In Re Adoption/Guardianship of Victor A.

BATTAGLIA, J. In this case, the Prince George’s Department of Social Services petitioned for guardianship of Victor A., a child with severe disabilities. The trial court granted the petition and terminated the parental rights of Victor A.’s parents, Mr. A. and Ms. A. We have been asked to consider whether the Court of Special Appeals, in its remand, applied a different standard to determine the best interests of children with special needs, than is applied to children without such needs in a termination of parental rights proceeding. ²⁹¹ I. Facts and Procedural History Victor A. was born on March 26, 2000, to Ms. A. and Mr. A. He tested positive for cocaine and amphetamines at birth and was diagnosed with severe mental and physical disabilities, including Cerebral Palsy, Mental Retardation, Dysphagia, Myopia, Reflux, Global Developmental Impairment Microcephaly, Encephalopathy, and Failure to Thrive. As a result, Victor A. is severely spastic and is unable to control any of his extremities; he is unable to speak or walk and has a swallowing disorder requiring that he be fed through a gastronomy tube. He must use a wheelchair and braces to keep his legs straight and other supports for his body; he also takes several medications to alleviate his discomfort and to help his breathing.

As part of his care, Victor A. requires 16 hours a day of in-home nursing services and has numerous doctors to help manage his disabilities, including a pediatrician, gastrologist, orthopedist, pulmonologist, and an ophthalmologist. He also receives speech therapy, physical therapy, and occupational therapy to prevent further deterioration that may result from his disabilities. At the time of Victor A.’s birth, Ms. A. was an active drug user, and Mr. A. also was undergoing assessment as a substance abuser; neither could care for Victor A., who, after birth, remained in the hospital for approximately three months. On July 8, 2000, the Prince George’s County Department of Social Services (PGDSS), filed an emergency shelter care petition in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, Division of Juvenile Causes, after which a hearing 1 was held and temporary custody of Victor A. was awarded to PGDSS with instructions to place him with a relative, who PGDSS identified as his maternal aunt.

The court allowed Ms. A. to ²⁹² have supervised visitation with Victor A. if she participated in a drug treatment program and remained drug free for three months; Mr. A. was permitted liberal unsupervised visitation unless he was found to have a substance abuse problem, which eventually turned out to be unsubstantiated. Thereafter, Victor A. was declared a child in need of assistance (“CINA”) 2 and was released from the hospital. He resided with his aunt until October of 2000, when Ms. A. alleged that Victor A. had been sexually abused by his aunt’s son. While the allegations of abuse were being investigated, PGDSS placed Victor A. in foster care, during which time Mr. A. visited Victor A. several times a week.

The allegations of abuse were never corroborated, but when Victor A.’s aunt was asked to resume caring for him, she declined. On January 25, 2001, the Circuit Court conducted a review hearing, during which the judge established a permanency plan 3 of reunification and awarded full custody to Mr. A. ²⁹³ Three months later, PGDSS filed a petition alleging that Victor A.’s medical needs were not being met, and during a hearing on the matter, the trial court rescinded Mr. A.’s custody, declared Victor A. to be a child in need of assistance for a second time, and placed him in foster care, but allowed Mr. A. and Ms. A. to have daily unsupervised visitation. In order to regain custody of Victor A., Mr. A. signed service agreements to complete parenting skills classes, to participate in a support group for parents of special needs children, and to obtain adequate housing. Ms. A. also agreed to undergo psychological evaluations, to participate in parenting skills classes, and to continue her drug treatment under a service agreement.

Thereafter, on May 28, 2002, the judge changed the permanency plan from reunification with Mr. A. to adoption, after PGDSS had reported that both parents had failed to meet some of the conditions set forth in the various service agreements. PGDSS then petitioned the court for a termination of the parental rights of Mr. A. and Ms. A., and on December 24, ²⁹⁴ 2002, the court granted PGDSS limited guardianship and reduced each parent’s visits to once per month. Subsequently, on July 18, 2003, the court conducted a two-day termination of parental rights hearing, during which PGDSS sought guardianship of Victor A. for the purpose of having him placed for adoption. The judge assessed Victor A.’s needs in terms of his medical care and each parent’s ability to care for him.

