Huffman v. Koppers Co. Inc.

HARRELL, Judge. This appeal stems from the finding of the Workers’ Compensation Commission that the heart attack sustained by Roby Huffman after being deposed by his former employer, Koppers Company, Inc., in connection with his claim regarding an earlier compensable injury, was not causally related to that earlier injury and, therefore, was not compensable. Mr. Huffman noted an appeal from that decision to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City (Noel, J.), which granted Koppers Company’s subsequent motion for summary judgment. Mr. Huffman now seeks relief from this Court.

We affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On 20 September 1978, Roby Huffman (the Claimant) injured his right knee while working as a welder for Koppers Company, Inc. (the Employer). He received from the Workers’ Compensation Commission (Commission) a temporary total disability award and, in 1981, a permanent partial disability award for a 25% loss of use of his right leg. The Claimant re-opened his case in 1985, alleging that the condition of his right leg had worsened and that he had developed problems with his left leg that were causally related to ¹⁸³ the original injury.

On 20 November 1985, the Commission found that the Claimant’s right leg had worsened and that the condition of his left leg was causally related to his accident, and awarded him a permanent partial disability compensation for a 55% industrial loss of use of his body. Aggrieved, the Employer appealed the decision to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. During the course of discovery in the appeal, the Employer deposed the Claimant in the early afternoon of 20 September 1988. Approximately twelve hours later, the Claimant was awakened by chest pains.

Shortly thereafter, he was admitted to St. Agnes Hospital, where he was diagnosed as having had a heart attack. Subsequently, the Employer’s appeal was dismissed, although the reason for this is not apparent from the record. In 1990, the Claimant petitioned to re-open his claim under the 1978 injury, alleging that his heart condition was covered under the claim. On 17 April 1991, the Commission granted the Claimant’s petition to re-open, but found that the heart attack was not causally related to the accidental injury of 20 September 1978 and denied him benefits.

The Claimant then appealed to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. After the Employer moved for summary judgment, the Claimant filed his own motion for partial summary judgment. Following a hearing, the circuit court granted the Employer’s motion for summary judgment on 24 October 1991. On appeal, the Subsequent Injury Fund elected not to participate as its interests were deemed coincident with the Employer’s interests.

DISCUSSION In this case of first impression, we are asked to decide whether a heart attack, suffered by an employee after he testified at a deposition in connection with a claim regarding an earlier compensable injury, is itself a compensable event that arises out of and in the course of employment when the ¹⁸⁴ heart attack is medically unrelated to the earlier injury. The Claimant has presented us with several reasons why we should resolve this issue in his favor. We are not persuaded by any of these arguments, however, and therefore affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. We explain.

The standard for appellate review of a trial court’s grant of a motion for summary judgment is whether the court was legally correct. Heat & Power Corp. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 320 Md. 584, 591 , 578 A.2d 1202 (1990). Summary judgment is appropriate only where there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Md.Rule 2-501; Brady v. Ralph Parsons Co., 308 Md. 486, 495 , 520 A.2d 717 (1987).

In determining whether a factual dispute exists, all inferences should be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. King v. Bankerd, 303 Md. 98, 111 , 492 A.2d 608 (1985). In the instant case, no material fact is in dispute and the question of whether the injury here is compensable is purely a matter of law. 1 We begin by determining whether the Claimant’s injury satisfies the statutory prerequisites of compensability. The Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act), which is set forth in Title 9 of the Labor and Employment Article of the Maryland Code, is designed to provide workers with compensation for loss of earning capacity that results from accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment.

Queen v. Agger, 287 Md. 342, 343 , 412 A.2d 733 (1980). The Act “is to be construed as liberally in favor of injured employees as the Act’s provisions will permit so as to effectuate its benevolent purpose as remedial social legislation.” Lovellette v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 297 Md. 271, 282 , 465 A.2d 1141 (1983). But this does not ¹⁸⁵ mean that the Act should be extended to cover situations not encompassed by its purpose or authorized by its provisions. Subsequent Injury Fund v. Thomas, 275 Md. 628, 635 , 342 A.2d 671 (1975); Ewing v. Koppers Co., 69 Md.App. 722, 731 , 519 A.2d 790 (1987).

With these principles in mind, Maryland courts have molded the contours of the two prerequisites of compensability — that the injury arise out of and in the course of employment — to bring myriad factual situations within the Act’s coverage. The first requirement, that the injury arise “out of” employment, refers to the cause or origin of the accident. Knoche v. Cox, 282 Md. 447, 455 , 385 A.2d 1179 (1978); Austin v. Thrifty Diversified, Inc., 76 Md.App. 150, 157 , 543 A.2d 889 (1988). There must be a “causal connection between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the ensuing injury.” Pariser Bakery v. Koontz, 239 Md. 586, 589 , 212 A.2d 324 (1965).

