In re: T.K.

In re: T.K., No. 60, September Term, 2021. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – CHILD IN NEED OF ASSISTANCE – REQUIREMENTS FOR EXERCISE OF DISCRETION UNDER COURTS AND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS § 3-819(E). A juvenile court has discretion to award custody under § 3-819(e) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article if the juvenile court, by a preponderance of the evidence: (a) sustains allegations in a CINA petition that are sufficient to support a CINA disposition against one, but only one, parent; and (b) finds that the other parent is able and willing to care for the child. CHILD IN NEED OF ASSISTANCE – BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD STANDARD.

If a juvenile court finds that the prerequisites required to exercise its discretion under § 3-819(e) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article have been met, the best interest of the child is the standard that applies to the court’s decision whether and, if so, how to exercise that discretion. CHILD IN NEED OF ASSISTANCE – EVIDENTIARY BEST INTEREST HEARING. A juvenile court must afford a parent who stands to lose custody as a result of an application of Courts and Judicial Proceedings § 3-819(e) an opportunity to present evidence if, after consideration of the evidence already presented or stipulated at an adjudicatory hearing, there are factual disputes as to any consideration that is material to (a) whether the parent to whom the court is considering awarding custody is able and willing to provide proper care for the child, or (b) the juvenile court’s determination of whether it is in the child’s best interest to leave the current custody arrangement in place or to award custody (legal, physical, or both) to the parent against whom allegations were not sustained. Circuit Court for Howard County Case No. C-13-JV-20-000175 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS Argued: June 2, 2022 OF MARYLAND No. 60 September Term, 2021 ______________________________________ IN RE: T.K. ______________________________________ Fader, C.J., Watts, Hotten, Booth, Biran, Gould, Eaves, JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Fader, C.J. Hotten, J., dissents. ______________________________________ Filed: July 28, 2022 Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 2022-07-28 12:04-04:00 Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk Parents have a fundamental right to rear their children without unwarranted interference by the State.

That right “occupies a unique place in our legal culture, given the centrality of family life as the focus for personal meaning and responsibility.” In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10941, 335 Md. 99, 113 (1994) (quoting Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 38 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). That interest, however, is not absolute, and must be balanced against society’s obligation to protect the welfare of children. See In re Yve S., 373 Md. 551, 568-69 (2003).

The General Assembly has adopted a statutory scheme to balance the fundamental right of parents to raise their children with the State’s obligation and prerogative to protect a child who requires court intervention for protection. Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. §§ 3-801 – 3-830 (2020 Repl.; 2022 Supp.). Under that statutory scheme, a child is in need of assistance if the child requires court intervention because, as relevant here, (1) the child has been abused or neglected and (2) the child’s parents, guardian, or custodian are unable or unwilling to properly care for the child.

Id. § 3-801(f)(1), (2). Unless both of those prongs are proven by a preponderance of the evidence, id. § 3-817(c), court intervention is unavailable and a court ordinarily must dismiss the child in need of assistance (“CINA”) case without further involvement. The General Assembly, however, has authorized a limited but important exception to that general rule when (1) the allegations of a CINA petition are proven against only one of the child’s parents, and (2) another parent is able and willing to provide care for the child’s needs. Id. § 3-819(e).

In that circumstance, ongoing court intervention is still unavailable, but the juvenile court, before dismissing the case, is authorized to “award custody to the other parent.” Id. Section 3-819(e) thus permits a juvenile court that is not otherwise able to intervene in a family’s affairs to determine the most appropriate custody arrangement for the child as between the child’s parents. We have not previously had the opportunity to provide guidance concerning the mechanics of the application of § 3-819(e) to situations in which a local department of social services has limited knowledge about one of a child’s parents until after a CINA adjudicatory hearing has concluded. We now take the opportunity to provide that guidance.

Specifically, we are called upon to clarify: (1) when a juvenile court has the discretion to make an award of custody under § 3-819(e); (2) what standard applies to the exercise of that discretion; and (3) when a juvenile court must afford a parent who stands to lose custody as a result of an application of § 3-819(e) an opportunity to present evidence relevant to the court’s exercise of authority under that provision. We hold that: 1. A juvenile court has discretion to award custody under § 3-819(e) only if the court, by a preponderance of the evidence: (a) sustains allegations in a CINA petition that are sufficient to support a CINA disposition against one, but only one, parent; and (b) finds that the other parent is able and willing to care for the child; 2. If those prerequisites are established, the best interest of the child is the standard that applies to the court’s decision whether and, if so, how to exercise that discretion; and 3.