Although the judge determined that both parents, for the most part, had complied with the service agreements by attending the parenting classes, he also found that Ms. A. had participated in the drug treatment program, submitted to psychological evaluations, and regularly visited Victor A. The court, however, concluded that Ms. A. was unable to care for Victor A. because she had an ongoing substance abuse problem and held that, “the return of Victor, Jr., to his mom does pose an unacceptable risk to [his] future safety[.]” While the judge expressed satisfaction as to Mr. A’s compliance with the service agreements and noted that Mr. A. maintained regular contact with and provided for Victor A. financially, he found unacceptable that Mr. A. had failed to secure adequate housing to accommodate Victor A.’s needs, despite Mr. A.’s assurances that he would find appropriate housing if Victor A. were returned to his care. At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge stated that he was “clearly convinced that the County [was] a better parent and that it [was] in the better interests of [Victor A.]. But whether it [was] in the best interests to terminate his parents’ rights [he was] not sure.” Thus, the judge reserved ruling on the matter to consider the evidence presented during the hearing regarding the available placement options for Victor A. and whether Mr. A. and Ms. A. could maintain visitation rights if their parental rights were terminated. After the hearing, the court made the following findings in an order issued on September 23, 2003: This matter, having been brought before this Court by the Prince George’s County Office of Law on a Petition for Termination of Parental Rights which was hereby held before this Court for trial on July 18, 2003 and further ²⁹⁵ hearing held on August 14, 2003, and having heard testimony and having weighed the relevant factors in this matter, it is on this 23rd day of September 10, 2003, by the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, hereby ORDERED, that this Court concludes that it is in the best interests of Victor [A.] for termination of his natural parents rights;[ 4 ] and is further ORDERED, that this Court hereby grants the Prince George’s County Department of Social Services’ (hereinafter referred as “Department”) petition to be granted guardianship of Victor [A.], with the right to consent to adoption and/or long term care, and further the right to make application to this Court for a change of name; and it is further ORDERED, that the Court also finds that until such time as the “Department” identifies such adoptive or long-term resource, that it is in the best interests of Victor [A.] to continue visitation with [Ms. A.] and [Mr. A.] under the supervision of the “Department.” ORDERED, that the above-captioned cases are hereby closed statistically.

Mr. A. and Ms. A. appealed the judgment terminating their parental rights to the Court of Special Appeals, arguing that PGDSS had failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that termination of their parental rights was in Victor A.’s best interests. The intermediate appellate court agreed with Victor A.’s parents in In re Adoption/Guardianship of Victor A., 157 Md.App. 412 , 852 A.2d 976 (2004), and held that the trial court did not make adequate factual findings to support a termination of their parental rights. In reaching its ²⁹⁶ decision, the Court of Special Appeals opined that the trial court “did not explain its mixed conclusion of fact and law that termination of the As’ parental rights [was] in Victor [A.]’s best interest” in light of the numerous findings in favor of preserving the parental rights and that it had failed to determine how continuation of parental rights would harm or diminish Victor A.’s prospects for adoption, pursuant to Maryland Code, Section 5-813(a)(3)(iv) of the Family Law Article (1984, 1999 Repl.Vol.). 5 Thus, the Court of Special Appeals vacated the judgment terminating Mr. A. and Ms. A’s parental rights and remanded the case to the trial court to assess all the available permanent placement options for Victor A. in deciding whether termination of parental rights would be appropriate. PGDSS filed a petition for writ of certiorari in this Court and the Public Justice Center filed a Petition and Memorandum in Support 6 thereof and asked to participate as amici curiae.

We granted both petitions and issued the writ of certiorari 7 to consider the following questions, which we have renumbered to clarify the issues in this case: 1. Did the Court of Special Appeals err in reaching and deciding the question of the completeness of the trial court’s findings, when that question, which does not pertain to the jurisdiction of either the trial court or the appellate court, was not raised by the appellants? 2. Did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that a different standard applies to determining whether adoption or long-term foster care is in the best interest of disabled children than applies to nondisabled children, in contravention of the American with Disabilities Act ²⁹⁷ and the strong legislative policy, recognized and approved by this Court’s binding precedent, favoring permanency for all children? For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals vacating the order terminating both parent’s parental rights and remanding the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

