Ibru v. Ibru

Panel: Graeff, Kehoe, Leahy, JJ. Leahy, J. ²¹ Chief Michael Christopher Ibru 1 ("Chief Ibru")-a prominent and very wealthy Nigerian business magnate-traveled to the United States from Nigeria for a medical procedure related to his Parkinson's Disease. Shortly after the procedure, ²² in 2008, Chief Ibru began living in Maryland with one of his daughters, Ms. Janet Osiorebruvbiho Ibru ("Janet" or "Appellee"). 2 Chief Ibru purportedly executed a durable power of attorney in which he appointed Janet as his attorney-in-fact, and then roughly a year later, in 2010, he entered into a general power of attorney, again appointing Janet as his attorney-in-fact (collectively, the "Powers of Attorney"). In 2016, Mr. Peter Ibru, one of Chief Ibru's sons ("Peter" or "Appellant"), filed suit in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County to enjoin Janet from exercising her rights under the Powers of Attorney.

He claimed that the Powers of Attorney were invalid because Chief Ibru was incompetent when he signed them, and, that Janet had fraudulently used them to gain access to his assets. While the case was pending, the court entered an order naming Janet as the temporary guardian of Chief Ibru so that she could continue to assist Chief Ibru with his medical needs. Chief Ibru passed away intestate on September 6, 2016. Peter amended his complaint, requesting that, in addition to declaring the Powers of Attorney invalid, the court establish a constructive trust for Chief Ibru's remaining assets in Maryland and order an accounting of Chief Ibru's assets for the entire time Janet acted as his attorney-in-fact.

In response, Janet filed a motion to dismiss and requested attorney's fees. Janet averred that an estate case had been opened in Nigeria where the vast majority of Chief Ibru's assets and family reside and insisted that a Nigerian court would be best suited to ⁴²⁸ handle the issues relating to Chief Ibru's property in Maryland. Six days later-before Peter responded to the motion-the trial judge granted Janet's motion to dismiss at a motions hearing. The court decided that "standing issues" precluded the court from considering Peter's petition for relief because the matter was actually an estate case.

The court then awarded Janet $4,500 in attorney's fees. Peter appealed. ²³ The central question in this appeal is the justiciability of Peter's claims in the circuit court. 3 We must determine whether the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction to consider Peter's petition and render a declaratory judgment, 4 and whether Peter had standing to bring the action below. Additionally, we consider whether the circuit court erred in awarding Janet attorney's fees. We hold that the circuit court mistakenly determined the underlying action was an estate case and that it was precluded from exercising jurisdiction over the case.

Next, we hold that Peter, as a descendant of Chief Ibru, had standing to petition the court to construe the validity of the Powers of Attorney and review Janet's actions as an agent under Maryland Code (1974, 2017 Repl. Vol.), Estates and Trusts Article ("ET"), § 17-103(a). Accordingly, we also resolve that the circuit court abused its discretion when it awarded attorneys' fees against Peter in favor of Janet without any findings or calculations. ²⁴ BACKGROUND In late 2008, Chief Ibru traveled from Nigeria to the United States for medical treatment for Advanced Parkinson's Disease and related disorders. Roughly three weeks after arriving, Chief Ibru began living with Janet, one of his children, in Prince George's County.

He remained in her care until his death. On February 17, 2009, Chief Ibru purportedly executed 5 a durable power of attorney (the "Durable POA"), naming Janet as his attorney-in-fact. The Durable POA gave Janet several powers incident to her role as Chief Ibru's caregiver, including: 1.1 Bank Accounts ⁴²⁹ To deposit in my name for my account in any banking or similar financial institution, all monies, bills of exchange, drafts, checks, promissory notes, and other securities for money payable or belonging to me, and for that purpose to endorse the same for deposit or collection, and to withdraw sums deposited with such financial institution[.] * * * 1.3 Sign Checks To draw and sign on my behalf any check, draft, note or other negotiable or non-negotiable commercial instrument which I might lawfully sign in person, whether as maker, drawer or endorser[.] * * * 1.6 Purchase To purchase such goods and items as my agent deems appropriate for my welfare and benefit and to accept and take possession of any property or interest or estate on my behalf. 1.7 Medical Treatment ²⁵ To consent on my behalf to medical examinations and medical or other professional care, treatment or advice. My agent shall not be personally liable for consenting to medical care which results in injury to me resulting from negligence or acts and/or omissions of third persons unless my agent fails to act in good faith with respect to approving such treatment. ...

