In Re Damien F.

DAVIS, J. Appeal No. 320 arises from a shelter care hearing held in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. The juvenile petition, filed by the Montgomery County Department of Social Services (the Department), alleged that nineteen-month-old Damien F. and six-year-old Terrell F. were “neglected and/or disabled” and requested that they be placed outside their parents’ care under a shelter care order. After a hearing in which the parties submitted only their respective proffers, the juvenile court found the facts as alleged in the petition and granted an emergency shelter care order to the Department. The mother, Ms. H., appeals from the juvenile court’s grant of the emergency shelter care order.

In Appeal No. 322, the Montgomery County Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (the Department) 1 filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, alleging that Christian D. and Jenna J. were Children In Need of Assistance (CIÑA) and requested that the court grant an order of shelter care directing that Christian and Jenna be removed from their parents’ care and temporarily placed with another ⁵⁵² caretaker. At a shelter care hearing held on April 3, 2008 in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, sitting as the Juvenile Court, the court granted the Department’s request for shelter care and the children were placed with their maternal grandmother. After the appeal was noted from the shelter care decision, the children were found to be CINAs. The mother of the children, Jennifer B., filed a notice of appeal of the CINA disposition, but soon thereafter voluntarily dismissed the appeal.

Ms. B. appeals the grant of the emergency order for shelter care, seeking to demonstrate that she should have been permitted to present witness testimony to. challenge the allegations in the Department’s CINA petition. In both Appeal No. 320 and Appeal No. 322, the mother of Damien F. and Terrell F. (Ms. H.) and the mother of Christian D. and Jenna J. (Ms. B.) and the father of Jenna J. present for our consideration the same question, which we quote: Where a parent requested an evidentiary hearing on the Department’s request for shelter care, did the juvenile court err in requiring the parties to proceed by way of proffer?

In Appeal Nos. 320 and 322, the Department presents the following questions for our review: 1. Should an appeal from a shelter care order be dismissed where the appellant has conceded the mootness of the legal issue on appeal? 2. Did the circuit court act within its discretion when ordering two children to be placed in emergency shelter care when their parents proffered no evidence that specifically disputed the allegations of abuse relied upon by the court? In Appeal No. 322, the Department presents the following additional question for our review: Did the Circuit Court act within its discretion in proceeding by proffer in an emergency shelter care hearing when the mother would have the opportunity to present evidence the forthcoming adjudication hearing? ⁵⁵³ FACTUAL BACKGROUND Appeal No. 320 Damien F. and Terrell F. were removed from the home on March 19, 2008.

The juvenile court held a shelter care hearing the next day. At the beginning of the hearing, the juvenile court stated that it would only hear proffers from both parties. Counsel for Ms. H objected, explaining that she had witnesses who would contradict the Department’s allegations. The juvenile court responded that counsel would not be permitted to call witnesses.

The following ensued: [COUNSEL FOR Ms. H]: My client doesn’t believe that the children should be sheltered. I do have a number of witnesses that I would like to call. Sharnissa H., as well as Shelly H. THE COURT: You won’t be calling any witnesses. I’ll be taking proffers. [COUNSEL FOR Ms. H]: Okay.

THE COURT: I don’t know what the other judges do, but that’s what I do. And it’s been on appeal. And I’ve not been reversed. So that’s what I do. [COUNSEL FOR MS.

HJ: Well, Your Honor, just for the record— THE COURT: Sure. [COUNSEL FOR Ms. H]: I am going to say that this is a hearing. It’s a shelter care hearing. I think that we have the right to put on witnesses so that Your Honor can judge the credibility. And we would ask that we’d be allowed to do so since— THE COURT: Thank you.

My position has been, remains, that this is an emergency kind of hearing and that I take the petition of the Department as their proffer to which they may add by proffer, and then I will accept proffers from each party through their counsel. And my, how shall I say, comment to that from the point of view of the Department is that a proffer is even more advantageous to a party ⁵⁵⁴ than live testimony, which may be contracted/ [2] may be the subject of cross-examination. It’s almost the best viewed, the best faced [sic], the best version that a party can put on which his or her counsel is able to make a representation to the court and make a proffer to the Court. So I don’t have any discomfort with doing that.