The second requirement, that the injury arise “in the course of” employment, refers to the time, place, and circumstances under which the injury occurred and asks whether the injury happened while the employee was performing the duty for which he was employed. Watson v. Grimm, 200 Md. 461, 466 , 90 A.2d 180 (1952). Thus, an injury arises in the course of employment “when it occurs within the period of employment at a place where the employee reasonably may be in the performance of his duties and while he is fulfilling those duties or engaged in doing something incident thereto.” Id. Whether a particular injury arose out of and in the course of employment depends on the facts and circumstances of each individual case.

Koontz, 239 Md. at 589 , 212 A.2d 324 . Applying the foregoing principles to the facts of this case, we think that the Claimant’s heart attack was not an injury that arose out of and in the course of his employment. His injury occurred outside the time and space limits of employment contemplated by the statutory requirements. First, the injury did not arise out of his employment.

The ¹⁸⁶ origin of the Claimant’s heart attack was his deposition, not his employment as a welder for the Employer. Attending a deposition was not the Claimant’s employment, and it was not a condition or obligation of his employment as a welder. Nor is it considered to be one of the usual hazards or obligations of being a welder. Second, the injury did not arise in the course of employment.

The heart attack did not occur while the Claimant was performing a duty that he was employed to do, because he was not employed to testify at depositions. In fact, the Claimant was not employed by the Employer in any capacity when he suffered his heart attack. His employment had been terminated approximately three years before the deposition. Because he was not the Employer’s employee at the time of the injury, the injury simply could not have arisen out of and in the course of his employment.

Section 9-202 of the Labor and Employment Article provides that a person is a covered employee “while in the service of an employer under an express or implied contract of apprenticeship or hire.” To be entitled to compensation, a person must have been a covered employee at the time of the injury. Lockerman v. Prince George’s County, 281 Md. 195, 201 , 377 A.2d 1177 (1977) (“the normal contractual incidents of the employer-employee relationship are required to be present in order that any person be covered under ... the Act”); Sun Cab Co. v. Powell, 196 Md. 572, 579 , 77 A.2d 783 (1951) (“it is essential that there should have existed at the time of the injury a contract of employment between the alleged employer and the injured workman”). 2 Clearly, the heart attack did not occur “within the ¹⁸⁷ [Claimant’s] period of employment.” See Watson v. Grimm, 200 Md. at 466 , 90 A.2d 180 . Consequently, it does not satisfy the “in the course of” requirement. Although the Claimant has not satisfied the statutory requirements for compensability — that the injury arise out of and in the course of his employment — our analysis does not end, because there is authority to support the conclusion that an employee may recover for injuries sustained while engaged in an activity that is not within the precise time and space limits of employment.

The Claimant relies heavily on the Maryland decisions that have awarded benefits to an employee who was on a “special errand” when the injury occurred. See, e.g., Coats & Clark’s Sales Corp. v. Stewart, 39 Md.App. 10 , 383 A.2d 67 (1978). The special errand doctrine developed as an exception to the “coming and going” rule that denied compensation to employees who were injured when travelling to or from the workplace. See id. at 13 , 383 A.2d 67 ; Fairchild Space Co. v. Baroffio, 77 Md.App. 494, 497 , 551 A.2d 135 (1989).

If an injury occurs while an employee is travel-ling to perform a “special errand” or “special mission,” it is compensable. A special errand or mission is a trip taken by the employee at the direction of the employer for the purpose of helping the employer’s business. Baroffio, 77 Md.App. at 501 , 551 A.2d 135 . “The essential characteristic of a special errand or mission is that it would not have been undertaken except for the obligation of employment.” Stewart, 39 Md.App. at 13 , 383 A.2d 67 . Employees feel obligated to go on the special mission because of the apparent underlying implication that if they do not go, their employment may be jeopardized.

The special errand doctrine does not help the Claimant for two reasons. First, as stated earlier, the Claimant was not working for the Employer when he testified at his ¹⁸⁸ deposition. Thus, the mission, i.e. attending the deposition, was not undertaken because of any obligation of the employment relationship. Instead, the obligation to attend and testify arose from the Maryland Rules of Procedure, which authorize dismissal, entry of a default judgment, or sanctions against a party who fails to appear for his deposition after proper notice.

See Md.Rules 2-432 and 2-433. Even though the Employer “requested” the Claimant’s deposition by timely serving a notice of deposition, the Claimant’s attendance actually was compelled by the Maryland Rules and not by any possibility that his failure to attend would jeopardize his employment relationship. In addition, the Claimant’s attending and testifying at the deposition did not serve the purpose of helping the Employer’s business. It is possible, of course, that the Claimant’s testimony would have helped the Employer win its appeal to the circuit court, if the case had not been dismissed.

But the Employer is not in the business of defending or attacking compensation claims; it is in the business of producing and selling industrial machinery and equipment. The Claimant also relies heavily on