A juvenile court must afford a parent who stands to lose custody as a result of an application of § 3-819(e) an opportunity to present evidence if, after consideration of the evidence already presented or stipulated at an adjudicatory hearing, there are factual disputes as to any consideration that is material to (a) whether the parent to whom the court is considering awarding custody is able and willing to provide proper care for the child, or (b) the juvenile court’s determination of whether it is in the child’s best interest to leave the current custody arrangement in place or to award custody 2 (legal, physical, or both) to the parent against whom allegations were not sustained. Here, the Circuit Court for Howard County, sitting as a juvenile court, made an award of custody under § 3-819(e) to a previously non-custodial father, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed. However, the record before the juvenile court did not contain evidence that the father was able and willing to care for the child, nor was there a stipulation to that effect, and the mother was not afforded the opportunity to present evidence to inform the court’s best interest analysis. Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and remand to that court with instructions to vacate the juvenile court’s order and remand for further proceedings described below.

BACKGROUND The CINA Statutory Scheme A child in need of assistance is a child who requires court intervention because: (1) The child has been abused, has been neglected, has a developmental disability, or has a mental disorder;[1] and (2) The child’s parents, guardian, or custodian are unable or unwilling to give proper care and attention to the child and the child’s needs. Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-801(f)(1), (2). Notably, the definition contains two prongs separated by the conjunctive “and,” requiring that both prongs be met before a child can be determined to be in need of assistance.

See In re Samone H., 385 Md. 282 , 316 n.13 (2005) 1 In certain respects, the statutory scheme applies differently to a child who may be determined to be in need of assistance due to a developmental disability or a mental disorder than it does when abuse or neglect is at issue. See, e.g., Cts. & Jud. Proc. §§ 3-815(f)(2); 3-816.1(b)(3); 3-819(b)(1)(ii), (c)(3), (h), (i), (j), (m); 3-823(h)(2)(vii). For purposes of this appeal, we are concerned with children who may be in need of assistance based on prior abuse or neglect and will limit our further discussion to those circumstances. 3 (explaining that for a test conjunctive in nature, each element must be met for the test to be satisfied).

Thus, although a finding of abuse or neglect can inform a court’s decision concerning a parent’s ability or willingness to give proper care, the two prongs are distinct, and both must be satisfied before a court can determine that a child is in need of assistance. Upon receipt of a complaint of possible abuse or neglect, an investigating local department of social services may file a CINA petition if it determines that the court has jurisdiction2 and that doing so is in the child’s best interest. Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-809(a).

A CINA petition must “allege that [the] child is in need of assistance and shall set forth in clear and simple language the facts supporting that allegation.” Id. § 3-811(a)(1). A CINA case proceeds in two phases.3 First, the juvenile court holds an adjudicatory hearing “to determine whether the allegations in the [CINA] petition, other than the allegation that the child requires the court’s intervention, are true.” Id. § 3-801(c). The rules of evidence apply at an adjudicatory hearing, and the local department must prove its allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. § 3-817(b), (c). 2 Section 3-803(a)(2) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article provides juvenile courts with exclusive original jurisdiction over “[p]roceedings arising from a petition alleging that a child is [in need of assistance.]” 3 A CINA proceeding may also involve a request for shelter care, which is “a temporary placement of a child outside of the home at any time before disposition.” Cts. & Jud.

Proc. § 3-801(bb); see also id. § 3-815 (addressing shelter care proceedings). However, “[s]helter care is not a component of every CINA case. Rather, it involves a separate proceeding in which the juvenile court decides whether to authorize interim protection for a child who may be at risk in the home while the CINA petition is pending.” In re O.P., 470 Md. 225, 237 (2020). There was no request for shelter care in this case. 4 Second, unless the CINA petition is dismissed, the court must “hold a separate disposition hearing . . . to determine whether the child is [in need of assistance].” Id. § 3-819(a)(1).

At a disposition hearing, the juvenile court has the discretion to decline to require the strict application of the rules of evidence. In re M.H., 252 Md. App. 29 , 43 (2021) (citing Md. Rule 11-115(b)); see also Md. Rule 5-101(c)(5). If at a disposition hearing the juvenile court determines that the child is in need of assistance, it may take either of two actions: (1) “Not change the child’s custody status;” or (2) “Commit the child on terms the court considers appropriate to the custody of” a parent, a relative or other individual, a local department of social services, or the Maryland Department of Health. Id. § 3-819(b)(1)(iii).

