Hyle v. Motor Vehicle Administration

¹⁴⁵ CHASANOW, Judge. In the instant case, we are called upon to determine whether it is proper to suspend a licensee’s driver’s license for refusing to take a blood test for alcohol concentration pursuant to Maryland Code (1977, 1992 Repl.Vol., 1997 Supp.), Transportation Article, § 16-205.1(b)(l)(i)2.A, 1 where the licensee agrees to take a breath test and the apparatus for administering the test is available, but no qualified person is available to administer the breath test. The resolution of this issue turns on a determination of whether the term “equipment” as used in Md.Code (1974, 1995 Repl.Vol.), Courts and Judicial Proceedings Art., § 10-305(a)(3), 2 the section specifying the type of test to be administered under § 16-205.1, includes a qualified person (or “technician”) to administer the test. For the following reasons, we cannot construe the term equipment so broadly and, therefore, hold that a licensee’s driver’s license should not be suspended under those circumstances.

In the early morning hours of January 25, 1996, Petitioner, Matthew John Hyle, was stopped by Police Officer Andrew Wheeler and Police Officer Trainee William P. Hoover 3 after Hyle was observed crossing the double yellow lines and running a red light. Upon questioning, Hyle admitted that he had had a couple of drinks. It was also noted that Hyle had a moderate odor of alcohol. Hyle was then given a variety of field sobriety tests, including the one leg stand, the walk and turn, and the horizontal gaze nystagmus test.

After performing unsuccessfully on the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, Hyle was arrested on suspicion of driving while intoxicated and ¹⁴⁶ transported to the Central District Police Station in Baltimore City. At the police station, Hyle was given, but refused to sign, a DR-15 Advice of Rights Form informing him of the possibility that his license would be suspended if he submitted to a test for alcohol and was found to have an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more, or if he refused to take such a test. Hyle then agreed to submit to a breath test. Because no technician was available to perform the breath test, however, Hyle was informed that he would be transported to Mercy Hospital for a blood test.

Hyle refused. As a consequence of this refusal, Hyle’s license was suspended for 120 days as provided for in § 16—205.1(b)(l)(i)2.A. Hyle then requested an administrative hearing regarding the proposed suspension. The administrative law judge (ALJ) upheld the suspension. After finding that the officers had reasonable grounds to make the stop, the ALJ determined that there was no technician available to take a breath test from Hyle and that this amounted to the equipment being unavailable under § 10—305(a)(3).

The ALJ further concluded that Hyle’s failure to submit to a blood test for alcohol constituted a “refusal” to submit to a test for alcohol pursuant to § 16-205.1. The ALJ, therefore, found that Hyle’s license had properly been suspended. On appeal, the Circuit Court for Worcester County affirmed the ALJ’s decision to uphold the suspension. Hyle then petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, which we granted on February 14, 1997.

For the reasons set forth below, we shall reverse the judgment of the circuit court. Under § 16-205.1(a)(2), Maryland’s “implied consent” law, a person who drives on a highway or private property used by the public in Maryland is deemed to have impliedly consented “to take a test if the person should be detained on suspicion of,” inter alia, driving under the influence of alcohol or driving while intoxicated. Section 16-205.1(b)(l)(i)2 provides for the suspension of a driver’s license where the driver refuses to submit to a chemical test for alcohol. Section 10-305, the ¹⁴⁷ statute at issue in this case, is part of a comprehensive statutory scheme “to regulate evidentiary procedures in drunk driving cases.” Willis v. State, 302 Md. 363, 371 , 488 A.2d 171, 176 (1985).

