In Re Billy W.

BATTAGLIA, J. as to Part I. In this action between the biological parents and the State, we have been asked to consider whether the trial court properly admitted hearsay testimony by a social worker and two Court Appointed Special Advocates 1 during a hearing to ⁴¹¹ review the permanency plans for children who had been declared in need of assistance. Because we have held that application of the Maryland Rules of Evidence is not mandatory in permanency planning hearings, the Circuit Court did not commit error in admitting hearsay testimony from the social worker and the Court Appointed Special Advocates during the permanency planning proceeding. Facts and Procedural History 2 Ms. B., an Appellant in this case, has four children who are the subjects of the permanency planning hearing at issue: Mary S., born in 1991, Jessica W., born in 1992, Billy W., born in 1994, and George B., born in 2000. The father of Mary S., Jessica W., and Billy W. is deceased.

George B.’s father is Mr. B., another Appellant in this ease, to whom Ms. B. was married, but from whom she is now separated. All four children resided with both Mr. and Ms. B. prior to the separation. The family first came to the attention of the Baltimore County Department of Social Services (“DSS”) when Mary S., then eight years old, alleged that she had been sexually abused by Mr. B., who was later charged and convicted. DSS, during its investigation of the sexual abuse allegations, determined that Ms. B. was aware of Mr. B.’s past history of sexual abuse and knew of Mr. B.’s behavior with Mary S., but had failed to take appropriate action to protect the girl.

All of the children, nevertheless, remained in Ms. B.’s care after she and Mr. B. separated. During the next two years, while the children were in Ms. B.’s care, there were four additional investigations by DSS of abuse and neglect, including allegations that Mary S. had sexually abused Billy W. On February 7, 2002, DSS removed all four children from Ms. B.’s care, placed them under emergency shelter care, and subsequently filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Baltimore ⁴¹² County requesting judicial approval of shelter care for the children. The court conducted a hearing and ordered DSS custody of the children and shelter care for them, pending an adjudicatory hearing. 3 Thereafter, during the adjudicatory hearing, all four children were declared to be children in need of assistance (“CINA”) 4 and committed to the care and custody of DSS for placement in foster care. The court also ordered that Ms. B. be permitted two hours supervised visitation once per week with all four children and that Mr. B. would have one hour supervised visitation once per week with George B. 5 At that time, the permanency plan 6 for the children was reunification solely with Ms. B. ⁴¹³ Initially, DSS placed Billy W. and George B. together in a foster home; however, both boys were removed due to allegations that Billy W. had sexually abused a younger child in the home.

After a brief stay in another home, Billy W. was committed to St. Vincent’s Center, a residential treatment center, from June 2002 until November 2003, when DSS transferred him to a therapeutic foster home. During that same time George B. was moved to another foster home where he has remained. Mary S. and Jessica W. were placed together in a foster home; after six weeks both were moved to a therapeutic foster home. In August 2002, Mary S. was admitted to ⁴¹⁴ Sheppard Pratt Hospital for suicidal behavior, where she was diagnosed with “aggressive disorder recurrent with psychosis” and “possible dissociative disorder.” Mary S. stayed at Sheppard Pratt for six weeks, was discharged and moved to transitional housing, and then to the Villa Maria Residential Treatment Center for six months, before returning to the original therapeutic foster home in May 2003.

Jessica W. has remained in the original therapeutic foster home the entire time. The Circuit Court conducted periodic review hearings, 7 and on June 23, 2003, DSS recommended, and the court ordered, a change in the permanency plan for George B. from reunification to a concurrent plan of reunification with Ms. B. and adoption. The court also increased Billy W., Jessica W., and Mary S.’s visitation with Ms. B. to include, in addition to supervised visitation, one hour of unsupervised visitation. The reunification plan with Ms. B. for the three children remained unchanged.

Mr. B.’s visitation was changed to one hour supervised visitation per month with George B. Ms. B. did not object to the maintenance of the permanency plans for Billy W., Jessica W., or Mary S. Both parents contested the change in the permanency plan for George B., and noted separate appeals to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court in a consolidated unreported opinion. While that appeal was pending in the Court of ⁴¹⁵ Special Appeals, the Circuit Court held another six month review hearing on November 10, 2003, in which the trial judge once again continued the commitment of all four children to the care and custody of DSS. The judge also ordered that Ms. B.’s visitation with Billy W. and Jessica W. would remain two hours supervised per week and one hour unsupervised per week. As to Mary S., the parties agreed and the court acquiesced in the decision that Ms. B. would be permitted one hour supervised visitation per week, but that the unsupervised visitation would be suspended. 8 With respect to George B., Ms. B.’s visitation remained three hours, but the supervised visitation was reduced to one and a half hours per week.

Mr. B.’s visitation with George B., one hour supervised visitation per month, was not changed. Both Ms. B. and Mr. B. noted separate appeals from the court’s order regarding George B., to the Court of Special Appeals, which in an unreported opinion, addressed the substantive issues raised by the parties and affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court. 9 Subsequently, while that appeal was pending in the Court of Special Appeals, the Circuit Court held a three-day review hearing on April 23, 2004 and May 4-5, 2004, which is the subject of this appeal. At the hearing, sixteen witnesses testified, including Ms. Kristy Caceres, a DSS social worker ⁴¹⁶ assigned to the case, who testified about the progress of the children and the children’s interaction with both Ms. B. and Mr. B. When DSS questioned Ms. Caceres about the progress of the children’s family therapy, the following ensued: [DSS’s COUNSEL]: And is that family therapy progressing as desired? [MS. CACERES]: The last that I talked to the therapist, she seemed to think that there were some— [Ms. B.’s COUNSEL]: Objection. [THE COURT]: Basis? [Ms. B.’s COUNSEL]: Hearsay. [THE COURT]: It’s a review hearing.