On the other hand, if the juvenile court determines that the child is not in need of assistance, it must, “except as provided in subsection (e) of this section, dismiss the case.” Id. § 3-819(b)(1)(i). Subsection (e) of § 3-819, which is at the center of the present dispute, provides: If the allegations in the petition are sustained against only one parent of a child, and there is another parent available who is able and willing to care for the child, the court may not find that the child is a child in need of assistance, but, before dismissing the case, the court may award custody to the other parent. That subsection thus provides a juvenile court with express authority to make an award of custody as between the child’s parents, if the statutory prerequisites are met, notwithstanding that the child (1) cannot be determined to be in need of assistance and (2) therefore cannot be subject to ongoing court intervention. If a juvenile court decides to exercise that authority, its custody order “[r]emains in effect” even “[a]fter the court terminates jurisdiction[.]” Id. § 3-804(c)(1). 5 With that statutory background in mind, we turn to the facts of this case.

The Department’s Involvement with the K. Family This case concerns the custody of T.K., born in late 2015 or 2016.4 The other primary parties involved are T.K.’s mother, N.K. (“Mother”); father, T.R. (“Father”); and older sister, Ta.K. Ta.K. is not a party to this appeal, and her custody is not in dispute.5 The Howard County Department of Social Services (the “Department”) became involved with the K. family in May 2020 to assist Mother, T.K., and Ta.K. in obtaining stable housing. At the time, Father was living in Georgia and was not involved in T.K.’s care.

In October 2020, the Department filed petitions seeking to have both children declared in need of assistance, which the Department later amended. The Department did not seek to place T.K. in shelter care. As a result, T.K. resided with Mother throughout the CINA proceedings. 4 T.K.’s year of birth is stated in documents in the record as 2020, 2015, and 2016. The first appears to be an obvious error.

As between the other two, the record does not resolve which is correct, nor do the parties’ briefs filed in this Court, as Mother’s brief states that T.K. was born in 2015 and the Department’s brief, the statement of facts from which is adopted in T.K.’s brief, states that he was born in 2016. Which year is correct is immaterial to our analysis. 5 During T.K. and Ta.K.’s combined adjudicatory hearing, Mother and the Department agreed to stipulated facts with respect to Ta.K., who, unlike T.K., has developmental and physical disabilities. Mother and the Department further agreed that at disposition, Ta.K. should be determined to be in need of assistance and placed in the custody of her maternal grandmother. 6 Adjudication An adjudicatory hearing was held in January 2021 before a magistrate.6 Father, whose paternity had not yet been established, attended the hearing but did not participate. During the hearing, Mother and the Department agreed to stipulate to some, but not all, of the allegations of the amended CINA petition.

As amended through negotiation between Mother and the Department,7 the stipulated facts included: • T.K. lived with Mother and Ta.K. in Mother’s apartment in Elkridge. • Mother has Type I diabetes and was hospitalized three times since the case opened. When hospitalized, she relies on her mother and brother to care for the children. Mother has a medical marijuana card for diabetes-related nausea. • Late on June 25, 2020, Mother, who had been drinking, left the children at an apartment in the care of an individual who Mother knew had also been drinking. Upon returning to the apartment, Mother learned that the individual had hit Ta.K. with a belt and a spatula, causing bruises, and had also pulled 6 Section 3-807 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article authorizes the appointment of magistrates to conduct both adjudicatory and disposition hearings and to “make findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations as to an appropriate order” in a CINA case.

Id. § 3-807(b)(1), (2). A magistrate’s proposals and recommendations are not final orders but may be adopted by the juvenile court without further proceedings unless a party files written exceptions and requests either a de novo or an on-the-record hearing by the juvenile court. Id. § 3-807(c), (d). 7 The written CINA adjudication order contains some allegations of the amended petition that were not included in the stipulation. However, the order specifies that the allegations were “proven by a preponderance of the evidence” only “as amended on the record.” As a result, we consider the allegations contained in that order and in the subsequent disposition order to be sustained only to the extent that they were adopted on the record in the transcript of the adjudicatory hearing. 7 out some of Ta.K.’s hair.

