In Re Julianna B.

⁵¹⁷ HOLLANDER, Judge. The Circuit Court for Montgomery County, sitting as a juvenile court, found Julianna B., appellant, delinquent, based on its determination that she committed second-degree murder and related offenses. At an initial disposition hearing on January 11, 2006, the court committed appellant to the Department of Juvenile Services (“DJS” or the “Department”). This Court affirmed.

See In re Julianna B., 177 Md.App. 547 , 936 A.2d 906 (2007) (“ Julianna I”). The circuit court held a review hearing on June 18, 2007, at which it declined to modify the terms of appellant’s commitment. 1 Instead, it continued appellant’s detention at a secure DJS facility. Appellant challenges that ruling, posing the following questions: I. In issuing an Order prohibiting the Department of Juvenile Services from implementing the program of rehabilitation that the Department had designed for Ms. B. which included passes for outings, home visits, and to pursue her college education, did the juvenile court violate the Separation of Powers Doctrine and the Juvenile Causes Act?

II

Notwithstanding uncontested evidence, including rarely given testimony by the Secretary of the Department of Juvenile Services, that Julianna B. had earned and was deserving of home passes and supervised college attendance as an important part of her program of rehabilitation, did the juvenile court abuse its discretion, violate the Juvenile Causes Act and violate Ms. B.’s due process rights in ordering that Julianna B. must not receive home passes or be permitted to ⁵¹⁸ attend college solely as a punitive measure because, in the judge’s words, “21 months [of detention] is woefully inadequate”? The State has moved to dismiss this appeal. It argues that “the juvenile court’s discretionary ruling declining to alter the disposition in Julianna B.’s case does not constitute a final, appealable order.” For the reasons that follow, we shall deny the motion to dismiss, vacate the juvenile court’s order, and remand for further proceedings. I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL SUMMARY 2 On September 23, 2005, during a fight in the parking lot of a high school, appellant, then fifteen years old, fatally stabbed fifteen-year-old Kanisha Neal (known as “Missy”).

On December 22, 2005, the juvenile court determined that appellant’s conduct constituted second-degree murder and related offenses. In Julianna I, 177 Md.App. at 549-54 , 936 A.2d 906 , we quoted, in part, the factual summary provided by the circuit court: “On the night of September 23, 2005, [the victim] and her friends, and [appellant] and hers attended a football game between Sherwood and Blake [High Schools].... [The victim] walked towards [appellant] intending to fight. With respect to [the victim], I find that she was 5 feet, 5, and she weighed 225 pounds; that she was 15 years old; that she possessed no weapon at any time; that she only used her fists; that she threw the first punch; that she approached [appellant] as [appellant] stood still; that she pulled six hair extensions from [appellant’s head; that she ⁵¹⁹ was unaware that [appellant] had a knife.... She was twice [appellant's weight and probably a lot slower than [appellant].

With respect to [appellant], I find that [appellant] was about 115 pounds; that she never ran for help to the police or adults____ She didn’t run away. This Court also finds that she armed herself in advance with a knife, a deadly weapon. When [the victim] approached, she stood still with clenched fist and a secreted knife. As I indicated, she didn’t retreat.

Her current lie, that [one of her friends] placed an object in her back pocket, that [appellant] knew it was a knife without asking for one, seeing it, touching it, [the friend] saying anything is preposterous. [Appellant] and [the victim] squared off, and [the victim] punched first, and [appellant] followed suit. [The victim] got the better of her, and [appellant] pulled out her deadly dagger; [appellant] never falling; never being choked. Her lucid responses for hours and hours afterwards and her pristine face depicted in [a photo taken shortly after the fight] gave testament to the State’s theory of a one-on-one fight. Once [appellant] pulled the knife, she slashed at [the victim] and made contact with her on six occasions, three cuts to [the victim]’s abdomen, one on each arm, which were consistent with defensive wounds, and a stab wound to the heart. .... [Appellant] said she didn’t know she stabbed [the victim]. As soon as [the victim] fell, [appellant] stopped fighting, and she immediately concealed the knife.

These actions belie her statement. Furthermore, the narrow wound to [the victim]’s left ventricle, which entered 3-1/2 inches, were [sic] straight in and straight out, which would indicate consciousness of penetration. ⁵²⁰ * * * Flight is evidence of consciousness of guilt, and she fled the scene and discarded the knife somewhere. [Appellant] never went over to the victim to render aid or say that she was only trying to get her off. She never went over and said, ‘Oh, my gosh! I can’t believe this happened.

Are you okay? I didn’t mean to go this far. I didn’t want you to die. I didn’t want you to fall.’ Never said that.

Never approached that. Rather, she remorselessly said ... T stabbed that fat bitch.’ No, [appellant], you were not in immediate danger of death or serious bodily injury. You never kicked [the victim] in the shins, screamed for help, or ever tried to cut her in her lower legs if your head was down, as you say.

You escalated the fight by plunging that serrated blade into [the victim]’s heart with the intention to inflict serious bodily injury. I do not find that you acted in perfect self-defense or imperfect self-defense. I, therefore, find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that you were involved in the second degree murder of [the victim] with the intent to inflict serious bodily harm, with a depraved heart, and by way of felony murder.” On January 9, 2006, DJS filed a Pre-Disposition Investigation Recommendation (“PDI”), noting that appellant had no prior record. In a section captioned “Perception of Offense(s),” DJS observed that “Julianna presents as very remorseful regarding her involvement in the current offense.

She is prepared to take responsibility for her actions.” The final section of the PDI was captioned “Recommended Treatment Service Plan.” It called, inter alia, for “[placement at the Waxter Children’s Center.” A psychological evaluation of appellant, conducted by James J. Smith, Ph.D., a psychologist, was appended to thé PDI. Dr. Smith noted that appellant “admitted to stabbing the victim during a physical altercation.” Further, he said: “During her [pre-trial] detention at the Noyes Center, Julianna has been ⁵²¹ described [as] respectful, relates well to others, and her behavior has been characterized as above average. She has attained the highest behavioral level in the detention center.” Dr. Smith offered the following recommendation: Given the serious nature of the current offense, it is recommended that Julianna be considered for placement outside of her home and community and into a DJS facility. Although such a placement needs to be an appropriate consequence for her actions, there does not appear to be a need for intensive therapeutic services, and such a placement is not likely to be long term.

However, placement in a locked facility, such as the Waxter Center, could be considered, but the length of her stay could be tied to her overall compliance and performance within the program. The prognosis for successful completion of such a program is considered to be very good. The court held a disposition hearing on January 11, 2006. 3 A representative of DJS, identified in the transcript as “Ms. Armstrong,” joined in the recommendation expressed in the PDI. She requested placement of Julianna in “the long-term secure program” at Waxter Children’s Center.

Armstrong added: “It’s the long-term behavior modification peer program,” and cautioned: “We don’t know how long she’ll be at Waxter. It’ll depend on her behavior and then the Court’s decision based on how long the Court wants her to stay there.” Appellant’s counsel pointed to the reports from the staff at Noyes, indicating appellant’s exceptional behavior, and suggested that “home detention would permit [appellant] to be in a situation where she could have all the restrictions, but at the same time, get the education.” Her attorney also asked the court “to maintain [appellant’s] level of schooling.” ⁵²² The Assistant State’s Attorney (“ASA”) “adamantly oppose[d]” the request for home detention, arguing: Your Honor, this is a case in which the Court found [appellant] involved in committing a second degree murder. ... * * * And, Your Honor, the State believes that based on the serious nature of the offense, Ms. B’s role in it, and in holding her accountable for what she’s done, the State is going to ask that [appellant] be held, ordered to be held at the Waxter facility until she is 21. After hearing a brief statement from Joyce Neal, the victim’s mother, the court acknowledged “the grief and loss that the Neal family has endured,” noting: “I have no sentence within my disposal that could even the score of this incident.” It ruled: Now, having found Julianna involved of second degree murder, this case is back before me for final disposition. And that’s somewhat of a misnomer, because this Court will maintain jurisdiction over this case until she reaches the age of 21 or the case is dismissed before that; that is, the jurisdiction terminated.

