In Re Adoption/Guardianship of Joshua M.

WOODWARD, Judge. This appeal concerns Joshua M., the biological child of appellant, Rita M. Joshua was born on October 4, 1999. He has been in the care of the Prince George’s County Department of Social Services (“PGDSS”) since February 4, 2002. On October 4, 2004, the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, sitting as a juvenile court, entered judgment denying PGDSS’s petition to terminate appellant’s parental rights.

On February 28, 2005, upon motion by PGDSS to alter or amend the October 4, 2004 judgment, and following a hearing, the court amended its October 4, 2004 judgment, and granted PGDSS’s petition to terminate appellant’s parental rights. Appellant filed a motion to alter or amend the February 28, 2005 judgment and/or reopen case and to revise judgment. That motion was denied without a hearing. Appellant presents two questions for our review, which we have slightly re-phrased: I. Whether the trial court erred in granting PGDSS’s motion to alter or amend judgment and ultimately terminate appellant’s parental rights based, in part, on facts that occurred after the entry of the original judgment on October 4, 2004.

II

Whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to hold a hearing on appellant’s motion to alter or amend the February 28, 2005 judgment. ³⁴⁴ For the reasons stated herein, we shall affirm the judgment of the trial court. BACKGROUND Facts And Proceedings Prior To August 25, 2004 Appellant is the natural mother of Joshua. Joshua was born prematurely on October 4, 1999. He has three siblings, including a twin brother, Justin, all of whom have been removed from appellant’s care. 1 The father of Joshua is unknown. 2 Appellant has a history of alcohol and drug abuse, and was using illegal drugs while she was pregnant with Joshua.

At the time Joshua was born, he tested positive for cocaine. Joshua suffers from a host of medical problems including hypotonia, cerebral palsy, severe gastroesophageal reflux that necessitates a feeding tube, breathing ailments, as well as other disorders and developmental delays. 3 Joshua requires intensive physical therapy, daily doses of oxygen, assistance ambulating, and near constant supervision and care. 4 Joshua has twice been adjudicated by the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County as a child in need of assistance (“CIÑA”). The first occasion was in 2001, and the second in 2002. In both cases, the court found that appellant failed to ³⁴⁵ supervise Joshua and address his medical and developmental needs.

The court further determined that appellant’s longstanding substance abuse issues diverted her focus from the chronic needs of her children. On February 4, 2002, Joshua was removed from appellant’s care as a result of neglect. On that date Joshua, and his twin brother were found by police officers alone and unattended to in the apartment that they occupied with appellant. The children were dirty and in need of fresh diapers.

Since that time, Joshua has been in the care of the same foster family. Although Joshua’s foster parents are willing to continue providing care for him, they are not interested in adopting him. Since Joshua was committed to the care of PGDSS in 2002, appellant’s visits with him have been infrequent. Appellant has not attended Joshua’s medical appointments, and she has not been in communication with Joshua’s foster parents regarding Joshua.

Between February 2002 and July 2004, appellant and PGDSS executed four service agreements under which appellant was required to participate in in-patient substance abuse counseling and treatment programs, as well as parenting classes focused on special needs children. Although appellant participated in various out-patient substance abuse programs, she never successfully completed any of those programs. There is indication that on at least two occasions, appellant’s failure to comply with the provisions of her service agreement occurred as a result of her being incarcerated. 5 On December 9, 2003, PGDSS filed a petition for guardianship of Joshua, with the right to consent to adoption or long-term care short of adoption. On August 4, 5, and 25, 2004, the circuit court, sitting as a juvenile court, held a hearing on PGDSS’s motion to terminate appellant’s parental rights with respect to Joshua. ³⁴⁶ Facts And Proceedings After August 25, 2004 On October 4, 2004, the circuit court ruled that it was not in Joshua’s best interest to terminate appellant’s parental rights.

In so determining, the court acknowledged that appellant had abstained from drugs for eight months, and that she had a new husband who supported her financially and who had expressed a willingness to provide for both her and Joshua. However, in denying PGDSS’s petition, the court stated: [T]he Court does not find that it is in Joshua’s best interest to be returned to [appellant] at this time. Until [appellant’s] history of substance abuse and relapses are appropriately addressed by in-patient treatment, there is little likelihood that she could provide a safe and productive environment for Joshua. The court further ordered that appellant continue and complete all recommended substance abuse treatment programs, remain abstinent from drugs, and sign releases permitting PGDSS to monitor her progress in treatment.

