Hull v. Hull

MOYLAN, Judge. Where alimony, permanent or rehabilitative, is appropriate, a number of factors may be considered in computing the appropriate amount thereof. Among them are the respective needs of the parties, including the cost of housing that the appellant argues about in the present case. Among them are the relative abilities of the parties to pay, which would take into account the relative disparity in wealth that the appellant argues about here.

Among them ²²¹ is also the standard of living that the parties enjoyed before the dissolution of the marriage, which is also argued by the appellant. In the case of rehabilitative alimony, moreover, the court would be concerned with whether, even after maximum rehabilitation had been attained, there might yet persist an “unconscionable disparity” in the relative living standards of the parties. Where at the very threshold, however, the determination is made that each party to the dissolved marriage is so financially self-supporting that no alimony at all is required, all such factors become essentially immaterial. One does not compute the amount of a non-award.

The appellant argues the present case as if the chancellor were computing the amount of alimony rather than determining whether alimony is even appropriate. The marriage of the appellant, Nancy Demarest Hull (Wife), and the appellee, Kenneth Duryee Hull, Jr. (Husband), was dissolved when Judge Robert S. Heise, in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, issued a Decree of Absolute Divorce on August 17, 1989. All issues other than alimony and attorney’s fees had been resolved by way of a Property Settlement Agreement executed by the parties on February 15, 1989. Judge Heise denied the Wife’s request for alimony and attorney’s fees.

Upon this appeal, the Wife raises the following four contentions: 1. That Judge Heise abused his discretion in denying her alimony; 2. That Judge Heise erroneously refused to consider the Wife’s financial circumstances immediately prior to her marriage; 3. That Judge Heise erroneously refused to consider evidence of the cost of replacement housing on Gibson Island; and 4.

That Judge Heise abused his discretion in not requiring the Husband to pay the Wife’s attorney’s fees. ²²² The June 15, 1973 marriage between Husband and Wife was the second marriage for both. The Wife was almost 61 years of age and the Husband was 66 years of age at the time of trial. No children were born of this second marriage. Each party had three adult children from their respective prior marriages.

Both parties were in excellent physical health. The Wife never worked during the course of the marriage. The Husband worked only for the first 15 days of the marriage. At that time, he took his retirement from the CIA.

The key issue in this case is the Wife’s contention that Judge Heise abused his discretion in refusing to award her permanent alimony. As we approach our consideration of the issue, we note that much of the Wife’s argument is rooted in the language and in the philosophy of alimony law as it existed in Maryland prior to 1980. Chapter 575 of the Acts of 1980, now Md.Fam.Law Code Ann. §§ 11-101 to 11-111 (1984), was a watershed that changed dramatically the law’s entire approach to the subject of alimony. In Holston v. Holston, 58 Md.App. 308, 321 , 473 A.2d 459 (1984), Judge Bloom described the earlier attitude toward alimony, now abandoned: “Formerly, when alimony was awarded, the award was for the joint lives of the parties or until the recipient remarried, subject to modification upon a subsequent material change in circumstances.

It was a basic concept of alimony that a financially dependent spouse (at least one who was not at fault for the destruction of the marriage) should be able to maintain the same standard of living to which that spouse had become accustomed during the marriage, provided, of course, that the other party could afford it. See Timanus v. Timanus, 178 Md. 640, 642, 643 , 16 A.2d 918 (1940).” After 1980, the law’s concern became that of fostering the self-sufficiency of both parties to the dissolved marriage. In this regard, alimony,. when necessary, became essentially short-term and rehabilitative. It was designed primarily to turn the formerly dependent party into one ²²³ who, after the rehabilitative steps had been taken, achieved for the first time or reachieved financial self-sufficiency.

The goal is to render the party seeking alimony self-supporting so as to vitiate any further need for alimony. In Holston v. Holston, supra, Judge Bloom observed in this regard, at 58 Md.App. at 321 , 473 A.2d 459 : “Under the present statute, the principal function of alimony is rehabilitation. Thus, when awarding alimony, the chancellor is required to consider not only those factors relating to the financial situation, age and health of each party, their standards of living, the duration of marriage and the contribution of each party to its well being but also the ability of the party seeking alimony to be wholly or partially self-supporting and the time deemed necessary for the party seeking alimony to gain sufficient education or training to enable that party to find suitable employment. It is apparent, therefore, that the concept of alimony as a lifetime pension enabling the financially dependent spouse to maintain an accustomed standard of living has largely been superseded by the concept that the economically dependent spouse should be required to become self-supporting, even though that might result in a reduced standard of living.” (Footnote omitted) (Emphasis supplied).

In Turrisi v. Sanzaro, 308 Md. 515, 524-525 , 520 A.2d 1080 (1987), Judge Adkins, for the Court of Appeals, described this fundamental change in Maryland’s philosophy toward the subject of alimony: “There is no doubt that the Alimony Act made major changes in the Maryland law of alimony. Prior to its effective date, the standards for awarding alimony had been judicial rather than statutory. Willoughby v. Willoughby, 256 Md. 590, 592 , 261 A.2d 452, 453 (1970). Now, those standards are essentially statutory, e.g., Family Law Art. § 11-106, although many of the standards incorporate previous judicial rulings.

See McAlear v. McAlear, 298 Md. 320, 329-30 , 469 A.2d 1256, 1261 (1984). ²²⁴ Moreover, alimony may now be awarded to either spouse, § ll-101(b), and will usually be awarded for a definite time, if awarded at all, § 11-106. One of the new concepts recommended by the Commission and embraced by the General Assembly was that of rehabilitative alimony. The Commission explained ‘that the purpose of alimony is to provide an economic means for both parties to deal with their new unmarried life on their own. Put another way, the purpose of alimony is to provide an opportunity for the recipient party to become self-supporting.’ 1980 Report at 2.

Thus, alimony was ‘not to provide a lifetime pension, but to facilitate a transition for the parties from the joint married state to