In Re Adoption No. 85365027/AD in the Circuit Court

POLLITT, Judge. On December 28, 1985, Christine gave birth to a baby boy. Pursuant to arrangements for a private adoption she had initiated several days earlier, and while still recovering in the hospital, Christine, on December 30, signed a consent to the adoption of the newborn infant by appellees. Appellees filed the consent and their petition for adoption with the court on December 31, at which time Judge John Carroll Byrnes entered a decree of adoption.

Undergoing an apparent change of heart, Christine informed her attorney, Kathleen Gallogly, on January 14, 1986, that she was having second thoughts. The next day Gallogly telephoned Frank, the attorney representing the adoptive parents and brother of the adoptive father. Gallogly, according to Frank’s version of the call, informed Frank that Christine was “hysterical” and “wanted to know ³⁶⁵ where the baby was.” Gallogly and Frank also engaged in a discussion of the decree of adoption, which Gallogly felt could not be construed as final. At 8:00 the next morning, January 16, Frank met with Judge Byrnes ex parte and obtained the Judge’s signature on a new, final decree of adoption.

They discussed only Maryland Code (1984), § 5-324 of the Family Law Article, which prohibits the entry of a final decree of adoption until at least 15 days after the birth of the child. The caption of the earlier decree was changed to “interlocutory.” Gallogly formally filed Christine’s signed revocation of consent a few hours later. Christine moved to vacate the order of adoption on January 26. Judge Hilary D. Caplan, after hearing arguments on March 4 and May 27, 1986, denied the motion, and Christine appealed to this Court.

We view the essential issue on appeal to be simply whether the trial court abused its discretion by failing to vacate the order of adoption. We have no difficulty in concluding it did. We have greater difficulty, however, in fashioning a remedy for Christine that preserves her rights as the natural mother while simultaneously serving the best interests of the child, who has now been in the appellees’ care for 16 months. We turn first to the trial court’s consideration of Christine’s motion to vacate.

The trial court’s revisory power over the entry of the final order of adoption is governed by Rule 2-535(a), as appellant filed her motion to vacate well within the 30 days after judgment specified by the Rule. The Rule provides that, in such circumstances, the trial court “may exercise revisory power and control over the judgment.” Our own previous opinions and those of the Court of Appeals have repeatedly and emphatically interpreted this language (and that of its predecessor Rules) as imposing an affirmative obligation upon the trial court to exercise its “extremely broad power of revision liberally lest technicality triumph over justice.” Haskell v. Carey, 294 Md. 550, 558 , 451 A.2d 658, 663 (1982); J.B. Corp. v. Fowler, 258 Md. 432, 435 , 265 ³⁶⁶ A.2d 876, 878 (1970); Hamilton v. Hamilton, 242 Md. 240, 243, 218 A.2d 684, 686 , cert. denied, 385 U.S. 924 , 87 S.Ct. 239 , 17 L.Ed.2d 147 (1966); Eshelman Motors Corp. v. Scheftel, 231 Md. 300, 301 , 189 A.2d 818, 818 (1963); Weaver v. Realty Growth Investors, 38 Md.App. 78 , 379 A.2d 193 (1977); Kaplan v. Bach, 36 Md.App. 152 , 373 A.2d 71 (1977); Chase v. Jamison, 21 Md.App. 606 , 320 A.2d 580 (1974). Armed with this formidable battery of case law we examine whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to vacate the adoption order. In making this determination we are directed to pay particular attention to “whether the trial court entertained a reasonable doubt that justice had not been done.” Cromwell v. Ripley, 11 Md.App. 173, 177 , 273 A.2d 218, 221 (1971), citing Abrams v. Gay Investment Co., 253 Md. 121 , 251 A.2d 876 (1969); Hamilton, supra; Ryan v. Johnson, 220 Md. 70 , 150 A.2d 906 (1959); and quoting Clarke Baridon, Inc. v. Union Asbestos and Rubber Co., 218 Md. 480, 483 , 147 A.2d 221, 223 (1958).

In cases of adoption, such as this one, notions of equity, statutory and case law all attempt to safeguard the parental rights of the natural mother and father. In the context of a motion to vacate an unenrolled adoption decree, as opposed to decrees in other types of actions, the trial court is therefore required to exercise a perhaps extraordinary degree of caution to ensure that “technicality” has not “triumphed” over the just rights of the parent. The Supreme Court has classified the parental rights of the natural mother and father as “far more precious than property rights” and protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 , 92 S.Ct. 1208, 1211 , 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972).