Because it’s an emergency hearing — and you can tell me what those witnesses would say. So, because it’s an emergency, that’s the way I’ll proceed, and I’ll note your disagreement with my view. So what I’m planning to do here is read the petition of the Department, hear if there are other proffers by counsel for the child, and then hear if there are other proffers by counsel for the mom. And then I’ll hear you on whether a shelter care order should be entered based upon everything I’ve heard.

The Department’s Allegations The Department’s proffer was the information in its petitions in support of its request to place the children in shelter care. It proffered that the children had been neglected and that Ms. H. was unwilling or unable to give proper care and attention to the children and their needs. In support of its conclusions, the Department submitted the following: On March 12, 2008, Child Welfare Services (CWS) received a report that the children were left home alone while Ms. H. went to the store. On March 19, CWS conducted an unannounced home visit and found Ms. H. home with the children.

Terrell was not wearing diapers, had dirt on his face and neck and had sticky hands. His hair was not combed and “was littered with white debris.” Damien’s clothing was ripped and “very dirty.” The home was “in disarray” and “infested with cockroaches.” Staff members observed “a plethora of ciga ⁵⁵⁵ rette butts in the home as well as empty liquor bottles.” The petitions further alleged that “there was no food or milk in the refrigerator, little frozen food in the freezer and no food in the pantry.” While the social worker was in the home, the nineteen-month-old was playing with wires behind the TV, and the six-year-old was banging his head on a broken baby swing. CWS staff noted that Ms. H. “presented as under the influence of substances, evidenced by slurred speech, acting non-responsive, and was unable to find clothing and shoes for her children.” Ms H.’s Proffer Ms. H. proffered the testimony of Sharnisa H., the mother’s sister. Sharnisa would have testified that she went to the family’s apartment shortly after the Department removed the children.

She observed that the house was clean. There was “ample” food in the refrigerator and pantry, such that she was able to eat a sandwich and chips. There was also a chicken defrosting in the sink. Furthermore, Sharnissa would have testified that she did not see even one roach in the apartment.

Sharnisa would have testified that the mother never told her or other relatives that she drank excessive milk or hid urine in order to produce a negative urinalysis result. Ms. H. would have denied the allegations in the CINA petition. Specifically, she denied that there were “wires” behind her television or that Damien was playing with wires. She also denied that Terrell was banging his head against the swing.

Ms. H. would have contradicted the allegation that she was under the influence of any substances, as the Department alleged. She would have attributed any extraordinary reactions, such as slurred speech, to experiencing shock at the notion that the Department was going to take her children away from her. Ms. H. would have admitted to having used marijuana occasionally, but would have denied that she has ever used PCP. Furthermore, she would have testified that there were no drugs in her apartment.

Ms. H. would have ⁵⁵⁶ testified that she was able to find clothing and shoes for the children. Ms. H. would have denied having hidden another person’s urine sample in her clothes in order to falsify her own drug test and, in fact, could not have done that because there was always someone present with her when she submitted to urinalysis. Ms. H. also proffered the testimony of Shelly H., whom she had known for many years. Shelly’s relationship with the family was that she took care of Damien for a brief period following a tragic incident involving Damien’s father.

Shelly would have testified that she has been to the family home and has observed Ms. H. with Damien and Terrell. She never saw any reason to be concerned for the children’s safety and would have called child welfare services if she had seen any of the behaviors that the Department was alleging. Both Sharnisa and Shelly would have testified that Ms. H. did not tell them or other relatives that she drank excessive milk or hid urine in order to produce a negative urinalysis result. The Court’s Ruling In granting an order of shelter care, the court concluded: ...

Based on the proffers made by all three parties and the arguments, I find that the home conditions were filthy and the children were dirty and inappropriately dressed. That there was a[n] alleged history of drug abuse by the mother. That the children were allegedly left at home alone by-this is family members found them alone at home is what I should say. And it’s not possible to return them because it’s against their-it’s contrary to the welfare of the children to do so because of the home condition and because the mother may be using illicit drugs, of reasonable efforts are not possible to eliminate the need for removal because of the emergency nature of the children’s situation.