I think there’s some latitude. [Ms. B.’s COUNSEL]: Again, I’m going to ask for a continuing objection to hearsay from therapists who aren’t present- to testify and could have been. [THE COURT]: All right. Overruled. Ms. Caceres continued to testify that she spoke with the children’s therapist, who was not present at the hearing, about the children’s family therapy and that the therapist “seemed to think that there was some progress. Things were going okay.” Counsel for Ms. B. again objected on the grounds of hearsay, to which the hearing judge replied: “It’s a review hearing.

Strict rules of evidence don’t apply if there’s some foundation for the knowledge, but there’s some latitude.” After the judge overruled the hearsay objection, Ms. Caceres opined that the permanency plans for the children should not be changed because there had been “minimal progress in Ms. B.’s ability to focus on the kids and to provide for their individual needs.” She also stated that DSS did not have the adoptive resources for the children and would not seek a termination of parental rights at that time. Ms. B. testified during the hearing that her relationship with the children was improving and that she would be able to care for the children if they were to be returned to her care. Several social workers involved with supervising the visitation with George B. and Mr. B. also testified at the hearing. ⁴¹⁷ All of the social workers uniformly stated that during a visit between Mr. B. and George B. in February 2004, Mr. B.’s behavior toward them was aggressive and erratic to a point that the police were called to remove Mr. B. from the building after he refused to leave the visiting room. The social workers also testified that during the altercation, Mr. B. became violent toward the police officers while George B. was present right outside the visiting room at the end of the visitation.

Mr. B. testified during the hearing and denied that he had been loud and aggressive during the visit with George B., contrary to the testimony given by the social workers. Mr. B. explained that he only had expressed anger after George B. had been removed from the visitation room before the scheduled visitation time had lapsed. Mr B. further argued that he wanted George B.’s permanency plan to be changed to a concurrent plan of reunification with both Mr. and Ms. B., and in the alternative, increased visitation would be acceptable. At the conclusion of the witness testimony, the trial judge referred the parties to the written reports of two Court Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”) volunteers assigned to the cases, who were present during the hearing: [COURT]: Well, CASA is here.

Usually at a review hearing I ask CASA if they have anything to add other than what’s contained in the record. [MR. B.’s COUNSEL]: But you accept the report in its entirety? I have not participated in one of these before. [COURT]: The reports are filed as part of the Court file. If anyone has questions about them they can ask CASA.

Or, if they want to inquire in any way, they can do that. Have you had a chance to review the CASA reports? [MR. B.’s COUNSEL]: Yes. And Your Honor, I was troubled by the hearsay in it, and how it was kind of replete with some false statements ... and that kind of thing. [DSS’s COUNSEL]: I don’t know how we address their report at this hearing. ⁴¹⁸ [COURT]: Well, let’s deal with the CASA reports in terms of what the objections or concerns are that you have about them.

After discussing the objections to the written reports, the judge explained that the parties could question the CASA volunteers about the reports and, then solicited testimony from both CASAs regarding the status of the children. Neither CASA volunteer was placed under oath prior to testifying at the1 hearing, and the CASA reports were not formally entered in evidence, although the record reflects that the reports previously had been reviewed by the juvenile court judge and the parties. In response to questions from the hearing judge, the CASA volunteer assigned to the girls testified that Mary and Jessica had stated that they want unsupervised visitation with Ms. B., but that they did not want to return home to Ms. B. The judge inquired whether the parties had any questions for the CASA, to which each counsel replied in the negative. The CASA assigned to the boys, Billy W. and George B., was then called to testify, and in response to questions posed by the trial judge, the CASA volunteer stated: [COURT]: Mr. [CASA], can I ask ... the frequency of your contact with the boys? [CASA]: It varies.

Sometimes it’s once a month and sometimes it’s twice a month. I talk to the stepmothers probably more than I see the boys, to find out how they are getting along. I do have a couple of things that I would like to say that are probably not in that report. [COURT]: All right. [CASA]: ... it’s about the conversations that they had with their mother when they are on unsupervised visits, or when they are on visits. The mother’s inappropriate conversation is a main problem that’s causing these children a lot of stress and strain. [MS.

B.’s COUNSEL]: Objection. [MR. B.’s COUNSEL]: Objection. ⁴¹⁹ [CASA]: This is my opinion. [COURT]: Hold on. Hold on. What’s the basis of the objection? [MR.

B.’S COUNSEL]: My basis was, he is expressing an opinion as to the main problem with these children. And again, that’s inappropriate for him to say that. [COURT]: Mr. [CASA], you can tell me about whatever they have told you about conversations with— [CASA]: I will do that. In ... January, I took ...

Billy out for lunch.... He always have been extremely pleasant, courteous, very polite. This particular visit was very strenuous on me.... Billy was belligerent, he was aggressive, he was very sharp with me.

He wouldn’t answer questions when I talked to him. So, I took him home and told the ... foster mom, that it didn’t go well. I called [the foster mom] up later that week and she said that— [MS. B.’S COUNSEL]: Objection. [CASA]: I said that the visit went very bad.

This is actually what happened. [COURT]: What’s the basis of the objection? [MS. B.’S COUNSEL]: We are getting hearsay from the foster mom on what she said Billy said to her. [COURT]: You know what, there is a statute that allows for CASA that permits precisely this. They are supposed to have contacts and report to the Court about the contacts. Hi Hi * [CASA]: Anyhow, [the foster mom] told me that Billy said his mother said that I [the CASA] was a very bad person and that [Billy] should have no contact with me.