II

Standard of Review We utilize three interrelated standards to review a trial court’s decision to terminate parental rights, as set forth in In re Yve S., 373 Md. 551 , 819 A.2d 1030 (2003): [W]e point out three distinct aspects of review in child custody disputes. When the appellate court scrutinizes factual findings, the clearly erroneous standard of [Rule 8-131(c) ] applies. [Second,] [i]f it appears that the [court] erred as to matters of law, further proceedings in the trial court will ordinarily be required unless the error is determined to be harmless. Finally, when the appellate court views the ultimate conclusion of the [court] founded upon sound legal principles and based upon factual findings that are not clearly erroneous, the [court’s] decision should be disturbed only if there has been a clear abuse of discretion. Id. at 586 , 819 A.2d at 1051 , quoting Davis v. Davis, 280 Md. 119, 122-26 , 372 A.2d 231, 232-34 (1977); see also Robinson v. Robinson, 328 Md. 507, 513 , 615 A.2d 1190, 1193 (1992); McCready v. McCready, 323 Md. 476, 484 , 593 A.2d 1128, 1131 (1991).

III

Discussion PGDSS contends that the Court of Special Appeals erred by enunciating a different standard for assessing the best interests of children with special needs or circumstances than is applied to children without such needs. In PGDSS’s view, the statutory time lines for achieving permanence were intended to apply to all children without regard to a child’s disabilities. PGDSS also asserts that the Court of Special Appeals decided an issue that was not before the court when it addressed ²⁹⁸ whether the trial court had made all of the requisite findings needed to terminate parental rights. According to PGDSS, Mr. A. and Ms. A. raised only two claims in the intermediate appellate court: “that [Victor A.’s] disabilities make it more appropriate to leave him indefinitely in foster care than to free him for adoption and that the trial court had erred in finding that neither of them [Mr. A. and Ms. A.] will become able to care for [Victor A.] in the reasonably foreseeable future,” which did not include a determination about the trial court’s findings.

To the contrary, Mr. A. and Ms. A. maintain that the Court of Special Appeals did not apply a different standard to determine the best interests of children with disabilities than that is applied to children without special needs. Victor A.’s parents contend that the Court of Special Appeals’s explanation of the applicable statutes did not distinguish between disabled and nondisabled children and that the holding was limited to the trial court’s findings in terminating their parental rights. Mr. A. and Ms. A. further assert that the trial court’s findings were properly raised because the Court of Special Appeals was asked to determine whether the trial court had erred in terminating their parental rights and within this inquiry was whether the trial court’s findings adequately supported the trial court’s decision. In this case we are presented with a unique issue of whether children with special needs in the child welfare system are subject to a different legal standard in the determination of the “best interests standard” than is applied to children without such needs.

The fundamental problem presented by this case warrants discussion of the child welfare system’s purpose and principles. A. Fundamental Rights of Parents The appropriate starting point in our analysis when the State intervenes in family relations is the fundamental rights of a parent. Certain fundamental rights are protected by the United States Constitution, and among those rights are a parent’s right to raise his or her children without undue ²⁹⁹ interference by the State. In re Yve S., 373 Md. at 565 , 819 A.2d at 1039 ; In re Adoption/Guardianship Nos. J9610436 and J9711031, 368 Md. 666, 692 , 796 A.2d 778, 793 (2002); In re Mark M., 365 Md. 687, 705 , 782 A.2d 332, 342 (2001).

The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that a parent has a constitutionally protected fundamental right to raise his or her children. See In re Yve S, 373 Md. at 566-67 , 819 A.2d at 1039 ; In re Mark M., 365 Md. at 705 , 782 A.2d at 342-43 ; In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10911, 335 Md. 99, 112-13 , 642 A.2d 201, 208 (1994). Most recently, in In re Yve S., we affirmed this principle and stated that a parent’s interest “occupies a unique place in our legal culture, given the centrality of family life as the focus for personal meaning and responsibility. ‘[F]ar more precious .. . than property rights,’ parental rights have been deemed to be among those ‘essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men....’” Id. at 567, 819 A.2d at 1039 , quoting In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10911, 335 Md. at 113 , 642 A.2d at 208 , in turn quoting Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 , 101 S.Ct. 2153 , 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981); In re Mark M., 365 Md. at 705 , 782 A.2d at 342-43 . Likewise, in In re Mark M., we emphasized the importance of parenting as a fundamental right: A parent’s interest in raising a child is, no doubt, a fundamental right, recognized by the United States Supreme Court and this Court.