I will continue to personally monitor this case until she reaches 21 or until it’s closed out. Our state legislature has established [a] separate lexicon for juveniles, which serves notice to the public that they are to be treated differently than adults. For example, juveniles are not found guilty, but involved; not convicted, but determined to be delinquent; not placed in jail or a penitentiary, but in a detention facility. ■ The maximum incarceration that an adult could receive for a second degree murder is 30 years. That would mean, were Julianna convicted as an adult, she could serve or the Court would have within its power to keep her incarcerated until she turned 46, still a relatively young age when you consider life expectancies.

But yet, that would be 30 years down the road. ⁵²³ The maximum detention that a juvenile can receive for a case that’s in juvenile court, where this case is, is until they reach their 21st birthday. That is a 25-year difference. The legislature has it enacted in the code the criteria for this Court to consider when sentencing a juvenile, which I must follow. The Court must balance objectives for children who have committed delinquent acts.

I must balance the public safety and the protection of the community, accountability of the child to the victim and the community for the offense committed, and the competency and character development to assist ... the child ... in becoming a responsible and productive member of society when she does leave this Court’s jurisdiction. When we look at Prong No. 3, competency and character, I find that Julianna has been leading, to this point, somewhat of a double life. We’ve had counselors. We’ve had a lot of reports indicating that she is an exceptional student and a lovely young lady the majority of the time that she is seen in public, and I don’t doubt any of those.

However, the other side was brought to the attention of this Court in the incident itself on September 23rd. This is a tough case, because no amount of detention can even the ledger, can set the score straight, can balance it. And that’s not what my job is. That’s not what my authority allows. [Appellant] asked that I consider home detention.

And although I do agree that she would do extremely well—in fact, I think I could send her home and put her on probation, and I suspect she probably would do very well. And were we dealing with a shoplifting or a housebreaking or something along those lines, State might even consent; Department may even ask for that. The State, on the other hand, is asking me to sentence her to her 21st birthday. It’s premature for that, because I ⁵²⁴ must consider the development, the character-building prong of my sentencing criteria along the way.

I do agree with the report of the psychologist, the Department of Juvenile Services, and the State, that she needs to be in detention ... out of the community. Public safety and protection of the community and accountability of the child require that. And to my understanding, Waxter is the only maximum security facility within this state [sic] ... that has a long-term program---I find that it is appropriate in this case. [T]herefore, I will find Julianna delinquent. I will place her at the Alfred D. Noyes Children’s Center pending transfer to the Waxter Children’s Center for the long-term placement.

We’ll see what happens in the next round, the next chapter. I will not set a review date. I’ll wait to hear from the Department.[ 4 ] The juvenile court subsequently issued a Disposition and Commitment Order, in which it found that appellant was delinquent and that “the best interests of both [appellant] and the public would be served by continuing to remove [appellant] from her home environment as it is contrary to the safety and welfare of [appellant] and the community because she is a serious risk to herself and others.” It committed appellant to the custody of DJS, “with the right of the custodian to consent to such medical, educational, and ordinary treatment as may be determined to be in [appellant’s] best interest, subject to the further order of this Court.” Further, it ordered that appellant “be detained at the Alfred D. Noyes Children’s Center pending transfer [to] The Waxter Children’s Center for long-term placement____” The court also ordered appellant “placed and continued under the jurisdiction and supervision of this Court____” ⁵²⁵ On January 17, 2006, DJS filed a “Certification of Implementation.” It stated that “the Treatment Service Plan for [appellant], which was recommended by the Department of Juvenile Services at a disposition hearing and approved by the Court ... [w]as implemented as of 01-17-06.” 5 Appellant noted her first appeal to this Court, in which she claimed that the court should have found her involved for manslaughter, not second-degree murder. Appellant did not challenge the juvenile court’s initial Disposition and Commitment Order, however.

We affirmed the juvenile court’s adjudication of delinquency. Julianna I, 177 Md.App. at 561 , 936 A.2d 906 . 6 On April 7, 2006, three months after appellant’s initial disposition hearing, appellant’s DJS case manager submitted a Memorandum to the court regarding appellant’s “[eligibility for outings and home passes.” The case manager noted that she had “informed the staff at Waxter that Julianna must have all passes and outings Court approved.” In support of the request for such permission, the Memorandum stated: Julianna has done extremely well at Waxter to date. She earns 100% of her points every day in the program. All members of the treatment team at Waxter have very positive things to report about Julianna and her progress.

She ⁵²⁶ is earning good grades and she is respectful to the staff and her peers. Julianna is considered a role model in the program. Given this positive behavior, Julianna has earned the “Purple Level”. On the Purple Level, students are eligible for outings with staff members (movies, bowling, outside activities, etc.) As well as passes with family.

The passes increase in length as she progresses in the program. At first, students complete two 2-hour passes, then two 12-hour passes, then two 24-hour passes, and finally, two 48-hour passes. However, DJS advised the court that the State’s Attorney was “adamantly opposed to Julianna going on outings/passes.” According to the case manager, a representative of the State’s Attorney’s office stated that “Julianna has only been at Waxter a short time and it is too soon to allow such passes---[I]f the Court is inclined to grant the outings/passes, the State would like a Review Hearing in the matter so that the victim’s family may be present/heard.” The case manager stated that DJS “defers to the Court in this matter.” The court denied the request for home passes and outings without a hearing; on the bottom of the DJS Memorandum, the judge wrote: “Respondent has been adjudicated delinquent of 2nd MURDER! Denied !!” (Capitalization and underlining in original).

The judge also sent an Action Memo to the court’s Juvenile Division Assignment Commissioner. He marked with an “X” the box on the form next to the line, “No action to be taken at this time.” In addition, he wrote “DENIED!!” at the top. The following month, on May 17, 2006, appellant’s new DJS case manager, Niasha John, filed another Memorandum with the court, requesting a home pass for appellant. Ms. John reported: Julianna continues to excel in the program and ... she is doing exceptionally well both behaviorally and academically____ Julianna is currently on the highest level which is the gold level at Waxter’s.

The entire treatment team has stated that it is a pleasure to work with Julianna and that ⁵²⁷ she is a leader and a great help to the staff and the other girls in the program. At this time, Waxter’s is requesting a home pass, based on her accelerating progress in the program. The Department has enclosed a treatment progress report and letter from Waxter’s in regards to Julianna. Waxter’s feels that as a part of her rehabilitation process it is essential for Julianna to participate in outings and the privileges that is [sic] available to her.

The outings include but are not limited to recreational activities. Other activities include those of an educational nature such as college tours, museums, etc. The treatment team feels that although the initial request for a home pass was denied, Julianna has maintained consistency and has in fact continued to excel in the program. A “Treatment Progress Report,” prepared by Dr. Keith Hannan, appellant’s psychologist at the Waxter Center, was attached to the Memorandum. Dr. Hannan stated: Juliana [sic] was involved in an incident at a high school football game in September of 2005, in which she was attacked by a group of girls, and responded by pulling out a knife she had been given by a friend and stabbing one of her attackers.

