South Easton Neighborhood Ass'n, Inc. v. Town of Easton

⁴⁷⁴ HARRELL, J. This case began with a request by Shore Health Systems, Incorporated (“SHS”), operator of the Easton Memorial'Hospital in Easton, Maryland (the “Hospital”), to expand the Hospital’s emergency room facilities. A prerequisite for construction of the planned expansion was the closure and conveyance to SHS of the roadbed of Adkins Avenue, a public street of the Town of Easton (“Town”), an incorporated municipality. The closure and conveyance would allow the new facility to be built across the existing public right-of-way. A hearing was held by the Town Council to consider concurrently the proposed closure of Adkins Avenue and a zoning amendment for the proposed Hospital expansion.

SHS claimed that the existing Hospital was designed for less than one-half of the current patient flow. Construction over the street bed was asserted as the only viable expansion alternative for the increased need for emergency room services. The South Easton Neighborhood Association, Inc. (“SENA”) opposed the closing of Adkins Avenue, offering two main arguments: (a) it would leave local neighborhood residents without a safe alternative to access downtown Easton; and (b) the existing use of Adkins Avenue by the public foreclosed the Town’s ability to close the street and convey the street bed to SHS. On 5 January 2004, the Town Council enacted Ordinance No. 466, closing Adkins Avenue and authorizing the conveyance to SHS of the lion’s share of the street bed.

SENA filed in the Circuit Court for Talbot County a two count petition against the Town, generally seeking to enjoin the closure and transfer. The first count sought a declaration, pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, §§ 8-401, et. seq. of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code, that Ordinance No. 466 exceeded the statutory authority granted to the Town Council under Article 23A, § 2(b)(24) of the Maryland Code. The second count sought judicial review of the Town Council’s action as if it were reviewable as the final action of an administrative agency or body. ⁴⁷⁵ At a motions hearing on 30 July 2004, the Circuit Court orally granted summary judgment to the Town and SHS (the latter having intervened as a party defendant), indicating its intention to declare Ordinance No. 466 to be a valid exercise of the authority granted to the Town by Article 23A, § 2(b)(24). In the judgment entered on 3 August 2004, the Circuit Court declared Ordinance No. 466 lawful and, with respect to SENA’s petition for judicial review, affirmed the Town Council’s decision to close and convey Adkins Avenue.

SENA’s post-judgment motions were denied. SENA appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. We granted a writ of certiorari, on the petition of SHS and the Town (collectively described here as Appellees) 1 before the intermediate appellate court could consider the appeal (see § 12-201 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, Md.Code (1973, 2002 Repl.Vol.) and Maryland Rule 8-302) to decide the following questions, which we re-order to facilitate our analysis: I. Whether the Town, in authorizing the closing and conveyance to private parties of an actively used public road, violated its fiduciary responsibilities under Maryland law with respect to that public road and failed to meet its burden of proof as a fiduciary for the challenged closing of an actively-used public street.[ 2 ] II. Whether the requirement in Section 2(b)(24) of Article 23A that municipal property may be conveyed when the legislative body determines that “it is no longer needed for ⁴⁷⁶ any public use” prohibits a municipality from conveying public property to a private person or entity if a limited minority of public uses the public property for convenience.

III

Whether the Town properly determined that closing Adkins Avenue to enable SHS to construct a new emergency care facility promotes a public benefit.

IV

Whether SENA submitted sufficient evidence of judicial bias to require Judge Horne to recuse himself from deciding this case. For reasons to be explained, we shall affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court. I. Further judicial review of the Circuit Court’s order upholding the Town Council’s decision to close Adkins Avenue cannot be maintained as an action for judicial review of an administrative agency’s decision. Our review here shall be directed to the Circuit Court’s declaratory judgment, an appealable final order. 3 ⁴⁷⁸ II.

The Hospital lies within a Commercial-Medical Zoning District (“C-M Zone”) 4 , established in 1993 and last amended by Town ordinance in 1998. The Hospital’s main campus bears the address 219 South Washington Street. The campus is bordered on the north and south by Biery Street and West Earle Avenue, respectively, and on the west by Adkins Avenue. Adkins Avenue is approximately nine hundred feet long and runs in a north/south direction, connecting Biery Street to Earle Avenue.

