In Re Julianna B.

RODOWSKY, J. The Circuit Court for Montgomery County, sitting as a juvenile court, denied an application by the Department of Juvenile Services (DJS) for modification of the treatment service plan for the respondent, Julianna B. Ms. B. appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which vacated the order of denial and remanded to the juvenile court. In re Julianna B., 179 Md.App. 512 , 947 A.2d 90 (2008). The State petitioned this Court for the writ of certiorari, presenting the following questions: “1. Should Julianna B.’s appeal be dismissed because the juvenile court’s Continued Commitment and Transportation Order, denying Julianna B.’s motion for modification of her disposition, is not a final, appealable order? “2.

Did the juvenile court properly exercise its discretion in denying Julianna B.’s motion for modification of her disposition, where the juvenile court expressly recognized and applied the criteria, purposes and goals of the Juvenile Causes subtitle relating to disposition in delinquency cases?” ⁶⁶⁰ Julianna B. filed a conditional cross-petition in which she raised the question set forth below. “1. Did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that, when issuing its Order prohibiting the Department of Juvenile Services from implementing the Treatment Service Plan the juvenile court had adopted at the disposition hearing, which included passes for outings, home visits, and to pursue Ms. B.’s college education, the juvenile court did not violate the Separation of Powers Doctrine or the Juvenile Causes Act?” We granted both petitions. In re Julianna B., 405 Md. 505 , 954 A.2d 467 (2008). Because, as we explain below, this case is moot, we shall vacate the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and remand this case to that court with direction to dismiss Ms. B.’s appeal.

In September 2005, when Ms. B. was fifteen years old, she was involved in a one-on-one fight with another, but larger, fifteen year old female. Ms. B. stabbed her adversary in the heart. The juvenile court found her involved in second-degree murder. That adjudication was affirmed.

In re Julianna B., 177 Md.App. 547 , 936 A.2d 906 (2007). In January 2006, the court committed Ms. B. to the custody of DJS for placement at Waxter’s Children’s Center. Within three months, DJS reported to the court that Ms. B. was “a role model in the program” and requested that she be allowed passes for outside activities with staff or family that would gradually increase from two hours to forty-eight hours. The court denied that request, marking on DJS’s memorandum, “Respondent has been adjudicated delinquent of second MURDER!” On May 16, 2006, DJS again applied to the court, advising that Ms. B. was “doing exceptionally well both behaviorally and academically.” She was then at the highest level in the program and, based on her accelerating progress, DJS requested a home pass.

The request was supported by a treatment progress report from Ms. B.’s psychologist. By marginal note, the court denied that application. ⁶⁶¹ DJS requested, on July 6, 2006, a six-month review hearing. The court ruled that no action was to be taken at that time, so that no review hearing was held. By letter dated December 21, 2006, six members of the DJS staff, including the psychologist who had seen Ms. B. in nearly forty sessions of individual therapy, advised the court in a joint letter that Ms. B.’s behavior had been “exemplary,” that she had earned her high school credits, and that she was currently studying to take the SAT.

DJS again, on March 28, 2007, submitted a case update to the court, with a request for a review hearing. In support, DJS furnished a thirteen-page psychological evaluation prepared by a psychologist other than the one who had been seeing Ms. B. regularly. That evaluation recommended that “gradual transition from placement to the community would be appropriate.” On May 3, the court set the matter in for a review hearing on June 18, 2007. A few days before the review hearing, DJS furnished the court with a transition plan that contemplated, inter alia, her attending Anne Arundel Community College.

At the hearing, the Secretary of DJS testified in support of modifying the treatment service plan, as did Ms. B.’s regular psychologist, and her case management specialist. DJS’s position was opposed, in person, by the victim’s parents. By an order that day, June 18, the court found Ms. B. to be “a danger to others” and that her “detention in a secure facility is necessitated.” The court ordered that Ms. B. “shall continue to be committed to [DJS] for such medical, educational, and ordinary treatment as may be determined to be in the Respondent’s best interest, subject to further Order of this Court[.]” Ms. B. noted an appeal from this order. The State moved to dismiss the appeal, but the Court of Special Appeals concluded that it had jurisdiction.