I hereby authorize my agent to obtain my individually identifiable health information and/or medical records, or consent to the use of my individually identifiable health information and/or medical records, for the purpose of obtaining medical care and treatment. * * * 1.23 General Authority To do all such other acts and things in relation to all or any part of any interest in my property, estate, affairs or business of any kind or description as I might or could do if acting personally. Roughly a year and a half later, on July 21, 2010, Chief Ibru purportedly executed 6 a general power of attorney (the "General POA"), again appointing Janet as his attorney-in-fact. The General POA allowed Janet "[t]o do anything [Chief Ibru] could do [him]self with regards [sic] to bank accounts, accounts at savings and loan institutions, credit unions and any other institution, including opening, modifying and closing such accounts and signing and endorsing checks or drafts of any kind." It also empowered Janet "[t]o make decisions [ ] and to authorize medical treatment" on Chief Ibru's behalf, which included accepting treatment in an emergency event or in the ordinary event, to agree to medical procedures which are suggested by [Chief Ibru's] physician or any treating physician, to determine whether a treatment is necessary or desirable, to consent to an operation, to decline treatment on [Chief ²⁶ Ibru's] behalf, and to make any other medical decision that [Chief Ibru] could make [him]self. For nearly six years, Janet assumed the role of primary caretaker for Chief Ibru.

During this time, his physical and mental health further deteriorated, 7 and by April ⁴³⁰ 2016, he required rigorous medical treatment and constant monitoring. On May 26, 2016, Peter filed a complaint in the circuit court which sought, among other things, to declare the Powers of Attorney null and void, alleging they were "fraudulent and unenforceable, as a matter of law, because [Chief] Ibru did not execute such document[s]." In addition, Peter entreated the court to infer that because Chief Ibru was unable to "even sign such [ ] important document[s]" due to "severe adverse health" issues, they were "in fact a product of fraud and or duress." The next day, on May 27, 2016, the circuit court granted a temporary restraining order ("TRO") and enjoined Janet "from exercising any right or authority purportedly granted to her" under the Powers of Attorney. The court set in a hearing on the TRO for July 22, 2016. In response, Janet filed an emergency motion to rescind the injunction and request for a hearing, alleging that Chief Ibru was mentally competent when he "signed" the Powers of Attorney, and implored the court to "rescind[ ] the injunction until the hearing ... to preserve [Chief] Ibru's health and life." The court deferred ruling on Janet's motion until the July 22, 2016 hearing.

At the hearing on July 22, 2016, the court decided to appoint Janet as temporary guardian of Chief Ibru, noting that Chief ²⁷ Ibru had been living in Janet's home for "about eight years[,]" and saw "no good reason to upset that right now." The court explained: It is my proposal, if everyone is agreed, we will appoint a temporary guardian so all of his property goes under court supervision, the guardianship of the person as well, to manage his affairs. We agree that the two of you will give me a list of three names of physicians, that I can pick one off the list to go visit with him, and to make sure that the powers of attorney would end today unless we find that he is competent, in which case he is free to reinstate the powers of attorney or do anything that anyone of us can do in polite society. That is the best way to handle it. In the event he is not able to manage his affairs we will have to appoint a permanent guardian. ... * * * There will have to be an accounting of the property.

