In Re Gloria H.

MURPHY, Judge. In this appeal from the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, sitting as a Juvenile Court, we hold that the State’s evidence was sufficient as a matter of law to establish that Gloria H., Appellant, violated the compulsory public school attendance law set forth in § 7-301 of the Education Article. We also hold, however, that Appellant is entitled to a new trial on the issue of whether she was “involved” in a violation of that statute. Background § 3-8A-03 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, in pertinent part, provides: (c) Criminal cases under compulsan/ public school attendance laws.—The jurisdiction of the [Juvenile] court is concurrent with that of the District Court in any criminal ⁵⁶⁶ case arising under the compulsory public school attendance laws of this State.

At all times relevant to the case at bar, § 7-301 of the Education Article, 1 in pertinent part, provided: Compulsory attendance. (a) Who must attend.—(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, each child who resides in this State and is 5 years old or older and under 16 shall attend a public school regularly during the entire school year unless the child is otherwise receiving regular, thorough instruction during the school year in the studies usually taught in the public schools to children of the same age. ⁵⁶⁷ (c) Duty of parent or guardian.—Each person who has legal custody or care and control of a child who is 5 years old or older and under 16 shall see that the child attends school or receives instruction as required by this section. (e) Penalties—.... (2) Any person who has legal custody or care and control of a child who is 5 years old or older and under 16 who fails to see that the child attends school or receives instruction under this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and; (i) For a first conviction is subject to a fine not to exceed $50 per day of unlawful absence or imprisonment not to exceed 10 days, or both; and (ii) For a second or subsequent conviction is subject to a fine not to exceed $100 per day of unlawful absence or imprisonment not to exceed 30 days, or both.

(3) As to any sentence imposed under this section, the court may suspend the fine or the prison sentence and establish terms and conditions which would promote the child’s attendance. The suspension authority provided for in this subsection is in addition to and not in limitation of the suspension authority under § 6-221 of the Criminal Procedure Article. Appellant was charged in an Adult Truancy Petition (“Juvenile Petition-Adult”) that included the following assertions: 1. That the [Appellant] was born on 09-AUG-1966 and is an adult residing [in] Prince George’s County, MD 20743. 2.

That your Petitioner alleges that the [Appellant] did: c. on or about August 22, 2005 have control over [her daughter, Monica 2 ], a child who was five (5) years or older and under sixteen (16) years of age and who is ⁵⁶⁸ subject to the compulsory attendance laws of the State as defined in Section 7-301 of the Education Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland, and failed to see that the child attended school or received instruction; 3. That such conduct constitutes a violation of Section 7-301 thereby constituting a criminal misdemeanor!.] * * * WHEREFORE,' the State asks that the Court make appropriate findings and dispositions!.] During the adjudicatory hearing on this Petition, the State presented its case through the testimony of Jacqueline Nayes, a Pupil Personnel Worker employed by the Prince George’s County Public School System. According to Ms. Nayes, (1) Monica, a student at Suitland High School, had been absent on seventy four of the one hundred eighty days in the Prince George’s County Public School System’s 2005-2006 school year, 3 and (2) from October of 2005 to the end of the school year, she contacted Appellant about Monica’s attendance- record “at least five times.” The following transpired during Ms. Nayes’ direct examination: THE PROSECUTOR: Now, Ms. Nayes, when you would have a conversation with [Appellant], what if anything would she tell you about this child? What reasons did she give you for the child’s (unintelligible)?

MS. NAYES: She just said that Monica—at the inner-agency council she said she was trying to get Monica to school. And she was trying and the grandmother—Pve spoken to the grandmother. She has tried too.

THE PROSECUTOR: In what way have they tried or did she indicate! ] in what way she had tried? MS. NAYES: I think on some occasions, and I don’t think it was on a regular basis, but I think she does—she has brought her to school. Drive her to school. ⁵⁶⁹ The following transpired during Ms. Nayes’ cross-examination: [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: If you are physically in the building but don’t go to class[,] specifically home-room, you’re marked absent?