He also said his ... foster mother was a very bad person, amongst other people. Now Billy knows better and he confides with me. On our ... last visit ... I confronted [Billy] with this question.

We were going for a long ride, and [Billy] told me that his mom told him that I [the CASA] was a very bad person and that [Billy’s] foster mother was also a bad ⁴²⁰ person, amongst other people in his school. And, that he was very mixed up and very confused. * * * [CASA]: And then I asked [Billy], you know, and Billy was telling me on this particular visit, and others, that on Wednesdays he sometimes gets very stressed out. And I asked him, why do you get stressed out on Wednesdays, and he said because he was to make plans for what he is going to do on Thursday with his mother. And I said, what do you mean, Billy, and he said you know, I have to set it all up, I’ve got to make sure we do things right and go to the right places.

I said, doesn’t your mother handle that, and he said, no, she doesn’t know the area and I have to handle it and I have to take care of it. This puts a lot of stress on this young man. [COURT]: Okay. The same CASA volunteer assigned to the boys also testified about George B.’s recent visits with Ms. B.: [CASA]: Georgie, is, by his foster-mom, he cries himself to sleep sometimes right after visits. [COURT]: Mr. [CASA], I’ve got to limit you to things that you see, you observe, what you know. [CASA]: I’ve got that. The visit that I had with Georgie, two or three weeks ago, on Saturday he and I had a very nice long walk and talk, and this is what he said to me.

He told me his mother made him feel bad and she called him bad names. And also, my father is in jail. That was from Georgie’s mouth. You know the foster parents have to pick up all the pieces of the visits, and it’s getting tough on the foster parents....

That’s the essence of what I have to say. The trial judge then asked whether any of the parties had any questions to ask the CASA, to which the following dialogue ensued: ⁴²¹ [MS. B.’S COUNSEL]: I have one. In all the time that you have been involved in this case have you ever talked with Mrs. B.? * * * [CASA]: Well, I couldn’t remember the dates.

I have been involved with this two years. [MS. B.’S COUNSEL]: It’s been a while? [CASA]: Probably. [MS. B.’S COUNSEL]: Have you ever tried to contact her? [CASA]: No. Should I? [MS. B.’S COUNSEL]: Have you ever tried to raise these concerns? [COURT]: Wait a minute.

Wait. Wait. Wait. Wait.

I have volunteers here who are giving their time. This is not to be confrontational. Mr. [CASA], it’s not the time to push them either. You can ask questions about the report, so do you have another question? [MS.

B.’S COUNSEL]: No. No, I don’t, Your Honor. The judge then inquired a second time whether the parties had any further questions, to which each counsel replied in the negative. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial judge approved the extant permanency plans that all four children remain committed to the custody of DSS. With regard to visitation for Jessica W. and Mary S., the trial judge stated that “[visitation [with Ms. B.] should be weekly, and it should be unsupervised.” The judge also ordered Ms. B. to participate in family therapy with the girls.

In expressing concern about the interaction between Billy W. and Ms. B., the judge stated: With regard to Billy, the situation with Billy is more difficult because there are varying views of the appropriateness of comments that are made to him. My reaction to what I have heard on Billy is that he is still in a fairly fragile state. He has just come out of St. Vincent’s, and he has had difficulty in adjusting.... On the one hand, there are ⁴²² suggestions that time with his mother should be more meaningful and unsupervised.

On the other hand, it appears that with Billy, that comments made in his presence have the potential to throw him off a little bit more. I am very concerned about this tension between Mrs. B. and the foster-mother because it’s clear that there is something there, and it has to be resolved. Accordingly, the hearing judge imposed the following conditions on Ms. B.’s visitation with Billy W.: With Billy, the plan still remains the same. The question is, the supervision structure----[Ms. B.] should have contact, phone contact with Billy, and Billy should have phone contact with his mother. * * * What I want is Mrs. B. involved in [Billy W.’s] therapy and that there would be at least two therapeutic visits before we resume unsupervised visits____I would like it done in a way that — I want [Ms. B.] involved in the therapy, and if there is a concern then the. therapist can articulate that and then I can get some input on why it should remain supervised only.

The judge further determined that Ms. B.’s visitation with Billy W. would remain three hours per week, but the unsupervised visitation would be suspended until Ms. B. completed two family therapy sessions with Billy W. In regard to Ms. B.’s visitation with George B., the judge stated: With regard to George, I think that there should be some supervision still with the contact that [Ms. B.] has with him.... I would ask that the Department try to make the visits, while supervised, to do it if at all possible through a parent-aide, so that it’s not Mrs. B. with the worker who is the person sort of in control of the situation, but with somebody with whom [Ms. B.] has a somewhat better or more relaxed relationship with. I would ask if you can explore whether the parent-aide would be available to supervise out-of-office visits, and at least twice a month, that ⁴²³ the visits, which would be likely, at least twice a month, that those would be out of the Agency. If those go well, and things stay on track and we don’t have a recurrence on the types in the past, and comments, or problems that have been problematic, we can look again and do unsupervised.

Right now I think we need to rein it back a little and have it under control. The hearing judge next addressed Mr. B.’s visitation schedule with George B. and determined: The question as to visits for Mr. B. is complicated by the fact that ... I would not burden the Department with supervising visits if the Department’s agents didn’t reasonably feel that they were safe in his presence or felt threatened in his presence. * * * To the extent that I would permit visits to continue it would only be done with an outside monitor in place and in a neutral site. It is my understanding that some of the sheriffs that are off duty will monitor supervised visitation and they’ll do it at a fee.