Any moneys spent on his behalf will have to be accounted for to the court. On August 1, 2016, the court signed an order appointing Janet as "temporary guardian of the person and properties" of Chief Ibru. The order stated its purpose was to "preserve the status quo of all normal business operations and all assets belonging to [Chief] Ibru, pending a full evidentiary hearing before this Court[.]" (Emphasis in original court order). The court also ordered Janet to provide an accounting "as is normally and customarily required of all the properties and expenditures of [Chief] Ibru[,]" 8 and temporarily suspended "all powers of attorney [signed] by [Chief] Ibru[.]" On September 6, 2016, Chief Ibru passed away intestate.

Pursuant to Maryland Rule 10-707(a), Janet completed an ^{28 431} inventory of the fiduciary estate signed September 28, 2016, which the court docketed on October 11, 2016. In it, Janet listed $151,925.36 in "cash and cash equivalents" and in the next section, the information report, she noted that $151,199.85 was held in jointly titled accounts (the "Joint Accounts") bearing her and Chief Ibru's names. She disclosed that Chief Ibru owned one checking account in his own name containing $725.51. Janet also completed a "fiduciary's account" report pursuant to Maryland Rule 10-708(a) and disclosed that she had disbursed $94,782.83 while serving as the temporary guardian of Chief Ibru.

According to the fiduciary's account, these disbursements included $37,155.50 in dayshift nursing and $51,481.48 in night-time nursing care and doctor's visits. Additionally, Janet completed an "annual report of guardian of disabled person" pursuant to Maryland Rule 10-206(e), in which she petitioned the court to extend her temporary powers of guardianship over Chief Ibru's property "to encourage reporting from those persons who have control over" his property. 9 On October 14, Peter filed a motion to terminate Janet's temporary guardianship of Chief Ibru as well as any authority purportedly granted to her pursuant to the Powers of Attorney. Peter argued that any power to act as Chief Ibru's temporary guardian expired on the date of Chief Ibru's death and any actions after his death were beyond the scope of the temporary guardianship order. Peter also requested that the court order Janet to provide an accounting.

And, on November 1, 2016, he amended his complaint (the "Amended Complaint"), 10 adding a request for an accounting and the establishment ²⁹ of a constructive trust over Chief Ibru's assets that Janet transferred. Janet responded to Peter's motion to terminate temporary guardianship, maintaining that he made "no specific allegation[s] that she ha[d] committed any illegal act" and agreed that her temporary guardianship authority had lapsed due to Chief Ibru's death. She also filed a motion to strike the Amended Complaint on November 16, arguing that, among other things, Peter had attempted to assert "almost entirely new claims for relief." She contended that Peter had essentially received all requested relief in the original complaint, as Chief Ibru's death rendered the Powers of Attorney a nullity. Additionally, Janet averred that Peter had "no standing" to compel Janet to produce an accounting of her actions under the Powers of Attorney, citing that because of Chief Ibru's massive "empire worth millions, if not billions of dollars, ... [s]uch an act would be frivolous, financially burdensome, and an imposition upon Chief Ibru's and [Janet]'s privacy without any justification." Then, on February 16, 2017, Janet filed a motion to dismiss, contending that Chief Ibru's death mooted all matters in Peter's ⁴³² original complaint.

She denied taking advantage of her father's trust and reiterated that his death extinguished any Powers of Attorney. She averred further that Peter's Amended Complaint was merely an "attempt[ ] to convert a guardianship matter into an estate matter[.]" Janet insisted that "a Nigerian court would be best suited" to handle the case because an estate case was already open in Nigeria to address Chief Ibru's property; that approximately 99% of his assets were in Nigeria; and that the only asset that Chief Ibru had remaining in Maryland was a bank account with roughly $2,000 in it. After accusing Peter of launching the litigation as a vehicle "to harass [her] and impugn her good character to ³⁰ place himself in a better position to be the executor of his father's estate in Nigeria[,]" Janet requested that the court strike the Amended Complaint, dismiss the case, and order Peter to pay her attorney's fees. On February 22-six days after Janet filed her motion to dismiss-the parties appeared in circuit court to address "all pending motions." Peter had not yet filed an opposition to the motion, nevertheless, the Court began by addressing Janet's motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint "just in case[.]" Janet's counsel argued, in relevant portion, that Peter did not have standing and that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to consider the case because an estate proceeding was opened in Nigeria and "this is not an estate proceeding." Peter's counsel responded that "we agree on one point.

