one out-of-state authority cited along with the early Maryland ²⁶⁶ cases was the Supreme Court decision of Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 , 18 S.Ct. 183 , 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897), which was not a due process case but one involving the Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Compelled Self-Incrimination. Driver v. State, 201 Md. 25, 29-31 , 92 A.2d 570 (1952), was a decision which, by its very terms, turned upon the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.

Three Supreme Court due process opinions were posited as controlling. The Driver opinion itself, however, went on to rely upon six Maryland voluntariness cases as guidelines in analyzing the federal due process claim. Hyde v. State, 228 Md. 209, 224-226 , 179 A.2d 421 (1962), was a decision that seemed to turn, sub silentio, exclusively on the Due Process Clause. All of the cases cited in the opinion were Supreme Court due process cases.

The literal holding, however, sustained the trial judge “in his finding that the confession was freely and voluntarily made and not coerced.” Hyde, 228 Md. at 224 , 179 A.2d 421 . Perhaps implicit in that holding is that the two standards are the same and it makes no difference which is being technically employed. The random wandering back and forth across the common law voluntariness/federal due process line continued in Grammer v. State, 203 Md. 200, 218-225 , 100 A.2d 257 (1953). No less than five Supreme Court due process cases entered prominently into the analysis.

They were freely mixed with Maryland voluntariness decisions, however, and the bottom-line test was in the familiar language of the common law: “The State must show to the satisfaction of the Court that the confession was a free and voluntary act of the accused and that in obtaining it, there was no force or coercion used and no hope or promise held out as an inducement.” Grammer, 203 Md. at 218 , 100 A.2d 257 . Jackson v. State, 209 Md. 390, 394-395 , 121 A.2d 242 (1956), was an inextricably mixed discussion of Maryland voluntariness opinions and Supreme Court due process opinions. In Hall v. State, 223 Md. 158, 169-172 , 162 A.2d 751 (1960), Supreme Court due process cases were cited at length before ²⁶⁷ the holding that the confessions “were made voluntarily and were obtained without the use of force or violence, threats or coercion (physical or mental) and without holding out or offering any inducements ... therefor.” Hall, 223 Md. at 172 , 162 A.2d 751 . Moreover, the frequently cited articulation of the voluntariness standard by Judge Grayson in Smith v. State, 189 Md. 596, 603-604 , 56 A.2d 818 , was both quoted and set out as the controlling standard.

Hall, 223 Md. at 169 , 162 A.2d 751 . What emerges from the Maryland case law is the unmistakable impression that the decisions in all of those cases would have come out exactly as they did regardless of whether they were analyzed in terms of 1) Fourteenth Amendment Due Process, 2) common law voluntariness, or 3) some undifferentiated combination of them both. The choice of formal doctrinal label, even when such choice was made, turns out to have been a distinction without a difference. The ultimate test of admissibility was the same: “Was the statement free and voluntary, in that it was not the product of force, violence or other coercion and not the product of threats or promises or other inducement?” There was no suggestion in any of the Maryland decisions that the outcome ever hinged on the choice of formal criteria.

Indeed, there was no suggestion that such a formal choice of criteria was even called for, as the opinions roamed casually back and forth among Maryland, federal, and common law authorities and randomly selected pertinent precedents from any of those jurisdictional settings. What Does Miranda Implement? A sea change occurred in 1966 with the promulgation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.E.2d 694 . Miranda did not establish a new standard; it prescribed a uniform and more efficient means for implementing an old standard.

It did so, moreover, not in all circumstances but only in the particular circumstance of custodial interrogation. In any other circumstance, the method for satisfying the old standard remained unchanged. ²⁶⁸ In an effort to streamline the adjudicative process and to eliminate much of the profligate expenditure of time and resources that had theretofor been plaguing the courts under the “totality of circumstances” approach, Miranda first established a bright-line formula. From the very fact of custodial interrogation, the hearing judge must presume the initial presence of Involuntariness/compulsion. Compulsion no longer had to be proved on a case-by-case basis, requiring a look at the multitudinous influences working on each suspect and a look, as well, at the multitudinous internal factors indicative of the resilience or resistance level of each individual suspect.