I am advising [Mr. B.’s Counsel] of that, that I would consider a proposal for supervised visits by an outside monitor who is an off-duty law enforcement person, but it’s going to be at Mr. B.’s expense. Essentially, the court advised that, because of Mr. B.’s volatile behavior against DSS representatives during the visits, it would require that an off-duty officer supervise Mr. B.’s once per month visitation, at the expense of Mr. B. Both parents, represented by the Public Defender’s Office, noted separate appeals to the Court of Special Appeals. 10 Ms. B.’s brief presented the following question for review: ⁴²⁴ Did the trial judge err in admitting hearsay evidence at the permanency plan review hearing in these CINA cases? Mr. B.’s brief presented the following question: Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Mr. B.’s request to change the permanency plan to reunification with George B. and by eliminating visitation with him? This Court issued, on its own initiative, a writ of certiorari, In re Billy W., 384 Md. 448 , 863 A.2d 997 (2004), prior to any proceedings in the intermediate appellate court.

Appealability In In re Samone H. and Marchay E., 385 Md. 282 , 869 A.2d 370 (2005), we considered whether an appeal would lie from an order entered after a permanency plan review hearing where the order continuing the permanency plan did not adversely affect the parental rights or change the terms of the permanency plan to the parent’s detriment. In that case, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City previously had implemented permanency plans of adoption for two children, Samone H. and Marchay E., both of whom had been adjudicated children in need of assistance, based upon allegations of neglect by their mother, Katina M. Id. at 289 , 869 A.2d at 374 . After several periodic review hearings, Katina M. filed a request for a “bonding study” to have the children evaluated by a psychiatrist to provide an assessment of her relationship with her children. She also had the children subpoenaed to testify at another pending review hearing.

During that hearing, the trial judge denied both requests and maintained the extant permanency plans for adoption, from which Katina M. appealed. On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, and this Court after granting certiorari, dismissed the appeal holding that “the trial court’s order denying the motion for [bonding] study [was] not an ⁴²⁵ appealable final judgment and [did] not constitute an interlocutory order under Section 12-803(x).” Id. at 316 , 869 A.2d at 390 . 11 In reaching that conclusion, we explained that the court’s order did not constitute a final judgment, and that it was not an appealable interlocutory order “[bjecause the order continuing the permanency plan did not adversely affect Katina M.’s parental rights or change the terms of the permanency plan to Katina M.’s detriment....” Id. at 317 , 869 A.2d at 391 . We further noted that the court’s order was not appeal-able under the collateral order doctrine because the order did not conclusively determine whether the permanency plans should have been changed, was not separate from the merits of the action, and would be reviewable on appeal if the denial had affected the mother’s parental rights adversely. Id. at 316 n. 13, 869 A.2d at 390 n. 13.

Thus, to be appealable interlocutory orders, court orders arising from the permanency plan review hearing must operate to either deprive the parent of the care and custody of his or her children or change the terms of the care and custody of the children to the parent’s detriment. Id. at 298 , 869 A.2d at 379 .; In re Damon M., 362 Md. 429, 438 , 765 A.2d 624, 628 (2001). In the present case, both Ms. B. and Mr. B. are appealing orders of the Circuit Court emanating from a permanency plan review hearing that maintained the extant plans for the children but changed the visitation. Clearly, the orders cannot be regarded as final in nature; rather, the orders are interlocutory in nature and must act to detrimentally affect Ms. B. and Mr. B.’s parental rights to be appeal- ⁴²⁶ able under Section 12-303(3)(x) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.

In re Samone H. 385 Md. at 299 , 869 A.2d at 380 ; In re Damon M., 362 Md. at 438 , 765 A.2d at 628 . The hearing judge changed Ms. B.’s visitation with Jessica W. and Mary S. from partial weekly unsupervised visitation to total weekly unsupervised visitation. Obviously, such a change in Ms. B.’s visitation does not operate to her detriment because she is allowed more unrestricted access to the girls. Conversely, the court orders relating to Billy W. and George B. , which eliminated Ms. B.’s unsupervised visitation infringes upon Ms. B.’s opportunities to interact with, and care for, the boys and to potentially build stronger relationships with them.

Because the orders regarding Billy W. and George B. changed the terms of Ms. B.’s visitation to her detriment, the orders are appealable as interlocutory orders under Section 12-303(3)(x). See In re Samone H. 385 Md. at 299 , 869 A.2d at 380 ; In re Damon M., 362 Md. at 438 , 765 A.2d at 628 . Similarly, the conditions placed on Mr. B.’s visitation with George B., specifically that Mr. B. secure the services of an off-duty officer to supervise his visitation with George B., changed the terms of Mr. B.’s care and custody to his detriment. During the hearing, Mr. B. explained that he did not have “the financial ability to contribute toward things,” and his eligibility to be represented by the Office of the Public Defender throughout these proceedings tends to support that assertion.

See In re Adoption/Guardianship Nos. 11387 and 11388, 354 Md. 574, 587 , 731 A.2d 972, 979 (1999) (holding that a natural parent is entitled to representation by Public Defender in hearing conducted to review children’s status, as long as that parent is indigent). The court’s requirement that Mr. B. hire an off-duty officer with his own resources constitutes a detrimental change in Mr. B.’s visitation rights because the order operates as an effective denial of visitation should he not be able to afford to pay for the officer’s services. Therefore, the order qualifies as an appealable interlocutory order. See In re Samone H. 385 Md. at 299 , 869 A.2d at 380 ; In re Damon M., 362 Md. at 438 , 765 A.2d at 628 . ⁴²⁷ PART I Ms. B.’s Appeal Ms. B. argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting hearsay testimony 12 provided by a DSS social worker and two CASAs during the permanency planning hearing because the application of the rules of evidence in such hearings are mandatory despite Maryland Rule 5-101(c), 13 which allows for the discretionary application of the Rules in certain proceedings, including “disposition hearings” under Maryland Rule 11-115 14 and “modification hearings” under ⁴²⁸ Maryland Rule 11-116. 15 Ms. B. distinguishes permanency planning hearings held under Section 3-823 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article from disposition hearings described under Maryland Rule 11-115d., because, according to her, the determinations made during permanency planning hearings are qualitatively different from those made in disposition hearings as contemplated under Rule 11—115d.

