Hill v. Lewis

¹²³ Orth, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. I Catherine Dashiell Kohlheim Lewis (Catherine) was found dead in the basement of her residence in Princess Anne, Somerset County, Maryland on 1 January 1972. She died without issue but left surviving her a husband, Raymond Calvin Lewis (Raymond), whom she married 14 April 1971, and two sisters, Lucille Dashiell Hill and Isabel Dashiell Shores (the Sisters). Catherine died testate.

Her will, disposing of an estate appraised at $124,716.93, and duly admitted to probate in the Orphans’ Court for Somerset County, named Raymond personal representative and devised to him real property, consisting of a 300 acre farm known as Goshen, appraised at $75,550. The rest and residue of the estate was devised and bequeathed to the sisters in equal shares. Raymond, as duly appointed personal representative, filed an administration account about 11 July 1972. On 1 August 1972 the Sisters excepted to the account with respect to any distributions, commissions, or allowances to Raymond and prayed for his removal as personal representative.

They alleged that Catherine did not die of natural causes, and requested that issues of fact raised by their petition be transmitted to a court of law for determination. Raymond answered the petition, averring that Catherine died as a result of an accident, and prayed that the petition be dismissed. He moved for a denial ~if the request for determination of any issues by a court of law. By orders filed 22 August 1972 the Orphans’ Court denied the motion to dismiss the petition of the Sisters, refused to approve the administration account, and did not approve the motion for denial of the request for a determination of issues by a law court.

The Sisters thereupon, on 11 September 1972, submitted the following issue of fact for determination: “Did Raymond Lewis murder Catherine Dashiell Lewis?” On 26 September 1972 the Orphans’ Court entered an ¹²⁴ order approving the issues for determination by the Circuit Court for Somerset County. On 8 November 1972, upon Raymond’s suggestion, the case was removed to the Circuit Court for Dorchester County, and the record was promptly transmitted to that court. On 24 November 1972 Raymond moved for summary judgment. The motion was supported by seven affidavits.

A report of the autopsy performed on Catherine was filed, depositions of various witnesses were taken, and interrogatories demanded and answered. The motion for summary judgment was answered on 17 July 1973 and further answered on 24 July. On the latter date there was a hearing on the motion. On 29 August the Circuit Court for Dorchester County ordered “that the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Raymond C. Lewis, personal representative of the estate of Catherine Dashiell Kohlheim Lewis, be and it is hereby granted, and the Clerk is directed to certify to the Orphans’ Court in answer to the issue presented a finding by this Court of ‘No’.” The Sisters noted an appeal “from the order entered in this action on August 29, 1973.” They question the authority of the court below to grant a motion for a summary judgment with respect to an issue transmitted for determination to it from an orphans’ court, and claim that even if the court had such authority, it erred in granting the motion in the circumstances here.

II It is settled law of this State, Chase v. Jenifer, 219 Md. 564, 567 , that neither a murderer, nor his heirs or representatives, can share in the estate of the person murdered, under the statutes of descent and distribution, or otherwise, Price v. Hitaffer, 164 Md. 505 . 1 See United Life ¹²⁵ and Accident Insurance Company v. Prostic, 169 Md. 535 ; Schmeizl v. Schmeizl, 184 Md. 584 ; Schmeizl v. Schmeizl, 186 Md. 371 . Actual conviction of murder is not a requisite for the application of the rule. Chase v. Jenifer, supra, at 566-567. Code, Art. 93, § 2-105, concerning the orphans’ courts, provides: “In any controversy in the court, issues of fact may be determined by the court or, at the request of any interested person made within such time as may be determined by the court, by a court of law.

Where such request is made before the court has determined the issue of fact, the court shall transmit the issues to a court of law. After the determination of the issue, whether by the court or after transmission to a court of law, the court shall enter an appropriate judgment or decree. This section shall not apply where the estate is administered under the jurisdiction of a court having general equity jurisdiction.” An issue may be sent to a law court for trial only when (1) the orphans’ court has jurisdiction of the subject, (2) the question is properly before the orphans’ court, and (3) the issue is relevant and material to the question before the orphans’ court. Myers v. Hart, 248 Md. 443 ; Ades v. Norins, 204 Md. 267 ; Fidelity Trust Company v. Barrett, 186 Md. 483 .