As a bright-line rule, such compulsion or involuntariness would now be presumed. “Unless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his free choice.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458 , 86 S.Ct. at 1619 (emphasis supplied). “[Wjithout proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 , 86 S.Ct. at 1624 (emphasis supplied). Miranda then established, -with its familiar catechism and attendant waiver requirement, a set of easily administered “litmus paper tests,” which the prosecution would not be permitted to shortcut but which, if satisfied, would dissipate or rebut the presumptive involuntariness/compulsion. If then, in the circumstance of custodial interrogation, Miranda did not simply supplement but fully implemented and protected an undergirding constitutional and/or common law standard, what precisely was the standard thus being implemented? Was it only the Fifth Amendment privilege or did Miranda also implement Fourteenth Amendment due process?

Was there, indeed, any difference between the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment protections? Did, moreover, either or both incorporate common law voluntariness? Would or would not Miranda , when invoked and satisfied, thereby ²⁶⁹ coincidentally protect Maryland’s common law guarantee of voluntariness as well? For something more than a glib seat-of-the-pants answer, we must drop back and trace the development of common law voluntariness following its 1884 implantation on federal soil even as we have traced it following its 1873 implantation on Maryland soil.

The Equation of Common Law Voluntariness With The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Relying totally on the landmark English cases and on the well recognized academic authorities, Hopt v. Utah adopted in 1884, as we have seen, the same common law test of voluntariness that Maryland had adopted in 1873. Sparf v. United States (1895), Pierce v. United States (1896), and Wilson v. United States (1896) followed as routine applications of the common law test. In 1897, however, Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 , 18 S.Ct. 183 , 42 L.Ed. 568 , produced a seismic shift of the tectonic plates, though it did so without rattling in any way the surface test. In terms of basic doctrinal predicates, Bram declared that, as applied to confessions, the Fifth Amendment privilege and the common law voluntariness test were one and the same: “In criminal trials, in the courts of the United States, where-ever a question arises whether a confession is incompetent because not voluntary, the issue is controlled by that portion of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, commanding that no person ‘shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.’ ” Bram, 168 U.S. at 542 , 18 S.Ct. at 187 .

Bram left no doubt that the test of voluntariness, now embodied within the Fifth Amendment privilege, was the traditional common law test of voluntariness. “The legal principle by which the admissibility of the confession of an accused person is to be determined is expressed in the textbooks.” Id. As a statement of the voluntariness test, Bram quoted with approval 3 Russell on Crimes 478 (6th ed.): ²⁷⁰ “But a confession, in order to be admissible, must be free and voluntary: that is, must not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence. A confession can never be received in evidence where the prisoner has been influenced by any threat or promise.” Bram, 168 U.S. at 542-543 , 18 S.Ct. at 187 . Bram observed that “this summary of the law is in harmony with the doctrine as expressed by other writers,” 168 U.S. at 543 , 18 S.Ct. at 187 , citing 1 Greenleaf on Evidence § 219 (15th ed.); Wharton’s Criminal Evidence § 631 (9th ed.); 2 Taylor’s Evidence § 872 (9th ed.) (this was the single textbook relied on by Maryland in Nicholson v. State); 1 Bishop’s New Criminal Procedure, § 1217.

Bram then pointed out that “[t]hese writers but express the result of a multitude of American and English cases.” 168 U.S. at 543 , 18 S.Ct. at 187 . It cited Hopt v. Utah, Sparf v. United States, Pierce v. United States, and Wilson v. United States, its own cases utilizing the common law voluntariness test. Turning to the state cases and “contending itself] with a brief reference to a few leading and well considered cases treating of the subject of inducements, and which are, therefore, apposite to the issue now considered,” Bram, 168 U.S. at 559 , 18 S.Ct. at 193 , the Court in Bram both cited and quoted from Biscoe v. State, 67 Md. 6 , 8 A. 571 (1887). Bram, 168 U.S. at 560 , 18 S.Ct. at 193 .