The United States Supreme Court has long avowed the basic civil right encompassed by child rearing and family life. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 , 120 S.Ct. 2054, 2060 , 147 L.Ed.2d 49, 57 (2000) (stating that “the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children”); See also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 , 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1394-95 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599, 606 (1982) (discussing “the fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child”); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 , 92 S.Ct. 1208, 1212-13 , 31 L.Ed.2d 551, 558-59 (1972) (stating that “[t]he rights to conceive and to ³⁰⁰ raise one’s children have been deemed ‘essential,’ ’’and that “[t]he integrity of the family unit has found protection in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ... the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ... and the Ninth Amendment....”) (internal citations omitted). Maryland, too, has declared a parent’s interest in raising a child to be so fundamental that it “cannot be taken away unless clearly justified.” Boswell v. Boswell, 352 Md. 204, 218 , 721 A.2d 662, 669 (1998)(citing In re Adoption No. 10941, 335 Md. 99, 112 , 642 A.2d 201 (1994)). Id. at 705, 782 A.2d at 342-43 .

In termination of parental rights proceedings where the State has intervened through the exercise of its generally recognized power to protect the child by reason of the natural parent’s unfitness, the standard is based upon the best interests of the child, see McDermott v. Dougherty, 385 Md. 320 , 869 A.2d 751 (2005); In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10941, 335 Md. at 112 , 642 A.2d at 208 , and there is a strong presumption in favor of maintaining parental rights to serve the child’s best interests. See In re Yve S., 373 Md. at 571 , 819 A.2d at 1042 ; In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10941, 335 Md. at 112 , 642 A.2d at 208 ; In re Adoption /Guardianship Nos. J9610436 and J9711031, 368 Md. at 692 , 796 A.2d at 793 . We explained this presumption in In re Yve S.: The best interests of the child standard embraces a strong presumption that the child’s best interests are served by maintaining parental rights. If it were otherwise, the most disadvantaged of our adult citizens always would be at greater risk of losing custody of their children than those more fortunate.

Those of our citizens coping with emotional or mental difficulties could be faced with such discrimination. Id. at 571, 819 A.2d at 1042 (internal citations omitted). A parent’s right to raise his or her children, however, is not beyond limitation, and there may be countervailing considerations that the State, pursuant to its parens patriae ³⁰¹ authority, must protect. We emphasized these considerations in In re Mark M.: That fundamental interest [in raising a child], however, is not absolute and does not exclude other important considerations.

Pursuant to the doctrine of parens patriae, the State of Maryland has an interest in caring for those, such as minors, who cannot care for themselves. See Boswell, 352 Md. at 218-19 , 721 A.2d at 669 . We have held that “the best interests of the child may take precedence over the parent’s liberty interest in the course of a custody, visitation, or adoption dispute.” Boswell, 352 Md. at 219, 721 A.2d at 669 ; see also In re Adoption No. 1094-1, 335 Md. at 113 , 642 A.2d at 208 (stating that “the controlling factor ... is ... what best serves the interests] of the child”). That which will best promote the child’s welfare becomes particularly consequential where the interests of a child are in jeopardy, as is often the case in situations involving sexual, physical, or emotional abuse by a parent.

As we stated in In re Adoption/Guardianship No. A91-71A, 334 Md. 538 , 640 A.2d 1085 (1994), the child’s welfare is “a consideration that is of ‘transcendent importance’ ” when the child might otherwise be in jeopardy. Id. at 561 , 640 A.2d at 1096 (citation omitted). We have recognized that in cases where abuse or neglect is evidenced, particularly in a CINA case, the court’s role is necessarily more pro-active. See In re Justin D., 357 Md. at 448, 745 A.2d at 417.

A trial court, acting under the State’s parens patriae authority, is in the unique position to marshal the applicable facts, assess the situation, and determine the correct means of fulfilling a child’s best interests. Id. at 705-06, 782 A.2d at 343 . B. The Child Welfare System The fundamental right of parents to raise their children is not only well settled in our common law, but also is reflected ³⁰² in federal and Maryland legislation. The role of federal and Maryland statutes relating to the child welfare system was explained in In re Yve S., quoting from Judge Karwacki in In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10941, 385 Md. 99, 103-06 , 642 A.2d 201, 203-05 (1994): The Maryland General Assembly has enacted a comprehensive statutory scheme to address those situations where a child is at risk because of his or her parents’ inability or unwillingness to care for him or her.