Adkins Avenue is forty feet wide at its northern terminus with Biery Street and fifty feet wide at its southern terminus with Earle Avenue. ⁴⁷⁹ The Hospital is wholly-owned by SHS, a Maryland nonprofit, non-stock charitable corporation providing emergency, diagnostic, and clinical medical care on the Eastern Shore of Maryland, principally through two hospitals — the Hospital and Dorchester General Hospital in Cambridge, Maryland, as well as other facilities. Other than the two hospitals operated by SHS, there are no other hospitals in Talbot, Dorchester, Queen Anne’s or Caroline Counties. The Hospital Emergency Room (the “Emergency Room”) was designed in 1983 to accommodate approximately 13,000 visits annually. At the time of the Town Council meeting in October 2003, the Emergency Room was receiving approximately 41,000 visits per year.

Estimates supplied by SHS indicated that approximately 50,000 patients would present at the Emergency Room by the year 2015, based on population growth and demographic progression. On 20 October 2003 the Town Council held a joint public hearing to consider, among other things, the proposed amendment to the C-M Zone to accommodate the Hospital expansion. In its request, SHS represented to the Town that a prerequisite to the construction of the expanded Emergency room was the closure and conveyance of Adkins Avenue to SHS. SHS proposed expanding the Hospital facility across the street bed and onto lots SHS controlled on the opposite side of Adkins Avenue.

Title to the street bed was to be transferred to SHS. The record contains a letter from the Chairman of the Town’s Planning and Zoning Commission and a Town staff report, both of which recommended approval of the closure of Adkins Avenue and propose no other or a future public use or purpose for the street bed. SHS submitted a traffic study showing that only 5-6 cars per hour drove the length of Adkins Avenue during peak travel periods. (Figure 1 depicts a not-to-seale drawing of the proposed Emergency Room expansion across the bed of Adkins Avenue). ⁴⁸⁰ [[Image here]] SENA purported to be acting at the Town Council hearing on behalf of area residents in its opposition to SHS’s requests. 5 Wye Avenue, which runs parallel to Adkins Avenue, was alleged to be an impractical alternative for public ingress and egress because of street congestion, pedestrian use, and a lack of off-street parking.

After submitting petitions supporting that Adkins Avenue be retained as a much-desired public right of way by the local residents, SENA argued that the Town lacked the legal authority to close Adkins Avenue because the on-going public use of Adkins Avenue, to any degree, foreclosed the Town’s discretion to close the street under Article 23A, § 2(b)(24) of the Maryland Code. 6 ⁴⁸¹ On 3 November 2004, the Town Council approved the closure of Adkins Avenue. On 5 January 2004, the Town Council enacted Amended Ordinance No. 466 and conveyed the relevant portion of the street bed to SHS. The Amended Ordinance authorized: (1) closing Adkins Avenue and conveying a portion of the bed of that street to SHS as requested by it will serve a public purpose and benefit, namely, facilitating the provision of emergency and outpatient care services to the residents of the Town, Talbot County and surrounding counties; and (2) closing the remaining portion of the bed of Adkins Avenue to the Temple[ 7 ] is appropriate since no public ⁴⁸² purpose is served by maintaining that portion of Adkins Avenue as a public street. The Ordinance also incorporated by exhibit a new boundary line revision plat (“McCrone Plat”) submitted by SHS.

The McCrone Plat showed that SHS and the Temple, the sole property owners abutting Adkins Avenue, would receive the streetbed, which was captioned on the McCrone Plat as “to be abandoned.” Ordinance No. 466 incorporated a statement of the Town Council’s Findings of Fact. These findings included: 1) Adkins Avenue is used as a convenience by area residents in lieu of Wye Avenue; 2) SHS would maintain a means of access of transit between Earle Avenue and Biery Street in the event that an emergency would close access to Wye Avenue and South Washington Street; 3) Town Charter Article II § 17-A (3) 8 authorized the Town Council to close public streets; 4) closing a portion of Adkins Avenue was in the best interest of the public in providing improved emergency medical services to the Town; 5) the Hospital would use approximately 250 feet of the 900 foot street bed for the addition to the Hospital and the proposed Emergency Room; 6) there is no particular benefit in publicly maintaining the portion of Adkins Avenue remaining after the Hospital’s construction of the expanded Emergency Room; and, 7) the Town Council was authorized to convey the remaining street bed pursuant to Md.Code Article 23A, § 2(b)(24). (Figure 2 depicts the Hospital in relation to the streets of the Town. Pennsfield Lane, depicted here parallel to Wye Avenue and Adkins Avenue, is an alley). ⁴⁸³ [[Image here]] Amended Ordinance No. 465 also was enacted 5 January 2004.