Appeal No. 822 On April 2, 2008, the Department removed Christian D. and Jenna J. from their mother’s care pursuant to the emergency ⁵⁵⁷ shelter care order. The Department filed a CINA petition on April 3, 2008, as to Christian D. and Jenna J. requesting that they continue to be committed to the Department under a shelter care order for thirty days pending the adjudication hearing. At the shelter care hearing, counsel for Ms. B. requested that she be allowed to present the testimony of two witnesses. The following transpired: THE COURT: All right.

Let me ask any persons who are not court personnel and who are not here for the case of Jenna J. and the case of Christian D. to please step outside, and we’ll retrieve you when your particular cases are called. Are all these persons involved with the case? [COUNSEL FOR MS. B.]: They are, Your Honor. [MS. B.]: No, they are not parties, but they are "witnesses.

THE COURT: Well as [sic] the rule on witnesses? I mean, is there going to be? [COUNSEL FOR THE DEPARTMENT]: Well, I’m going to object to any witnesses being called. I think Ms. Wolf-son and Mr. Cooney can certainly proffer, but they are not parties to this case and should be not be present for the hearing. THE COURT: All right.

Well, are you contemplating, holding an evidentiary hearing? [COUNSEL FOR M S. BJ: If the Court would permit it, I would like to have them testify, two of the people testify. THE COURT: Well, I’ll hear proffers. [COUNSEL FOR THE DEPARTMENT]: Okay, well for purposes of the record I need to object to that. THE COURT: Okay. Well, my construction of the statute is that members of the general public are excluded.

And I consider persons who are involved in the case either as support or potential witnesses if this were an evidentiary ⁵⁵⁸ hearing to be not in that category. So, I’ll allow them to remain. THE COURT: And let me do the first thing I’ll do is read the petition. Is there any other evidence besides the petition that you are proffering, Ms. Schultz? [COUNSEL FOR THE DEPARTMENT]: No, I do have just one minor correction to the petition.

(Emphasis added). The Department’s Proffer The Department proffered the contents of the CINA petition,' which alleged as follows: The Department received a report on March 3, 2008 that Ms. B. was neglecting four-year-old Christian and six-month-old Jenna. The reporter stated that Ms. B. had a history of mental health issues and was an alcoholic, which rendered her unable to provide for the care and safety of the children. During an interview of Christian on March 21, 2008 by a social worker from the Department, he reported that he gets nothing to eat during the day and that he “gets a beating so hard” that he cries whenever he does something bad.

He also said that his mother cursed at him, drank beer and threatened to kill Jenna’s father, Ricky J. Christian also claimed that his father pushed him into a television stand. According to the petition, Christian was afraid that his mother would hurt him. When she was interviewed, Ms. B. admitted drinking alcohol and hitting Christian. When the social worker met with Ms. B. and Ricky J. on March 31, both parents denied that the father had pushed Christian into the television stand.

Ms. B. signed a safety plan proposed by the Department, which required her to have a mental health evaluation, to follow all treatment recommendations and to provide urine samples. The petition further alleged that the social worker observed that Ms. B. was “very sarcastic,” and had commented, “Right, so it’s not okay for me to kick my son?” Ms. B. subsequently completed a substance ⁵⁵⁹ abuse evaluation and was found to be ineligible for services. She refused the referral for mental health treatment. On April 2, 2008, in a second report of neglect of Christian by his mother, the reporter alleged that Ms. B. had threatened family members that they would never see Christian again.

Ms. B. called the maternal grandmother and asked her to pick Christian up because she was “throwing him out.” According to the reporter, one hour later, Mr. J. called the maternal grandmother and asked her to pick up Christian because Ms. B. had been drinking in a bar and was acting strangely. Christian was outside without a shirt or shoes when the grandmother went to the house. The grandmother reported that Christian was outside alone, shaking and crying with no shirt or shoes on. Christian’s mother had thrown his clothes out in the rain.

According to the Department, family members said that Ms. B. has a history of violent behavior and unpredictable moods and that the she has a history of psychiatric hospitalizations, including a stay at the Regional Institute for Children and Adolescents as a teenager. Family members also described an incident in which Ms. B. once threw a telephone out of her apartment window. The Department removed Jenna from Ms. B.’s custody on April 2nd. The police who assisted in Jenna’s removal, according to the Department, told Ms. B. to prepare formula for Jenna and she refused.

