Howard v. State

Thompson, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Christine Howard complains that her guilty pleas to shoplifting of goods under the value of $100 and possession of narcotics in a quantity sufficient to indicate an intent to distribute were not voluntary because the trial judge, prior to the acceptance of the plea, erroneously informed her the maximum sentence for both charges was twenty-one and one-half years. The governing statutes authorize, in addition to the stated incarceration, the imposition of monetary fines. Md. Code, Art. 27, § 551A (d) and § 286 (b)(1).

The sentences actually imposed were eighteen months for the ⁴⁶ shoplifting charge and four years for the narcotics violation to run concurrently. In two recent cases we reiterated the rule that the record must show that the accused knew the maximum sentence to which he was subjecting himself before a tendered plea of guilty can be accepted by the trial judge. Gant v. State, 16 Md. App. 382 , 297 A. 2d 327 and Matthews v. State, 15 Md. App. 686 , 292 A. 2d 131 , cert. den. September 19, 1972, 266 Md. 739 .

Without such an affirmative showing it cannot be said that an accused has entered a plea with intelligent understanding. Most other states seem to follow a similar rule. 97 A.L.R.2d 549 . A review of our cases indicates, however, the precise point prescribed in the instant case has not been decided; and we have found very few other cases where an accused was given inaccurate information as to the maximum sentence. In one case the accused was informed the sentences on two charges could be consecutive when the law was to the contrary.

The Court in United States v. Woodall, 438 F. 2d 1317, 1329 (5th Cir. 1970), said: “Although we are unwilling to lay down a per se rule which would hold every form of misinformation as to plea consequences which indicated more rigorous consequences than the law would truly permit could never be considered in an attack on a guilty plea, we do now expressly overrule the prior panel holdings of this court in Stephen and Grant, supra. Isolating all other factors that could influence a defendant in determining to enter a plea of guilty, the court is of the opinion that even if Woodall had been told the district judge could pyramid the maximum sentences under each of the separate counts of the two indictments to which he pled, this factor would not invalidate his plea. The probability such information would have influenced Woodall not to change his plea so far outweighs the possibility that the prospect of stiffer punishment may have caused the change, that we refuse to consider the latter as ⁴⁷ relevant. It is apt to repeat the admonition of Mr. Justice Cardozo in Snyder v. Mass., 291 U. S. 97 , 54 S. Ct. 330 , 78 L. Ed. 674 (1934), ‘There is danger that the criminal law will be brought into contempt * * * if gossamer possibilities of prejudice to a defendant are to nullify a sentence pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction * * * and set the guilty free: 291 U. S. at 122 , 54 S. Ct. at 338 .” (Emphasis added) In that case the Court also referred to the most recent pronouncement by the Supreme Court on the question of guilty pleas, North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U. S. 25 , 91 S. Ct. 160 , 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), saying: “ The standard was and remains whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.” We have found only one case in which the accused was informed that the penalty was less than permitted under the statute, Proffitt v. Cupp, Or.

App. 468 P. 2d 912 , wherein the Court simply stated that the defendant was not prejudiced because the sentence imposed did not exceed that which the petitioner