This ordinance amended the C-M District Zone to reflect the Emergency Room expansion and incorporated by reference the Emergency Services Pavilion and Outpatient Center C-M District Application & Amendment Sketch Plan detailing the construction of the Emergency Room over the to-be-closed street bed of Adkins Avenue. Ordinance No. 465 also incorporated the closure of Adkins Avenue, stating that the “Town Council will take the necessary legislative action” to close and transfer Adkins Avenue to SHS and the Temple. 9 ⁴⁸⁴ On 4 February 2004 SENA filed in the Circuit Court for Talbot County its two count complaint against the Town. SENA reiterated in its complaint that the Town lacked legal authority to close Adkins Avenue while the street still was being used by the public. It alleged that the Town held Adkins Avenue in trust for the public use.

Lastly, it alleged, in its judicial review request, that the Town acted arbitrarily and capriciously in adopting Ordinance No. 466. Four months after filing the suit, SENA moved for assignment of a judge to hear the case who was not dependant on SHS for health care, claiming that the sole sitting judge in the Circuit Court should recuse himself if he or any member of his immediate family relied upon SHS for necessary health care. After SHS intervened as a party defendant, SHS and the Town moved separately for summary judgment on both counts. In both motions, the parties claimed that the Town was authorized under the Town Charter to close the street.

They further asserted that the Town reached the necessary legal conclusion comporting with § 2(b)(24), that continued use of Adkins Avenue as a public thoroughfare was no longer needed and the construction of an expanded emergency room was a public use and public benefit. In addition, the Town opposed the motion for recusal of the judge, pointing out that the reasoning of SENA’s motion effectively would extend to each sitting judge in each Circuit Court in the Mid-Shore Area. * The Honorable William S. Horne held a hearing in the Circuit Court on 30 July 2004 to consider the motion for his recusal and the motions for summary judgment. Regarding the recusal motion, counsel for SENA alleged that Judge Horne and his wife relied extensively on the Hospital for medical treatment. Because of this reliance, counsel believed that Judge Horne could not decide this litigation fairly and impartially.

Judge Horne denied SENA’s motion, stating that whether a judge depended on SHS for medical care for ⁴⁸⁵ himself/herself or his/her family was irrelevant to his or her ability to decide fairly the matters raised in SENA’s complaint and the motions for summary judgment. The Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Town and SHS and declared Ordinance No. 466 lawful. In its oral opinion, the Circuit Court stated that, even though the conveyance of the largest portion of the street bed of Adkins Avenue was to a private entity, the land transfer to build the expanded emergency room was for a public use and benefited the public. Although Adkins Avenue was being used as a public street to some extent, the Town Council properly determined, pursuant to § 2(b)(24), that it no longer was needed as a public street.

The court also noted that the Town Council recognized that parallel, remaining streets could be used to arrive at the same locations that Adkins Avenue served. The Circuit Court concluded further that the planned public use of the street bed of Adkins Avenue for an expanded emergency room was superior to that of the convenience of the nearby residents in having Adkins Avenue continue as a public thoroughfare. SENA filed a motion for a new trial, citing Surratt v. Prince George’s County, 320 Md. 439 , 578 A.2d 745 (1990). SENA’s counsel alleged that Judge Horne had demonstrated a “rather remarkable and offensive pattern of judicial misconduct” towards the attorneys and clients of their firm and enclosed sealed affidavits allegedly supporting that position.

Because of this alleged longstanding pattern of personal animus, counsel believed that their motion, as a matter of law, must be heard and ruled upon by another judge. Judge Horne denied the motion, without a hearing, on 2 September 2004.

III

SENA asserts that the Town, as' the entity holding public roads in trust for the public as a matter of law, violated an implied fiduciary relationship to the general public. As support for the existence of this fiduciary relationship, SENA contends that we have held that “ ‘land held by a municipality ⁴⁸⁶ in its governmental capacity ... and therefore held in trust for the public cannot be disposed of without special statutory authority....’” McRobie v. Mayor of Westernport, 260 Md. 464, 467 , 272 A.2d 655, 657 (1971) (quoting City of Balt. v. Chesapeake Marine Ry. Co., 233 Md. 559, 572 , 197 A.2d 821, 827 (1964)). SENA equates a municipal corporation’s (and its officials’) duty to hold property in trust for the public to that of the fiduciary duty a trustee would have towards a beneficiary.