MS. NAYES: You are marked absent. However, if a teacher spots you then ... they’re supposed to alert the attendance office to let them know. [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: And once she enters the school building she’s—once she enters the school building she’s then in the care and custody of the Suitland High School? MS.

NAYES: Correct. Appellant and Monica both testified that, although Monica arrived at her school on a regular basis, Monica rarely attended the classes to which she was assigned. The following transpired during Appellant’s cross-examination: LTHE PROSECUTOR]: At some point you realized that your child was not going to school? [APPELLANT]: Yes. [THE PROSECUTOR]: And what if anything did you do when you found out she was not in school? [APPELLANT]: I would leave work and take her to school or get the cab to take her. [THE PROSECUTOR]: So the only thing you did was (unintelligible) send her to school (unintelligible)? [APPELLANT]: Correct. [THE PROSECUTOR]: But there were sometimes when you did not even see her get on the bus, right? [APPELLANT]: Right. [THE PROSECUTOR]: Now how much did you pay a cab to take her to school? [APPELLANT]: Ten dollars. ⁵⁷⁰ * * * [THE PROSECUTOR]: Of the 74 days is it your testimony then that she was in school but not in class for those 74 days? [APPELLANT]: Yes. [THE PROSECUTOR]: How do you know? [APPELLANT]: ‘Cause she wasn’t at home when I got there. [THE PROSECUTOR]: For those 74 days—for the 74 days? [APPELLANT]: Uh-huh. # * * [THE PROSECUTOR]: Okay. Did you ever ask Monica why she didn’t want to go to school? [APPELLANT]: No. [THE PROSECUTOR]: (Unintelligible)? [APPELLANT]: I mean, she tells me she goes to school, she just don’t go to class. [THE PROSECUTOR]: Okay.

Did you ever find out why you[r] child didn’t like to go to class? [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Objection, the issue is whether or not she went to school. [THE PROSECUTOR]: well it— THE COURT: Overruled. [THE PROSECUTOR]:—even in school or— THE COURT: All right. I said—I said overruled. [APPELLANT]: Can you repeat the question, please? THE COURT: Did you ever ask her why she didn’t want to go to class? [APPELLANT]: No. [THE PROSECUTOR]: You never did? THE COURT: The answer is no.

Next question. [THE PROSECUTOR]: Nothing further. The following transpired during Monica’s cross-examination: ⁵⁷¹ [THE PROSECUTOR]: Did there come a point in time when you got disciplined for not going to class? WITNESS: Yes. , [THE PROSECUTOR]: What kind of discipline was that? WITNESS: I couldn’t go outside or nothing. [THE PROSECUTOR]: You couldn’t go outside?

WITNESS: Yes. [THE PROSECUTOR]: Okay. And that was it? WITNESS: Yes. [THE PROSECUTOR]: Okay. And how long would you be—I guess you would call that—you were grounded, is that it?

WITNESS: Yes. [THE PROSECUTOR]: How long would you be grounded? WITNESS: I don’t know. [THE PROSECUTOR]: How long would your mom ground you? WITNESS: I don’t know. [THE PROSECUTOR]: You can’t remember? WITNESS: No. [THE PROSECUTOR]: Days, weeks, months?

(No verbal response.) [THE PROSECUTOR]: So you’d be grounded, but you still wouldn’t go to school? WITNESS: Yes. [THE PROSECUTOR]: And you’d be in the school building according to you, but you wouldn’t go to class? WITNESS: Yes. [THE PROSECUTOR]:—for 74 days? And where were you hanging out?

WITNESS: In the hallways. [THE PROSECUTOR]: Just hanging out in the hallways? (No verbal response.) ⁵⁷² [THE PROSECUTOR]: Who were you hanging out with? [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Objection, Your Honor. THE COURT: Overruled. WITNESS: Sometimes with my friends or by myself. [THE PROSECUTOR]: When you were hanging out by yourself—so the times you hung out by yourself, according to you, your friends would be in class, right?

WITNESS: I don’t know. [THE PROSECUTOR]: But they wouldn’t be with you, hanging out in the hallways, right? WITNESS: Yes. [THE PROSECUTOR]: You’d be hanging out by yourself? WITNESS: Yes. [THE PROSECUTOR]: So when you go to school and you hang out in the hallways, what time would you get home? WITNESS: My regular time. [THE PROSECUTOR]: What did you say?

