Hurt v. Stillman & Dolan, Inc.

Thompson, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal is from summary judgments entered in the Circuit Court for Howard County, in favor of the appellee, Stillman & Dolan, Inc. and from orders denying motions to strike out the judgments. The appellants, Marcia Hurt and Francis X. Bossle, Jr., contend that the trial court erred because there was a dispute as to material facts. The appellants are former employees of Stillman & Dolan, Inc., a Maryland corporation, which performs telephone auditing and communication consulting services.

Each was employed on a salary plus commission basis. The commissions were paid to the employees when the company collected its fee from the clients for whom the employees had performed the service. At the termination of the appellants’ employment, several commissions which were due had not been collected. Suits were filed to collect these commissions. 1 The appellee in its motions for summary judgment attached alleged commission agreement contracts, which stated in the pertinent part that “[commissions for work performed will be payable for a period of ninety days after termination based on cash receipts.” These agreements were signed and dated by the appellants. 2 The appellants answered these motions for summary judgment with the general assertion that there was a genuine dispute between the parties over the fact that the alleged contracts had never been put into effect and that there was never any contract or ⁶⁴⁶ agreement- that limited the payment of commissions to ninety days from the termination of employment.

These allegations were supported by affidavits of the appellants. The law is well settled that a summary judgment is properly granted under Maryland Rule 610 “if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Dietz v. Moore, 277 Md. 1, 4, 351 A. 2d 428 (1976). “The function of the summary judgment procedure is not to try the case or decide the issues of fact raised; it is merely to determine whether or not there is an issue of fact to be tried and if there is none, to cause judgment to be rendered accordingly.” Lynx, Inc. v. Ordnance Products, 273 Md. 1, 7 , 327 A. 2d 502 (1974). In the case at bar we must determine what facts were properly before the court. Neither bare allegations that there is a dispute as to a material fact nor general allegations which do not show facts in detail and with precision are sufficient to prevent the entry of a summary judgment.

Lynx, Inc. v. Ordnance Products, supra at 7-8. An unsupported conclusion is not the proper way to show an issue of a material fact. Carter v. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co., 25 Md. App. 717, 724 , 336 A. 2d 790 (1975). In Guerassio v. American Bankers Corp., 236 Md. 500 , 204 A. 2d 568 (1964), the Court of Appeals stated how facts are to be put before the trial court: “Appellee's pleadings and affidavits set out prima facie the elements necessary to entitle it to a summary judgment as a matter of law.

Thereupon, appellants were required either to discredit appellee’s averments as untrue or to specify evidence which would give rise to a triable issue of material fact. Appellants’ pleadings and affidavits do not discredit appellee’s averments as untrue. The only issue, therefore, is whether appellants have specified some opposing evidence which would raise a triable issue of material fact. Such evidence must ⁶⁴⁷ be indicated to the court in the form of an affidavit or deposition in support of the answer to the motion stating a fact or facts which would negative the appellee’s right to a summary judgment.

Maryland Rule 610 a 3; Molesworth v. Schmidt, 196 Md. 15, 20 , 75 A. 2d 100 .” Id. at 503. The only evidence submitted to defeat the motions for summary judgment were the denials of the appellants that the contract ever came into being. There was no denial that the appellants had signed the agreement, nor was the agreement otherwise explained. The burden was on them, once the appellee had established prima fade the necessary elements for a summary judgment, to set forth the facts in support of the dispute.

Hill v. Lewis, 21 Md. App. 121, 134 , 318 A. 2d 850 (1974). This general denial was merely an unsupported conclusion. The reasoning behind this was stated with clarity in Wyand v. Patterson Agency, Inc., 266 Md. 456 , 295 A. 2d 773 (1972): “This is necessary so that summary judgment procedure may retain its vitality. If general statements or bald assertions were sufficient to obtain a summary judgment the rule would serve no useful purpose.

Cf. Tri-State v. Middleman, supra. Conversely, if a general denial could be relied on to prevent the granting of summary judgment, a motion for such a judgment would be an exercise in futility since it could always be successfully resisted. For these reasons, an affidavit is required, with the expectation that if it is established that no genuine dispute exists as to material facts the expense and delay caused by more extensive litigation can be avoided.” Id. at 460.

While we feel that the summary judgments were properly entered, the denials of the