Huntley v. Huntley

Woodward, J. Appellee, Lydia Huntley (“Lydia”), filed a Complaint for Absolute Divorce in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County after twenty-eight years of marriage to appellant, Charles Huntley (“Charles”). Lydia requested, among other things, a monetary award, alimony, a portion of the marital share of Charles’s retirement benefits, and attorney’s fees. Charles filed an answer in which he denied Lydia’s entitlement to a monetary award and asked the court to deny Lydia an award of alimony. Charles did not request any affirmative relief aside from the grant of a divorce.

At trial, Charles requested a portion of the marital share of Lydia’s retirement benefits, which were already in payout ⁴⁸⁷ status. The trial court denied Charles’s request on the ground that Charles had not included such request in his pleadings. The court awarded Lydia half of the marital portion of Charles’s retirement benefits and a monetary award, but denied her request for alimony. The court did, however, grant Lydia an award of $3,500 in attorney’s fees.

On appeal to this Court, Charles raises two issues for our review, which we have rephrased as questions: 1 1. Did the trial court err by refusing to grant Charles a portion of the marital share of Lydia’s retirement benefits because of Charles’s failure to include a request for such relief in his pleadings? 2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by awarding attorney’s fees to Lydia? For the reasons set forth herein, we answer these questions in the negative and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

BACKGROUND Charles and Lydia were married on September 1, 1986, in Harford County. No children were born of the marriage; their two adopted children are emancipated. The parties separated on September 15, 2013. On October 14, 2014, Lydia filed a Complaint for Absolute Divorce in the circuit court.

In her complaint, Lydia requested, among other things, that the court award her alimony, a monetary award, and a portion of the marital share of Charles’s retirement benefits, along with attorney’s fees. On December 2, 2014, Charles filed his Answer to Complaint for Absolute Divorce, in which he admitted and denied various ⁴⁸⁸ allegations in the Complaint, including a denial of Lydia’s allegation that she was entitled to a monetary award. In the answer, Charles requested no affirmative relief apart from the Court “granting] him a Divorce, and denying] [Lydia] alimony”. Charles did not file a counter-complaint.

The circuit court held a trial on May 1 and May 8, 2015. At that time, Charles was sixty years old, and Lydia was sixty-eight years old. The court found that Charles’s annual income was approximately $130,000, while Lydia, who was retired, received a total monthly income of around $8,500 from her SSI and military pension, or about $42,000 per year. The court also found that both parties had a considerable amount of debt: Lydia’s debts totaled over $459,000, while Charles’s debts totaled $23,500.

In addition, the court found that the total value of the parties’ marital property was almost $96,000. At trial, Charles requested that he be awarded one half of Lydia’s retirement benefits. 2 The trial court denied Charles’s request on the ground that Charles had not requested such relief in his answer or by counter-complaint. At the conclusion of trial, the court issued an oral ruling awarding Lydia a monetary award of $42,600. The court also awarded Lydia one half of the marital share of Charles’s retirement benefits.

In addition, the court noted that Charles “didn’t ask for it, but he’s entitled to [Lydia’s] Social Security if she’s getting Social Security.” The court denied Lydia’s request for alimony, but awarded her attorney’s fees in the amount of $3,500. On May 12, 2015, the court issued a Judgment of Absolute Divorce, memorializing its oral rulings. 3 On June 10, 2015, Charles noted his appeal to this Court. ⁴⁸⁹ STANDARD OF REVIEW Maryland Rule 8431(c) states: When an action has been tried without a jury, the appellate court will review the case on both the law and the evidence. It will not set aside the judgment of the trial court on the evidence unless clearly erroneous, and will give due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. A circuit court’s classification of property as marital or non-marital is subject to review under the clearly erroneous standard, while a discretionary standard of review applies to the decision of whether to grant a monetary award and the amount of that award.

Gordon v. Gordon, 174 Md.App. 583, 625-26 , 923 A.2d 149 (2007). “Factual findings that are supported by substantial evidence are not clearly erroneous.” Richards v. Richards, 166 Md.App. 263, 272 , 888 A.2d 364 (2005). Under the abuse of discretion standard, “we may not substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder, even if we might have reached a different result, absent an abuse of discretion.” Gordon, 174 Md.App. at 626 , 923 A.2d 149 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). As for attorney’s fees, this Court has stated that an award of such fees is governed by the abuse of discretion standard and such an award should not be modified unless it is arbitrary or clearly wrong. Abuse of discretion is determined by evaluating the judge’s application of the statutory criteria as well as the consideration of the facts of the particular case.

Consideration of the statutory criteria is mandatory in making an award and failure to do so constitutes legal error. Ledvinka v. Ledvinka, 154 Md.App. 420, 432 , 840 A.2d 173 (2003) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). DISCUSSION I. Retirement Benefits Charles argues that the trial court erred in refusing to divide Lydia’s retirement benefits, which she listed on the ⁴⁹⁰ parties’ Rule 9-207 form as marital property. Charles notes that Lydia requested in her Complaint that the Court determine the value of all marital property and contends that, in his answer, he “did not answer, aver, nor in any other manner indicate that he intended to waive his marital portion of the marital property that [Lydia] had sought to have the court make a determination on and value.” According to Charles, Lydia was not prejudiced by his failure to request such relief in his answer, “because she agreed on the form that her pension and IRA accounts were marital, and she sought valuation and division of marital assets in her Complaint for Absolute Divorce.” Charles argues that the “trial court awarded half of [Lydia’s] social security to [Charles] without it being specially plead [sic], but refused to divide [Lydia’s] pension and IRA even though the parties stipulated that they were marital property.” Lydia responds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to award Charles an interest in Lydia’s retirement benefits, because Charles did not request such relief in his answer, and “[a]t no time did [Charles] file a counterclaim or, in the alternative, an amended answer that would have placed [Lydia] on notice of his intent to seek affirmative relief under the Marital Property Act at trial.” According to Lydia, Charles’s “reliance on Maryland Rule 9-207 in this matter is misplaced and inapposite to the pleading requirements of Rule 2-305,” and notes that Rule 9-207 does not contain any “procedural mechanism” to serve as a request for affirmative relief, We agree with Lydia that the trial court did not err when it refused to award Charles a portion of the marital share of Lydia’s retirement benefits, because Charles did not request such relief in his answer or in any counter-complaint.