Title 5 of the Family Law Article of the Maryland Code (1984, 1991 Repl.Vol.) (Hereinafter “F.L.”) governs the custody, guardianship, adoption and general protection of children who because of abuse or neglect come within the purview of the Department of Human Resources.... During the 1970’s, nationwide concern grew regarding the large number of children who remained out of the homes of their biological parents throughout their childhood, frequently moved from one foster care situation to another, thereby reaching majority without belonging to a permanent family. This phenomenon became known as “foster care drift” and resulted in the enactment by Congress of Public Law 96-272, the “Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980,” codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 610-679 (1988). One of the important purposes of this law was to eliminate foster care drift by requiring states to adopt statutes to facilitate permanent placement for children as a condition to receiving federal funding for their foster care and adoption assistance programs.

Under the federal act, a state is required, among other things, to provide a written case plan for each child for whom the state claims federal foster care maintenance payments. 42 U.S.C. § 671 (a)(16). The case plan must include a description of the home or institution into which the child is placed, a discussion of the appropriateness of the placement, and a description of the services provided to the parents, child and foster parents to facilitate return of the child to his or her own home or to establish another ³⁰³ permanent placement for the child. 42 U.S.C. § 675 (1). The state must also implement a case review system that provides for administrative review of the case plan at least every six months and judicial review no later than eighteen months after placement and periodically thereafter. 42 U.S.C. § 675 (5)(B) and (C). The purpose of the judicial review is to “determine the future status of the child” including whether the child should be returned to its biological parents, continued in foster care for a specified period, placed for adoption, or because of the child’s special needs or circumstances, continued in foster case on a long term basis. 42 U.S.C. § 675 (5)(C).

Maryland receives considerable federal funds pursuant to this Act. Accordingly, the Maryland General Assembly has enacted legislation to comply with the federal requirements. Under Maryland’s statutory scheme, for those children committed to a local department of social services the department is required to develop and implement a permanency plan that is in the best interests of the child. F.L. § 5-525.

In developing the permanency plan, the department is required to consider a statutory hierarchy of placement options in descending order of priority. F.L. § 5-525(c). First and foremost, the department must consider returning the child to the child’s natural parents or guardians. F.L. § 5-525(c)(1).

If reunification with the biological parents is not possible, the department must consider placing the child with relatives to whom adoption, guardianship, or care and custody, in descending order of priority, are planned to be granted. F.L. § 5-525(c)(2). If placement with relatives is not possible, then the department must consider adoption by a current foster parent or other approved adoptive family. F.L. § 5-525(c)(3).

Only in exceptional situations as defined by rule or regulation is a child to be placed in long term foster care. F.L. § 5-525(c)(5). If it is determined that reunification is not possible and that adoption is in the child’s best interests, the juvenile court lacks jurisdiction to finalize this plan. In re Darius A., 47 Md.App. 232, 235 , 422 A.2d 71, 72 (1980); see also ³⁰⁴ F.L. § 1-201.

Instead, unless the parents consent to the adoption of their child, the department is required to petition the circuit court for guardianship pursuant to F.L. § 5-313. If the circuit court finds by clear and convincing evidence, after considering the statutorily enumerated factors, that it is in the best interests of a child previously adjudicated a CINA for parental rights to be terminated, the circuit court has authority to grant the department’s petition for guardianship. Such award carries with it the right for the department to consent to the adoption of the child. F.L. §§ 5-311 and 5-317(f).

The overriding theme of both the federal and state legislation is that a child should have permanency in his or her life. The valid premise is that it is in a child’s best interest to be placed in a permanent home and to spend as little time as possible in foster care. Thus, Title 5 of the Family Law Article seeks to prevent the need for removal of a child from its home, to return a child to its home when possible, and where returning home is not possible, to place the child in another permanent placement that has legal status. Id. at 573-76, 819 A.2d at 1043-45 ; see also In re Adoption/Guardianship Nos. J9610436 and J9711031, 368 Md. at 676-78 , 796 A.2d at 783-85 .

This overall statutory scheme essentially has remained in place since this Court’s description in 1994, notwithstanding various amendments to the provisions governing the child welfare system. 1. Permanency Planning for Children in Foster Care The initial assessment in child placement where the State acts as parens patriae, is the development of a permanency plan by the Department of Social Services (DSS) “to set the direction in which the parent, agencies, and the court will work in terms of reaching a satisfactory conclusion to the situation.” In re Yve S., 373 Md. at 582 , 819 A.2d at 1049 . In developing a permanency plan DSS must adhere to the mandates enumerated in Section 5—525(e)(1) of the Family Law Article, which states: ³⁰⁵ Development of a permanency plan. — if) In developing a permanency plan for a child in an out-of-home placement, the local department of social services shall give primary consideration to the best interests of the child. The local department shall consider the following factors in determining the permanency plan that is in the best interests of the child: (i) the child’s ability to be safe and healthy in the home of the child’s parent; (ii) the child’s attachment and emotional ties to the child’s natural parents and siblings.