The appellate court reasoned that the juvenile court’s denial of modification of the treatment service plan terminated the proceeding that was then before the court and, thus, constituted a final judgment under Maryland Code (1974, 2006 Repl.Vol.), § 12- ⁶⁶² 301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (CJ). In re Julianna B., 179 Md.App. at 549-59 , 947 A.2d at 111-18 . The intermediate appellate court further held that the juvenile court had authority to override DJS’s judgment as to the terms and conditions of Ms. B.’s confinement, id. at 559-72 , 947 A.2d at 118-25 , but that, under the circumstances of this case, the juvenile court had abused its discretion by denying any supervised leave and by “continuing that commitment without adequately considering the legislative priorities of [CJ Title 3, Subtitle 8A, Juvenile Causes—Children Other Than CINAs and Adults], as well as the consensus of the experts with respect to Julianna’s undenied progress and the appropriate course for her rehabilitation.” 179 Md.App. at 588 , 947 A.2d at 135 . In their briefs to this Court, the parties advised us of subsequent developments.

Four days after the mandate issued from the Court of Special Appeals, vacating the judgment of the juvenile court and remanding this matter to that court for further proceedings consistent with the Court of Special Appeals’ opinion, the juvenile court entered an order dated June 6, 2008, entitled, “Permanency Plan Review and Continued Commitment.” That order granted Ms. B. home passes and found that the permanency plan should be reunification of Ms. B. with her mother. 1 The State has not fully briefed the question of mootness that arises from the new order of the juvenile court. In a footnote, the State suggests that the appealability issue is not rendered moot, and cites to ⁶⁶³ Cottman v. State, 395 Md. 729 , 739 n. 7, 912 A.2d 620 , 625 n. 7 (2006). That footnote reads in its entirety: “The term ‘jurisdiction,’ when applied to courts ‘“is a term of large and comprehensive import and embraces every kind of judicial action.” ’ Pulley v. State, 287 Md. 406, 415 , 412 A.2d 1244, 1249 (1980) (citations omitted).” Presumably, the State is suggesting that we must first have appellate jurisdiction in order to decide whether a case is moot. The State next submits in the footnote that appealability is an issue of important public policy, on which we should comment in dicta.

At oral argument, Ms. B. acknowledged that the present case is moot, but asked that we speak to the issues “for guidance.” I Because, as explained in Part II, the second issue raised by the State’s certiorari petition and the issue raised in Ms. B.’s conditional cross-petition are moot, it is immaterial in this case whether the juvenile court’s order of June 18, 2007, was appealable. If that order were not appealable, our mandate would be that the mandate of the Court of Special Appeals be vacated, and that this case be remanded to that court, with instructions to dismiss the appeal. If the June 18, 2007 order were appealable, our mandate would be the same, ie., a vacatur of the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and a remand to that court with directions to dismiss the appeal on the grounds of mootness. The fact that the case became moot after the Court of Special Appeals’ decision does not alter that result.

See Cottman v. State, 395 Md. at 749-50 , 912 A.2d at 631-32 . Cottman was an appeal from a judgment of conviction in a criminal case. Prior to the issuance by the Court of Special Appeals of its opinion, the circuit court granted the appellant a new trial. Subsequently, the Court of Special Appeals, not knowing that a new trial had been granted, filed an opinion affirming the conviction.

Before the official mandate was issued, the defendant petitioned to dismiss the appeal as moot ⁶⁶⁴ and to have the opinion withdrawn. The Court of Special Appeals denied both requests and issued its official mandate. This Court granted the defendant’s petition for certiorari and the State’s conditional cross-petition. We held that the grant of the new trial mooted the appeal in both appellate courts.

Indeed, the defendant’s “appeal became moot the instant that the Circuit Court granted him a new trial.” Id. at 743 , 912 A.2d at 628 . As in the case before us, the Court of Special Appeals’ opinion in Cottman had been published. On that aspect of the case, we said in Cottman : ' “Given the posture of the case before the Court of Special Appeals, that court could choose to maintain the expression