Ms. B. also asserts that permanency planning hearings are not modification hearings under Maryland Rule 11-116, characterizing the order issued as a result of a permanency planning hearing as a new order rather than modifying the court’s original order. Conversely, the Department argues that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in admitting the hearsay testimony of the social worker and CASA during the perma ⁴²⁹ nency planning hearing because such a hearing is a dispositional hearing, which does not require mandatory application of the Rules of Evidence and permits the juvenile court to decide which rules should apply. The Department notes that the determinations made at a permanency planning hearing are virtually identical to those listed in Rule 11-115d. and that certain evidence may be considered by the court in permanency planning hearings that otherwise would not be admissible, including hearsay testimony by the social workers and the CASAs. According to the Department, because permanency planning hearings are properly considered disposition hearings, “strict application” of the Rules of Evidence is not necessary, and the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to do so.

Application of the Rules of Evidence in Permanency Planning Hearings In 1993, this Court adopted Title 5 of the Maryland Rules governing the admission of evidence during judicial proceedings. 16 Specifically, we approved Rule 5-101, 17 which ⁴³⁰ delineates three categories of proceedings based upon the application of the Rules of Evidence. Subsection (a) provides the general rule that the rules of evidence apply to “all actions and proceedings in the courts of this State” subject to certain exceptions. Md. Rule 5-101(a). Subsection (b) lists those proceedings in which the Rules of Evidence do not apply, except “those relating to the competency of witnesses.” Md. Rule 5-101(b).

Finally, subsection (c), entitled “Discretionary application,” contains proceedings, including “Disposition hearings under Rule 11—115d.,” in which the court, in its discretion, ⁴³¹ may decline to apply the Rules of Evidence. Md. Rule 5-101(c). In the present case, Ms. B. presents arguments similar to those of the petitioner in In re Ashley E., Laione D., Matthew B., and Gregory B.-G., 387 Md. 260 , 874 A.2d 998 (2005). Specifically, Ms. B. contends that disposition hearings under Rule 11-115d. are distinct from permanency planning hearings under Section 3-823 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, and therefore, under Rule 5-101, the juvenile court is required to strictly apply the Rules of Evidence in permanency planning hearings.

To that end, she emphasizes that there are different determinations that the court must make under Section 3-823 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article as compared to what the court must accomplish to comply with the requirements under Rule 11-115d. 18 In In re Ashley E., we rejected those arguments and held that permanency planning hearings are dispositional in nature and are properly characterized as disposition hearings under Rule 11-115d. As such, we concluded that “the court may, in the interest of justice, decline to require strict application” of the Rules of Evidence “other than those relating to the competency of witnesses.” Id. at 294 , 874 A.2d at 1019 . We find our holding in In re Ashley E., to be dispositive of Ms. B.’s arguments. Therefore, under In re Ashley E., the juvenile court in the case sub judice, could, in the interest of justice, decline to require strict application of the Rules of ⁴³² Evidence, other than those relating to the competency of witnesses.

Id. at 294 , 874 A.2d at 1019 ; Md. Rule 5-101(c). Admissibility of Hearsay Testimony in Permanency Planning Hearings In the present case, we are called upon to address the criteria that should be utilized by the trial court to determine the admissibility of hearsay evidence in permanency planning hearings after we have declined to require strict application of the Rules of Evidence. Although this specific issue is one of first impression in this Court, we have had the opportunity to evaluate the criteria for admissibility of evidence when the evidentiary rules do not “strictly apply” in sentencing hearings and administrative proceedings. See Whittlesey v. State, 340 Md. 30, 71-72 , 665 A.2d 223, 243 (1995) (noting that although “the strict Rules of Evidence do not apply at a sentencing proceeding .... [this] does not require the admission of unreliable evidence”); Baker v. State, 332 Md. 542, 558 , 632 A.2d 783, 790 (1993) (stating that “while the strict Rules of Evidence do not apply at a sentencing proceeding, unreliable hearsay is inadmissible”); State v. Dopkowski, 325 Md. 671, 680 , 602 A.2d 1185, 1190 (1992) (same); Woods, 315 Md. at 604, 556 A.2d at 242 (same); Smith, 308 Md. at 166, 517 A.2d at 1083 (same); Gorin v. Board of County Commissioner for Anne Arundel County et al., 244 Md. 106, 110 , 223 A.2d 237, 239 (1966) (stating “[w]hile proceedings before an administrative board are informal and the strict Rules of Evidence do not apply .... [o]ne of the requisites in such a proceeding is that the party who carries the burden of proving an issue adduce substantial evidence of probative value”).