WITNESS: My regular time. [THE PROSECUTOR]: Which was? Which is what? WITNESS: Three— [THE PROSECUTOR]: Three o’clock. Okay.

WITNESS: Yes. [THE PROSECUTOR]: When you get home, would your mom be home? WITNESS: Yes. THE COURT: I can’t hear you. What did you say?

WITNESS: Yes. [THE PROSECUTOR]: Okay. And what would you tell her? WITNESS: Nothing. [THE PROSECUTOR]: Nothing? What would she ask you? ⁵⁷³ WITNESS: Sometimes she’d ask me do I go to class, sometimes she don’t. [THE PROSECUTOR]: What would you tell her?

WITNESS: No or yes—I’d say yes, sometimes I said no. [THE PROSECUTOR]: Okay. Sometimes you tell her you didn’t go to class, right? WITNESS: Yeah. [THE PROSECUTOR]: Okay. And the only thing that she did was ground you?

WITNESS: Yes. The summation of Appellant’s counsel included the following arguments: [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: .... Your Honor, again the petition alleges that Ms. H., failed to see that her child attended school. Ms. H., testified that she got up early in the morning, because she had to be in school to work at 7:00.

She got her daughter up. Her daughter left the house with her. She paid for a cab for her daughter to go to school after they determined it wasn’t safe after a robbery at the school bus stop with her tote. She drove her to school sometimes herself.

Her daughter said—Monica also testified that some days she also got a ride from her aunt. Ms. H., never let her daughter just stay home from school. When Ms., H., received phone calls from the school that her daughter wasn’t in class, she did leave work to go check—a—at home to make sure she was not there and then reported to the school. Your Honor, once she gets her daughter to school, which is her responsibility, she’s not'—• she’s in the care and custody of the school.

She has to go to work. She’s not going to sit in school all day and follow her around. The statute says that she has to see that her daughter attends school and she did that. She did not fail to see that her child attended school.

She got her there. Her daughter just decided that she wasn’t going to go to class and she got up there and she testified to that. I don’t ⁵⁷⁴ think that should be attributed to Ms. H., Your Honor and I would ask that she be found not involved. The prosecutor responded with the following arguments: [THE PROSECUTOR]:' Your Honor, the—again this case boils down to credibility, and this is just very sad, and very pathetic.

One of the reasons being the apathy, with which the [Appellant] testified. Counsel—the apathy that was evident on the part of the child, Monica S. According to this [Appellant] she did everything she could, yet she admitted that she never once asked her daughter why don’t you want to go to school. The statute clearly states that she has a responsibility to ensure that that child attends school or obtains some sort of instruction. She testified that she would get a cab, but she didn’t always see the child get into the cab.

There were times she would go up to the school, and the child would be there, but would not be in class, but that was not all the time. I—I—Your Honor, of those 74 days, it boils down to credibility. There’s no way that she could say for sure that for those 74 days that child was in the school building or had even made it to school if she didn’t see her get into the cab. I think that [Appellant] clearly, yes, she may have made an attempt by calling a cab and paying $10.00 per day, but she did not do everything she could to ensure that her child received the education that she needed to receive.

All she did was to ground her. We don’t know whether it was for hours, days, weeks or months. But all that child got was or all that happened was that she was told she couldn’t go outside when she was missing so many days of school. And her mother knew from Ms. Nayes that there was a problem.

I think she could have done more and I ask that you find her involved. At that point, the Circuit Court announced the following findings and conclusions: THE COURT: I guess your case is a lot—it is a lot different—a lot like a lot of other cases coming here in these kinds of cases especially the testimony that’s been presented here. And that is, whether or not I believe the testimo ⁵⁷⁵ ny that’s been presented to me. The [Sjtate’s witnesses testified basically regarding the records that are contained and the number of days that you’ve missed.