Based on that incident, Mother was indicated for neglect of both children.8 • As part of a safety plan, the children were not permitted to be at the apartment at which Ta.K. had been hit. Nonetheless, Mother once called the Department to ask if she could go see an individual who lived there. The individual Mother wanted to see was not the individual who had previously hit Ta.K. • Mother previously had housing until October or November of 2017, and since November 2020 had rented a three-bedroom apartment. • A family involvement meeting occurred in September 2020 at which other family members decided to work together to create a plan to assist Mother. • In October 2020, Mother informed the Department that T.K. got hold of a stair railing pole and hit Ta.K., cutting her eye. Mother iced Ta.K.’s injury but did not take her to a physician. • The Department referred Mother to therapy, which Mother attended at first and then discontinued.

Mother had been enrolled in once-a-week individual therapy through Families First since November 2020. The only fact concerning Father addressed in the stipulation—or, indeed, alleged in the amended petition—was that he was then living in Stone Mountain, Georgia. Following the stipulation, counsel for the Department noted that if the court were to find T.K. to be in need of assistance at disposition, Mother and the Department agreed to the Department’s dispositional recommendation, which was that custody remain with 8 Neglect is defined as “the leaving of a child unattended or other failure to give proper care and attention to a child . . . under circumstances that indicate: (1) That the child’s health or welfare is harmed or placed at substantial risk of harm; or (2) That the child has suffered mental injury or been placed at substantial risk of mental injury.” Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-801(s). 8 Mother under an order of protective supervision.

However, counsel also observed that Father, if confirmed as T.K.’s biological father, was expected to argue that there should be no CINA determination because he was “a fit and proper parent.” Following the adjudicatory hearing, the juvenile court entered an order finding the facts as stipulated to be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Disposition In February 2021, the parties appeared before the magistrate for a scheduled disposition hearing. At the outset, the Department informed the magistrate that it intended to dismiss the petition because Father had been confirmed as T.K.’s biological father and was “present[ing] himself as a fit and proper parent.”9 Mother objected and sought to present evidence that Father was not a fit and proper parent and that it was not in T.K.’s best interest to change custody. Relying primarily on an unreported opinion from the Court of Special Appeals,10 Mother argued that the juvenile court was required to conduct a best interest analysis before changing custody.

She also proffered that, if permitted to present evidence, she would offer testimony to the effect that Father had abandoned T.K. and had been abusive to T.K., Mother, and another former partner with whom he shared a child. 9 Mother, who had been hospitalized on an emergency basis, did not appear but was represented by counsel. Mother’s counsel requested a postponement, to which other parties objected. The magistrate denied the postponement on the ground that if Father was willing and able to care for T.K., as the Department asserted, there was no need to proceed to disposition at all. 10 Pursuant to Rule 1-104, unreported appellate opinions are neither precedent nor persuasive authority and may not be cited in any court of the State except for limited reasons, none of which are applicable here. Md. Rule 1-104(a), (b). 9 Father, in turn, asserted that he had not abandoned T.K. and stated that he had four witnesses who could offer testimony on his behalf.

The magistrate ultimately decided that the Department had the right to dismiss its case and so recommended dismissal on the Department’s motion. The magistrate also recommended an award of full legal and physical custody to Father pursuant to the authority granted by § 3-819(e) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Mother filed exceptions and requested a de novo hearing before the juvenile court.11 At the de novo hearing, the Department again stated that it was “seeking to withdraw or dismiss” the case. The Department explained that it believed that result was compelled by In re Russell G., 108 Md. App. 366 (1996), in which the Court of Special Appeals held that a child cannot be adjudicated in need of assistance if either of the child’s parents is able and willing to provide proper care and attention to the child.

Because the Department had done its “due diligence,” found Father to be “willing and able to provide proper care and attention to [T.K.],” and believed him to be “in fact a fit and proper parent,” the Department concluded that T.K. could not be adjudicated in need of assistance and that 11 Mother’s Notice of Exceptions states only that she “files this exception to this Honorable Court’s findings as identified in its Report and Recommendations,” without identifying any specific challenge. Section 3-807(c)(1) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article states that a party who files “exceptions to any or all of the magistrate’s findings, conclusions, and recommendations [ ] shall specify those items to which the party objects.” Because no party raised before the juvenile court or in their appellate briefs the issue of whether Mother’s exceptions satisfied § 3-807(c), we will not address it. See Md. Rule 8-131(a). 10 dismissal was therefore required.12 The Department did not request “any specific Court disposition as to custody” upon dismissal of its petition. It did, however, confirm that it had intended to request that T.K. be placed with Mother under an order of protective supervision if the matter had proceeded to disposition.