In an interview, Christian’s father, Dexton D., told the social worker that Ms. B. was “crazy” and has “two personalities.” He allegedly also said that Ms. B. has a drinking problem. He was unable to attend the shelter care hearing because he had to work, but he wanted Christian to be in his grandmother’s care because she will allow him to visit with Christian; Ms. B. does not. Ms. B.’s Proffer The first witness proffered by Ms. B. was Lauren Harper of the Montgomery County Coalition for the Homeless. She had been assisting Ms. B. for the past two months, visiting her ⁵⁶⁰ every week.

She would have testified that Ms. B. is a really good mother and she has never noticed any problems in the home. The children are very bonded with their mother. Ms. B. is extremely cooperative and, among the numerous services in place for her, are in-home parenting classes by the organization Families Foremost. Ms. B. had vouchers for the children to attend all-day daycare.

No one at the daycare ever saw any indication of abuse or neglect of the children and, according to Harper, the children seemed to have been well taken care of. The second witness would have been Ms. McNeil, a worker with the Greentree Shelter. During the few months that she has been working with Ms. B, McNeil saw her with her children at the Greentree Shelter “all the time.” McNeil would have testified that Ms. B. is “a great mom” and that she has never had any concerns about the way she takes care of the children. Additionally, Ms. B. was completely cooperative ■with McNeil in following through with services, including attempting to become employed.

Ms. B. would have also testified, denying the allegations in the CINA petition. She would have admitted that she does not permit Christian to see his father because he is a convicted and registered sex offender. She would have further testified that Christian’s grandparents on numerous other occasions have attempted to obtain custody of him. The Proffer of Jenna’s Father Counsel for Ms. B. proffered that Jenna’s father, Ricky J., would have testified that he has never seen Ms. B. abuse or neglect her children.

In his opinion, Ms. B. provides good care to Jenna. He admitted that he called the maternal grandmother to pick up Christian, but he denied making any disparaging remarks about Ms. B. He would have testified that an ongoing feud between Ms. B. and the maternal grandmother is at the root of the allegations against Ms. B. The Court’s Ruling The court ruled as follows: ⁵⁶¹ Well, as the parties well know, this is something akin to a probable cause determination, it’s not a conclusive finding that I make. I have to look at the allegations in the CINA petition, hear the proffer from any parties opposing and determine whether I think there is a probability that some of this conduct may have occurred which would necessitate me sheltering the child. I’ve reviewed the petition and there are several allegations which are of concern to me which have not been denied, including a remark made by the mother, allegedly, that in response to the CWS staff suggesting that she has been kicking her son.

The allegation in paragraph (f), that’s previously been referenced which has not been denied, is that when the grandmother went to the home, found Christian standing outside of the home without any shirt or shoes. There are other suggestions of her violence that has been going and personality problems with the mother that cause her to act in an erratic manner. So, I do think at this point of the proceeding, which is not a final determination, that it would be contrary to the children’s welfare to return them to the family home at this time for the reasons I’ve stated. I find an emergency situation is presented by virtue of this alleged conduct.

(Emphasis added). Although the court’s response to counsel’s request to produce live testimony was “I’ll hear proffers,” it did cite in its ruling that the charge that Ms. B. had kicked Christian was not denied by either parent in their proffers. Finding “reasonable grounds to believe these events took place,” the court also cited the allegation that Christian was kicked out of the home and the other allegations of erratic behavior by Ms. B. The court then ordered that the children be placed in the care of their maternal grandparents, with Ms. B. having weekly supervised visitation. A pre-trial hearing was scheduled for April 24, 2008.

On April 9, 2008, Ms. B. noted an appeal of the shelter care order. ⁵⁶² The Parties’ Contentions Appellants assert that the juvenile court erred in refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing and in not permitting witnesses to testify. They argue that the statutory scheme established by the legislature clearly anticipates an evidentiary hearing. By proceeding by way of proffer, they assert, the court had no way of judging the credibility of the witnesses and no way of determining the reliability of the evidence. Appellants recognize that this issue is moot as it relates to the shelter care hearing of March 20, 2008 because there was an adjudication and disposition hearing on April 10, 2008, as to Damien F. and Terrell F. and, on May 1, 2008, as to Christian D. and Jenna J., at which time the children were declared to be CINA.

