Hull v. Caughy

Alvey, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The order appointing the receiver was passed on the 2d of March, 1886, from which no appeal was taken ; hut after filing their answer, the defendants moved to rescind the order of appointment, and on the 10th of April, 1886, the Court passed an order refusing to rescind its previous order, whereby the receiver was appointed ; and it is from that order of the 10th of April, 1886, that the present appeal has been taken. The appellee has moved to dismiss the appeal, and it is clear the motion must prevail. The order from which the appeal is taken is in no sense an order in the nature of a final decree ; and while an appeal is given from an order appointing a receiver, no appeal is given from an order refusing to rescind the appointment; or to discharge the receiver.

Code, Art. 5, secs. 20, 21. There have occurred cases where appeals have been taken, and maintained in this Court, from orders appointing receivers, orders granting injunctions and appointing receivers, and orders refusing to dissolve injunctions and discharge receivers (in all of which cases appeals are authorized by the statute): and under which appeals the question of the propriety of continuing the receiver, (because necessarily involved,) has been considered; as in the cases of Speights vs. Peters, 9 Gill, 472 , and Voshell & Heaton vs. Hynson, 26 Md., 83 . In such cases there was a proper subject-matter of appeal, in the order