Mother did not object to dismissal of the CINA case but argued that the juvenile court should do so without making an award of custody. If the court would not do that, Mother argued that it was required to conduct a best interest analysis, and take evidence to inform that analysis, before making an award of custody. Mother emphasized that awarding custody to Father would remove T.K. from the only parent he had ever really known, uproot him from his family, and move him to another state. Father argued that the petition should be dismissed and that the court should award him custody.

He contended that it would not make sense and would not be in T.K.’s best interest to leave custody with a parent who had neglected T.K. when there was “another biological parent -- who also has a Constitutional right to raise that child -- [and who] is ready, willing, and available.” Although the juvenile court did not formally invite proffers of evidence from the parties, counsel for Father, Mother, and the Department each made partial, informal proffers during the hearing. Father’s counsel proffered that Father was present during the first years of T.K.’s life, before Mother prevented his further involvement with the child, 12 The Department, citing In re Najasha B., 409 Md. 20, 43 (2009), recognized that it would not be permitted to unilaterally dismiss its petition over T.K.’s objection, but observed that T.K. did not object to dismissal. 11 and that Father would ensure that Mother would have access to T.K. if the child were to be placed in his custody. Father also had concerns about Mother’s ability to care for T.K. due to her hospitalizations and medical history. Mother’s counsel proffered that she was prepared to present a witness who shared a child with Father and who would testify: (1) to Father’s “abusive manner towards her and towards the child”; and (2) that Father “plays no role in that child’s life.”13 Counsel also proffered that Mother would testify that Father had been abusive toward herself and toward T.K., including an incident in which Father had “attempt[ed] to teach [T.K.] about fire by lighting a flame to his arm,” which Father justified by saying “how else do you teach a child about fire?”14 The Department’s counsel proffered that it had cleared Father and all adult members of his household, verified Father’s employment, conducted a video tour of his home, and that Father had acted appropriately in his interactions with the Department.

After wrestling with whether to take testimony or remand to the magistrate for that purpose, the juvenile court decided to close the CINA case and award custody to Father without taking testimony. Acknowledging that its award of custody to Father was 13 The Department suggests that the proffers that the witness would testify both that Father had been abusive and that he was uninvolved are “internally contradictory.” Although there is a possible interpretation of the proffers that is inconsistent, another interpretation is that the witness would have testified that Father was abusive when he was involved with her and her son and that he subsequently abandoned them. 14 Mother interprets this proffer as suggesting that Father lit a flame to T.K.’s arm. T.K.’s attorney interprets it as indicating that Father lit a flame to Father’s own arm. In context, the former seems much more likely, but the record does not provide a definitive answer because the testimony was not permitted. 12 discretionary, the court stated that, based on the arguments and its review of the petition, it would “find that – even without hearing any other proffer or any other testimony – that it is in the child’s best interest to be placed with the parent that is willing and able[.]” The court subsequently issued a written order granting Father “sole legal and physical custody of [T.K.], with reasonable and liberal visitation with the mother . . . at times, and as can be arranged by the parties.” Mother noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed.

In re T.K., No. 292, Sept. Term, 2021, 2021 WL 5200223 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Nov. 9, 2021). Although the intermediate appellate court agreed with Mother that a juvenile court’s transfer of custody under § 3-819(e) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article is discretionary and “that a child’s best interest is always paramount,” id. at ⁵, the court held that Mother was not entitled to a separate evidentiary hearing to present evidence of Father’s ability to provide care for T.K., id. at ⁵-6. The court considered Mother’s proffers insufficient to create a dispute of material fact and concluded that the juvenile court had “ample evidence” to find that Father was able and willing to care for T.K. and that an award of custody to Father was in T.K.’s best interest.

Id. at ⁶. Mother filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which we granted. In re T.K., 477 Md. 381 (2022). DISCUSSION Standard of Review This Court reviews CINA determinations utilizing three interrelated standards of review.

In re Yve S., 373 Md. 551, 586 (2003) (quoting Davis v. Davis, 280 Md. 119 , 13 124-26 (1977)). Factual findings by the juvenile court are reviewed for clear error. In re Yve S., 373 Md. at 586 . Matters of law are reviewed without deference to the juvenile court.