This is not an estate matter." Counsel argued that dismissal was not warranted, as Janet had disclosed that only $2,000 remained of Chief Ibru's money, yet in her inventory in the guardianship she listed approximately $149,000 in joint checking accounts, which she became owner of upon Chief Ibru's death. Janet's counsel responded that Peter could have objected to Janet's appointment as Chief Ibru's temporary guardian, but he did not. The court made the following ruling orally: I hate to go out on a limb and dismiss this case, but I am. I think there are standing issues.

In reciting some of the history, [Chief] Ibru had resided in Lanham, Maryland with his daughter for a fairly long period of time. Apparently, [Chief] Ibru is worth about $2 billion in Nigeria, most of the assets being there. And as I understand it, there's now an estate case pending there. I think this is an estate case.

I don't think it's a declaratory judgment case. You can call it that, but it's really not and I'm not sure the standing to even bring it by one of the other brothers of [Chief] Ibru's daughter. Or in any event, it's a large - obviously large family in any event. I think it appropriate and the right thing to do to order this case dismissed.

Thank you all very much. ³¹ Shortly thereafter, the circuit court issued an order embodying its decision to grant Janet's motion. The court also awarded Janet $4,500.00 in attorney's fees. On March 20, 2017, Peter noted his timely appeal to this Court. DISCUSSION I. Justiciability We must determine, as a threshold matter, whether Peter's Amended Complaint petitioning the court to review the validity of the Powers of Attorney remained justiciable in the circuit court following the death of Chief Ibru and the opening of the estate in Nigeria.

See , e.g. , R.K. Grounds Care v. Wilson , 235 Md. App. 20 , 36, 174 A.3d 906 (2017) (whether a court had subject matter jurisdiction to decide an issue ⁴³³ is a "threshold matter" that "may be raised at any time, by a party or by the Court"). The circuit court framed the issue as one of standing, ruling that "there are standing issues." But the issues raised implicate the circuit court's subject matter jurisdiction to hear Peter's action as well as Peter's standing to bring the action. Peter argues that the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear this case, establish a constructive trust, and render a declaratory judgment. He argues that the alleged fraudulent acts underlying his claims occurred during Chief Ibru's lifetime and that the funds in the joint accounts transferred solely to Janet.

Therefore, he contends, the funds at issue are non-probate assets, making this an equitable matter judiciable in circuit court. Additionally, Peter says he has standing to bring this action for declaratory judgment under the Maryland General and Limited Power of Attorney Act ("MGLPAA"). Janet responds that the circuit court correctly dismissed the action because Chief Ibru's death terminated the Powers of Attorney. Janet contends the circuit court decided rightly that "this is an estate case," and is within the Orphan's Court's ³² jurisdiction-not that of the circuit court.

Accordingly, Janet insists, Peter has no standing to seek equitable remedies on behalf of the estate because he is not the personal representative of the estate and has no authority to speak on behalf of Chief Ibru or the estate. 11 As we next explain, the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over the case and Peter had standing to bring the action. We review de novo a circuit ⁴³⁴ court's determinations ³³ of its own subject matter jurisdiction and a party's standing. See Holbrook v. Newell , 231 Md. App. 451 , 453, 153 A.3d 183 (2017) ; Tomran, Inc. v. Passano , 159 Md. App. 706 , 723, 862 A.2d 453 (2004), aff'd, 391 Md. 1 , 891 A.2d 336 (2006). 12 A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Relying on a Maryland federal district court case- Libonati v. Ransom -Peter asserts that, because the allegedly wrongful transfers occurred during Chief Ibru's lifetime, Peter should have been permitted to contest the validity of the Powers of Attorney and their effect on any subsequent transfers. 664 F.Supp.2d 519 (D. Md. 2009). He contends that the joint accounts transferred solely to Janet, as joint holder of the accounts, when Chief Ibru died, placing the funds outside Chief Ibru's estate as non-probate assets.