Similarly, our colleagues on the Court of Special Appeals have explored the standards for admitting evidence when the Rules of Evidence do not strictly apply. See In re Delric H., 150 Md.App. 234, 248-49 , 819 A.2d 1117, 1126 (2003) (holding that “even though a court may decline to require a strict application of evidentiary rules [in juvenile restitution hearings], there still exists an inherent reliability/credibility requirement which a proponent of the offered evidence must ⁴³³ satisfy”). See also Prince George’s County v. Hartley, 150 Md.App. 581, 595 , 822 A.2d 537, 545 (2003), quoting Travers v. Baltimore Police Dep’t, 115 Md.App. 395 , 693 A.2d 378 (1997) (holding that the Rules of Evidence are relaxed in administrative proceedings; however, the evidence adduced “must demonstrate sufficient reliability and probative value to satisfy the requirements of procedural due process”); Kitchen v. State, 87 Md.App. 299, 303 , 589 A.2d 575, 577 (1991) (determining that “in probation revocation proceedings formal Rules of Evidence are not applied, and that reasonably reliable hearsay may be received”) (emphasis added). Consistent with this view, several of our sister states have held that in juvenile proceedings in which rules of evidence are not strictly applied, admissibility of evidence must be based upon reasonable indicia of reliability and trustworthiness.

See In re C.J., 328 Ill.App.3d 103 , 262 Ill.Dec. 36 , 764 N.E.2d 1153, 1160 (2002) (stating that in a juvenile proceeding the formal rules of evidence are relaxed and that “all evidence shall be admissible if it is relevant and reliable”); In re Sara M., 194 Cal.App.3d 585 , 239 Cal.Rptr. 605, 611 (1987) (finding that the “rules of evidence are relaxed in dependency proceedings but expert evidence not shown to be reliable ... remains inadmis-' sible”). Similarly, state courts addressing administrative proceedings in which the rules of evidence are relaxed have held that the evidence to be admitted must possess some degree of reliability and trustworthiness. See e.g., Alix v. E-Z Serve Corporation, 846 So.2d 156, 159 (La.App.2003) (holding that in “workers’ compensation matters, the technical rules of evidence are relaxed, but findings must nonetheless be based on ‘competent evidence’” which is “evidence [that] has some degree of reliability and trustworthiness and is of the type that reasonable persons would rely upon”); New London Housing Authority v. State Board of Labor Relations, 47 Conn.Supp. 624 , 820 A.2d 332, 338 (2001) (noting that in administrative proceedings the rules of evidence are relaxed and that the court may consider any materials that are reliable and probative); Bean v. Montana Board of Labor ⁴³⁴ Appeals, 290 Mont. 496 , 965 P.2d 256, 260 (1998) (determining that although the rules of evidence are more relaxed in an administrative proceeding than in a court of law, the evidence adduced must be reliable and probative). Addressing the specific issue before us, we conclude that in permanency planning hearings when the Rules of Evidence are not strictly applied, the trial court must evaluate whether evidence proffered for admission is sufficiently reliable and probative prior to its admission.

Ms. B. contends that the trial court should have sustained her objections to portions of the testimony of the DSS social worker, Ms. Caceres, which contained hearsay statements. 19 During the May 5, 2004 hearing, the trial judge admitted the testimony of Ms. Caceres, who stated that as a part of her duties, she was charged with gathering information to make determinations and recommendations to the court concerning the best interests of the children. See Md.Code (1984, 1999 Repl Vol.), § 5-525 of the Family Law Article. Ms. Caceres testified about Ms. B.’s conduct and conversations during visits with the children, the children’s feelings toward Ms. B., and the children’s behavior following visits with Ms. B. Ms. Caceres’s testimony also included statements concerning the progress of the children’s therapy sessions based upon information provided by the psychologist conducting the therapy sessions. Most of the information that Ms. Caceres conveyed to the court was related to her direct observations of both parents and the children.

Therefore, we conclude that Ms. Caceres’ testimony was sufficiently reliable and probative based upon her responsibilities and opportunity to observe both parents and the children. Court Appointed Special Advocates Ms. B. also urges this court to determine that the trial court improperly admitted the testimony of the CASA volunteers ⁴³⁵ during the hearing. The present case involves the use of CASAs in a juvenile proceeding, which previously has not been addressed by this Court or the Court of Special Appeals. Therefore, a discussion of CASAs and their role in such proceedings is warranted.

Because of growing concern regarding the lack of quality legal representation for abused and neglected children, in 1974 the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (“CAPTA”), was enacted by Congress. It required that “in every case involving an abused or neglected child which results in a judicial proceeding a guardian ad litem shall be appointed to represent the child in such proceedings.” Pub.L. No. 93-247, § 4 (b)(2)(G), 88 Stat. 4 (1974), codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5107 (1994). In response to CAPTA’s mandate, Judge David Soukup, a Superior Court Judge in Seattle, Washington, introduced the concept of utilizing volunteers to act as guardian ad litems (“GAL”) 20 for children in abuse and neglect cases, and in 1977, began a child advocacy program called Court Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”). A CASA has been described as “a trained community volunteer, appointed by a judge, to represent the best interests of children in cases that come before the court due to alleged abuse or neglect.” National Court Appointed Special Advocate Association, Judge’s Guide to CASA/GAL Program Development [hereinafter “NCASAA Judge’s Guide”] 15 (2004).

In 1982, a National Court Appointed Special Advocate Association [hereinafter “NCASAA”] was established to create ⁴³⁶ uniform standards for newly formed as well as expanding state programs. Thereafter, in 1990, Congress enacted the Victims of Child Abuse Act, which endorsed CASA programs and called for expanding the utilization of CASA volunteers by making them available to every victim of child abuse or neglect. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 13011-13014 (1994). In addition, the Act provides federal funds to develop statewide CASA programs and establishes criteria that a program requesting funds must meet to qualify.

Victims of Child Abuse Act of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-647, § 211 . The statute requires, in part: 1. A CASA association must have a mission and purpose in keeping with the National CASA Association and that it abide by the National CASA Association Code of Ethics; 2. A CASA program must operate with access to legal counsel; 3.