They argue, nevertheless, that the issue should be decided b y this Court because shelter hearings “evade appellate review due to the inherent time constraints in CINA cases,” which require the juvenile court to hold an adjudication hearing within thirty days of the shelter care hearing. Appellants aver that, “[bjecause parenting is a fundamental right, and an order of shelter care deprives a parent of that fundamental right even if only temporarily, this case presents an issue that is of public concern.” They assert that, “[gjiven the stakes involved compared with the high risk of an erroneous deprivation, even if temporary, due to the nature of the hearing, this Court should clarify whether conflicting proffers is a sufficient basis for deciding whether to place a child in shelter care.” The Department has moved to dismiss both appeals “as moot because [appellants] had an opportunity to present witness testimony at the adjudication hearing” and, as to Appeal No. 320, the State avers that Ms. H’s subsequent stipulations to the facts alleged in the CINA petition constitutes acquiescence to the shelter care order. 3 ⁵⁶³ The Department further asserts that the juvenile court acted within its discretion when proceeding by proffer because appellants would have had the opportunity to present witnesses within thirty days of the shelter hearing. DISCUSSION I A Statutory Rights At Shelter Hearing Although the Department asserts that appellant bases her argument on procedural due process, in our view, appellant’s argument is primarily based on the statutory scheme set out in the Maryland Code and Rules of Court. Shelter care is governed by Md.Code, Cts. & Jud.

Proc., § 3-815 (C.J.), which provides, in pertinent part: (b) A local department may place a child in emergency shelter care before a hearing if: (1) Placement is required to protect the child from serious immediate danger; (2) There is no parent, guardian, custodian, relative, or other person able to provide supervision; and (3) (i) 1. The child’s continued placement in the child’s home is contrary to the welfare of the child; and 2. Because of an alleged emergency situation, removal from the home is reasonable under the circumstances to provide for the safety of the child; or (ii) 1. Reasonable efforts have been made but have been unsuccessful in preventing or eliminating the need for removal from the child’s home; and 2.

As appropriate, reasonable efforts are being made to return the child to the child’s home. (c) (1) Whenever a child is not returned to the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian, the local department shall immediately file a petition to authorize continued shelter care. ⁵⁶⁴ (2) (i) The court shall hold a shelter care hearing on the petition before disposition to determine whether the temporary placement of the child outside of the home is warranted. (ii) Unless extended on good cause shown, a shelter care hearing shall be held not later than the next day on which the circuit court is in session. (3) If the child’s parents, guardian, custodian, or relatives can be located, reasonable notice, oral or written, stating the time, place, and purpose of the shelter care hearing shall be given.

(4) A court may not order shelter care for more than 30 days except that shelter care may be extended for up to an additional 30 days if the court finds after a hearing held as part of an adjudication that continued shelter care is needed to provide for the safety of the child. (5) Unless good cause is shown, a court shall give priority to the child’s relatives over nonrelatives when ordering shelter care for a child. (d) A court may continue shelter care beyond emergency shelter care only if the court finds that: (1) Return of the child to the child’s home is contrary to the safety and welfare of the child; and (2) (i) Removal of the child from the child’s home is necessary due to an alleged emergency situation and in order to provide for the safety of the child; or (ii) Reasonable efforts were made but were unsuccessful in preventing or eliminating the need for removal of the child from the home. (e) (1) If the court continues shelter care on the basis of an alleged emergency, the court shall assess whether the absence of efforts to prevent removal was reasonable.

(2) If the court finds that the absence of efforts to prevent removal was not reasonable, the court shall make a written determination so stating. (3) The court shall make a written determination as to whether reasonable efforts are being made to make it ⁵⁶⁵ possible to return the child to the child’s home or whether the absence of such efforts is reasonable. Maryland Rule 11-112 provides, a. Emergency Detention or Shelter Care. 1.

Authority. The court or an intake officer may authorize emergency detention or shelter care of a child taken into custody in accordance with Section 3-815(b) of the Courts Article. 2. Report to Court — Petition for continued detention or shelter care. If a child is placed in emergency detention or shelter care, the intake officer shall, on the next day the court is sitting: (i) report that fact to the court, together with the circumstances that led to the child being placed in emergency detention or shelter care; and (ii) if continued detention or shelter care is sought, file a petition for continued detention or shelter care showing cause why continued detention or shelter care is warranted. 3.