The girl later died. [PJrior to the killing in September, Juliana had no history of delinquent behavior. She was an honor student, with no involvement in antisocial activities. She enjoyed the role of peacemaker when others would squabble. She took pride in being a positive influence on her friends.

She reported a close relationship with her mother and sister. Indeed, her mother visits twice weekly, never missing a visitation time. Juliana has not abused drugs. In essence, she displayed none of the risk factors for delinquency.

Talking about the killing has been very difficult for Juliana. She has been very tearful. She clearly feels very badly about what happened.... She continues to suffer from guilt.

At this point, she is still struggling to figure out ⁵²⁸ how she is going to live with her involvement in the killing. Clearly, her behavior during the incident does not fit with her values. She is . able to acknowledge that she feared for her life during the incident and that she might have been killed had she not used the knife. However, she reports that the guilt is so difficult to bear that she wishes she had never had the knife even though it might mean that she would have been killed.

Juliana’s behavior on the unit has been exemplary. She is a positive leader, encouraging the other girls to refrain from antisocial behaviors. She is seen by all of her peers as a source of support. She regularly diffuses tension that erupts between other girls.

In groups, she is a real asset, helping to get her peers focused on group topics in a productive way. I have seen enough of Juliana to believe that she represents no risk to the community. She has no history of aggressive or antisocial behaviors, other than the killing. Her behavior during the incident can be seen as an unfortunate response to a terrifying situation.

I have found no evidence of character defects that would indicate a risk of future involvement in aggressive acting out. The long-term secure program is a six to twelve month program. A key part of the program involves a slow transition to the community. Girls earn home passes through good behavior.

The family must also be seen and assessed for the home passes to take place. While on a pass, girls are supervised at all times by their parents. Home passes allow girls supervised time with their family during which they can practice new skills they are learning in the program. If difficulties emerge, they are addressed in their treatment upon their return to the facility.

I believe home passes would assist Juliana in the healing process, while at the same time, not compromising the safety of the community. (Italics added). Six days later, the court denied the request, again without a hearing. Then, on July 3, 2006, appellant’s DJS case manager ⁵²⁹ sent a Memorandum to the court, requesting a “Six-Month Review Hearing” for appellant.

On July 31, 2006, the judge signed an “Action Memo,” in which he again checked the box for “[n]o action to be taken at this time.” He also crossed out the section for scheduling a review hearing and inserted the words “do not” into a portion of the form, which then read: “Please do not schedule the above captioned petition(s) for ... Review Hearing.” On December 21, 2006, six members of appellant’s treatment team at the Waxter Center, including Dr. Hannan, signed a letter to the judge “to update [him] on the progress of [appellant] in the Long-Term Secure Program at the Waxter Center.” The letter reiterated many of the observations of Dr. Hannan’s prior Treatment Progress Report, and included the following additional statements: We believe that [appellant] has started to accept what happened and will find a way to integrate the events of that day into her life. Juliana [sic] has poured her energy into her education. She earned the credits necessary to graduate from high school.

She competed in the Department of Juvenile Services oratorical contest and won first place. She is currently studying to take the SAT. Juliana’s crime was extremely serious. While we function as a rehabilitative program, we also take seriously our role in protecting the community from dangerous juvenile offenders.

We have subjected Juliana to careful scrutiny. We have seen enough of her to believe that she represents no risk to the community. We are respectfully requesting permission for [appellant] to have a series of home passes, which, if successful, will lead to her release from the program____ We believe Juliana has already received maximum benefit from our program and is ready to move on with her life. We are very ⁵³⁰ confident that this youngster does not represent a threat to the community.

Instead, we believe she will become a productive adult who is an asset to her community. (Emphasis added). The court took no action in response to the letter. On March 28, 2007, appellant’s case manager, Ms. John, sent another Memorandum to the court, including a “Case Update and Request for a Review Hearing.” DJS attached to the Memorandum a fourteen-page psychological evaluation conducted on February 19, 2007, by Laura Estupinan-Kane, Ph.D., a psychologist, 7 as well as the December 2006 letter from appellant’s treatment team.

Ms. John stated: Julianna has continued to do well at the Waxter Center. Julianna has earned all her high school credits and was able to graduate in October 2006. Her commencement ceremony was held at the Waxter’s [sic] Center in which Waxter’s staff members, family, Mends, and the education department were in attendance. [Former DJS] Secretary Kenneth Montague was in attendance as well and spoke very highly of Julianna and her achievements____ Julianna took the [SAT] in January 2007 and received a score of 1550 out of 2400---- Julianna has excelled scholastically, and has very high potential to be an academic scholar. The ultimate goal is for Julianna to be able to transition back into the community and attend college.

Julianna is currently taking an online course at Anne Arundel Community College for Introduction to Psychology. Julianna continues to be a positive role model and has been an enormous help to staff members and teachers. At Julianna’s treatment team meetings staff members have nothing but positive things to say about Julianna. She has been on Gold Level (which is the highest level in the program) since April 2006.

Julianna has qualified several times for the purple room which has special privileges and is used to recognize excellent behavior in youth. ⁵³¹ Julianna has a very large family support system and they are present at all treatment team meetings and other family-oriented activities in the program. She has also made great strides in therapy sessions---- The aftercare treatment team is recommending that community visits be integrated as an aftercare plan. At this time, the Department is requesting a Review Hearing to further discuss options to assist her rehabilitation process. A week later, on April 5, 2007, counsel for appellant also filed a Request for a Review Hearing.

The court granted the request, and the review hearing was held on June 18, 2007. At the hearing, Donald DeVore, the Secretary of DJS, testified in support of DJS’s recommendation. The court commented: “I think it’s the first time I’ve had a Secretary actually come to court and testify. And obviously, it shows the level of interest that the Department has [in Julianna].” Secretary DeVore testified that he was “very impressed by the way that [appellant has] conducted herself in our facilities .... ” He emphasized appellant’s academic achievements and her role as “an arbiter for disputes and conflict that’s existed within the facilities.” Noting that appellant had “completed the first phase of her treatment” under DJS, “which was a period of confinement and treatment at Waxter Center,” the Secretary explained: “And we’re now at a point, Your Honor, where I think we need to give consideration for that appropriate type of transitioning plan,” because appellant “represents no further risk to our community....” Secretary DeVore underscored the importance of an “appropriate transition plan,” stating: What I’ve learned, Your Honor, about our facilities ... is that what happens within our facilities is important, but [what] is almost more important is that there be an appropriate transition plan for kids when they’re ready to leave our facilities. ⁵³² When you look at recidivism rates in our general population, the majority of kids that recidivate are ... kids who come back into our system because we haven’t done a good job of providing for transitioning.

The Secretary presented the transition plan recommended for appellant by DJS. 8 The plan called for appellant to “gradually transition back to the community by successfully attending Anne Arundel Community College, home visits, participating in family therapy and continuing to participate in individual therapy,” with the ultimate goal, by the end of 2007, of release from Waxter to the custody of her mother on aftercare supervision. Secretary DeVore explained that the home visit passes would progress from once-a-week day passes, to overnight, and then to weekend passes, predicated on direct parental supervision at all times. The transition plan also provided a suggested course schedule for appellant at Anne Arundel Community College, and anticipated that “Waxter will provide transportation to and from ... the [campus] daily.” 9 Further, Secretary DeVore indicated that DJS staff could accompany appellant to classes, “if the Court saw that as necessary and appropriate.” Additionally, the Secretary noted that, after appellant’s anticipated release from the Waxter Center in January 2008, “[s]he would continue under our supervision of probation ... and any conditions that the Court would consider appropriate to impose upon her at that time.” The court questioned DeVore about the educational options for appellant if she remained at Waxter, including “undergraduate studies.” DeVore responded: “So far, Your Honor, she’s taken one [college] course, which was three credits in psychology. And that was an on-line course at Waxter, using the computers there____ But with on-line, it would probably be one course at a time____” Later, DeVore explained that ⁵³³ appellant had limited access at Waxter to internet-accessible computers needed for on-line college courses.