PGDSS was ordered to provide liberal, bi-weekly, supervised visitation between appellant and Joshua, provide or make referrals for appellant for in-patient substance abuse treatment, as well as after-care, and arrange for parenting classes focused on caring for a special needs child. On October 15, 2004, eleven days after the court entered judgment denying PGDSS’s petition, PGDSS filed a Motion for New Trial, to Alter or Amend Judgment, and/or Reopen Case and to Revise Judgment. By way of its motion, PGDSS asserted that: (1) appellant was no longer participating in drug treatment; (2) appellant failed to attend five group sessions in August 2004 and all six sessions in September 2004; (3) appellant’s last urinalysis test was August 10, 2004; (4) appellant had failed to return telephone calls from drug treatment providers regarding in-patient treatment; and (5) appellant was “out of town.” In opposition to PGDSS’s motion, appellant responded that she was in North Carolina because of life threatening illnesses to her father and sister, both of whom died on October 17, 2004, that she would return ³⁴⁷ to Maryland in November, and that she would submit to inpatient treatment at that time. On December 15, 2004 and January 25, 2005, the court held a hearing on PGDSS’s motion to alter or amend judgment.

During that hearing the court considered evidence offered by both parties from August 25, 2004 through January 19, 2005. 6 On February 28, 2005, the court issued an amended order and decision granting PGDSS’s request to alter or amend judgment. The court adopted and incorporated findings from its original decision on October 4, 2004, and made the following additional findings based on evidence of facts occurring from August 25, 2004 through January 19, 2005: 36. Since the August 25, 2004 hearing, [appellant] ceased her sessions with Gaudenzia, Inc., and has not engaged in any formal drug treatment program. 37. Between August 25, 2004 and December 21, 2004, [appellant] did not visit or otherwise attempt to arrange any visits with Joshua, nor did she communicate with Joshua’s foster parents, . . . who have cared for Joshua for three years, regarding his well-being. 38. [Appellant] received a communication from her brother at the end of September 2004, that her father and sister were ill with cancer.

She went to North Carolina to be with them until their untimely death in October 2004. She remained in North Carolina through November 2004. [Appellant] did not notify [PGDSS] of her intention to travel to North Carolina nor the duration of her stay. 39. [Appellant] admitted that during her stay in North Carolina she smoked crack cocaine on more than one occasion. 40. Under the terms and conditions of [appellant’s] probation, she was subject to weekly urinalysis. [Appellant], however, did not submit to urinalysis between August and November 10, 2004. ³⁴⁸ 41. [Appellant] was assigned to Ms. Michelle Alston, her probation agent in the District of Columbia on September 22, 2004. However, Ms. Alston did not meet [appellant] until November 10, 2004. [Appellant] tested positive for cocaine on November 16,18 and December 9, 2004. 42. [Appellant] stated that she had attended AA/NA meetings at the Reeves Center in the District of Columbia since the August 2004 hearing, but provided no supporting documentation. 43. [Appellant] missed several group sessions through Gaudenzia, Inc. There is no evidence that [appellant] submitted to urinalysis testing between the one on August 10, 2004 and the one on November 10, 2004.

She tested positive for cocaine on November 16, 2004, November 18, 2004 and December 9, 2004, but tested negative on November 23, 2004, November 30, 2004 and December 2, 2004. [Appellant] did not attend any formal substance abuse treatment programs between August 10, 2004 and December 2004. 44. [Appellant] declined an opportunity on August 27, 2004, to observe Joshua at school. A letter from [PGDSS], regarding other possible school visits received no response from [appellant] until November 2004. 45. [Appellant] did not visit Joshua from the end of August 2004 to December 2004. [Appellant] failed to appear for a visit with Joshua on December 7, 2004. She later advised [PGDSS] that she forgot. 46. Since the August hearing, [PGDSS] located five possible in-patient treatment facilities and several parenting programs to address Joshua’s special needs.