(iii) the child’s emotional attachment to the child’s current caregiver and the caregiver’s family; (iv) the length of time the child has resided with the current caregiver; (v) the potential emotional, developmental, and educational harm to the child if moved from the child’s current placement; and (vi) the potential harm to the child by remaining in State custody for an excessive period of time. Md.Code (1984, 1999 Repl.Vol.), § 5-525(e)(1) of the Family Law Article. The statutory hierarchy of placement options that DSS should consider is set forth in Section 5-525(e)(2) of the Family Law Article, which provides: To the extent consistent with the best interests of the child in an out-of-home placement, the local department shall consider the following permanency plans, in descending order of priority: (i) returning the child to the child’s parent or guardian, unless the department is the guardian; (ii) placing the child with relatives to whom adoption, guardianship, or care and custody, in descending order of priority, are planned to be granted; (iii) adoption in the following descending order of priority: ³⁰⁶ 1. by a current foster parent with whom the child has resided continually for at least the 12 months prior to developing the permanency plan or for a sufficient length of time to have established positive relationships and family ties; or 2. by another approved adoptive family; (iv) placing the child in a court approved permanent foster home with a specific caregiver; (v) an independent living arrangement; or (vi) long-term foster care. Md.Code (1984, 1999 Repl.Vol.), § 5-525(e)(2) of the Family Law Article.

Likewise, the role of the courts in ensuring that the appropriate permanency plan is implemented was described by this Court in In re Damon M.: [T]he court has the responsibility for determining the permanency plan ... and justifying the placement of children in out of home placements for a specified period or on a long-term or permanent basis ... in addition to conducting periodic, six month reviews. Section 3-826.1 [now codified as Section 3-823 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article] requires the court, not later than 11 months after a child found to be in need of assistance has been placed in foster care, see also Md.Code (1989, 1991 Repl.Vol., 1997 Cum.Supp.) § 501(m) of the Family Law Article, to hold a permanency planning hearing to determine the permanency plan for that child. § 3-826.1(a)(1) [now § 3-823(b)(1) ]. At that hearing, for each child in placement and in determining the plan, the court is required to make certain decisions and findings, § 3-826.1(c), [now § 3-823(e) ] specifically, whether the child should be: returned to the parent or guardian, § 3-826.1(c)(1)(I) [now § 3-823(e)(1)(I) ]; placed with relatives to whom adoption or guardianship is granted, § 3-826.1(c)(1)(ii) [now § 3—823(e)(1)(ii) ]; placed for adoption, § 3 — 826.1(c)(1)(iii) [now § 3-823(e)(1)(iii) ]; emancipated, § 3-826.1(c)(1)(iv) [now deleted]; or “because of the child’s ³⁰⁷ special needs or circumstances, continued in placement on a permanent or long-term basis or for a specified period.” § 3-826.1(c)(1)(v) and (vi) [now § 3-823(e)(1)(v) and (vi) ]. There are restrictions on the court’s ability to continue a child in placement because of the child’s special needs or circumstances. § 3-826.1(d) [now § 3-823(f) ].

That section pi^ohibits the court from using that option unless it finds that the agency to which the child is committed has documented a compelling reason for determining that it would not be in the best interest of the child to: (1) Return home; (2) Be referred for termination of parental rights; or (3) Be placed for adoption or guardianship with a specified and appropriate relative or legal guardian willing to care for the child.’ Id. at 432 n. 1, 765 A.2d at 625 n. 1 (some internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). We continued to explain: Section 3-826.1(f) [now § 3-823(h) ] mandates periodic reviews of the permanency plan by the court. Subsection (f)(1)(i) provides [now § 3-823(h)(1)(i) ] that such reviews will be “no less frequently than every six months until commitment is rescinded.” If, however, at the permanency planning hearing or a subsequent review hearing, the court, inter alia, orders a child continued in permanent foster care, the court is no longer required to hold the review hearings at six month intervals. Subsection (f)(1)(h) [now § 3-823(h)(1)(ii), is revised to require review hearings every 12 months.].

As is true of the