Moreover, not all courses required for a degree program are available on line. The following exchange is noteworthy: [The Court]: And I’m sure you’re acutely aware that the legislature, in their wisdom, have seen fit that some individuals should be ... detained until they reach their 21st birthday, is that correct? [Secretary DeVore]: Yes. Yes, Your Honor. I’m aware of that. [The Court]: And one thing I’ve heard echoed over and over, when I sat in Juvenile ... is that “Judge, he or she is 18 now.

We don’t have anything else to offer for them.” ... Let them go____ I don’t think the legislature intended ... for anyone to reach 18, just to be released, regardless of ... the offense. [Secretary DeVore]: If that’s what you thought I was proposing, Your Honor, I’m certainly not. [The Court]: I didn’t think you were.... What I’m saying is you’ve looked at the facilities.... You found a lot of them are woefully inadequate....

And you’ve made a lot of improvement. What steps ... is the Department taking? Or do you have the budget ... to deal with these children, age 17 on. Obviously, when they hit 18, they’re not juvenile.

I mean they’re still under our jurisdiction, but they become adults. And we hear all too often, I believe, that “Judge, there’s really nothing else. We’ve finished the program.” ____ I guess what I’m saying is the legislature could have said everybody should, once they start a program, should finish a program, and when the program is over, then they should be released. But they didn’t say that---- So my question to you is, in the alternative, if the Court doesn’t see fit, just given all the alternatives, what would there be for Ms. B.?

In response, DeVore outlined several long-term plans for improving the programmatic capacity of DJS, and some of the ⁵³⁴ institutional challenges that DJS faced. He also offered comments concerning appellant and his “best thoughts about a transition plan” for her: [S]peaking on behalf of the Department, we have no intention to shake Julianna loose. We’re willing to structure something that we think would be very reasonable to the Court, to continue to maintain accountability of Julianna while we also strive to improve her competence as a student. I thought that since she already has this existing relationship with Anne Arundel, given only one course, and since that’s in Maryland and we can very closely supervise that, I thought that going to the community college was very appropriate.

And I also think that the elements of this transition plan are, too. And as I said, we’re not locked into this plan.... If the Court’s concern is that you want our staff to accompany her to college, that’s what we will do. If the Court determines that they want a longer period of transition than January for release, then that’s what we’ll do.

Dr. Hannan, appellant’s psychologist at Waxter, testified that he had been appellant’s therapist for the past 15 months. In that capacity, he saw her every week for one hour. He noted that appellant also participated in weekly group therapy, and her family has been very involved in her treatment. According to Dr. Hannan, appellant’s treatment team recommended appellant’s transition to the community.

Dr. Hannan explained that appellant was committed to the “secure unit” at Waxter, a 6 to 12 month program that requires completion of four levels. Describing appellant as a “role model,” he noted that she “progressed as quickly as one can to the highest level.” Once this “gold” level is achieved, explained Dr. Hannan, the program anticipates transitional home visits. According to Dr. Hannan, such home passes are a “key part of the program at Waxter, involving a slow transition to the community.” Concerning home passes, Dr. Hannan stated: ⁵³⁵ [Appellant] had earned them, according to the requirements of the program, first of all. And I think, also, there was a feeling at that point that she had progressed in her treatment to the point where we didn’t really see a whole lot of other things that we could do for her in the facility.

And sort of the next logical step would be to begin some transitional visits. In Dr. Hannan’s view, appellant “poses no security concern.” He considered appellant quite “impressive,” and claimed he had “never seen anyone like [her].” Dr. Hannan also testified that the staff was having difficulty securing sufficient time for appellant on the Center’s computer, which appellant needed to continue her college studies. On cross-examination, the ASA asked Dr. Hannan whether he was aware of the discrepancy between the court’s finding that appellant did not act in self-defense and appellant’s claim to the contrary. The following colloquy ensued: [Dr. Hannan]: I think this case has already been tried....

What we have tried to do is find out whether there are any anti-social qualities in this girl, and whether she is safe to be in the community. I did not sit through the trial. And our job here at Waxier is basically to determine whether a girl is safe to reenter the community. And that’s the determination that we’ve made. [The Court]: Let me just interject myself.

But Doctor, that’s an important consideration, is it not? How you, at Waxter are viewing the individual? .... What I did is a matter of public record, and that’s why she’s there. But when you’re determining whether or not she poses a danger and should be released, you obviously, I would think, would have to tick through your mind whether you thought it was justified or not---- Are you saying that that doesn’t even enter into your consideration? [Dr. Hannan]: No, it does, sir.

But what I would say about that is a person’s character is determined on what they do every day. And certainly, there are extraordinary circumstances that people can come across in their life, in which ⁵³⁶ they would engage in behaviors that are atypical for them. And it’s my assessment that that’s what happened here: that we have a girl who was in a situation that was extraordinary, and engaged in a behavior which is not typical for her---- And you know, we’ve tried to make, we certainly hope for that in all our girls, when we make determinations about their safety to return to the community, we have left no stone unturned here. (Emphasis added.) Appellant’s uncle, Nathaniel M., testified that he visits Julianna every Saturday and, after she completed her high school education at Waxter, he worked with her in applying to college.

Mr. M. testified that Julianna had been accepted at several colleges, and had received a total of $325,000 in scholarship monies based on “academic excellence.” Niasha John, appellant’s DJS case manager, testified that appellant’s progress had “been exemplary for the past 17 months.” She reported that a home study of appellant’s stepfather’s home was also satisfactory. Additionally, Ms. John confirmed that appellant had only limited computer access at the Waxter Center. The State called the victim’s mother and uncle to testify as to the effect of the killing on their family. The ASA also offered into evidence the evaluation of appellant conducted by Dr. Estupinan-Kane, dated February 19, 2007. 10 The judge described Dr. Estupinan-Kane as “one of the most outstanding psychologists that I’ve ever had contact -with.

And I have no trouble saying that. She’s amazing. And the Department is lucky that they still have her.” The evaluation by Dr. Estupinan-Kane included a “Delinquent History” section, which recounted, in detail, appellant’s version of the incident, including her claim that she acted in self-defense. Dr. Estupinan-Kane also summarized the re- ⁵³⁷ suits of several psychological tests for “Personality/Emotional Functioning” and “Risk Assessment,” as follows: The Revised Children’s Manifest Anxiety Scale (RCMAS) is ... designed to assess for the presence of anxiety---Her scores ... suggest[ ] a reduction in he r overall level o f anxiety. * ❖ * The Piers-Harris Children’s Self-Concept Scale, Second Edition (Piers-Harris 2) ... generates self-concept and validity scales____ [H]er level of self-esteem is comparable to that of most students in the norming sample.

The MACI [Million Adolescent Clinical Inventory] is ... designed to assess adolescent personality characteristics and clinical syndromes____ Julianna’s MACI was valid although she was not forthcoming in responding to the measure and attempted to present herself in a somewhat unrealistically positive light. Nonetheless, personality patterning reflects an egocentric and potentially attention-seeking adolescent. Julianna’s profile suggests that she may appear entitled. Her profile suggests that she is self-confident and she is likely accustomed to admiration and doting by adult figures in her life.