Other sections within this scheme include § 10-303(a)(2), which provides that if a chemical test for alcohol is to be given it must be administered within two hours after the driver’s apprehension. In addition, § 10-304(b) states that a “test of breath shall be administered by a qualified person with equipment approved by the toxicologist.” Section 10-304(a)(3) defines a “qualified person” for administering a test as one “who has received training in the use of the equipment in a training program approved by the toxicologist.” Section 10-304(e) also provides that “[t]he person tested is permitted to have a physician of the person’s own choosing administer tests in addition to the one administered at the direction of the police officer.” Section 10-305, specifies which type of test should be administered. Sections 10-306 to 10-308, not relevant here, discuss the admissibility of evidence obtained from a chemical test for alcohol. Finally, § 10-309(a) specifies that the test discussed in § 16-205.1 is not compulsory and that “[n]o inference or presumption concerning either guilt or innocence arises because of [a] refusal to submit.” There are two types of tests: a breath test and a blood test. § 16-205.1(a)(l)(iii).

As we noted earlier, these tests may only be administered by a “qualified person” using “equipment approved by the toxicologist.” § 10-304(b), (c). Section 10-305(a)specifies that “[t]he type of test to be administered to the defendant ... shall be the test of breath except” in three circumstances: “(1) The defendant is unconscious or otherwise incapable of refusing to take a test to determine alcohol concentration; (2) Injuries to the defendant require removal of the defendant to a medical facility; or (3) The equipment for administering the test of breath is not available.” § 10-305(a). In the case sub judice, the MVA suspended Hyle’s license for refusing to submit to a blood test, although ¹⁴⁸ he had consented to a breath test. We must, therefore, determine whether this case falls within any of the exceptions set forth in § 10-305(a).

The only exception which might be applicable in this situation is the third, “[t]he equipment for administering the test of breath is not available.” § 10-305(a)(3). Thus, only if the equipment was unavailable would Hyle’s refusal to take a blood test have violated § 16-205.1. The AL J concluded that the test apparatus was available, but there was no qualified technician to perform the test. This case, therefore, turns on the meaning of the term equipment, as used in § 10-305(a)(3), and whether a qualified technician is encompassed within that definition. “The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the actual intent of the [legislature.” State v. Loscomb, 291 Md. 424, 429 , 435 A.2d 764, 767 (1981); accord Revis v. Automobile Ins.

Fund, 322 Md. 683, 686 , 589 A.2d 483, 484 (1991) (“[U]ltimate aim [in statutory construction] is to effect the legislative intent.”). To determine the legislature’s intent, we must look “ ‘ “first to the words of the statute, read in light of the full' context in which they appear, and in light of external manifestations of intent or general purpose available through other evidence.” ’ ” Motor Vehicle Admin, v. Chamberlain, 326 Md. 306, 314-15 , 604 A.2d 919, 923 (1992) (quoting Dickerson v. State, 324 Md. 163, 170-71 , 596 A.2d 648, 651-52 (1991), in turn quoting Cunningham v. State, 318 Md. 182, 185 , 567 A.2d 126, 127 (1989)); see also Loscomb, 291 Md. at 429 , 435 A.2d at 767 . Moreover, we must give this language “its ordinary and common meaning.” Chamberlain, 326 Md. at 315 , 604 A.2d at 923 (quoting Dickerson, 324 Md. at 171 , 596 A.2d at 652 ). We must similarly avoid strained interpretations that lead to “absurd” results.

Id. Here, the legislature chose the term “equipment.” § 10-305(a)(3). “Equipment is defined as ‘the implements used in an operation or activity.’ ” 318 North Market St. v. Comptroller, 78 Md.App. 589, 597 , 554 A.2d 453, 457 (1989) (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary ); accord Holtz v. Babcock, 143 Mont. 341 , 389 P.2d 869, 874 (1963) ¹⁴⁹ (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary). The term equipment is also synonymous with apparatus, machinery, paraphernalia, and gear. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged, at 768 (Philip B. Gove ed., 1986).

