In Re Darren M.

HARRELL, Judge. On 26 October 1998, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, sitting as the juvenile court, dismissed a delinquency petition filed against Appellee, Darren M. The juvenile court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction and that the District Court had exclusive jurisdiction over the matter. The State appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. Before the intermediate court heard the appeal, we issued a writ of certiorari on our own initiative.

For the reasons stated below, we hold that the juvenile court had exclusive jurisdiction over Darren M. and the conduct alleged in the delinquency petition. As a consequence of our holding, we reverse the judgment of the juvenile court. The factual allegations that gave rise to the initiation of action against Darren M. can be stated succinctly. In a statement given to a Baltimore City Police detective, Darren M.’s former female companion reported that, on 25 March 1998, she met Darren M. at a Baltimore City apartment to retrieve some of her possessions that he had retained since their breakup.

According to her account, after a brief conversation, Darren M. persuaded her to remove her coat and then attempted to force her into having sex with him. She refused. She reported that Darren M. then produced a handgun, ordered her to remove her clothing, and raped her. Darren M. was seventeen years old at the time of the alleged incident.

Darren M. was charged originally in the District Court of Maryland, sitting in Baltimore City, via a criminal warrant, with one count each of rape in the first degree, assault in the first degree, assault in the second degree, use of a handgun in ¹⁰⁷ the commission of a felony or crime of violence, use of a deadly weapon with intent to injure, and carrying a handgun. 1 On 1 May 1998, at a preliminary hearing held in the District Court, the State entered a nolle prosequi to counts of first-degree rape, first-degree assault, use of a handgun in the commission of a felony or crime of violence, and carrying a handgun. Darren M. waived his right to a trial by jury and his bench trial on the remaining charges, second-degree assault and use of a deadly weapon with intent to injure, was scheduled in the District Court for 6 May 1998. The trial in the District Court began as scheduled. 2 The State’s first witness was the victim. As part of her testimony, she testified that Darren M. was seventeen years of age at the time of the alleged incident.

At this point, the trial came to a halt as everyone realized, seemingly for the first time, that Darren M. was a juvenile. The District Court judge asked the State how it wished to proceed. The State responded by nolle prossing the two remaining criminal charges against Darren M. The State subsequently filed a delinquency petition in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, sitting as the juvenile court, on 14 May 1998. In the petition, the State alleged that Darren M. committed the delinquent act of assault in the second degree.

A hearing on the juvenile petition began on 4 June 1998 before a master. At the start of the proceeding, Darren M. moved for dismissal. He contended that the ¹⁰⁸ juvenile court lacked jurisdiction over his case and, alternatively, that the institution of the juvenile action, under the circumstances, violated the Fifth Amendment prohibition against double jeopardy. The master concluded that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction and recommended dismissal of the petition.

The State filed a notice of exceptions with the juvenile court challenging the master’s ruling. The court overruled the State’s exceptions, reiterating the view that it lacked jurisdiction over Darren M.’s case. Specifically, the court found that the District Court had acquired exclusive jurisdiction and, consequently, the juvenile court was precluded from exercising jurisdiction in the matter. I. Our focus in this case is on whether the juvenile court erred in ruling that it lacked jurisdiction over the delinquency proceeding in which seventeen year old Darren M. was alleged to have committed the delinquent act of second-degree assault.

Darren M. contends that the juvenile court ruled correctly because the District Court had jurisdiction over his case. 3 He premises his argument, in part, on the jurisdictional limits of the juvenile court as set forth in Maryland Code (1973, 1998 RepLVol.), Courts and Judicial Proceedings (CJP), § 3-804(e). 4 Pursuant to CJP § 3-804(e)(l), Darren M. asserts that the State initially and properly charged him criminally in the District Court because the juvenile court does not have jurisdiction over cases involving a “child at least 14 years old ¹⁰⁹ alleged to have done an act which, if committed by an adult, would be a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment.” First-degree rape, a charge contained in the District Court warrant against Darren M., would be a qualifying charge under CJP § 3-804(e)(l) because it is punishable by life imprisonment. 5 See Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol., 1999 Cum.Supp.), Article 27, § 463(b). Darren M. points out that the juvenile court also lacks jurisdiction over the other charges in the warrant because CJP § 3-804(e)(l) prohibits that court from gaining jurisdiction over charges arising out of the same incident which caused the criminal court to acquire jurisdiction. 6 Relying on Gray v. State, 6 Md.App. 677 , 253 A.2d 395 (1969), Darren M. further asserts that the District Court retained jurisdiction over his case after the State nolle prossed the first-degree rape and first-degree assault counts. He directs us to an excerpt in Gray where the intermediate appellate court explained: It has long been accepted as a well-known principle of law that the jurisdiction of a court depends upon the state of affairs existing at the time it is invoked, and if the jurisdiction once attaches to the person and subject matter of the litigation, the subsequent happening of events, though they are of such a character as would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance, will not operate to oust the jurisdiction already attached. ¹¹⁰ Gray, 6 Md.App. at 682-83, 253 A.2d at 398 . In Darren M.’s view, the misdemeanor counts remaining against him after the State nolle prossed the felony counts may have been within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, but under the facts of his case, the remaining charges should have stayed in the District Court because proper criminal jurisdiction attached originally in the District Court.

On the question of which court, district or circuit, had criminal jurisdiction over his case, Darren M. maintains that his case was properly before the District Court, rather than the Circuit Court. He reasons that, after the State nolle prossed the felony charges, the remaining charges involved crimes that were misdemeanors within the exclusive jurisdiction of the District Court under CJP § 4—301(b)(1). 7 Based on his waiver of the right to a jury trial, Darren M. contends that his case should have remained in the District Court. Because the District Court had jurisdiction over his case when the State nolle prossed the final counts against him, Darren M. penultimately contends that jeopardy attached during the District Court trial when the court swore the State’s first witness, Darren M.’s former girlfriend. Darren M. suggests that the State is barred from subsequently instituting any charge arising from the same course of conduct in juvenile court due to the constitutional prohibition against twice placing a defendant in jeopardy because the State entered a nolle pros in a court with jurisdiction after jeopardy attached.

II

Darren M.’s effort to explain to his advantage the jurisdictional constraints of our judicial system is fundamen ¹¹¹ tally flawed. Darren M. overlooks that the District Court never had jurisdiction to adjudicate the criminal charges lodged against him. When the State originally charged Darren M. the case was not within the