She is likely to be strongly self-reliant and may be overly confident that things will work out well without any need on her part to engage in reciprocal social interactions. However, her profile also suggests that she has a strong need for affection and thus she may engage in manipulative or attention-seeking behaviors in order to ensure that her needs for attention are met. Julianna’s profile suggests that she is likely to be somewhat submissive and that she may avoid condemnation by others by behaving in a controlled and perfectionistic manner. However, angry feelings may occasionally break through her external control.

Julianna’s profile also suggests that she is somewhat indifferent to the needs and concerns of others.... A mild predisposition to continued delinquent behavior is suggested. ⁵³⁸ The YLS [Youth Level of Service] is ... designed to assess a youth’s level of risk for future delinquent activity. Julianna’s score ... suggests she is at low risk for continued delinquent involvement. * ❖ * The Structured Assessment of Violence Risk in Youth (SAVRY) is a checklist of risk factors derived from the professional literature pertaining to youth violence and allows for consideration of developmental [sic] and the dynamic nature of risk. The SAVRY is comprised of 24 risk items---- Based on systematic review of the risk factors identified by the SAVRY, Julianna appears to be at low risk for future violence....

(Emphasis added.) In summary, Dr. Estupinan-Kane made the following observations: Based on prior assessment, Julianna appears to be functioning in the average range of intelligence____ Overall, Julianna manifests no significant cognitive deficits. Julianna presents as a likeable and engaging adolescent but testing suggests that she is rather egocentric____ Julianna’s primary coping mechanism appeared to be avoidance. ... Julianna has maintained appropriate behavior throughout her placements at Noyes Children’s Center and Waxter. She expressed regret for her actions on the day in question but continues to maintain that she was acting in self-defense.

Julianna appeared forthcoming regarding her involvement in physical altercations with peers and admitted that prior to the incident in question she did not view fighting as of significant consequence. Testing suggests Julianna is currently attempting to remain at a distance from emotionally charged situations, which may reflect her realization that overwhelming emotion can cloud her judgment. Based on her behavior over the last year, Julianna does not appear to be at significant risk for continued aggressive behavior. She reasonably stated that she does ⁵³⁹ not think it would be appropriate for her to immediately return to the community.

(Emphasis added.) Further, Dr. Estupinan-Kane made several recommendations, including the following: 1. Considering the severity of Julianna’s prior behavior and her consistent compliance with the rules of placement, it is felt that a gradual transition from placement to the community would be appropriate. Julianna requested permission to participate in home visitation with potential later release from Waxter. Thus, it is recommended that consideration be given to allowing her to have home passes of increasing length predicated on her appropriate behavior during the passes and the family’s compliance with the parameters of the passes.

However, Julianna should be directly supervised by an adult at all times while on home pass.... 2. It is recommended that Julianna continue participating in individual psychotherapy and sessions be focused on victim impact, accurate recollection [of] the incident in question to the extent possible, dissolution of avoidance as a primary coping mechanism and continued reinforcement of appropriate coping skills. 3. Julianna could derive benefit from completing the online courses she is registered for. It would be beneficial for Julianna to continue her efforts in applying to college.

The court then heard argument of counsel. Counsel for appellant asserted: “There has been not a scintilla of evidence presented in this courtroom that this child has exhibited any threat to anybody in the past 17 months. So we’d ask the Court to begin the institution of home passes.” Appellant’s counsel also presented “a separation of powers and executive function argument,” stating: [T]he legislature has determined that the Department of Juvenile Services ... is to administer the program of ⁵⁴⁰ reform and rehabilitation and treatment in the juvenile facilities. * * * The Department has instituted a program of treatment at Waxter____ Part of the program at Waxter, and a very key component of the program at Waxter, is the institution of home passes. Children cannot complete Waxter’s program without participating in those home passes.

And this Court has denied her that opportunity. I respectfully argue to the Court that it is the Department of Juvenile Services’ position, by way of what the legislature has given them in terms of their administration of their program of treatment, to make that determination. * ❖ * Waxter can offer her nothing more in terms of rehabilitation and/or treatment, except for the institution of home passes, the beginning of family therapy, and the transition back to the community. When the Court denied those ... requests, the Court interfered with the executive branch’s delegation of powers. Counsel for DJS argued: “[A]t this time a plan of higher education, family therapy, and gradual community reintegration is the best way to ... accomplish the balance [of the] factors that is envisioned by the statute.” The ASA urged the court to deny the request of DJS and appellant, arguing that “the rehabilitation that [appellant] is currently receiving at Waxter [does not show] that Ms. B. is accepting remorse for what the Court found that she’s done.” Rather, counsel contended: It’s Ms. B. accepting remorse for just being put in a situation where she ... had no choice but to stab Kanisha Neal.

And Your Honor, the facts in the trial showed that was clearly not the case: that she had a knife, had a one-on-one fist fight, and she stabbed Kanisha Neal. ⁵⁴¹ That’s what the rehabilitation should be geared to. That’s what Ms. B. should be accepting accountability for. And not until she starts to show remorse for that, accepts responsibility for that ... can we ever say that she’s being held accountable to the family of Kanisha Neal. The court then ruled: I presided over this lengthy trial and read all the reports.

And it didn’t take much to jog my memory on all of the facts in the case. Julianna B., born December 18th, 1989. She’s 17 years old. She was detained on September 23rd, '05, first at Noyes and then, as we heard, at Waxter.

That’s been a total of 21 months. If she were to be detained until her 21st birthday, the total would be five and a quarter years. Her life expectancy probably is every bit of 80. So if she were detained till [sic] 21, she would have approximately 59 years left of life.

This murder took place on September 23rd, 2005. Julianna, you were 15 at the time. In the past 21 months, you have used your time wisely and productively. All reports have been positive, and I have not heard of any infractions.

You have received your high school degree, and you’re now taking a college course. You, with the assistance of Waxter and DJS, are preparing yourself academically for the challenges of adulthood. I’ve even found, with the testimony today, that you are a calming influence at Waxter. So, you’re more than an idle participant there; that you are making the best of your situation there.

I have read your psychological reports, prepared by Dr. Kane. Her positive assessments are that you’re functioning in the average range of intelligence. You possess no cognitive deficits. You’re likeable, engaging, and don’t appear to be at significant risk for continued aggressive behavior.

On the negative side, she states that the testing suggests that you’re rather egocentric, and your primary coping mechanism appears to be avoidance. The MACI tests suggest you may appear entitled, and you may engage in ⁵⁴² manipulative and attention-seeking behavior, to see that your needs for attention are met. Testing also indicates that you’re indifferent to the needs and concerns of others, and you still maintain that you acted in self-defense. A delinquent act means an act which, if the crime was committed by an adult, it would be a crime.

If you were 18 when you had committed this second-degree murder, you would be facing up to 30 years at the Department of Corrections. During your short 15 years in life, before this murder on September 23rd, you exhibited two very distinct and different personalities. One side of you placed you on the honor roll and merited the admiration of several teachers. Your other side was sneaky, dishonest, combative and vulgar.

In ninth grade you were suspended for not reporting that your sister and a friend had gone into another girl’s locker and took her purse and money. By your own admission, you were involved in three to four physical fights. On September 9th, just two weeks prior to your encounter with Missy Neal, you, along with some of your friends, followed a mother and her children from the Sherwood game to their car, taunting them. And you personally opened the car door and spit inside at them.

As they drove away, you threw a bottle of water at the car and shouted “I’m going to get her. This isn’t over.” On September 23rd, 2005, on the night of the incident, you armed yourself with a knife and secreted it on your person. Your fight with Missy was one-on-one____ When Missy was getting the better of you, you plunged your knife into her heart and left her to moan, gag, fall and die. After you had the presence of mind to pull your dagger from Missy’s heart, you proclaimed, boastfully, that you “stabbed that fat bitch.” I found that there was no self-defense.