Id. Ultimate conclusions of law and fact, when based upon “sound legal principles” and “factual findings that are not clearly erroneous,” are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Id. We granted Mother’s petition for writ of certiorari to consider (1) what standard applies to a juvenile court’s discretion to make an award of custody under § 3-819(e), and (2) when a juvenile court must afford a parent who stands to lose custody as a result of an application of § 3-819(e) an opportunity to present evidence.15 We address those issues, respectively, in Parts II and III below.

As a predicate to addressing those issues, we must first clarify when a juvenile court has discretion to make an award of custody under § 3-819(e), which is the question to which we turn in Part I. 15 In her brief, Mother raises two additional, related questions. First, she asks whether our recent opinion in In re R.S., 470 Md. 380 (2020), compels a juvenile court to award full custody to a non-custodial parent if the court sustains petition allegations against only one parent. Mother argues that it does not, and neither the Department nor T.K. take a contrary position. Instead, they acknowledge that the decision whether to award custody pursuant to § 3-819(e) is discretionary.

Father, on the other hand, argues that the “non- offending [parent] is entitled to custody of the child” in the absence of a finding that the other parent is unable or unwilling to provide appropriate care. For reasons explained at length below in addressing the other issues Mother raises, § 3-819(e) does not compel a juvenile court to award custody merely because the statutory prerequisites are satisfied. To the contrary, § 3-819(e) provides a juvenile court with discretion to award custody, which must be exercised in accord with the best interest of the child. R.S. is not to the contrary.

Second, Mother asks whether the evidence before the juvenile court was sufficient to sustain the court’s award of custody. Because we conclude that the juvenile court erred in declining to hear additional evidence, we will not separately address that question. 14 I. Parents have a constitutionally protected right to raise their children as they choose, free from excessive intrusion by the State, a liberty interest long recognized by the United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59 (1982); Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). “Maryland has consistently echoed the Supreme Court, declaring a parent’s liberty interest in raising a child a fundamental one that cannot be taken away unless clearly justified.” In re Yve S., 373 Md. at 566 .

A CINA proceeding provides a mechanism to determine whether government intrusion in a parent’s relationship with a child is clearly justified. “[A]dhering to statutory requirements, both procedural and substantive, is critical when the safety of the child and the fundamental rights of parents are at issue.” In re M.H., 252 Md. App. 29 , 44 (2021). By its express terms, § 3-819(e) includes two prerequisites to a juvenile court’s discretionary authority to “award custody to the other parent.” First, “the allegations in the petition [must be] sustained against only one parent of a child[.]” Id. Second, there must be “another parent available who is able and willing to care for the child.” Id. If both prerequisites are met, the juvenile court: (1) may not adjudicate the child in need of assistance; and (2) must dismiss the case; but (3) before doing so, “may award custody to the other parent.” Id.

In this Part, we will explore the two prerequisites to the juvenile court’s authority to exercise discretion under § 3-819(e). 15 A. The first prerequisite to a court’s authority to award custody pursuant to § 3-819(e) is that the court must have sustained the allegations in the petition against only one parent. That, however, begs the questions of which “allegations in the petition” must be sustained and what it means to sustain them “against” a parent. Answering those questions requires resort to our standard rules of statutory interpretation. “As in any question of statutory interpretation, the goal is to discern and implement the intent of the Legislature.” In re O.P., 470 Md. 225, 255 (2020). In doing so, we begin “with the text of the particular provision within the context of the statutory scheme of which it is part.” Id.

Review of the legislative history, as well as prior caselaw concerning the provision or similar provisions, may provide guidance and “help confirm conclusions drawn from the text or resolve its ambiguities.” Id. “Finally, consideration of the consequences of alternative interpretations of the statute grounds the analysis.” Id. The plain text of § 3-819(e) does not identify which “allegations in the petition” must be sustained or what it means to say they are sustained “against” just one parent. Here, the single allegation made in the amended petition as to Father—that he lived in Stone Mountain, Georgia—was sustained. By contrast, only some of the allegations in the amended petition against Mother were sustained, as a result of the parties’ negotiated stipulation.