The management and operation of a CASA program must assure adequate supervision of court appointed special advocate volunteers; 4. A CASA program must keep records on the operation of the program in general, and on each appellant, volunteer and case; 5. A .CASA program must have written management and personnel policies and procedures, screening requirements, and training curriculum; 6. A CASA program will not accept volunteers who have been convicted of, or have charges pending for, or have in the past been charged with, a felony or misdemeanor involving a sex offense, violent act, child abuse or neglect, or related acts that would pose risks to children or to the CASA program’s credibility; 7.

A CASA program must have established procedures to allow the immediate reporting to a court or proper agency of a situation in which a CASA volunteer has reason to believe that a child is in imminent danger; 8. A CASA volunteer must be an individual who has been screened and trained by a recognized CASA program and ⁴³⁷ appointed by the court to advocate for the children who come before the court system primarily as a result of abuse or neglect; and 9. A CASA volunteer serves the function of reviewing records, facilitating prompt, thorough review of cases, and interviewing appropriate parties in order to make recommendations on what would be in the best interest of the child. Victims of Child Abuse Act of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-647, § 211 .

CASA programs provide training for community volunteers to advocate for the best interests of children who come into the court system primarily as a result of alleged abuse or neglect. See Standards for National CASA Association Member Programs [hereinafter NCASAA Standards] 1 (2002). The programs also ensure that volunteers have regular, in-person contact with the child sufficient to have a working knowledge of the situation and to make factual recommendations to the court. See NCASAA Standards at 1.

According to NCASAA’s Standards for National CASA Association Member Programs, each CASA volunteer receives training consisting of approximately thirty hours of instruction, conducted by the local CASA program. Id. at 22 . NCASAA recommends that CASA volunteers receive instruction in topics such as child sexual abuse, early childhood development, adolescent behavior, and advocacy techniques. Id.

The NCASAA Standards require that CASAs should receive instruction in courtroom procedure from the principals in the system, ie., judges, attorneys, social workers, and court personnel. Id. According to the NCASAA Judge’s Guide to CASA Program Development, a CASA volunteer, as a part of his or her duties, should: 1. Conduct an independent investigation by reviewing all pertinent documents and records and interviewing the child, parents, social workers, foster parents, teachers, therapists, daycare providers and other relevant persons to determine the facts and circumstances of ⁴³⁸ the child’s situation.

To do this effectively, volunteers spend considerable time getting to know children and gaining their trust. 2. Determine the thoughts and feelings of the child about the situation, taking into account the child’s age, maturity, culture and ethnicity and degree of attachment to family members, including siblings. Also to be considered are continuity, consistency and a sense of belonging and identity. 3. Seek cooperative solutions by acting as a facilitator and mediator among conflicting parties to achieve resolution of problems and to foster positive steps toward achieving permanence for the child. 4.

Provide written reports at every hearing which include findings and recommendations. The report documents the extent of the volunteer’s investigation, lists each source of information and includes sufficient facts to justify the recommendations. 5. Appear at all hearings to advocate for the child’s best interests and provide testimony when necessary. 6. Explain the court proceedings and the role of the CASA volunteer to the child in terms the child can understand. 7.

Make recommendations for specific, appropriate services for the child and the child’s family and advocate for necessary services which may not be immediately available. 8. Monitor implementation of case plans and court orders, checking to see that court-ordered services are implemented in a timely manner and that review hearings are held in accordance with the law. 9. Inform the court promptly of important developments including any agency’s failure to provide services or the family’s failure to participate. The CASA volunteer should ensure that appropriate motions are filed on behalf of the child in order that the court can ⁴³⁹ be made aware of the changes in the child’s circumstances and can take appropriate actions. 10.

Advocate for the child’s interests in the community by bringing concerns regarding the child’s health, education and mental health, etc. to the appropriate professionals to assure that the child’s needs in these areas are met. NCASAA Judge’s Guide at 17. Moreover, CASA volunteers may be subject to dismissal for having taken action without program or court approval that endangers the child or outside the role or purview of the CASA program. The service of CASA volunteers also may be terminated for engaging in an ex parte communication with the court; violating a program policy, court rule, or the law; failing to complete required training or to carry out effectively his or her assigned duties; or if allegations of abuse or neglect are brought against the CASA.

See NCASAA Standards at 25. To date, there is at least one CASA program in each of the fifty states, and the majority of states also have enacted statutes establishing CASA programs and defining the role that the CASA volunteers play in child abuse and neglect cases. Many state courts have sanctioned the use of CASA volunteers and have allowed them to submit reports and recommendations, as well as testify regarding their findings. See e.g., In re K.L.S., 94 P.3d 1025 (Wyo.2004); In re T.H., 131 S.W.3d 598 (Tex.App.2004); In re R.A.R., 259 Ga.App. 680 , 577 S.E.2d 872 (2003); Arkansas Dept. of Human Services v. Collier, 351 Ark. 506 , 95 S.W.3d 772 (2003); In re D.F., 201 Ill.2d 476 , 268 Ill.Dec. 7 , 777 N.E.2d 930 (2002); In re W.B., 772 N.E.2d 522 (Ind.App.2002); In re J.W., 111 Wash.App. 180 , 43 P.3d 1273 (2002); In re A.T.H., 37 S.W.3d 423 (Mo.App.2001); Div.

Family Services v. Hutton, 765 A.2d 1267 (Del.Supr.Ct.2001); Adoption of Georgia, 433 Mass. 62 , 739 N.E.2d 694, 699-700 (2000); In re Samantha M., 205 W.Va. 383 , 518 S.E.2d 387, 390-91 (1999); Adoption of Tina, 45 Mass.App.Ct. 727 , 701 N.E.2d 671, 676 (1998); In Interest of N.M., 528 N.W.2d 94 (Iowa 1995); In re Autumn H., 27 Cal.App.4th 567 , 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 535 (1994). In particular, ⁴⁴⁰ CASA volunteers have testified about the family dynamics among the parent, child, and foster-parents and the extent of the services being offered to accommodate the child’s needs, and have provided recommendations to the court regarding the appropriate placement for the child. See e.g., In re A.C.O., 269 Ga.App. 667 , 605 S.E.2d 77 (2004); Fresno County Dept. Children & Fam.