In Scott v. Jenkins, the Court of Appeals explained the paramount importance of pleading: Of the necessities for the prosecution of a successful lawsuit, none is more important than the pleading. It is the first, and sometime the last, opportunity a plaintiff ⁴⁹¹ has to make his or her case. Although Maryland abandoned the formalities of common law pleading long ago, it is still a fair comment to say that pleading plays four distinct roles in our system of jurisprudence. It (1) provides notice to the parties as to the nature of the claim or defense; (2) states the facts upon which the claim or defense allegedly exists; (3) defines the boundaries of litigation; and (4) provides for the speedy resolution of frivolous claims and defenses.

John A. Lynch, Jr. & Richard W. Bourne, Modern Maryland Civil Procedure § 6.1 (1993). Of these four, notice is paramount. American Express Co. v. State, 132 Md. 72, 74 , 103 A. 96, 96 (1918); Pearce v. Watkins, 68 Md. 534, 538 , 13 A. 376, 377 (1888); see also Early v. Early, 338 Md. 639, 658 , 659 A.2d 1334, 1343 (1995) (“The Court has no authority, discretionary or otherwise, to rule upon a question not raised by the pleadings, and of which the parties therefore had neither notice nor an opportunity to be heard.”). 345 Md. 21, 27-28 , 690 A.2d 1000 (1997) (emphasis added). In Scott, the plaintiff filed a complaint alleging various tort claims against the defendant, a Prince George’s County police officer, arising out of “a scuffle” between the parties.

Id. at 25-26 , 690 A.2d 1000 . The plaintiffs complaint demanded “damages in the amount of $500,000.00” for each count, plus costs, as well as any “other and further relief as the court may deem just and proper.” Id. at 26 , 690 A.2d 1000 , At the close of the defendant’s case, the plaintiff requested a punitive damages instruction. Id. The defendant objected to the inclusion of such instruction on the grounds that (1) the plaintiffs complaint did not include a demand for punitive damages, and (2) the plaintiff did not mention punitive damages during the trial until the discussion of jury instructions.

Id. The trial court overruled the objection, “noting that [the plaintiffs] claim of $500,000 damages, given the nature of the case, should have forewarned [the defendant] that punitive damages were being sought.” Id. ⁴⁹² The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in submitting the plaintiffs punitive damages claim to the jury. Id. at 38 , 690 A.2d 1000 . The Court noted: A claim that “may” support a punitive damages award, does not necessarily apprise the defendant of the true nature of the claim against him.

This is especially so, when, as in the instant case, the pleading fails to expressly demand a judgment for “punitive damages.” See, e.g., Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Barrack, 210 Md. 168, 175 , 122 A.2d 457, 461 (1956) (actual malice necessary to support punitive damages in a false imprisonment claim, but malice is not an element of the tort). A punitive damages award based upon an insufficiently pleaded complaint may render the judgment constitutionally infirm. See Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Nationwide Constr. Corp., 244 Md. 401, 410-411 , 224 A.2d 285, 290 (1966) (“Where a judgment was outside the cause of action stated in the complaint and the defendant was not given a fair opportunity to defend against the claim on which the judgment was based, the judgment is invalid and subject to collateral attack.”).

Id. at 35-36 (emphasis added); see also Hoang v. Hewitt Ave. Assocs., LLC, 177 Md.App. 562, 588 , 936 A.2d 915 (2007) (concluding “that an ad damnum clause that seeks damages ‘in excess of a stated amount cannot satisfy the plain language directive of Rule 2-305, that ‘a demand for a money judgment shall include the amount sought’ ”). This Court has held that pleading requirements apply equally in the family law context. In Ledvinka , the appellee filed an amended complaint containing three counts: annulment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and fraudulent inducement to marry. 154 Md.App. at 425 & n. 2, 840 A.2d 173 .

In her closing argument at trial, the appellee raised for the first time the issue that appellant may have fraudulently transferred assets. Id. at 426 , 840 A.2d 173 . The appellant “responded that if [the appellee] was seeking some form of fraudulent conveyance, the issue was neither pleaded nor was it one of the issues the parties stipulated as being in controversy at the beginning of the hearing.” Id. at 427 , 840 A.2d ⁴⁹³ 178. In a written opinion, the trial court found that the appellant had fraudulently conveyed real property with the intent of keeping the appellee “from ‘getting at’ it.” Id.

This Court reversed, holding that the trial court “exceeded its authority in setting aside the conveyance when no cause of action sufficient to put [the] appellant on notice that the property was in dispute was pleaded.” Id. at 428 , 840 A.2d 173 . We cited to Scott and other cases related to “the due process concerns raised by lack of notice in the pleadings.” Id. at 429 , 840 A.2d 173 (citations omitted). We also cited to Gatuso v. Gatuso, 16 Md.App. 632 , 299 A.2d 113 (1973): In Gatuso , we addressed the issue of what discretion a trial court has to enter an order on issues outside the relief prayed or the issues framed in the pleadings. We held that a trial court “has no authority, discretionary or otherwise, to rule upon a question not raised as an issue by pleadings, and of which the parties therefore had neither notice