And the police officer’s description of you, and the picture taken of you after the fight, corroborated that. ⁵⁴³ After you returned, you feigned innocence and ignorance. At the police station, you lied, over and over, and even implicated one of your friends, saying that she had given you the knife, which I did not believe. I don’t think you comprehend the catastrophic consequences of your conduct. It’s true, most teenagers are self-absorbed.

And it’s understandable that even someone who is directly responsible for a 15-year-old girl dying would focus primarily on how the incident affected her. Courts & Judicial Proceedings [§ 3-8A-02] mandates to this Court—and this is by the legislature—what the purposes and the construction of the juvenile justice system is. The juvenile justice system must balance the following: public safety and the protection of the community; accountability of the child to the victim and the community for offenses committed. It must also balance competency and character development, to assist children in becoming responsible and productive members of society.

I think character can best be described as what one does when no one is looking. I have always divided juvenile cases into two categories. First, juvenile offenses committed by juveniles, such as shoplifting, possession of drugs, assault; car theft; and adult offenses committed by juveniles. Murder is the most egregious of those.

I have considered strongly the testimony of Mr. Secretary, Mr. DeVore.... I have never heard of the Secretary coming forward. And if you couple his testimony with Dr. Hannon [sic], you have a complete team. You not only have family members, but you have the entire Department of Juvenile Services interested in your case.

And I believe that you will be given every opportunity with this treatment team to succeed. I don’t doubt the sincerity of any of the reports, and I don’t doubt that the recommendations are not well thought-out by the Departments [sic], and that you’ve exhibited the ⁵⁴⁴ type of conduct where you are, which in their opinion, would require you to take the next step, which would be transition into the community. And I appreciate Secretary DeVore’s interest in your case. And obviously, he’ll be taking a fresh look at the Department of Juvenile Services____ It’s a tough job....

We ask our schools to do more than they can do, and we certainly ask the Department of Juvenile Services to do, in a lot of the cases, more than they can do. I think a year, a couple, I guess it was about a year, maybe two years ago, shutting down Hickey was a good first step. But we can’t shut down all facilities, because the public does need to be protected, and they need to know that when juveniles commit adult offenses, that society will consider that and they’ll consider protection. And although the strong emphasis on a juvenile is to consider rehabilitation, there is also a concern of the community, and accountability.

And I read you what the legislature has mandated that this Court consider. I’ve considered the safety and protection of the community. People in this county should be able to send their children off to a high school football game on a Friday night without a second thought about their safety. Julianna must be accountable.

Twenty-one months in detention is woefully inadequate. Missy, her family, and the citizens of this county deserve more accountability than 21 months. Julianna, your character development has a long way to go. I only hope it is fully developed when you turn 21.

You do need to develop compassion, selflessness, respect for others, appreciation of life, and an understanding of how lucky you are, and a deep understanding of what your conduct caused. When you do get released, I want you ready to be a law-abiding citizen, a law-abiding, productive, generous, compassionate, and model citizen. I certainly don’t believe, because one life has been lost, that another one should also be lost. I want you to be well ⁵⁴⁵ educated, productive, happy, and a model citizen.

I want your adult life to be filled with all the opportunities that this great country affords. I am not being punitive, but just. The responsibility is now on your shoulders, Julianna. You have the choice to make the best of a bad situation.

You can focus all your energies on being the best person you can be, or you can spend your time thinking about what you’re missing. It’s up to you. I therefore deny the Department’s and the respondent’s motion for Julianna to be released into the comm,unity, or to have any furloughs or weekend passes or transitions. Julianna is to be held in a secure facility which will continue to educate her and will continue to build her character.

If the Department can’t meet these needs now, hopefully, they will continue to strive to give you the opportunity, which they have already done, such as continuing your further education. ... The motion is denied. (Emphasis added.) Accordingly, on June 18, 2007, the court issued a Continued Commitment and Transportation Order (“CCTO”). It provided, in part: [T]his Court FINDS: 1.

The Respondent is a danger to others. 2. That pursuant to section 3-8A-02 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland, detention at a secure facility is necessitated. Therefore it is ... ORDERED that the Respondent ... shall be transported via secure transportation to be detained at Waxter Children’s Center under the direction of the Maryland Department of Juvenile Services for continued detention, education, and character development; and it is further ORDERED that the Respondent shall continue to be committed to the Department of Juvenile Services for such ⁵⁴⁶ medical, educational, and ordinary treatment as may be determined to be in the Respondent’s best interest, subject to further Order of this Court____ We shall include additional facts in our discussion. 11 II.

DISCUSSION A. Statutory Background We begin our analysis with a review of the statutory framework that governs juvenile delinquency proceedings. Maryland has adopted “a separate system for juvenile offenders, civil in nature.” In re Victor B., 336 Md. 85, 91 , 646 A.2d 1012 (1994); see also In re Areal B., 177 Md.App. 708, 714 , 938 A.2d 43 (2007) (“Juvenile causes are civil, not criminal proceedings.”). The Juvenile Causes Act (the “Act”), codified at Md.Code (2006 Repl.Vol., 2007 Supp.), §§ 3-8A-01 et seq. of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“C.J.”), “grant[s] jurisdiction in juvenile courts over young offenders and establishes] the process for treating them, to advance its purpose of rehabilitating the juveniles who have transgressed to ensure that they become useful and productive members of society.” Lopez-Sanchez v. State, 155 Md.App. 580, 598 , 843 A.2d 915 (2004), aff'd, 388 Md. 214 , 879 A.2d 695 (2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1102 , 126 S.Ct. 1042 , 163 L.Ed.2d 876 (2006). See also In re John M., 129 Md.App. 165, 189-90 , 741 A.2d 503 (1999).

The Act is to be “liberally construed to effectuate [its] purposes.” C.J. § 3-8A-02(b). Chapter 11 of the Maryland Rules, titled “Juvenile Causes,” contains provisions pertinent to the Act. Under C.J. § 3-8A-01©, a delinquent act is an act that “would be a crime if committed by an adult.” A delinquent child is a child “who has committed a delinquent act and requires guidance, treatment, or rehabilitation.” C.J. § 3-8A- ⁵⁴⁷ 01(m). C.J. § 3-8A-02(a) sets forth the purposes of the Act with respect to a child who has committed a delinquent act: (1) To ensure that the Juvenile Justice System balances the following objectives for children who have committed delinquent acts: (i) Public safety and the protection of the community; (ii) Accountability of the child to the victim and the community for offenses committed; and (iii) Competency and character development to assist children in becoming responsible an d productive members of society; (4) To provide for the care, protection, and wholesome mental and physical development of children coming within the provisions of this subtitle; and to provide for a program of treatment, training, and rehabilitation consistent with the child’s best interests and the protection of the public interest; (5) To conserve and strengthen the child’s family ties and to separate a child from his parents only when necessary for his welfare or in the interest of public safety; (6) If necessary to remove a child from his home, to secure for him custody, care, and discipline as nearly as possible equivalent to that which should have been given by his parents; (7) To provide to children in State care and custody: (i) A safe, humane, and caring environment; and (ii) Access to required services....