Bram characterized the Fifth Amendment privilege as “but a crystallization” of the common law voluntariness doctrine: “A brief consideration of the reasons which gave rise to the adoption of the Fifth Amendment, of the wrongs which it was intended to prevent and of the safeguards which it was its purpose unalterably to secure, will make it clear that the generic language of the Amendment was but a crystallization of the doctrine as to confessions, well settled when the Amendment was adopted, and since expressed in the text writers and expounded by the adjudications, and hence that the statements on the subject by the text writers and ²⁷¹ adjudications but formulate the conceptions and commands of the Amendment itself.” (emphasis supplied). 168 U.S. at 543 , 18 S.Ct. at 187 . It recounted how the “well settled nature of the rule in England at the time of the adoption of the constitution and of the Fifth Amendment, and the intimate knowledge had by the framers of the principles of civil liberty which had become a part of the common law, aptly explain the conciseness of the language of that Amendment” and that “the doctrine as to confessions as now formulated embodies the rule existing at common law and embedded in the Fifth Amendment.” 168 U.S. at 548 , 18 S.Ct. at 189 . Among the multitudinous English authorities cited and quoted were Rex v. Kingston, 4 Car. & P. 387 (1830), relied on by Biscoe v. State, 67 Md. 6 , 8 A. 571 (1887), and Regina v. Baldry, 2 Denison Cr.C. 428 (1852), relied on not only by Biscoe v. State but also by Young v. State, 90 Md. 579 , 45 A. 531 (1900) and Hammond v. State, 174 Md. 347 , 198 A. 704 (1938). It is not without significance that, over the decades, the Maryland opinions have looked to Bram as a leading authority on the common law test of voluntariness.

Watts v. State, 99 Md. 30, 36 , 57 A. 542 (1904); McCleary v. State, 122 Md. 394, 399 , 89 A. 1100 (1914); Edwards v. State, 194 Md. 387, 396 , 71 A.2d 487 (1950); Keller v. State, 2 Md.App. 623, 627 n. 1, 236 A.2d 313 (1967); State v. Kidd, 281 Md. 32 , 35 n. 2, 375 A.2d 1105 (1977); Reynolds v. State, 327 Md. 494, 506 , 610 A.2d 782 (1992). The process of cross-referencing and cross-fertilization between the Maryland voluntariness cases and the Supreme Court cases dealing with the amalgamized voluntariness test and Fifth Amendment privilege has been going on continually for ninety-five years. Although Wigmore was skeptical of the historical accuracy of Bram’s analysis, the Supreme Court indisputably equated the Fifth Amendment privilege with common law voluntariness. As stated in McCormick § 147, at 373: “Only thirteen years after Hopt , the Court — in Bram v. United States — commented that whenever in federal criminal trials an issue arises as to the voluntariness of a ²⁷² confession, ‘the issue is controlled by that portion of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, commanding that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” ’ The Amendment, continued the Court, embodied the common law rule of voluntariness.” (footnotes omitted).

Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 , 41 S.Ct. 574 , 65 L.Ed. 1048 (1921), confirmed that the “Fifth Amendment ... protects from extorted confessions.” In excluding an involuntary confession in a federal trial, Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1 , 45 S.Ct. 1 , 69 L.Ed. 131 (1924) was a routine application of the Bram test. See also Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 153 , 75 S.Ct. 194 , 99 L.Ed. 192, 198 (1954). Although in the wake of Bram the Supreme Court opinions dealing with confessions in federal trials were relatively few, they did make very clear their concern with such indirect compulsion as promises and inducements as well as with more obvious compulsion such as threats or violence. Hardy v. United States, 186 U.S. 224 , 22 S.Ct. 889 , 46 L.Ed. 1137 (1902), observed that “statements which are obtained by coercion or threat or promise will be subject to objection.” Hardy, 186 U.S. at 229 , 22 S.Ct. at 891 (emphasis supplied).

The Supreme Court, citing Bram , was able to affirm the conviction before it for review as it held: “Affirmatively and fully it appears that all that he said in the matter was said voluntarily, without any inducement or influence of any kind being brought to bear upon him.” (emphasis supplied). Hardy, 186 U.S. at 230 , 22 S.Ct. at 905 . Although at first glance it might appear difficult to catalogue promises of reward and other affirmative inducements as forms of compulsion, the difference between a promise and a threat is really no more than a word game. The promise to confer a benefit if a confession is forthcoming is, ipso facto, a threat to withhold the benefit if the confession is not forthcoming.