And your lawyer is right to an extent. Seventy-four days have been missed in the 2005-2006 school year. Quite frankly only to 76—seven of those may be directly attributable to—attributable to you not sending the child to school and the child not attending school properly or being unexcused absences have—in fact those seven may have been excused because the child was suspended. But what is probably shocking and telling in this case, one of the last questions the [Sjtate’s attorney asked you.

Did you ever talk to your child about why she wasn’t going to school? To me that’s a bit incomprehensible that the answer would be no. When the child was withdrawn in February because the child had missed 44 days by February 24, 2006 and you never talked to her. She goes to live with the father purportedly to try to get her on the right t[rjack to go to school.

She comes back or re-enrolled somewhere around February—strike that, March 17, then she misses another 26 to the end of the school year in June. You never talked to her to find out— ask her why and she’s not going. And she was suspended, as you say, for cutting classes. You never—after she’s suspended you don’t ask, baby why you being suspended, and you know you’re suspended for cutting classes, what is your reason for cutting classes?

I would have to say something is wrong. Either you talked to her or you knew that she wasn’t going and you weren’t encouraging her to going—to go to school and—or that she missed the six or seven days from school and you knew she missed the six or seven days from school and you didn’t encourage her to go to school. So it is one of two. Did you talk to her and if you talked to her and you just encouraged her, or you just didn’t give a durn that she wasn’t going to school?

And it appears as though you just didn’t give a durn. That’s what it appears as though. That’s the—and the hard cold reality of it all right now, I don’t think it has registered on you or your daughter until today ... T’m concluding that she ⁵⁷⁶ wasn’t going to school because it is just hard for me to imagine someone is paying $10.00 a day basically every day to catch a taxi to school and you’re going to ask—you see the report card, you know she’s been suspended.

You know by February she’s already missed 44 days and you’re not going to ask. When you put all those pieces together, I’m going to—I can’t help but conclude that the child was not attending school and the mother knew that she was not attending school and she was not encouraging her to attend school. And the court will find that the [Sjtate has proven its case. The court will, in fact, find the [Appellant] involved of the one count of this petition.

The Circuit Court placed Appellant on unsupervised probation, Appellant noted an appeal of that disposition to the Court of Special Appeals, and filed a brief in which she presented a single argument: THE EVIDENCE WAS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDING THAT THE APPELLANT VIOLATED MD. CODE, EDUCATION, § 7-301(E)(2). Before this argument was presented to a panel of the Court of Special Appeals, 4 this Court issued a writ of certiorari on its own initiative. 404 Md. 658 , 948 A.2d 70 (2008). Discussion I. Appellant argues (in the words of her brief): Notwithstanding the appellant’s efforts, the trial court found that there was sufficient evidence to sustain a finding that the appellant “failed to see that her child attended school.” Such a finding is simply not supported by evi ⁵⁷⁷ dence.

The appellant did everything she could to see that Monica attended school. As such, reversal is required. This argument incorrectly assumes that the Circuit Court was required to accept the testimony presented by Appellant and Monica. The Circuit Court was entitled to (1) accept—or reject—all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness, including testimony that was not contradicted by any other witness, and (2) draw reasonable inferences from the facts that it found to be true. “There is nothing mysterious about the use of inferences in the fact-finding process.

Jurors routinely apply their common sense, powers of logic, and accumulated experiences in life to arrive at conclusions from demonstrated sets of facts.” Robinson v. State, 315 Md. 309, 318 , 554 A.2d 395, 399 (1989). In bench trials, judges do the very same thing. In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Clements, 319 Md. 289 , 572 A.2d 174 (1990), while ordering that a Petition for Disciplinary Action be dismissed, this Court stated: [The Hearing Court] plainly rejected Clements’s testimony[.] Thus, we eliminate from our analysis that aspect of Clements’s defense.... The issue is whether Bar Counsel presented sufficient evidence of the charge to meet the clear and convincing standard of proof.

Id. at 298 , 572 A.2d at 179 . Because the Circuit Court was entitled to reject all of Appellant’s evidence, to determine whether the State presented sufficient evidence to meet the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof, we are required to “eliminate” Appellant’s evidence from our analysis. Having done so, we must determine whether evidence that a high school student was not in