Maryland case law › In Re Deontay J.

In Re Deontay J.

408 Md. 152 (2009) · Court of Appeals of Maryland
Court of Appeals of MarylandDisposition: Aff'd in partMURPHY, J.✓ Good law
HoldingDeontay J.

154 MURPHY, J. On December 10, 2008, this Court ORDERED that the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals in No. 1733, September Term, 2007 be and is hereby AFFIRMED in part, and VACATED in part; and ... further ORDERED that the case be and is hereby REMANDED to the Court of Special Appeals with directions to remand to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City for further proceedings; and ... further ORDERED that pending the further proceedings required by this Order, the custody provision of the Circuit Court’s September 7, 2007 Order shall have the force and effect of a pendente lite Order; and ... further ORDERED that upon remand, the Circuit Court shall hold a custody hearing at which the Circuit Court shall (1) ' expressly state the findings it is required to make under § 9 — 101(b) of the Family Law Article, and (2) enter a custody order that conforms to the applicable law and is based upon a current and complete factual predicate; and ... further * * * ORDERED that [Respondent's Motions to Supplement the Record be and are DENIED. This opinion states the reasons why we entered that Order. Background Deontay J. (Deontay) was born on March 8, 2006.

In the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, on August 21, 2006, the Baltimore City Department of Social Services (Petitioner) filed a PETITION WITH REQUEST FOR SHELTER CARE of Deontay that included the following assertions: 1. [Deontay’s] mother abuses alcohol, prescription drugs and illicit drugs, conditions which render her incapable of providing consistently adequate care, protection and supervision of the respondent. 155 2. On or about August 18, 2006, [Deontay’s] mother was observed walking in the flow of traffic with the respondent in his stroller. [Deontay’s] mother was in a zombie like state. [Deontay’s] mother was observed to be under the influence of an intoxicant. 3. The BCPD was called and an Officer responded to the location of the mother and [Deontay]. [Deontay’s] mother was observed to be carrying an open bottle container and a prescription pill container. The Officer attempted to question the mother, but she was incoherent. [Deontay’s] mother was observed nodding and to the point of unconsciousness. 4.

The BCPD Officer contacted the necessary emergency response personnel. [Deontay] was transported to the JHH where he was examined by the attending physician. [Deontay] was found to have a severe diaper rash on his buttocks and groin area, hypuspadias, (deformity of the penis), and Seborrheic, (infant cradlecap). [Deontay] will need surgery to correct the Seborrheic. [Deontay] was unkempt, dirty, and spoiled milk was in his bottle. 5. The BCDSS was contacted and [Deontay] was placed in their care. 8. [Deontay] has five siblings, [Sophia] B. (ID# 199526), Donnick D. (ID# 182876), Davon J.

(ID# 192670), Denzel J. (ID# 192672), and Shyra J. (ID# 192671). All of whom have been found CIÑA.

The BCDSS has been granted guardianship in regard to the siblings, Sophia and Donnick. Davon[,] Denzel and Shyra have been committed to the BCDSS with limited guardianship granted to Linda C. The next scheduled hearing date for Shyra, Denzel and Davon will be a Review hearing on October 3, 2006, at 1:00 p.m. in Part-l/H-5. 9. [Deontay’s] father, Jeffrey J., has failed to take necessary steps to protect his child from the neglectful situation. Later that day, the Circuit Court placed Deontay in Petitioner’s custody. At the conclusion of a September 13, 2006 156 adjudicatory hearing, the Circuit Court entered an Order Controlling Conduct that placed Deontay in the custody of his •father, Jeffrey J.

(Respondent). On October 6, 2006, Petitioner filed an AMENDMENT TO PETITION AND REQUEST FOR SHELTER CARE that included the following assertions: 2. On September 18, 2006, the Court ordered the parties ([Deontay’s] parents) to comply with an Order Controlling Conduct. The. mother was to have no contact with [Deontay].

The father was [to] ensure health care, day care, and comply with BCDSS. 3. On or about October 4, 2006, the BCD SS was informed that [Deontay] and his father moved into the same home with the mother. 4. [Deontay] was removed and placed in shelter care pending further Court intervention. Between October 6, 2006 and April 20, 2007, Deontay was the subject of several hearings and a settlement conference. At the conclusion of an April 20, 2007 Contested Disposition Master’s hearing, the Master recommended that Deontay be placed in Petitioner’s custody.

The Master’s on-the-record explanation for this recommendation included the following comments: But I have serious concerns about [the father’s] judgment, his understanding of what parenting is. Buying — having a home and having all the things to care for the baby without understanding how to actually care for the baby. What disturbs me most is that he’d been with his wife for a long period of time and he still does not really either accept or understand the significance of the substance abuse. Didn’t recognize that it existed.

And once he fully acknowledged it, he still does not even want to accept or understand or comprehend the seriousness of it and how it impacts the children. I also don’t think he understands how to care for the [respondent]. In certain things, he does. He knows that he can’t give [respondent] a piece of steak ...

But in terms of 157 medical treatment and in terms of his ability to negotiate those systems, it is — and even to know when something urgent needs to happen, I think his judgment is impaired. I think there are some limitations for him in that area. The fact that he would take the child out every day from Harford County to Baltimore City just because he was bored with what was happening in Harford County, it’s almost like he doesn’t know what to do with the baby. And all day long, just sort of walking around out in the environment without— * * * I think that he has cognitive limitations.

I think that the parenting skills, although he went to class, maybe the class was not appropriate for him in terms of infant care. But I think that there are lapses in his judgment and critical thinking skills in terms of raising a baby. I just don’t think that he’s able to do that at this time based on the testimony that 1 heard and the Court medical report. It’s the cognitive limitation, the poor insight, and the lack of judgment and decision making.