However, [PGDSS] subsequently learned that [appellant] could not avail herself of those programs due to her District of Columbia residency. 47. [PGDSS’s] permanency plan for Joshua is adoption. However, they have yet to secure the appropriate adoptive match, but continue to monitor local and national adoption registries. ³⁴⁹ 48. Efforts by [PGDSS] to facilitate reunification between Joshua and [appellant] since August 25, 2004, have not achieved success. A scheduled visit between [appellant] and Joshua occurred on August 27, 2004. [Appellant] did not seek visitation again until November 30, 2004.

The next scheduled visitation was December 7, 2004. She was reportedly in North Carolina with her dying father and sister through November 2004. [Appellant] did not contact [PGDSS] to check on Joshua’s welfare during her North Carolina visit. Since the December 7, 2004 visit, [appellant] visited Joshua on December 22, 2004, January 5 and 19, 2005. 49. [Appellant’s] probation agent in the District of Columbia, Michelle Alston, communicated to [PGDSS] that [appellant] was on a waiting list for in-patient substance [abuse] treatment, possibly with the RAP program. The duration of such a program, should it become available, is unknown. 50.

In August 2004, [appellant] applied for food stamps and related benefits during her son Justin’s brief visit with her. She received $249.99 in cash and $265.00 in food stamps. These benefits were received by her for the months of August and September 2004. Justin, however, did not remain in [appellant’s] care for this period.

There is no evidence regarding how [appellant] utilized those benefits. 51. Subsequent to [appellant’s] release from incarceration in June 2004, she was assigned a probation agent in Fairfax County, Virginia. The probation was transferred to the District of Columbia in and around August 2004. However, [appellant] did not report to the newly assigned agent, Ms. Austin (sic), until after her return from North Carolina in November 2004.

In consideration of all of its findings, the court concluded: [Appellant’s] contacts with Joshua between 2002 and 2004 were sporadic, but she visited with him between her release from incarceration in June 2004 and August 2004. She has the capacity to provide for Joshua’s medical and other ³⁵⁰ needs, but not the will or the drive to overcome her addiction. Neither [appellant] nor [PGDSS] have provided the opportunity for Joshua to maintain contact with his siblings, Kayla and Jonathan, or his twin brother, Justin. Joshua has no emotional ties with them or his mother.

Tragically, [appellant’s] addiction has both created and perpetuated this reality for Joshua and his siblings. Parenting is an awesome responsibility, particularly for a special needs child. [Appellant’s] desire for drugs consumes her life, leaving no room for the task of providing stability for Joshua. Regrettably, [PGDSS’s] request to alter/amend judgment must be granted and the parental rights be terminated. It is unfortunate that the link between Joshua and his siblings never really developed.

Any link between Joshua and his father is non-existent. [Appellant] was the last link. She never developed the opportunities for a bond to grow between her and Joshua. Her addiction became the centerpiece of her existence. Joshua can wait no longer.

It is in his best interests to terminate the rights of his parents. [PGDSS’s] request to alter/amend judgment is hereby granted. Thereafter, on March 9, 2005, appellant filed a motion to alter or amend judgment and/or reopen case and revise judgment. By way of her motion, appellant asserted, inter alia, that she was enrolled in an in-patient drug treatment program, that she was drug-free, and that her prognosis was very good. She requested a hearing to present additional evidence.

PGDSS did not oppose the motion. On March 18, 2005, the court denied appellant’s motion without a hearing. This appeal followed. DISCUSSION (I) Standard of Review In resolving the issue of whether the trial court erred in granting PGDSS’s motion to alter or amend the October 4, ³⁵¹ 2004 judgment based, in part, on facts that occurred after the entry of that judgment, we must first determine what standard guides our review.

Although not expressly stated, the parties set forth two separate standards of review. Specifically, appellant attempts to draw a bright-line rule by arguing it was legal error for the trial court to admit evidence of facts that occurred after the entry of judgment on October 4, 2004. Appellee responds that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in receiving the additional evidence of facts that arose after October 4, 2004, and ultimately entering a new judgment. Both parties agree that the trial court was within its rights to consider evidence of facts that occurred between the last day of the trial, August 25, 2004, and the entry of judgment on October 4, 2004.

Our review of the trial court’s decision to grant appellee’s motion to alter or amend judgment under Maryland Rules 2-534 and 2-535(a) is governed by the abuse of discretion standard. See Renbaum v. Custom Holding, Inc., 386 Md. 28, 46 , 871 A.2d 554 (2005) (holding the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting a