In re Appeal No. 857

Lowe, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Appellee, barely 16 years of age, was charged with robbery with a deadly weapon and related offenses. In light of his age, the juvenile court would have had original jurisdiction over him but for Md. Code, Cts. Art., § 3-804 (d) (4), which provides that the juvenile court does not have jurisdiction when the charge is robbery with a deadly weapon.

However, the circuit court, exercising its general criminal jurisdiction, is permitted to waive the youth to juvenile jurisdiction if a waiver is believed to be in the best interest of the child or society. Md. Code, Art. 27, § 594A. Judge Morris Turk, sitting as the Circuit Court for Howard County, so concluded, and waived the circuit court’s criminal jurisdiction over appellee, thus giving the juvenile court jurisdiction. The State seeks to appeal that waiver.

It argues that the action constituted a “final judgment” against it, relying upon our recent opinion in an appeal by a juvenile in another awkwardly named case. In Re Appeal No. 507, Term 1976, 34 Md. App. 440 . We find it unnecessary to reach the question of finality because the State has overlooked the fact that it has no right to appeal, regardless of the finality of the action or the State’s aggrieved posture. Appellate jurisdiction in Maryland is dependent upon a statutory grant of power.

Lohss and Sprenkle v. State, 272 Md. 113, 116 . That grant of power is set forth in Md. Code, Cts. Art., § 12-301: “Except as provided in § 12-302, a party may appeal from a final judgment entered in a civil or criminal case by a circuit court. The right of appeal ⁶³⁷ exists from a final judgment entered by a court in the exercise of original, special, limited, statutory jurisdiction, unless in a particular case the right of appeal is expressly denied by law.

In a criminal case, the defendant may appeal even though imposition or execution of sentence has been suspended.” One of the exceptions in § 12-302 (c) severely limited the State’s right to appeal: “In a criminal case, the state may appeal only from a final judgment granting a motion to dismiss or quashing or dismissing any indictment, information, presentment, or inquisition in a criminal case.” Under that statute, which was in effect at the time of the commission of the crimes with which appellee is charged, it is abundantly clear that the only right of the State to appeal is within those narrow confines. In State v. Wooten, 277 Md. 114, 115-116 , we are told that the law regulating the State’s right to appeal is that which was in effect at the time of the commission of the offense charged: “Preliminarily we must consider a jurisdictional matter, Wooten’s contention that the petitioner, the State, has no right to initiate this appeal. While recognizing that this Court, in State ex rel. Sonner v. Shearin, 272 Md. 502, 526 , 325 A. 2d 573 (1974), decided that under Maryland Code (1957, 1968 Repl.

Vol.), Art. 5, § 14 the State was permitted to appeal from a trial court’s denial of a motion to correct an illegal sentence, the respondent asserts that such appeals were prohibited when that provision was reworded at the time it was reenacted as Code (1974), Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, §§ 12-301 and 12-302. However, because the crime in this case, as in Sonner, was committed prior to January 1, 1974, ⁶³⁸ the effective date of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, Laws of Maryland 1973, First Extraordinary Session, ch. 2, §§ 18 and 21, the applicable law in this casé is Art. 5, § 14. State ex rel. Sonner v. Shearin, supra, 272 Md. at 525-26.

Consequently, we are not required to interpret §§ 12-301 and 12-302, but only hold that under Art. 5, § 14 this appeal is proper. Id. at 526 & n. 6.” (footnotes omitted and emphasis added). In light of Wooten , we could rest here, and simply hold that because the State cannot come within the provisions of § 12-302 (c), it has no right of appeal. But in Matter of Anderson, 272 Md. 85 , where the Court of Appeals also, with terse clarity, spoke upon the subject of which law must apply when the State attempts to appeal, a different rule was set forth: “The right of appeal must be determined under the law in effect at the time of the appeals.” Id. at 88 .

This conflict is of note because, by Laws 1976, Ch. 49, § 1, effective July 1, 1976, the Legislature modified the State’s right to appeal. Except for form and style, the 1976 change had only two meaningful aspects — the removal of a word (which we will bracket) and the