It is clear that the issue here met these tests. Whether a person had forfeited his right to inherit from a decedent, under a will, or as an heir, or as a distributee of an intestate estate, is a question which may be raised in an orphans’ court. Schmeizl v. Schmeizl, 184 Md. at 599 . The question whether Raymond forfeited his right to inherit from Catherine was properly before the orphans’ court.

The issue ¹²⁶ was relevant and material to that question. It was ancillary to relief in a matter over which the orphans’ court had jurisdiction to decide, Goldsborough v. De Witt, 169 Md. 463 , but was not wholly within its discretion, Vickers v. Starcher, 175 Md. 522 . It was a single, definite, and material question framed from the allegations of a petition and the answer thereto, Ades v. Norins, supra, at 272. It was properly submitted to the law court. “In answering issues the circuit court acts, strictly speaking, not as an appellate court nor in the exercise of its original jurisdiction.

It acts rather as: ‘. . . a tribunal ancillary to the orphans’ court, whose aid is invoked for the single purpose of determining issues of fact submitted to it by the orphans’ court for its guidance in dealing with some matter before it.’ ” Ades v. Norins, supra, at 273, quoting Holland v. Enright, 167 Md. 604, 607 . In other words, the law court has limited jurisdiction under the statute. 2 Holland v. Enright, 169 Md. 390 . It has no power to review the proceedings of the orphans’ court wherein the issues were framed, or to consider the sufficiency of the pleadings upon which the issues were founded. 3 “The general rule has been adopted that the trial court has no right to revoke or modify issues after they have been ¹²⁷ transmitted by the Orphans’ Court.” Forsythe v. Baker, 180 Md. 144, 149 . On the other hand, it is well settled that after issues have been sent to a court of law for trial, the orphans’ court has no right to revoke or modify them, for the functions of the orphans’ court are suspended until the verdict is returned by the trial court.

Idem, citing Pegg v. Warford, 4 Md. 385, 396 ; Schmidt v. Johnston, 154 Md. 125, 133 ; Greenhawk v. Quimby, 168 Md. 396 ; Baldwin v. Hopkins, 172 Md. 219, 232 . Further, the law is firmly established that the orphans’ court is bound to accept the findings of the trier of fact in the trial court as conclusive, and to make them effective by proper judgment or decree. This is the clear intent of the provision: “After the determination of the issue, whether by the [orphans’] court or after transmission to a court of law, the [orphans’] court shall enter an appropriate judgment or decree.” Code, Art. 93, 8 2-105. Forsythe v. Baker, supra, at 149, citing Flaks v. Flaks, 173 Md. 358 .

Despite the settled state of much of the law with respect to issues submitted by an orphans’ court to a court of law, the Sisters bring into question the conduct of the trial in a law court of issues so propounded by an orphans’ court. The Court said in Forsythe v. Baker, supra, at 149: “Unless the issues are wholly immaterial, or contain solely questions of law, or are for any reason so defective that no reasoned verdict could be rendered upon them, it is the imperative duty of the trial court to submit the issues to the jury.” The Sisters construe this as prohibiting the trial court from granting a motion for summary judgment as to the issues. We think it must be considered within the context in which it was made. The statement was made concerning the lack of power in the trial court to review the proceedings of the orphans’ court wherein the issues were framed or to consider the sufficiency of the pleadings upon which the issues were founded.

It led to the conclusion that the general rule is that the trial court has no right to revoke or modify issues after they have been transmitted. The statement in this context ¹²⁸ supports the general rule, but goes no further. Earlier in Forsythe the Court discussed the province of the trial court when its aid was invoked as a tribunal ancillary to the orphans’ court. It is, the Court said, at 148-149, “* * * merely to submit the issues of fact to the jury in accordance with legal procedure and upon competent evidence, and upon rendition of the verdict to certify it to the Orphans’ Court.” (emphasis supplied) The Court had said the same thing in a slightly different way in Diffenderffer v. Griffith, 57 Md. 81 , 84: “The power of the court and its duty was to see that a verdict, upon the issues propounded for inquiry before a jury was reached by legal steps, and competent and legal evidence.