I don’t think that he’s able to do that. I do think he needs to have a special parenting class, because he is not going to grasp the concepts that are being presented in the typical parenting role. And I don’t think it’s safe for [the child] to return to his care. He has medical issues that are serious ones.

And if they’re not treated appropriately, they can develop into something much more serious. So this Court finds that the father is willing but unable. So the Court finds [the child] a child in need of assistance and I’m going to commit him to the Department. The record shows that the Master’s recommendations were filed on April 20, 2007, and that the Circuit Court entered the recommended Order on the following day.

The record also shows that, although Respondent did not move to vacate the Order entered on April 21, 2007, he did file a Notice of Exceptions on April 25, 2007, and that Respondent’s excep 158 tions were denied at the conclusion of a September 7, 2007 hearing. On September 20, 2007, Respondent noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. In an unreported opinion filed on May 15, 2008, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the finding that Deontay is a CINA, but held that “[n]either the facts presented nor the concerns expressed by the trial court are sufficient to remove Deontay from his father’s custody.” In re Deontay J., No. 1733, September Term, 2007, 180 Md.App. 766 (slip opinion, p. 13). Thereafter, Petitioner requested that this Court issue a writ of certiorari to address three questions: 1.

Is appellate jurisdiction lacking in this case, where the juvenile court adopted the master’s recommendation by order dated April 21, 2007, before Mr. J. filed his notice of exceptions, and Mr. J. neither moved to vacate that order nor noted [] his appeal within thirty days of that order? 2. May a juvenile court find a child in need of assistance and commit him to the custody of a local department based on the parents’ neglect of five siblings, which resulted in CINA findings as to all of the children, and termination of parental rights as to two of them? 3. Did the juvenile court properly find a child to be a child in need of assistance and commit him to the custody of the local department on finding that the father had placed the child in a life-threatening situation and that the father’s cognitive limitations, lack of judgment, and lack of parenting and life skills rendered him unable to provide proper care and attention to the child and his needs? On July 29, 2008, this Court granted that petition. 405 Md. 350 , 952 A.2d 225 (2008).

Discussion I. Maryland Rule 11-111, in pertinent part, provides: c. Review by Court if Exceptions Filed. Any party may file exceptions to the master’s proposed findings, conclu 159 sions, recommendations or proposed orders. Exceptions shall be in writing, filed with the clerk within five days after the master’s report is served upon the party, and shall specify those items to which the party excepts, and whether the hearing is to be de novo or on the record.

Upon the filing of exceptions, a prompt hearing shall be scheduled on the exceptions. An excepting party other than the State may elect a hearing de novo or a hearing on the record. If the State is the excepting party, the hearing shall be on the record, supplemented by such additional evidence as the judge considers relevant and to which the parties raise no objection. In either case the hearing shall be limited to those matters to which exceptions have been taken. d.

Review by Court in Absence of Exceptions. Tn the absence of timely and proper exceptions, the master’s proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommendations may be adopted by the court and the proposed or other appropriate orders may be entered based on them. The court may remand the case to the master for further hearing, or may, on its own motion, schedule and conduct a further hearing supplemented by such additional evidence as the court considers relevant and to which the parties raise no objection. Action by the court under this section shall be taken within two days after the expiration of the time for filing exceptions.

In the words of Petitioner’s brief, Under the rationale of In re: Kaela C., [ 394 Md. 432 , 906 A.2d 915 (2006)] and In re: Kevin E., [ 402 Md. 624 , 938 A.2d 826 (2008)], the April 21 order, although entered in error, became the final order of the juvenile court, thereby nullifying Mr. J’s exceptions. Mr. J. neither moved to vacate the April 21 order nor noted his appeal within thirty days of that order, but instead filed exceptions to the master’s recommendation of April 20, 2007. After the juvenile court overruled his exceptions, he filed his notice of appeal on September 20, 2007. This was within thirty days of the order that overruled his exceptions, but five months 160 after the court had signed an order adopting the master’s recommendations.

Under the rationale of Kevin E. and Kaela C., Mr. J.’s exceptions were a nullity and the April 21, 2007 order was the dispositive CINA order. (Footnote omitted). We are persuaded, however, that the September 20, 2007 notice of appeal was timely. We hold that it is of no consequence whatsoever that Respondent’s April 25, 2007 filing was captioned “Notice of Exceptions” rather than “Motion to Vacate Order.” To hold that the Court of Special Appeals did not have jurisdiction to decide Respondent’s appeal would be inconsistent with the well established principle “that the substance rather than the form of the pleading is the controlling consideration.” Lapp v. Stanton, 116 Md. 197, 199 , 81 A. 675, 677 (1911).

In Murrell v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 376 Md. 170 , 829 A.2d 548 (2003), this Court held that an action initiated in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City by the filing of a “Petition for Judicial Review” should not have been dismissed by the Court of Special Appeals because “the substance of the circuit court action was a common law mandamus action[, and therefore] was appealable to the Court of Special Appeals under § 12-301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.” Id. at 196-97, 829 A.2d at 564 . The record shows that Respondent’s Notice of Exceptions was supplemented by a nine page Memorandum, the last sentence of which concluded with the argument that “the decision finding [Deontay] to be a CINA and committing him to the Department of Social Services should be reversed.” The record also shows that the Circuit Court treated the Notice of Exceptions as the functional equivalent of a motion to vacate. Under these circumstances, Respondent had the right to appellate review of the April 21, 2007 Order. II. & III.

Section 9-101 of the Family Law Article, in pertinent part, provides: 161 (a) Determination by comt. — In any custody or visitation proceeding, if the court has

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