How are we to measure whether enough of “the allegations in the petition” were sustained “against” either parent for purposes of invoking § 3-819(e)? To obtain a more fulsome understanding of the legislative intent, we consider the role of the CINA petition in the broader statutory scheme. See State v. Bey, 452 Md. 255 , 16 266 (2017) (“We, however, do not read statutory language in a vacuum, nor do we confine strictly our interpretation of a statute’s plain language to the isolated section alone.”). Pursuant to § 3-811(a)(1) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, a CINA petition must “allege that a child is in need of assistance and shall set forth in clear and simple language the facts supporting that allegation.” Rule 11-205(e) includes a substantially similar requirement and further requires that a CINA petition include specified information about the petitioner (here, the Department), the child, and the child’s parents, guardians, or custodians; the basis for the court’s jurisdiction; the names and addresses of known witnesses; and whether the child is in shelter care.

A CINA petition is thus required to include basic factual allegations to support a petitioner’s claim that the child is in need of assistance. Because a child can be adjudicated in need of assistance only if (1) the child has been abused or neglected,16 and (2) “[t]he child’s parents, guardian, or custodian are unable or unwilling to give proper care” to the child, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-801(f), it necessarily follows that a CINA petition must support both prongs of the definition, see In re M.H., 252 Md. App. at 42 (observing that “[t]he facts in the petition must support an allegation that the child” meets both prongs of the CINA definition). Although the same factual allegations may support both prongs, see In re Adriana T., 208 Md. App. 545, 570 (2012) (“It has long been established that a parent’s past conduct is relevant to a consideration of the parent’s future conduct.”), the prongs are 16 As reflected in footnote 1, the first requirement can also be satisfied if the child has a developmental disability or a mental disorder.

Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-801(f). Because provisions related to those bases for a CINA adjudication are not at issue in this case, we do not discuss them here. 17 analytically distinct and must both be addressed. A CINA petition, therefore, must allege facts that, if sustained, would be sufficient to support a determination that both prongs of the CINA definition—past abuse or neglect and a present inability or unwillingness to provide proper care—are satisfied.17 The allegations in a CINA petition are then tested at the adjudicatory hearing, the purpose of which is “to determine whether the allegations in the petition, other than the allegation that the child requires the court’s intervention, are true.” Cts. & Jud.

Proc. § 3-801(c). Thus, the first prerequisite to the exercise of discretion under § 3-819(e) requires that, following the adjudicatory hearing, the juvenile court will have sustained allegations in the petition that are sufficient to support determinations that: (1) the child has been abused or neglected; and (2) one of the child’s parents is unable or unwilling to provide proper care for the child. Our interpretation is consistent with the broad purpose of the CINA statute, which “is to ensure that juvenile courts (and local departments of social services) exercise authority to protect and advance a child’s best interests when court intervention is required,” In re Najasha B., 409 Md. 20, 33 (2009), as well as with the State’s “parens patriae ‘interest in caring for those, such as minors, who cannot care for themselves,’” id. (quoting In re Mark M., 365 Md. 687, 705-06 (2001)), because it provides an avenue for 17 For reasons generally set forth in the Court of Special Appeals’ decision in In re E.R., 239 Md. App. 334, 341 (2018), it will often not be possible for a local department to set forth specific factual allegations as to the willingness or ability to provide care of a parent whose existence the department may not even be aware of, or as to whom the department may have only very limited information, at a time when it is necessary to file a petition. 18 court action to protect a child who is at risk in the care of one parent, even though the child does not fully meet the definition of being in need of assistance.

Our interpretation is also consistent with the legislative history of § 3-819(e), which was enacted in response to the decision of the Court of Special Appeals in In re Russell G., 108 Md. App. 366 (1996). There, the juvenile court had determined that a child was in need of assistance based on sustained allegations that (1) the custodial mother had repeatedly neglected the child and was unable or unwilling to provide care for the child due to her alcoholism, and (2) the non-custodial father was unable or unwilling to provide care for the child due to willful ignorance of the mother’s alcoholism and a lack of legal custody of the child. Id. at 370-72 . The intermediate appellate court took no issue with the juvenile court’s findings with respect to the mother but concluded that there was no evidence to support the sustained allegations with respect to the father.

Id. at 379-80 . As a result, the court held that the child could not be adjudicated in need of assistance and there was no basis for the court to exercise continuing jurisdiction over the child. Id. at 380 . Russell G. thus identified a loophole in the CINA statute because the juvenile court, lacking any basis to exercise jurisdiction over the child or order a transfer of custody, was powerless