When a beneficiary or dependent party produces evidence that a trustee has violated its fiduciary duty, the trustee shoulders the burden of adducing proof to the contrary. Lopez v. Lopez, 250 Md. 491, 501 , 243 A.2d 588, 594 (1968). As SENA sees it, the Town had the burden to rebut the alleged breach of its implied fiduciary duty to the public in its conveyance of Adkins Avenue to SHS. SENA’s novel argument is incorrect.

As Appellees point out, the public trust discussed in McRobie has never been viewed as more than an advisory admonition to public officials. 10 In Kerpelman v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 261 Md. 436 , 276 A.2d 56 (1971), Kerpelman’s standing to sue was based on her status as a member of the Maryland public. She claimed that the public trust was violated by the Maryland Board of Public Works when it transferred wetlands in Worcester County to a private entity for a “completely and totally inadequate money consideration.” Id. at 440 , 276 A.2d at 58 . She alleged that persons invested with legislative powers of government were trustees and accountable to her as a beneficiary of the public trust flowing from Article 6 of the ⁴⁸⁷ Maryland Declaration of Rights. 11 We rejected the notion that Article 6 created a beneficiary-trustee relationship.

We explained rather that the language of Article 6 was merely advisory. Id. at 444-45 , 276 A.2d at 61 . An incorporated municipality, like Easton, invested with legislative powers under § 2(b)(24), holds property in trust for the public in a general sense, but not in a way creating a special relationship relative to the public at large. This “ ‘public trust’ does not create a fiduciary relationship. 1 George T. Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees, § 38, p. 422 (1984) (‘Public’ office is a ‘trust’ in the sense that confidence is imposed that the welfare of the public will be enhanced, but there is no trust [here].”).

IV

The exercise of the governmental power at issue in this case is solely that to convey a former public street bed. Our standard of review of the declaratory judgment entered as the result of the grant of a motion for summary judgment is whether that declaration was correct as a matter of law. Converge Servs. Group, LLC v. Curran, 383 Md. 462, 476 , 860 A.2d 871, 879 (2004).

For a declaration regarding a town council’s decision to convey property used for government purposes (a legislative determination) to be correct as a matter of law, the analysis focuses on whether the decision was made within “the legal boundaries” of the Town’s statutory authority. See Dep’t. of Natural Resources v. Linchester Sand & Gravel Corp., 274 Md. 211, 224 , 334 A.2d 514, 523 (1975). A. As an incorporated municipality, the Town is granted the express power to convey real property pursuant to Article 23A, § 2(b)(24) of the Maryland Code. After examining the ⁴⁸⁸ statutory language of § 2(b)(24) and the issues presented by SENA, we agree with the Circuit Court and shall affirm the declaration regarding Amended Ordinance No. 466. 12 Before deciding ultimately the legality of Amended Ordinance No. 466, it is necessary to explain two separate (origi ⁴⁸⁹ nally), but now intertwined, legal concepts at issue in this case.

The first is the authority of a municipal corporation to convey governmental real property. At common law, municipalities had no inherent power to convey property used for governmental purposes, absent legislative approval from the General Assembly. McRobie, 260 Md. at 467-68 , 272 A.2d at 657 . Article 23A § 2(b)(24) supplies that legislative grant.

Article XI-E, § 3 of the Maryland Constitution granted Home Rule to municipal corporations, enabling those corporations to enact local laws or ordinances relating to their respective governmental affairs. Section 2(b) of Article 23A enumerates a non-exclusive list of “express ordinance-making” powers available to municipal corporations. 13 Ordinances passed pursuant to this broad-sweeping Home Rule power, however, are not permitted to be contrary to existing public general laws. Art. 23A, § 2(a); Inlet Assocs. v. Assateague House Condo. Assoc., 313 Md. 413, 425 , 545 A.2d 1296, 1302 (1988).

The second issue is the authority of a municipal corporation to close permanently a public street. Home Rule empowers municipal corporations with the authority to close streets. Md. Const. Art. XI-E, § 3; Art. 23A, § 1.

The authority to close public streets is limited to circumstances where the closure, and subsequent transfer, of the public street does not benefit solely a private interest because the streets of a municipal corporation are held in trust for the benefit of the general public, “the closing of a street, and the conveyance of the [municipality’s] interest in the street solely ⁴⁹⁰ for the private benefit of another, is not within the legislative body’s power.... ” Inlet Assocs., 313 Md. at 431 , 545 A.2d at 1305 . Otherwise, the State possesses plenary power to close streets and may delegate that authority. Mayor of Balt. v. Brengle, 116 Md. 342 , 81 A. 677 (1911) (holding that the closing of a public street in accordance with a legislatively sanctioned annexation plan to be valid); see 11 Eugene McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, § 30.185, p. 99-102 (3rd ed.2000). We first addressed an appellate challenge to § 2(b)(24), some forty years after its enactment, in the factual context of the closure of a public street and the conveyance of the street bed.