A finding of delinquency embodies a two-step process: an adjudicatory hearing, under C.J. § 3-8A-18, at which “the allegations ... that the child has committed a delinquent act must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt,” and a later disposition hearing, under C.J. § 3-8A-19, to determine “(1) Whether a child needs or requires guidance, treatment, or rehabilitation; and if so (2) The nature of the guidance, treatment, or rehabilitation.” C.J. § 3-8A-01(p). We ex ⁵⁴⁸ plained in In re Charles K., 135 Md.App. 84 , 761 A.2d 978 (2000): “The process by which a child is determined to be delinquent consists of a two-step procedure: an adjudicatory hearing, then a disposition hearing. Only after the adjudicatory judge finds that the child has committed a delinquent act and the dispositional judge finds that the juvenile is in need of guidance, treatment or rehabilitation, can a juvenile be classified as a ‘delinquent child.’ ” Id. at 93-94 , 761 A.2d 978 (quoting In re George V., 87 Md.App. 188, 190-91 , 589 A.2d 521 (1991)) (emphasis deleted from Charles K. and George F). In making its disposition, the court has a range of options that it may consider.

One option is provided by C.J. § 3-8A-19(d)(l)(ii), which states, in part, that the court may “commit the child to the custody ... of the Department of Juvenile Services ... on terms that the court considers appropriate to meet the priorities set forth in [C.J.] § 3-8A-02 ... including designation of the type of facility where the child is to be accommodated.... ” (Emphasis added.) Alternatively, the court may place the child on probation or under supervision, C.J. § 3-8A-19(d)(l)(i); order the child and/or parents to participate in rehabilitative services; C.J. § 3-8A-19(d)(l)(iii); or commit the child to the custody of the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene or another public or licensed private agency. C.J. § 3-8A-19(d)(l)(ii). C.J. § 3-8A-19(c) provides: “The priorities in making a disposition are [to be] consistent with the purposes specified in § 3-8A-02____” In addition, on disposition the court “may adopt a treatment service plan----” C.J. § 3-8A-19(d)(2). A treatment service plan is “a plan recommended at a disposition hearing ... by [DJS] to the court proposing specific assistance, guidance, treatment, or rehabilitation of a child.” C.J. § 3-8A-20.1(a)(1).

If the court adopts a treatment service plan, DJS “shall ensure that implementation of the ... plan occurs within 25 days after the date of disposition,” and “shall certify in writing to the court within 25 days after the date of ⁵⁴⁹ disposition whether implementation ... has occurred.” C.J. § 3-8A-20.1(b)(l), (3). As noted, in the case sub judice DJS filed such a certification on January 17, 2006. Further, the Act provides that, “[i]f the court obtains jurisdiction over a child under this subtitle, that jurisdiction continues until that person reaches 21 years of age unless terminated sooner.” C.J. § 3-8A-07(a). In addition, an order committing a child to the custody of DJS “is effective for an indeterminate period of time,” subject to the limitations that it may not exceed three years from the date entered (although it may be renewed by the court on its own motion or that of DJS), and that it is no longer effective after the child reaches 21 years of age.

C.J. § 3-8A-24. Moreover, under certain conditions, C.J. § 3-8A-26 authorizes the court to “make an appropriate order directing, restraining, or otherwise controlling the conduct of a person who is properly before the court under this subtitle.” B. Motion to Dismiss Appeal We first consider the State’s motion to dismiss this appeal. The State contends that “[t]he juvenile court’s discretionary ruling declining to alter the disposition in Julianna B.’s case does not constitute a final appealable order.” But, the State’s brief is devoid of any reason or explanation for this conclusory assertion. 12 ⁵⁵⁰ At oral argument, we repeatedly asked the State to explain the basis for its position that the CCTO is not reviewable; the State was unable to articulate a clear rationale for its position. The State offered that Title 11 of the Maryland Rules contains “built-in provisions for periodic review” of juvenile commitments, and suggested that unspecified ills would result if every order emanating from that review process were appeal-able.

The State also suggested that the CCTO is analogous to the order of a three-judge panel of the circuit court on review of a criminal sentence. See Md.Code (2001, 2007 Supp.), §§ 8-101 et seq. of the Criminal Procedure Article. We do not agree with that contention. Cf.

In re Victor B., supra, 336 Md. at 95-96 , 646 A.2d 1012 (“[CJriminal rules of procedure are inapplicable to juvenile proceedings.”). In any event, we glean from the State’s brief and oral presentation that the State views the CCTO as an interlocutory order because the juvenile court retains revisory power over the disposition. Appellant responds that the juvenile court’s order is appeal-able, either as a final judgment or as an interlocutory order under C.J. § 12-303(3)(x), which permits the appeal of any order “[depriving a parent, grandparent, or natural guardian of the care and custody of his child, or changing the terms of such an order.” 13 To the extent that the State’s argument suggests that the continued jurisdiction and revisory power of the juvenile court precludes review of its denial of the motion to modify the disposition, we reject the contention. We conclude that the CCTO here is an appealable final judgment.

We explain. Generally, an appellate court obtains jurisdiction only when an appeal is taken from a final judgment entered in the ⁵⁵¹ trial court. C.J. § 12-301 (“The right of appeal exists from a final judgment....”). See Taha v. Southern Mgt.

Corp., 367 Md. 564, 567 , 790 A.2d 11 (2002) (“Taha II"); O’Brien v. O’Brien, 367 Md. 547, 554 , 790 A.2d 1 (2002); Philip Morris Inc. v. Angeletti, 358 Md. 689, 713 , 752 A.2d 200 (2000). As we said in Jenkins v. Jenkins, 112 Md.App. 390, 399 , 685 A.2d 817 (1996), cert. denied, 344 Md. 718 , 690 A.2d 524 (1997), “[t]he longstanding rule in this State deems the existence of a final judgment as a jurisdictional fact prerequisite to the viability of an appeal.” Maryland Rule l-202(n) defines “judgment” as “any order of court final in its nature entered pursuant to these rules.” See Niemeyer and Schuett, Maryland Rules Commentary 486 (3d ed. 2003, 2007 Supp.). A final judgment is one that “terminates the case in the trial court, and for which the court has entered a judgment on the docket.” Taha II, 367 Md. at 567-68, 790 A.2d 11 . See Claibourne v. Willis, 347 Md. 684, 691 , 702 A.2d 293 (1997); Board of Liquor License Comm’rs for Baltimore City v. Fells Point Cafe, Inc., 344 Md. 120, 127-28 , 685 A.2d 772 (1996).

If the record suggests that the trial court intends to take further action to dispose of a case on the merits, the order ordinarily is not regarded as final. See, e.g., Anderson v. Anderson, 349 Md. 294, 297-98 , 708 A.2d 296 (1998) (dismissing an appeal because “the trial judge anticipated further findings and recommendations from [a] master before entering a final judgment”). The Court of Appeals explained in In re Samone H., 385 Md. 282, 297-98 , 869 A.2d 370 (2005) (internal citations omitted): For the trial court’s ruling to be a final judgment it must either determine and conclude the rights of the parties involved or deny a party the means to “prosecut[e] and defend[] his or her rights and interests in the subject matter of the proceeding.” In considering whether a particular court order or ruling constitutes an appealable judgment, we assess whether any further order was to be issued or whether any further action was to be taken in the case. It is well established that the court’s original dispositional order in a juvenile delinquency proceeding is a final, ⁵⁵² appealable judgment.