Because his claims concern title to non-probate assets, Peter urges that the issues are beyond the jurisdiction of a probate court to consider. Janet, on the other hand, cites to this Court's decision in Kroll v. Fisher for the proposition that if an attorney-in-fact mismanaged a decedent's funds during his or her life, the misappropriated funds go directly to the estate, not the party challenging the attorney-in-fact's actions. 182 Md. App. 55 , 957 A.2d 205 (2007). Janet reasons that this is a probate action ³⁴ and, had the court issued a decree regarding money she supposedly owed, the judgment would have " no compulsion over Chief Ibru's actual personal representative nor over [his] estate[.]" (Emphasis in original). By Janet's estimation, "such order would[ ] constitute a legal nullity, or at best, a sort of 'advisory opinion' applicable to only two of the late Chief Ibru's numerous offspring." (Emphasis in original).

As a general matter, a state equity court may not conduct "the administration of a decedent's estate," which is specially "committed to the Orphans' Court." Tribull v. Tribull , 208 Md. 490 , 499, 119 A.2d 399 (1956) ; see also Gaver v. Gaver , 176 Md. 171 , 189-90, 4 A.2d 132 (1939) ("Ordinarily courts of equity will not intervene in the administration of estates by a probate court except to remedy some evil or establish some right which such courts are powerless to grant or establish." (citations omitted) ). Maryland law has long recognized that the Orphans' Court is "a court of special limited jurisdiction, [and] must be confined to the express letter of its authority." DeFelice v. Riggs Nat'l Bank of Wash. , 55 Md. App. 476 , 478, 462 A.2d 88 (1983) (citing Taylor v. Bruscup , 27 Md. 219 (1867) ). This jurisdiction is a product of statutory law and allows the Orphans' Court to conduct judicial probate, direct the conduct of a personal representative, and pass orders which may be required in the course of the administration of an estate of a decedent. It may summon witnesses.

The court may not, under pretext of incidental power or constructive ⁴³⁵ authority, exercise any jurisdiction not expressly conferred. ET § 2-102(a). Implicit in this grant of jurisdiction to orphans' courts is a restriction on the jurisdiction of state equity courts from interfering with the administration of a decedent's estate. See Gaver , 176 Md. at 189 -90 , 4 A.2d 132 .

In Tribull , for example, the Court of Appeals considered whether the Orphans' Court could properly exercise jurisdiction to determine the validity of a transfer of title of a bank account, which was effected shortly before the decedent's death. 208 Md. at 493 , 119 A.2d 399 . There, in December of ³⁵ 1945, a woman, Mrs. Tribull, opened an account and placed close to $15,000 in it "in trust for herself and her daughter, [Antoinette], as joint owners, the balance at death of either belonging to the survivor." Id. For the next few years, the name of the account remained the same, although Antoinette made occasional withdrawals on her mother's orders. Id. at 494 , 119 A.2d 399 .

On July 1, 1952, Mrs. Tribull's son, Francis, took her to the hospital. Id. On July 3, Francis closed the account and transferred the remaining amount to a new account bearing only Mrs. Tribull's name. Id. at 494-95 , 119 A.2d 399 .

On July 8, Francis changed the account again-this time changing it from Mrs. Tribull's name alone to a joint account between her and Francis as "joint owners, subject to order of either, the balance at death of either to belong to the survivor." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Mrs. Tribull passed away on July 13, 1952. Id. at 496 , 119 A.2d 399 .

Following her death, Francis went to the bank and closed the third account and transferred the remaining money "to a new account in the name of Francis A. Tribull for himself and his wife as joint owners[.]" Id. at 497 , 119 A.2d 399 . Francis did not turn the money in the bank account over to the executor of Mrs. Tribull's estate, and Francis's brother, Paul, sued in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City to set aside the transfer of the bank account. Id. at 497-98, 492-93 , 119 A.2d 399 . The court granted a motion to dismiss the action, and "expressed the view that the bill could be brought only by the executor, even if he had refused to sue, and that [Paul's] only remedy was to apply to the Orphans' Court for an order requiring the executor to sue." Id. at 499 , 119 A.2d 399 .

Paul appealed the circuit court's dismissal of the suit. On appeal, the Court held that the grant of the motion to dismiss was in error, as the Orphans' Court would be unable to afford relief, as it was without jurisdiction to consider the claim because it was "of an equitable nature." Id. at 503 , 119 A.2d 399 . The Court reasoned, relying on its decision in Noel v. Noel , 173 Md. 147 , 195 A. 322 (1937), that equity jurisdiction-and not consideration in the Orphans' Court-was appropriate ³⁶ "because the jurisdiction of the [O]rphans' court was inadequate and incomplete and did not include, as did the court of equity, the power of the determination of questions of partnership, of the creation of express and implied trusts and their associated relations of fiduciary and beneficiary, and the determination of title to personalty between conflicting claims on behalf of the estate of the intestate on the one hand, and the mother and sister of the intestate, on the other. In consequence of its more extensive jurisdiction, and of its superiority of remedy and relief, equity had paramount authority and will retain its jurisdiction for such relief as may be necessary, and, while so exercising this jurisdiction, further proceedin[g]s on the pending proceedings in the [O]rphans' court should be stayed ." ⁴³⁶ Tribull , 208 Md. at 502 , 119 A.2d 399 (quoting Noel , 173 Md. at 151 , 195 A. 322 ) (emphasis added).

The Court noted that "the administration of a decedent's estate is committed to the Orphan's Court," but nonetheless concluded that equity jurisdiction was proper because "the only remedy which the Orphans' Court could give would be to direct the executor to bring suit; that Court could not try the issue of the validity of the transfer of the bank account." Id. at 499, 503, 119 A.2d 399 . Therefore, the circuit court-not the Orphans' court-retains jurisdiction over disputes where the equitable title of a decedent's property is at issue. 13 In Libonati , an elderly man-referred to as "Decedent" by the federal court-executed a durable power of attorney on December 23, 2008, appointing his neighbor, Dora Ransom, as his attorney-in-fact. 664 F.Supp.2d at 521 . On February 5, 2009, Decedent was admitted to the hospital and was later diagnosed with a terminal illness with an estimated three ³⁷ months to live. Id.

By that time, a form of dementia had deteriorated his mental state to the point that Decedent was unable to care for himself. Id. As a result, he moved in full-time with Ransom and her family. Id.

The same day that Decedent was admitted to the hospital, he "signed a writing purporting to be his Last Will and Testament" naming Ransom as his personal representative and sole beneficiary of his estate. Id. On June 5, 2009, Decedent passed away in Ransom's home that she shared with her husband and mother. Id.

Ransom submitted documents to Decedent's nieces and sister-in-law-the plaintiffs-stating that "prior to his death, she had transferred at least $350,000 of [Decedent's] assets to herself and designated herself the beneficiary of [Decedent's] transfer on death bank accounts." Id. The plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Orphans' Court for Baltimore City contesting the validity of the will, asserting that Decedent "was not legally competent to execute a [w]ill, that the execution of the [w]ill was the product of undue influence and fraud, and that the [w]ill lacked the requisite formalities." Id. The plaintiffs also filed a separate action in federal court seeking a declaration that the transfer of assets during Decedent's lifetime was improper, contending that "Ransom, and her co-defendants, through fraud and undue influence, transferred funds from Decedent to herself and designated herself the beneficiary of Decedent's transfer on death accounts." Id. at 522 . Ransom moved to dismiss the federal claim, arguing that the Orphans' Court proceeding precluded subject matter jurisdiction over the claim in federal court.

Id. The federal court began its discussion by noting that "[t]he probate exception 14 does not prevent a federal court from determining the rights of the parties; it prohibits only the administration of assets." ⁴³⁷ Id. (citation omitted). Quoting Maryland ³⁸ law, the court remarked that "the Maryland Court of Appeals has found that when the claim requires the determination of 'title to personalty between conflicting claims,' equity jurisdiction is appropriate." Id.

(quoting Tribull , 208 Md. at 502 , 119 A.2d 399 ) (additional citations omitted). The court held that it could exercise jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claim because the issue presented-whether Ransom held proper title to the transfer-on-death accounts-was "clearly one of title." Id. at 524 . Applying DeFelice v. Riggs , supra , the court ruled that " 'where the proceedings will either directly or effectively involve a determination of title to personal property ... [t]he Orphans' Courts ... are simply without jurisdiction to consider this type of question.' " Id. (quoting DeFelice , 55 Md. App. at 481 -82 , 462 A.2d 88 ) (alterations in Libonati ).

The court reasoned that the claim in federal court was "distinct and separate" from the claim filed in the Orphans' Court, meaning "[t]here [wa]s no danger" its decision would interfere with the administration of Decedent's estate. Id. at 523 . Further, the court held that the inter vivos transfer of funds pursuant to the power of attorney converted the assets into non-probate assets, making it "an issue beyond the jurisdiction of the Orphans' Court." Id. Regardless of its decision, the federal court explained, "administration of Decedent's estate will proceed in the Orphans' Court unimpeded." Id.

In Kroll -the case on which Janet relies-a deceased woman's nephew filed for an accounting in the circuit court for the period that her attorney-in-fact, Barbara Fisher, who was subsequently appointed as her personal representative, managed her finances. 182 Md. App. at 57 , 957 A.2d 205 . The nephew alleged that the personal representative had committed fraud during the time that she was the attorney-in-fact and sought an independent accounting of the estate and restitution for any "malfeasance." Id. at 58 , 957 A.2d 205 . Fisher moved to dismiss for lack of standing, which the court granted, reasoning that the Orphans' Court had sole jurisdiction to determine whether to appoint a successor personal representative and what monies, if any, the first personal ³⁹ representative owed to the estate. Id. 58-60 , 957 A.2d 205 .

The nephew appealed. Id. at 60 , 957 A.2d 205 . On appeal, this Court clarified that "[i]t was not a question of standing, but one of subject matter jurisdiction." Id. at 62 , 957 A.2d 205 . We held that the circuit court correctly dismissed the nephew's request for an accounting, as the Orphans' Court was the correct authority "to order such an accounting because [Fisher]'s management of Ms. Kroll's finances prior to her death is relevant to [Fisher]'s duties as personal representative of the estate." Id.

(citations omitted). We further instructed that, to obtain his requested relief, the nephew could file a claim in Orphan's Court seeking removal of the "personal representative for failing to discharge her obligations and, in that context, request discovery and an order requiring her to account for the management of the decedent's assets prior to the decedent's death." Id. at 63 , 957 A.2d 205 . Finally, we observed that, because the action was one by a beneficiary of an estate, requesting an accounting of the estate and alleging mismanagement by the personal representative of the estate, "the recovery of such funds would go directly to the estate." Id. Accordingly, we held that the Orphans' Court, and not the circuit court, possessed subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint.

Id. We do not read Kroll to be applicable in the current case. As the federal district court did in Libonati , we distinguish ⁴³⁸ the facts of Kroll because "the claim here is that the assets belonging to the decedent were wrongfully transferred by the decedent's attorney-in-fact to herself prior to the decedent passing away." 664