The only difference is one of diplomatic nicety in the ²⁷³ phraseology. A conditional promise is, by definition, a threat in the eventuality the condition is not satisfied. Indeed, as noted in McCormick § 148, at 378: “In many situations, discussions lend themselves to characterization either as a representation that something undesired will occur if a confession is not given or that something desired will occur if the statement is forthcoming. Whether an interrogator’s language will be construed as promising a benefit or as threatening a detriment in such situations is a matter of very subjective choice.” United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36, 41 , 72 S.Ct. 97, 97 , 96 L.Ed. 48 (1951) pointed out that whether the federal exclusionary principle was based on the Fifth Amendment privilege or on common law voluntariness, the standard was the same: “The constitutional test for admission of an accused’s confession in federal courts for a long time has been whether it was made ‘freely, voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement of any sort.’ ” In Shotwell Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 341 , 83 S.Ct. 448 , 9 L.Ed.2d 357 (1963), the petitioners, convicted of income tax evasion, claimed that certain inculpatory evidence should have been suppressed because it was unconstitutionally induced by the Treasury Department’s “voluntary disclosure policy.” The policy was a representation that delinquent taxpayers could escape possible criminal prosecution by disclosing their derelictions before an investigation commenced.

Although denying relief under the circumstances of that case, the Supreme Court made it very clear that the Fifth Amendment privilege guarded not only against “coercion” but against “promises” as well: “We have no hesitation in saying that this principle also reaches evidence of guilt induced from a person under a governmental promise of immunity, and where that is the case such evidence must be excluded under the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Bram v. United States.” ²⁷⁴ Shotwell, 371 U.S. at 347 , 83 S.Ct. at 453. The Court restated the test from Bram : “The controlling test is that approved in Bram : ‘ “a confession, in order to be admissible, must be free and voluntary: that is, ... not ... obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight.” ’ Evidence so procured can no more be regarded as the product of a free act of the accused than that obtained by official physical or psychological coercion.” Shotwell, 371 U.S. at 347-348 , 83 S.Ct. at 453 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court concluded that the “admission into evidence did not offend the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment.” Shotwell, 371 U.S. at 350 , 83 S.Ct. at 454 .

Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 , 90 S.Ct. 1463 , 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970) used Bram and the Fifth Amendment privilege to test the voluntariness of a guilty plea following a plea bargain. After quoting Bram’s command that a “free and voluntary” confession must not be one “obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight,” Brady, 397 U.S. at 753 , 90 S.Ct. at 1471 , the Brady opinion drew a salutary and necessary distinction between a confession given by an uncounseled suspect in a custodial setting and an agreement worked out with the aid of a lawyer in an official setting: “Bram is not inconsistent with our holding that Brady’s plea was not compelled even though the law promised him a lesser maximum penalty if he did not go to trial. Bram dealt with a confession given by a defendant in custody, alone and unrepresented by counsel. In such circumstances, even a mild promise of leniency was deemed sufficient to bar the confession, not because the promise was an illegal act as such, but because defendants at such times are too sensitive to inducement and the possible impact on them too great to ignore and too difficult to assess.

But Bram and its progeny did not hold that the possibly coercive impact of a promise of leniency could not be dissipated by the presence and advice of counsel, any more than Miranda v. Arizona, held that the possibly coercive atmosphere of the ²⁷⁵ police station could not be counteracted by the presence of counsel or other safeguards.” Brady, 397 U.S. at 754 , 90 S.Ct. at 1472 . At this juncture, we note tangentially that in several pages of thoughtful and well considered dicta, Reynolds v. State, 327 Md. 494, 504-507 , 610 A.2d 782 (1992), paved the way for, in an appropriate case, keeping the Maryland voluntariness law similarly up to date. Judge Chasanow’s opinion quoted from Brady v. United States and also cited numerous other authorities for the recognition of the critical difference between the possibly erosive effect of an inducement on the will to resist in an uncounselled, custodial setting and the tactical advantages that a counselled defendant should be entitled, and, indeed, encouraged to pursue in a plea bargaining setting. Without this Brady-Reynolds recognition of the new reality, the very institution of plea bargaining could not survive.

No