Hearing. If a petition for continued detention or shelter care is filed pursuant to this Rule, a hearing shall be held on the day the petition is filed and the respondent shall be brought to court for the hearing. The hearing may be postponed or continued by the court for good cause shown, but it may not be postponed for more than eight days following the commencement of respondent’s emergency detention or shelter care. Reasonable notice of the date and time of the hearing shall be given to the respondent, and if possible to his parent and his counsel, if known. b.

Continued Detention or Shelter Care Pending Adjudication or Waiver. 1. Finding. Detention or shelter care may not be continued beyond emergency detention or shelter care unless after a hearing the court finds that one or more of the circumstances stated in Section 3 — 815(b) of the Courts Article exists. 2. Maximum Period of Detention or Shelter Care.

Continued detention or shelter care pending the adjudicatory or ⁵⁶⁶ waiver hearing may not be ordered for a period of more than thirty days. c. Continued detention or shelter care after waiver or adjudicatory hearing. The court may, on petition or on its own motion, continue detention or shelter care for a period not longer than thirty days after a denial of a petition for waivér or an adjudicatory hearing. d. Title 5 not applicable.

Title 5 of these rules does not apply to detention or shelter care hearings. There is no question that the Department was required to request a hearing and that the juvenile court was required to hold one. The question is whether the court was required to permit Ms. H and Ms. B., as the parents of the sheltered children, to present witnesses at that hearing to prove their case and whether they had a right to cross-examine the Department’s witnesses to contradict its case. B Statutory Construction The rules of statutory construction are clear. “Our primary purpose, in interpreting a statute, is always ‘to discern the legislative purpose, the ends to be accomplished, or the evils to be remedied by a particular provision.’ ” Ishola v. State, 404 Md. 155, 160 , 945 A.2d 1273 (2008) (citation omitted). “In order to ascertain the intent of the Legislature, we begin with the plain language of the statute, and if that language is clear and unambiguous, we look no further than the text of the statute.” Id.

(citation omitted). “Although the plain language of the statute guides our understanding of legislative intent, we do not read the language in a vacuum.” Cain v. State, 386 Md. 320, 327 , 872 A.2d 681 (2005) (citations omitted). “When construing a statutory provision within a single statutory scheme, we must consider the statutory scheme as a whole to determine the legislative intent.” In re Mark M., 365 Md. 687, 711 , 782 A.2d 332 (2001). “ ‘[I]t is presumed that the General Assembly acted with full knowledge of prior legislation and intended statutes that affect the ⁵⁶⁷ same subject matter to blend into a consistent and harmonious body of law.’ ” Pete v. State, 384 Md. 47, 65 , 862 A.2d 419 (2004) (citation omitted). The purposes of the statutes relating to children in need of assistance are set out in C.J., § 3-802. Purposes and construction of subtitle. (а) Purposes.

The purposes of this subtitle are: (1) To provide for the care, protection, safety, and mental and physical development of any child coming within the provisions of this subtitle; (2) To provide for a program of services and treatment consistent with the child’s best interests and the promotion of the public interest; (3) To conserve and strengthen the child’s family ties and to separate a child from the child’s parents only when necessary for the child’s welfare; (4) To hold parents of children found to be in need of assistance responsible for remedying the circumstances that required the court’s intervention; (5) Except as otherwise provided by law, to hold the local department responsible for providing services to assist the parents with remedying the circumstances that required the court’s intervention; (б) If necessary to remove a child from the child’s home, to secure for the child custody, care, and discipline as nearly as possible equivalent to that which the child’s parents should have given; (7) To achieve a timely, permanent placement for the child consistent with the child’s best interests; and (8) To provide judicial procedures for carrying out the provisions of this subtitle. “The best interests of the child standard embraces a strong presumption that the child’s best interests are served by maintaining parental rights.” In re Yve S., 373 Md. 551, 571 , 819 A.2d 1030 (2003) (citation omitted). The presumption is “a well established principle of Maryland law” and “the ⁵⁶⁸ presumption exists, until rebutted, that it is in the child’s best interest to be placed with a parent.” Id. at 572 , 819 A.2d at 1042-43 . This Court has recognized the drastic nature of removing a child from the custody of his or her parents. In In re Jertrude O., 56 Md.App. 83 , 466 A.2d 885 (1983), we noted that “[t]he Legislature and the Supreme Court have both expressed the view that children should not be uprooted from their family but for the most urgent reasons.” Id. at 99 , 466 A.2d 885 .