Prior to Stanley , in Walker v. Gardner, 221 Md. 280, 284 , 157 A.2d 273, 276 (1960), the Court of Appeals articulated the role parental rights played in the social policy of this State by declaring that these considerations “have led the Legislature and this Court to make sure as far as possible that ³⁶⁷ adoption shall not be granted over parental objection unless that course clearly is justified.” See also Bridges v. Nicely, 304 Md. 1, 7 , 497 A.2d 142, 145 (1985), where the Court wrote “adoption should not be granted over parental objection unless that course is clearly warranted, bearing in mind ... all just claims of the objecting parent.” The Legislature has codified this policy in Subtitle 3 of the Family Law Article, which states as two of its purposes the protection of: (2) natural parents from a hurried or ill-considered decision to give up a child, ... [and] (3) adoptive parents: ... (ii) from a future disturbance of their relationship with the child by a natural parent. Section 5-303. When this legislation is superimposed on Rule 2-535, the combined effect is obvious.

Rule 2-535(a), governing unenrolled decrees, safeguards the interests of the natural parent by allowing the parent 30 days after the entry of a final decree of adoption to show that the decree exalts technicality over justice. The natural parent must create in the trial judge’s mind “a reasonable doubt that justice has been served.” After the enrollment of the decree, the adoptive parents are protected from disturbances of their relationship with the child, absent a showing of “fraud, mistake, or irregularity.” Rule 2-535(b). See also § 5-325 of the Family Law Article which provides further protection from any procedural or jurisdictional defect after one year from the entry of the final decree. In the present case, appellant, the natural mother, 1 moved to vacate the final order of adoption ten days after the order was entered, before enrollment of the decree.

The proper inquiry for the trial judge, in such cases, concerns the circumstances surrounding the entry of the final decree. He must determine if the rights of the natural ³⁶⁸ mother have been terminated in a manner consistent with justice. If he has any “reasonable doubt,” he should vacate the order. Testimony at the hearing on the motion to vacate before Judge Caplan revealed that appellant had initially been informed by Gallogly that adoption procedures usually involved a six-month waiting period, 2 during which time she could revoke consent; that although what was eventually titled an interlocutory decree of consent had been entered on December 31, appellant’s consent contained no notice that an interlocutory decree would cut off her right to revoke; that Gallogly informed appellant on January 2 that she would have only until “mid-January” to revoke; that appellant telephoned Gallogly on January 14 and in an emotionally-charged conversation questioned the decision to consent; that Gallogly recommended appellant seek counseling to help her make the decision on consent; that Gallogly telephoned attorney Frank on January 15, and in Frank’s words, She said, “Frank, I’ve just received a call from Christine and Christine was hysterical.

She wanted to know where the baby was”____ She [Gallogly] sensed some sort of anxiety in her discussion with Christine ... I guess I would describe it as, sort of, post-partem blues ... At that point, the conversation shifted to the order that was signed in the case. Miss Gallogly said to me, do you have a final order in the case.

I said, Judge Byrnes signed an order the day we were down there; that at 8:00 the next morning Frank met with Judge Byrnes ex parte and obtained the Judge’s signature on a new, final order of adoption; and that a few hours later, after she first obtained Christine’s signature, Gallogly filed Christine’s revocation of consent with the court. ³⁶⁹ Based on this testimony Judge Caplan made the following factual finding: The Court also believes the adoptive parents were anxious to get the final order signed as any adoptive parents might be, and the argument has been made by Mr. Rohr [counsel for Christine at the hearing] that the next morning, very early morning, which indeed it was, that after conversation with [Frank] — this is [Frank], the attorney — that he ran down to the courthouse and basically beat other counsel down to the courthouse to file the decree of adoption before the revocation was filed. Judge Caplan nonetheless refused to vacate the order because the mother in this case was not really aware of what her intentions were. The evidence in my mind was very clear at the time she was on the witness stand that she said, and I wrote in my own notes, and it is very clear what she said, that she was going to go to counseling before her “final decision” which leads this Court to believe that she had not made a final decision, that she was questioning the decision, but that it was not finally made. From this Judge Caplan concluded that Christine had not, in fact, revoked in a timely manner, and that because the decree was filed after the 15-day statutory waiting period succeeding the birth of the child, the revocation was ineffective.

In examining the equities of the situation, Judge Caplan observed: Who has gone through with all the proceedings that were necessary to bring this case to Court and file all the necessary papers, bought all the necessary items for the child, given this child nourishing the last five months? The [adoptive parents], and the [adoptive parents] even went so far as to say that they would give the child back if, number one, there would be a good home for the child and, number two, we would be paid our medical expenses ³⁷⁰ which they felt justified in requesting, and those items were not able to be met by [Christine]. ****** The [adoptive parents], the parties in this case who have done nothing wrong, who have never changed their minds, who have never wavered in this case, who have consistently done what this