It was the province of the court to decide all questions necessarily incidental to the bringing to trial and verdict; and when a verdict was obtained, to certify it to the Orphans’ Court, whence the issues came.” (emphasis supplied) We think that when the Court said that it was the duty of the trial court to submit the issues to the jury “in accordance with legal procedure and upon competent evidence”, and to see that a verdict upon the issues was reached “by legal steps and competent and legal evidence”, such “legal procedure” and such “legal steps” contemplated the rules generally governing the conduct of trials in the law court. Necessarily, we believe, this would include the Maryland Rules of Practice and Procedure, as now in effect, with respect to the trial of cases in a court of law. Rule 610 concerns “Summary Judgment”, and it applies to procedures at law. Rule 1 a 1.

A motion for a summary judgment may be made in an “action”, Rule 610 a 1, and an “action” includes “all the steps by which a party seeks to enforce any right in a court of law or equity”, Rule 5 a. 4 “In an action, a party asserting a claim, * * * or a party against whom a ¹²⁹ claim is asserted, may at any time make a motion for a summary judgment in his favor * * Rule 610 a 1. When issues are transmitted to a law court under Code, Art. 93, § 2-105, we think that there is a party asserting a claim and a party against whom a claim is asserted within the contemplation of Rule 610. The short of it is that we believe a law court has authority to grant a motion for a summary judgment, as provided by Rule 610, in an action before it on issues transmitted by an orphans’ court. There is support for our view.

When an orphans’ court sends issues to a court of law for trial, said the Court in Schmeizl v. Schmeizl, 184 Md. at 598 , “[t]he court of law has the same powers, with respect to the jury 5 and the verdict, as in an ordinary action, including ‘power to direct the jury and grant a new trial.’ ” 6 This doctrine was applied in McIntyre v. Saltysiak, 205 Md. 415 , where the Court affirmed rulings of the court below directing verdicts on all issues sustaining the validity of a will, for the reason that caveators had not produced sufficient evidence to justify submitting the issues to the jury. The Court said, at 424: “Whether sufficient evidence was offered to justify the submission of issues to the jury is a question of law for the court. If there is not sufficient evidence and the jury would only be left to speculation and conjecture on the issues submitted, the court should refuse to submit such issues, should direct a verdict, and withdraw those issues from the jury.” The Court made clear in Schmeizl, 184 Md. at 597-598 , that the trial rules of the Rules of Practice and Procedure, as then in effect, were applicable not only in an ordinary action at law but, as far as may be, in any other proceeding at law, ¹³⁰ including, specifically, issues from an orphans’ court. The rules as to a directed verdict, now Md. Rule 552, and judgment N.O.V., now Md. Rule 563, were applicable, said the Court, to any proceeding tried by a jury. 7 And it declared that the word “judgment” as used in the rule concerning judgment N.O.V. had “no narrow technical meaning; it includes a ‘decision’ or ‘determination’, on issues from the Orphans’ Court or in any other proceeding at law.” “Judgment” is used in the sense of the judicial determination of a court upon a matter within its jurisdiction.

Id., at 598 . Thus, the Court concluded, for the purposes of the rule as to judgment N.O.V., “there is no material difference between the decision or determination of a court of law on issues from the Orphans’ Court and an ordinary judgment at law * * Idem. See Stockslager v. Hartle, 200 Md. 544 ; Drury v. King, 182 Md. 64 ; Malone v. Malone, 148 Md. 200 ; Kelley v. Stanton, 141 Md. 380 . For other cases involving issues from an orphans’ court in which a directed verdict or judgment N.O.V. was concerned, see Nalley v. Nalley, 253 Md. 197 ; Jackson v. Jackson, 249 Md. 170 ; Waple v. Hall, 248 Md. 642 ; Shearer v. Healy, 247 Md. 11 ; Sachs v. Little, 245 Md. 343 ; Ingalls v. Trustees, 244 Md. 243 ; Giardina v. Wannen, 228 Md. 116 ; Hughes v. Averza, 223 Md. 12 ; West v. Fidelity-Balto.

Bank, 219 Md. 258 ; Kuenne v. Kuenne, 219 Md. 101 ; Sellers v. Qualls, 206 Md. 58 . The Sisters, conceding that “there are principles common to consideration of a motion for a summary judgment and for a directed verdict”, attempt to distinguish the one from the other. They postulate: “The motion for summary judgment procedure is for the purpose of determining, without regard to the sufficiency of the evidence which might be produced at trial,