Thus, the term equipment, on its face, would seem to encompass the apparatus or machine used to test for alcohol levels and not the qualified technician necessary to administer the test. Moreover, we have been unable to find, and the MVA failed to point out, any statutory use of the term equipment which encompasses a person trained to use that equipment. See, e.g., State Tax Comm. v. Whitehall, 214 Md. 316, 324 , 135 A.2d 298, 302 (1957) (quoting with approval the trial court in the same case, in turn quoting Webster’s) (“ ‘Webster defines “equipment” as “whatever is used in equipping” ’ ”); Abbott v. Temple, 73 So.2d 647, 650 (La.Ct.App.1954) (quoting with approval the trial court in the same case, in turn quoting Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary) (“ ‘ “Equipment” is defined to mean “anything used in equipping.” ’ ”); Polliak v. Smith, 19 N.J.Super. 365 , 88 A.2d 351, 353 (Ch. Div.1952) (citing Funk & Wagnalls’ New Standard Dictionary of the English Language (1937), which defines equipment as “the act or process of equipping with all needful supplies for any special service”).

Personnel, in fact, have been excluded from the definition of equipment. “[Equipment usually covers everything, except personnel, needed for the efficient operation or service____” Holtz, 389 P.2d at 874 (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary) (emphasis added). In interpreting a statute, “we construe the statute as a whole, interpreting each provision of the statute in the context of the entire statutory scheme.” Blondell v. Baltimore Police, 341 Md. 680, 691 , 672 A.2d 639, 645 (1996). Furthermore, we must avoid “constructions that render any portion of the language superfluous or redundant.” Blondell, 341 Md. at 691 , 672 A.2d at 644 . Sections 10-302 through 10-309 and § 16-205.1 are “integrally interrelated” and “must be ¹⁵⁰ construed harmoniously in order to give full effect to each.” Loscomb, 291 Md. at 432, 435 , 435 A.2d at 768, 770 .

To construe equipment to include a qualified technician, as the MVA urges us to do, would render parts of §§ 10-302 through 10-309 nonsensical and others redundant. See Montgomery County v. Buckman, 333 Md. 516, 523-24 , 636 A.2d 448, 452 (1994) (“[A]bsent clear intent to the contrary, a statute is to be read so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless, or nugatory.”). For example, it makes little sense to speak of a qualified person as having received training on the use of a qualified person. Cf § 10-304(a)(3) (defining qualified person as one who has “received training in the use of the equipment”).

Moreover, such a reading would make subsections (a)(3) and (b) of 10-304 repetitive. Subsection (b) states that the equipment used for the breath test must be approved by the toxicologist. If a qualified person were encompassed in the definition of equipment, subsection (a)(3), stating that a qualified person is one who “has received training in the use of the equipment in a training program approved by the toxicologist,” is unnecessary because under subsection (b) the toxicologist would already have to approve the qualified person. Similarly, § 10-306, which provides for the admissibility of the test results when accompanied by a report, separately requires the report to “[identify the technician or analyst as a ‘qualified person,’ ” § 10-306(a)(2)(i), and to “[s]tate that the test was performed with equipment approved by the toxicologist,” § 10-306(a)(2)(ii).

Under the MVA’s reading, one of these would be superfluous. Throughout §§ 10-302 through 10-309 and § 16-205.1, the legislature has amply demonstrated its ability and -willingness to use terms such as equipment and qualified person distinctly. See, e.g., § 10-304. Under § 10-304, for example, both the blood and breath tests must be administered by a “qualified person” on “equipment approved by the toxicologist.” § 10-304(b), (c)(l)(i).

Qualified person is defined as “a person who has received training in the use of the equipment.” § 10-305(a)(3). Similarly, § 16-205.1(g), which allows a person to ¹⁵¹ withdraw an initial refusal to take a test, lists as one of the factors to consider in determining whether the initial refusal has been validly withdrawn as “[wjhether a qualified person ... to administer the test and testing equipment were readily available.” § 16-205.1(g)(8)(ii). This last example evidences that the legislature had at least contemplated the possibility that a technician might not be available. Given the legislature’s demonstrated awareness of the distinction between equipment and the personnel needed to operate the equipment, the legislature could easily have provided in § 10-305 that the blood test should be administered when either the equipment or a qualified person “for administering the test of breath is not available.” It also is important to note that the statute does not provide an exemption where the “test” is unavailable, but instead uses the specific term “equipment.” Whether