Inlet Assocs. v. Assateague House Condominium Assoc., 313 Md. 413 , 545 A.2d 1296 (1988). 14 Then-Chief Judge Murphy, writing for a unanimous Court, held that the express delegation of legislative authority by the General Assembly to municipal corporations required an “intention that the city council act upon municipal affairs through ordinances when performing its legislative function.” Id. at 430 , 545 A.2d at 1304 . Before considering the substance of § 2(b)(24), we held that the controlling provisions of § 2(b) required the Town of Ocean City, a municipal corporation, to make an affirmative determination via an ordinance before conveying a portion of a public street to Inlet Associates. Inlet Assocs., 313 Md. at 431 , 545 A.2d at 1305 . Because the municipal corporation conveyed the street bed via a resolution, rather than an ⁴⁹¹ ordinance, we held ineffective the Town of Ocean City’s attempted conveyance of the street bed.

We further expressed that the relevant controlling Ocean City Town Charter provisions, which did not require an express determination of whether the street bed was needed for any public use, were controlled by Article 23A, § 2(b)(24), namely that “a determination that there is no longer any public need for the street is requisite____” Inlet Assocs., 313 Md. at 431 , 545 A.2d at 1305 . B. The gravamen of SENA’s appeal is that Amended Ordinance No. 466 exceeded the statutory authority granted by § 2(b)(24). The contest here is limited to the determination of why the property was conveyed, although the exact means of the conveyance also is contested by SENA. Section 2(b)(24) of Art. 23A contemplates conveyance by a municipality of public property in two scenarios.

The first occurs when the property was acquired initially by the municipal corporation through “conveyance, purchase or condemnation.” The second is when a municipal corporation receives property by “gift, grant, bequest, or devise” and later conveys all or a portion of property so acquired. The manner in which the municipality acquired the subject property in the first instance is unclear on this record. 15 This creates a hurdle to a determination under which scenario of § 2(b)(24) the operative facts should be analyzed. Of course, this omission may not be important if the tests that must be met under either scenario are functionally identical or, if different, the result would be the same on the particular facts of the present case. In the first scenario, the municipality may convey the property when the “legislative body determines that [it] is no longer needed for any public use.” Art. 23A, § 2(b)(24) (emphasis added).

In the second, the municipality ⁴⁹² may convey the property when it determines “it is no longer needed for public purposes. ...” Id. (emphasis added). In this case, Ordinance No. 466 conveyed the street bed to SHS, for the purpose of the expanded Emergency Room, and to the Temple, neither of which depended on Adkins Avenue for its sole main access. Although there may be a conceptual difference between public use and public purposes as contemplated by the statute, property held for certain government purposes also may be a public use and a public purpose at the same time.

Adkins Avenue, for example, is both. In Inlet Associates, we explained conclusively that the streets of a municipality are held in trust for the benefit, use, and convenience of the general public. 313 Md. at 431 , 545 A.2d at 1305 (emphasis added) (citing Sinclair v. Weber, 204 Md. 324 , 104 A.2d 561 (1954); Townsend, Grace & Co. v. Epstein, 93 Md. 537 , 49 A. 629 (1901)). Our holding in Inlet Associates notwithstanding, were we to parse the analytical paradigm into separate parts, the result would be the same. Public use is a somewhat undefined legal tenet — there is “[n]o satisfactory single clear-cut rule ... which can decide all cases.... ” Green v. High Ridge Assoc., 346 Md. 65, 73 , 695 A.2d 125, 128 (1997) (citation omitted).

Ultimately, it is for the Judiciary to determine whether a particular use is public, although a reviewing court will “give weight” to legislative bodies in their own determinations of what constitutes a public use. Id., 695 A.2d at 128-29 ; Prince George’s County v. Beard, 266 Md. 83, 95-96 , 291 A.2d 636, 642 (1972) (explaining that a legislative body cannot merely declare a public use without a judicial determination). For example, actual public use or an entitlement by the public to use the property is often sufficient to prove that a public use exists in condemnation cases. Green, 346 Md. at 74 , 695 A.2d at 129 .