See In re George V., 87 Md.App. 188, 191 , 589 A.2d 521 (1991) (“[Ajfter the determination as to appropriate disposition is made ... the Juvenile Court’s action become[s] a final judgment.”); In re Sorrell, 20 Md.App. 179, 184 , 315 A.2d 110 (1974) (“The disposition hearing was a final hearing. [A]n appeal to this Court lies____”). This is so, even though the juvenile court has continuing jurisdiction over a juvenile delinquent, C.J. § 3-8A-07(a), and the respondent is not “put out of court.” The appealability of an order modifying, vacating, or declining to modify a juvenile delinquency disposition, however, appears to be a question of first impression in Maryland. To be sure, Maryland appellate courts have decided appeals from such orders. See, e.g., In re Demetrius J., 321 Md. 468, 478-80 , 583 A.2d 258 (1991) (on appeal from juvenile court’s denial of motion to vacate or modify its order, holding that juvenile court had no authority to dictate particular facility for juvenile’s commitment); In re Leslie M., 305 Md. 477 , 505 A.2d 504 (1986) (holding that juvenile court “has the authority to vacate a prior order adjudicating a child to be delinquent after the successful completion of a period of probation”); In re Glenn H., 43 Md.App. 510 , 406 A.2d 444 (1979) (on appeal from juvenile court’s commitment order, entered pursuant to hearing for “review of commitment for placement,” reversing and remanding where juvenile was not represented by counsel nor advised of his right to counsel at review hearing).

But, those decisions have reached the merits without squarely addressing whether such an order is appealable. 14 We perceive the CCTO in this case to have been entered pursuant to the court’s revisory authority under Rule 11-116. It provides, in part: ⁵⁵³ Rule 11-116. Modification or vacation of order. a. Revisory Power.

An order of the court may be modified or vacated if the court finds that action to be in the best interest of the child or the public except in cases involving commitment of a child to the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene for placement in a State mental hospital. In cases involving such commitment the court shall proceed as provided in Rule 11-115. b. Sua sponte or on petition. The court may proceed under section a. of this Rule on its own motion, or on the petition of any party or other person, institution or agency having supervision or custody of the respondent, setting forth in concise terms the grounds upon which the relief is requested.

If the court proceeds on its own motion, the order shall set forth the grounds on which it is based. c. Hearing—When required. If the relief sought under section a. of this Rule is for revocation of probation and for the commitment of a respondent, the court shall pass an order to show cause why the relief should not be granted and setting a date and time for a hearing. The clerk shall cause a copy of the petition and Show Cause Order to be served upon the parties.

In all other cases, the court may grant or deny the relief, in whole or in part, without a hearing____[ 15 ] ⁵⁵⁴ Accordingly, we must determine whether the court’s continued jurisdiction in juvenile cases, coupled with its revisory power, renders the denial of a motion to modify non-final for purposes of appeal. We pause to point out that in the CCTO the juvenile court never explicitly ordered DJS to deny appellant the privileges that are generally part of its treatment plan, reward system, or behavior modification program, such as home passes and attendance at college. Rather, the court ordered that appellant “be detained at Waxter Children’s Center under the direction of [DJS] for continued detention, education, and character development[.]” Nevertheless, it is apparent from the record that DJS, appellant, the State, and the court believed that court approval was required in order for DJS to accord such privileges. Indeed, the review hearing was held to consider the request of DJS and appellant for privileges.

And, at the conclusion of its bench opinion, the court stated: “I ... deny the Department’s and the Respondent’s motion for Julianna to be released into the community, or to have any furloughs or weekend passes or transitions. Julianna is to be held in a secure facility....” Because the court’s CCTO did not expressly allow such privileges, and instead ordered continued detention, the order ⁵⁵⁵ constituted a denial of the requests. The parties understood the clear implication of the court’s order: DJS was not permitted to provide Julianna with the privileges that it believed were appropriate to her progress and rehabilitation. Accordingly, we shall consider the CCTO as the functional equivalent of an express directive denying such privileges. 16 We return to the State’s implied suggestion that the CCTO is deprived of finality because of the court’s continuing revisory power.

Arguably, an enrolled judgment in a civil case is equally “non-final,” to a limited degree; under Rule 2-535(a), the court may “exercise revisory power ... over the judgment” on motion filed within 30 days after entry of judgment, and under Rule 235(b), the trial court has revisory power “[o]n motion of any party filed at any time,” in the event of “fraud, mistake, or irregularity.” (Emphasis added.) Yet, the fact that the trial court retains this measure of control over its judgment does not deprive the judgment of finality for appeal purposes. Similarly, child custody and support orders are generally appealable, although such orders may be revised to advance the best interests of the child. See Md.Code (2006 Repl.Vol, 2007 Supp.), § 8-103(a) of the Family Law Article (“F.L.”). See, e.g., Frase v. Barnhart, 379 Md. 100, 112 , 840 A.2d 114 (2003).

Rule 11-116 is certainly no broader than F.L. § 8-103(a), which grants a trial court revisory power over orders concerning child custody and support. By analogy, Frase v. Barnhart, is instructive as to the appealability of orders entered pursuant to the court’s revisory power under Rule 11-116. In the context of contested issues of child custody under the Family Law Article, the ⁵⁵⁶ Court observed, 379 Md. at 111-112 , 840 A.2d 114 (some internal citations omitted): Child access ... orders are ordinarily of two types. The normal progression of a contested child access case is for there first to be a pendente lite determination____ A pendente lite order is not intended to have long-term effect. ...

At some point, hopefully with dispatch, the issue comes before the court for “final” resolution.... Because the court retains continuing jurisdiction over the custody of minor children, no award of custody or visitation, even when incorporated into a judgment, is entirely beyond modification, and such an award therefore never achieves quite the degree of finality that accompanies other kinds of judgments. Nonetheless ... “[a]n order determining custody must be afforded some finality, even though it may subsequently be modified when changes so warrant to protect the best interest of the child.” See also Hardisty v. Salerno, 255 Md. 436, 439 , 258 A.2d 209, 211 (1969) (“[W]hile custody decrees are never final in Maryland, any reconsideration of a decree should emphasize changes in circumstances which have occurred subsequent to the last court hearing.”). In Haught v. Grieashamer, 64 Md.App. 605, 611 , 497 A.2d 1182, 1185 (1985), the Court of Special Appeals observed that such an order, if possessing the other required attributes of finality, was a judgment as defined in Maryland Rule l-202(n) and was therefore subject to Maryland Rule 2-535____[ 17 ] As in Frase , the original disposition here is not “entirely beyond modification, and such an [order] therefore never achieves quite the degree of finality that accompanies other kinds of judgments.” Id.

Although the court may revisit its disposition, there is no guarantee that it will do so at the time ⁵⁵⁷ the disposition is entered. See Md. Rule 11-116 (“An order of the court may be modified or vacated” on court’s own motion or that of party or custodian). (Emphasis added.) This bare potential for future modification does not deprive the juvenile court’s disposition of finality. In construing Rule 11-116, we look to Rule 2-585 because, in other contexts, we have analogized to the scope of review under Rule 2-535 when considering the reviewability of revisory orders. 18 In Suber v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 73 Md.App. 715 , 536 A.2d 142 (1988), for example, we considered the appealability of an order of the Worker’s Compensation Commission “rescinding] and annulling]” a prior order in which it had found that a claimant had sustained a compensable, accidental injury in the course of employment.

The Commission’s authority to revise its prior order derived from the Worker’s Compensation Act, which then provided: “ ‘The powers and jurisdiction of the Commission over each case shall be continuing, and it may, from time to time, make such modifications or changes with respect to its ⁵⁵⁸ former findings or orders with respect thereto as in its opinion may be justified...." Id. at 720, 536 A.2d 142 (quoting Md.Code Ann., Art. 101, § 40(c), now codified at Md.Code (1999 Repl.Vol., 2007 Supp.), § 9-736(b) of the Labor and Employment Article). The Court observed that the Commission’s revisory power was “exceedingly broad, indeed it is ‘one of the broadest reopening statutes,’” Suber, 73 Md.App. at 720 , 536 A.2d 142 (internal citation omitted), and that it “ ‘gives the Commission a revisory power akin to that available to courts under ... Maryland Rule ... 2-535, but without the thirty day limitation’----” Id. at 720-21 , 536