Services v. Superior Court, 122 Cal.App.4th 626 , 19 Cal.Rptr.3d 155 (2004); In re J.P., 268 Ga.App. 32 , 601 S.E.2d 409 (2004); In re Tara P., 836 A.2d 219 (R.I.2003); In re E.M., 810 So.2d 596 (Miss.2002); Larscheid v. Arkansas Dept. of Human Services, 343 Ark. 580 , 36 S.W.3d 308 (2001); In re Adoption of C.D., 313 Ill.App.3d 301 , 246 Ill.Dec. 180 , 729 N.E.2d 553 (2000); Padilla v. Norfolk Div. of Social Services, 22 Va.App. 643 , 472 S.E.2d 648 (1996); Matter of Gail, 417 Mass. 321 , 629 N.E.2d 1308 (1994). The mechanisms by which the programs operate, however, differ among the states. Most states have general statutes that establish CASA programs by defining the program’s purpose and setting forth how the program is to be administered, including funding, training, selection, and supervision of the CASA volunteers, but do not define the role of CASA volunteers in juvenile and family proceedings beyond a generic description of those duties and responsibilities. 21 These states utilize informal ways of integrating CASA volunteers into the judicial process by allowing the CASA program to formulate its own guidelines, procedures, and policies related to the ⁴⁴¹ scope of the CASA’s duties. In these instances, there is no statute or court rule that enumerates the extent of a CASA volunteer’s involvement in the judicial process.

Conversely, approximately fourteen states have formal mechanisms that are statutorily-mandated for defining the scope of a CASA volunteer’s responsibilities in juvenile proceedings. 22 For example, the State of California has a comprehensive statutory scheme that sets forth the requirements a CASA program must follow to be recognized and specifically defines the CASA volunteer’s duties to include interviewing and observing the parties involved in the case, reviewing relevant records and reports, filing a report with the court, and monitoring cases assigned to the volunteer by the judge. See Cal. Welf. & Inst.Code § 100-104 (1988). Similarly, the State of Colorado has a statutory scheme that enumerates the duties and responsibilities of a CASA volunteer, which include: conducting independent investigations regarding the child, providing factual background information to the court in the form of a report, interviewing relevant individuals, reviewing records, making recommendations to the court, and testifying in court proceedings.

See Colo.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 13-91-105 (2000). Other state statutes have allowed CASA volunteers a more expansive role in advocating for the child. In those instances, the CASA volunteer is permitted to participate in depositions, negotiations, discovery, pretrial conferences, hearings, and appeals. See e.g., Ariz.Rev.Stat. Ann. §§ 8-522 to 523 (1991); ⁴⁴² Del.Code Ann. tit. 81, § 3608-3610 (2000); Kan.

Stat. Ann. 38-1606a. (1994). In Maryland, the Court-Appointed Special Advocate Program was enacted to establish the use of CASAs in juvenile proceedings. See 1989 Md. Laws, Chap. 641.

The statute has not changed substantively since its enactment and was recodified as Maryland Code (1989, 2002 Repl.Vol.), § 3-830 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, in 2001. 23 The Maryland CASA Program is county-oriented and is dependent on court 24 appointment of trained volunteers whose primary pur ⁴⁴³ pose is to ensure that children who are the subject of a CINA proceeding are afforded appropriate services and case planning that is in their best interests. See Md.Code, § 3-830(a)(3) and (b)(2) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Maryland’s CASA statute provides a generic description of a CASA volunteer’s responsibilities and functions in a juvenile proceeding. According to the statute, a court may appoint a CASA volunteer to “[p]rovide the court with background information to aid it in making decisions in the child’s best interest; and to [ejnsure that the child is provided appropriate case planning and services.” Md.Code, § 3-830(a)(3) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.

Rather than explicitly outlining the duties and responsibilities of CASA volunteers, the statute authorizes the Administrative Office of the Courts to “adopt rules governing the implementation and operation of the Program including funding, training, selection, and supervision of volunteers.” Md.Code, § 3-830(b)(3)(iii) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. The Guidelines adopted by the Administrative Office of the Courts in 1989 dictate how the CASA programs are to be structured and operated, the requirements for volunteer training and supervision, and the funding requirements for the programs. See Administrative Office of Courts CASA Rules and Guidelines [hereinafter “AOC CASA Guidelines”], 1 (2004). The Guidelines describe the role of the CASA volunteer: The CASA volunteer is considered a Friend of the Court and does not have party status.

The volunteer is considered an agent of the court and is appointed at the judge’s discretion to represent the child’s best interests. Volunteers are not represented by an attorney but should be provided access to legal counsel by the program. ⁴⁴⁴ AOC CASA Guidelines-at 1. The Guidelines also define the responsibilities of a CASA volunteer, those being: to review the case history and juvenile court file; to meet with the CASA staff to develop a case plan; to schedule and attend appointments with relevant parties; to complete required CASA forms and documentation; to maintain the confidentiality of any and all information received on behalf of the child; and to submit a written report to the court. See AOC CASA Guidelines at 4.

CASA volunteers have been permitted to testify in court proceedings and submit recommendations relating to child placement. See e.g., In re Justin D., 357 Md. 431, 438 , 745 A.2d 408, 412 (2000)