By comparison, a public purpose is a more broadly-defined term; a public purpose is a government-directed action for the benefit of the public as a whole. Black’s Law Dictionary, 1267 (8th ed.2004). Examples of valid public purposes range from legal benefits to domestic partners of ⁴⁹³ county employees, Tyma v. Montgomery County, 369 Md. 497, 513 , 801 A.2d 148, 157 (2002), to ensuring the habitability of housing, Benik v. Hatcher, 358 Md. 507, 531 , 750 A.2d 10, 23 (2000). Here, we examine the determination by the Town Council in regard to Adkins Avenue as it existed at the time Ordinance No. 466 was enacted.

Adkins Avenue, as a public street, was both a public use and used for a public purpose. The Findings of Fact by the Town Council reflect sufficiently this premise. In its Findings of Fact, the Town Council determined that the public use of Adkins Avenue was as an access to the existing Hospital and as a convenient route for nearby residents traveling downtown. With the zoning amendment approved, including the proposed Emergency Room expansion across the street bed, there no longer could be public use of Adkins Avenue as either an access or a through-street. 16 Likewise, Adkins Avenue served a public purpose of providing access for the public to the Hospital’s existing emergency medical facility.

SENA offers little argument, or evidence, that the Town Council did not consider the public use or purpose of Adkins Avenue, nor that the Town Council did not determine that Adkins Avenue was no longer needed for the existing public use or purpose. Furthermore, SENA offers little to rebut the Town Council’s decision that the retention of Adkins Avenue was not needed for any other public use. Instead, SENA contends that Amended Ordinance No. 466 violates the Town’s statutory authority because Adkins Avenue was an actively used public street. 17 It believes that the authority to convey or sell public property under ⁴⁹⁴ § 2(b)(24) may be exercised only after a finding of non-use. In other words, any contemporaneous or actual public use would preclude the Town from conveying the street bed.

SENA relies on Cristofani v. Board of Education of Prince George’s County, 98 Md.App. 90 , 632 A.2d 447 (1993), to support its interpretation of Article 23A, § 2(b)(24) requiring that any 'need associated with contemporaneous use would foreclose the' Town from conveying the street bed. In that case, Judge Cathell, writing then for the Court of Special Appeals, explained that an incorporated municipality could not abandon land held in fee simple to a neighboring property owner. He further explained, by means of an example, that mere non-use, which may constitute abandonment, was insufficient to transfer property held for a governmental purpose, without a legislative determination pursuant to Article 23A, § 2(b)(24). Cristofani did not require the absence of use or need, but merely illustrated that if non-use existed alone, it would be an insufficient justification to convey the property.

Id. at 96-97 , 632 A.2d at 450 . ⁴⁹⁵ In relying on the dicta in Cristofani , SENA ignores two principles of statutory construction. First, SENA’s interpretation replaces “needed” with the term “used” in the statute, rendering “needed” nugatory and precluding any statutory effect being given to the ordinary meaning of the word. Bd. of Educ. v. Lendo, 295 Md. 55, 63 , 453 A.2d 1185, 1189 (1982). Second, to adopt SENA’s interpretation of Article 23, § 2(b)(24) would produce absurd results.

Coerper v. Comptroller of Treasury, 265 Md. 3, 6 , 288 A.2d 187, 188 (1972). Recognizing an absolute no-use standard would permit one person to walk the length of Adkins Avenue, or any other public right of way, and thereby foreclose any conveyance of the roadbed, regardless of the Town Council’s legislative determinations. SENA also argues that Ordinance No. 466 fails to mimic the exact language of § 2(b)(24) and therefore a determination that Adkins Avenue is “no longer needed” may not be deduced from this record without the Town Council reciting the so-called “magic words.” We have held that mere incantation of the “magic words” of a legal test, as an adherence to form over substance, may not cause the Genie to appear and is neither required nor desired if actual consideration of the necessary legal considerations are apparent in the record. Cannon v. Cannon, 384 Md. 537, 559 , 865 A.2d 563, 576 (2005); Faulk v. Ewing, 371 Md. 284, 305 , 808 A.2d 1262, 1276 (2002).

Here, the Town Council decided to close Adkins Avenue and transfer the street bed to SHS and the Temple only after its Planning & Zoning Commission, Town Engineer, Town Planner, and a staff report approved the closure without so much as a suggestion for any other future public use. If the closed street bed was needed for any other public use or purpose, the various town agencies and officials who pondered the fully revealed plans surely would have stated so. Although the Town Council did state that the portion of the street bed unconsumed by the Emergency Room expansion was no longer needed,