Indeed, a “more stringent” standard of proof is required to deny a parent custody than to declare a child a CINA. In re Joseph G., 94 Md.App. 343, 350 , 617 A.2d 1086 (1993). “[Depriving a parent of custody of a child is a drastic measure that should only be taken when necessary for the welfare of the child.” Id. (citations omitted). In recognition of the fundamental nature of parental rights, C.J., § 3-813 provides that a parent is entitled to counsel at every stage of the proceedings under this subtitle and to representation by the Public Defender’s Office if he or she cannot afford a private attorney.

That section provides, in pertinent part: § 3-813. Right to counsel (a) In general. Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) of this section, a party is entitled to the assistance of counsel at every stage of any proceeding under this subtitle. (b) Eligible parties.

Except for the local department and the child who is the subject of the petition, a party is not entitled to the assistance of counsel at State expense unless the party is: (1) Indigent; or (2) Otherwise not represented and: (i) Under the age of 18 years; or (ii) Incompetent by reason of mental disability. (c) Representation by Office of the Public Defender. The Office of the Public Defender may not represent a party in a CINA proceeding unless the party: (1) Is the parent or guardian of the alleged CINA; ⁵⁶⁹ (2) Applies to the Office of the Public Defender requesting legal representation by the Public Defender in the proceeding; and (3) Is financially eligible for the services of the Public Defender. Further, as noted above, when the Department removes a child from his or her home, both C.J., § 3-815(c)(2)(i) and Md. Rule ll-112(a)(2) require that a hearing be held on the next day that the court is in session.

Both § 3-813(c)(3) and Rule 11-112(a)(3) require that reasonable notice of the date and time of the hearing is to be given to the child’s parents if they can be found. The summons advises a parent of his or her right to counsel and instructs the parent on how to subpoena a witness if he or she does not want a lawyer. Appendix to the Maryland Rules, Form 912-N, “Notice Of Emergency Detention/Shelter Care And Notice Of Hearing”; Appendix to the Maryland Rules, Form 904-R/WS, a request for a witness subpoena. These provisions indicate that the legislature intended that the parent of a sheltered child be present and participate in the proceeding.

Our conclusion is buttressed by this Court’s decision in In re McNeil, 21 Md.App. 484 , 320 A.2d 57 (1974). In that case, the juvenile court denied a continuance to allow the presence at the hearing of a mother who had filed a Petition For Review Of Commitment of her children to the Department of Social Services. Id. at 486 , 320 A.2d 57 . The reason for her absence was that one of the children who were the subjects of the petition was ill.

Id. at 487 , 320 A.2d 57 . We held that the juvenile court had erred in denying the continuance: We can think of no right more fundamental to any parent than to be given a reasonable opportunity to be present at ⁵⁷⁰ any judicial proceeding where the issue is whether or not the parent should be permitted to have custody of its child. We believe that there was grave and serious error on the part of the trial judge in compelling the hearing to proceed in the absence of the Appellant, and we find that it was arbitrary and unreasonable for him to refuse to grant a continuance so that she might be present. The Maryland General Assembly has clearly expressed its recognition of the principle that the primary right to rear and nurture a child rests in its parents and not in the State, and it is only under the most extraordinary circumstances that a parent may be divested of that right and custody of a child placed in the hands of others.

Article 26, Section 70(4), now Courts Art. Section 3-802(a)(5), states that one of the purposes of the special legal provisions relating to juvenile causes is “(t)o separate a child from his parents only when necessary for his welfare or in the interest of public safety” In Matter of Wooten, 13 Md.App. 521, 528 , 284 A.2d 32 (1971), we indicated that the special concerns expressed in our juvenile law were not merely meaningless, high sounding phrases. We reiterate that view. Id. at 496-97, 320 A.2d 57 (internal footnote omitted) (emphasis added). We continued: While recognizing the reluctance of the court to grant a last minute continuance when duly summonsed witnesses have