Witherspoon v. State

Levine, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal is from judgments of conviction in two cases in which the trial judge (Sklar, J.) accepted pleas of guilty entered by appellant. In one case, appellant was charged with rape, assault and battery, and assault with intent to rape; he pleaded guilty to the latter. In the other case, he was charged with assault and battery, larceny, receiving stolen goods, and robbery; he pleaded guilty to the robbery charge.

The court sentenced appellant to a. term of 15 years on the assault with intent to rape conviction and to a term of 10 years on the robbery charge, the two terms to be served consecutively. The charges arose out of an attack upon a blind female passenger who had entered a taxicab occupied by appellant and a male accomplice. The victim had been placed in the taxicab by a companion apparently on the assumption that one of the male occupants was the regular operator of the vehicle, and that the other was either a passenger or a friend of the driver. Actually, the two males had stolen the cab from the parking lot of the owner.

After driving some distance in the cab, the males attacked the passenger, but despite a vicious effort, were unsuccessful in having sexual intercourse with her. They did, however, remove the sum of $22 from her purse. Following his arrest, appellant made a statement to the police in which he admitted being present in the taxicab, but denied participating in the assault or the robbery. A pretrial motion to suppress that statement, bottomed on Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1966), was denied by Judge Sklar.

Following the ruling on the statement, plea bargaining ensued between the prosecutor and counsel for appellant during a recess in the trial. Those negotiations led to the two pleas mentioned earlier. Before the tendered pleas were accepted, however, appellant was closely examined by both ⁵⁶ his attorney and the court. Among the subjects of this inquiry were appellant’s awareness vel non of the constitutional rights at stake in the guilty plea and his understanding of the njaximum sentences which could be imposed in consequence of the two convictions.

Then, the prosecutor made a detailed proffer of what the State would prove to establish the corpus delicti and appellant’s criminal agency. The proceedings concluded with the court’s acceptance of the guilty pleas. Disposition was deferred to a later date so that a presentence report could be obtained. On appeal, these contentions are advanced: 1.

That error was committed because of the State’s failure to make a recommendation at the time of sentencing as required by the plea bargain; and that this was compounded by the failure of the record “to adequately and completely reflect the plea bargain.” 2. That appellant lacked an intelligent understanding of either the nature of the offenses to which he pleaded guilty or the possible consequences of his plea. 3. That error occurred in light of “appellant’s failure to admit the conduct comprising the charge,” his denial of guilt to the police, and the tender of his plea against the advice of counsel. (1) While appellant was being interrogated by his counsel in open court regarding his tendered plea, it became readily apparent — as the record clearly discloses — that the plea of guilty to the assault with intent to rape charge had been offered on the condition that the State would recommend to the court that a maximum sentence of 15 years be imposed on that charge.

It is equally clear from the record that the court was cognizant of this agreement, but cautioned appellant that it was not bound by that recommendation and could impose a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. Moreover, appellant acknowledged that he fully understood the court’s admonition. Also, with respect to the robbery charge, the court was ⁵⁷ aware that the State had agreed to make no recommendation, and drew from appellant an acknowledgment that he understood the maximum punishment for this charge to be 10 years. Finally, the court pointedly stated to appellant that even if it were to abide by the State’s recommendation regarding the assault with intent to rape charge, respective sentences of 15 and 10 years could be imposed consecutively.

In the company of his father and grandmother, appellant expressed his understanding of these possibilities. Notwithstanding the extreme care exercised by the trial court, appellant now complains because the State failed to explicitly recommend that the court impose no more than a 15 years’ sentence on the assault charge. The short answer to this contention is that even if it be assumed that the State failed to make that recommendation, the court became fully aware of the agreement and, though not required to do so, abided by it. Thus, appellant’s heavy reliance on Santobello v. New York, 404 U. S. 257 , 92 S. Ct. 495 , 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971), is seriously misplaced.

There, the prosecutor’s office, despite an agreement to make no recommendation, urged successfully that the maximum penalty of one year be imposed for a gambling violation. Nor is the situation here the same as it was in Miller v. State, 272 Md. 249 , 322 A. 2d 527 (1974), where the state agreed to