In Re Jason Allen D.

HOLLANDER, Judge. In this case, we must determine whether the Circuit Court for Frederick County, sitting as a juvenile court, properly found that Jason Allen D., appellant, committed the offense of trespass, in violation of Md.Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 577, and the common law crime of resisting arrest. The charges stemmed from Jason’s arrest on September 22, 1997, while he was on the grounds of the Sagner Housing Complex, owned by the Housing Authority of the City of Frederick (the “Housing Authority”). At the time of the incident, Jason was sixteen years old.

After the court found Jason delinquent, he was placed on supervised probation. Thereafter, Jason noted his appeal, and presents three issues for our consideration, which we have rephrased: I. Was the evidence sufficient to sustain the trespass conviction? ⁴⁶⁰ II. Is the trespass statute constitutional?

III

Was the evidence sufficient to sustain the conviction for resisting arrest? For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the finding that appellant committed a trespass. Further, we shall vacate the finding of delinquency as to the offense of resisting arrest, and remand to the circuit court for a determination of whether appellant used excessive force. Factual Background In an amended juvenile petition, the State alleged that, at approximately 9:10 p.m. on the evening of September 22,1997, Jason “did enter upon the private land of the Frederick City Housing Authority known as the Sagner Housing Complex after having been duly notified not to do so on March 22, 1997____” 1 The petition also alleged that Jason unlawfully resisted the September 22, 1997 arrest.

The matter proceeded to an adjudicatory hearing, at which several witnesses testified. Theresa Ham, the Executive Director of the Housing Authority, testified that the Sagner complex is owned and operated by the Housing Authority as part of Frederick’s public housing program. She explained that portions of the complex are designated as no-trespassing areas. In particular, Ham stated that a no-trespassing sign had been posted in front of 153 Pennsylvania Avenue, one of the buildings in the complex.

Pursuant to a resolution passed by the Housing Authority Board of Commissioners in July 1994, members of the Frederick Police Department were authorized to enforce the no-trespassing laws on behalf of the Housing Authority. Frederick City Police Officer John Fry testified that, at approximately 6:53 p.m. on the evening of November 28, 1996, ⁴⁶¹ he “approached an individual [later identified as Jason] who was standing by 158 [Pennsylvania Avenue] along the sidewalk.” Officer Fry “asked [Jason] if he resided on the property.... ” When Jason said he did not, the officer called his dispatcher in order to determine if appellant’s name had been added to the Housing Authority’s “trespass log.” The dispatcher informed Officer Fry that appellant’s name was not listed on the log. Thereafter, Officer Fry issued a written notice to appellant stating that he “was not permitted on the property.” 2 Officer Fry further stated that Jason signed the notice and acknowledged that he understood that he was not to return to the property. On cross-examination, Officer Fry testified that when he issued the notice, Jason was just “standing there.” No complaint of criminal activity had been lodged by any resident of the complex or by anyone else.

Although Officer Fry did not know where appellant was coming from or where he was going, he issued the notice “simply because he was not a resident of Sagner.” On re-direct, Officer Fry acknowledged that no-trespass notices are “issued to all individuals who are on the property of the Frederick Housing Authority who do not live there.” Officer Phillip Custead, also of the Frederick Police Department, testified that, on the evening of September 22, 1997, he arrested appellant twice for trespassing at Sagner. The second arrest is at issue here. Turning to the first arrest, it occurred at 7:38 p.m., after Officer Custead was “dispatched to [the complex] for a trespass.” The officer conceded that the first arrest did not occur on Sagner property, nor did he witness appellant commit any offense on the Sagner grounds. Nevertheless, Officer Cu-stead arrested appellant “because he was instructed to do so by [his] Sergeant.” After the officer transported Jason to the ⁴⁶² police station, he was processed, released to his parents, and instructed not to return to Sagner.

Despite the officer’s instruction to Jason, Officer Custead testified that, at 9:10 p.m., he was again dispatched to Sagner because he “was advised by dispatch that Jason [D.] had returned to the property and was harassing the security guards there.” Appellant’s counsel immediately objected to the officer’s testimony. The court overruled the objection after the State said: “Your Honor, that’s not for the truth of the matter asserted, only for the knowledge of the hearer in this case, it’s why Officer Custead returned to the scene.” Officer Custead then described his second encounter with Jason: THE PROSECUTOR: Officer Custead, upon returning back to the Sagner property did you happen to make contact with the respondent, [Jason]? OFFICER CUSTEAD: Yes I did, I pulled into Sagner Drive and was met by a Watkins Security officer who then advised me of the situation again. And the two of us walked between the buildings over to Pennsylvania Avenue side of the complex.

THE PROSECUTOR: Could you please describe the area where the respondent was standing? OFFICER CUSTEAD: The respondent was standing on the curb which was the property of the Housing Authority of the City of Frederick. Officer Custead later testified that he observed appellant standing in close proximity to several other people. The officer did not know the identity of the people standing with Jason.

Nor did he attempt to ascertain their relationship either to Jason or to the Sagner housing project. When backup officer David Armstrong arrived on the scene, Jason was advised that he was under arrest. ⁴⁶³ Appellant’s counsel questioned Officer Custead about the circumstances of the second arrest. The following colloquy is relevant: APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: When you went back [at the time of the second arrest] you went back for the specific purpose of arresting him ... isn’t that correct? OFFICER CUSTEAD: I would have used my discretion when I got there, it was not a specific purpose to arrest him at that time, no.

APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: When you went back the second time you didn’t go there to arrest him? OFFICER CUSTEAD: If he had been on the property, yes. APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: Okay. And once you saw him on the property it was clear you were going to arrest him at that point, right?

OFFICER CUSTEAD: That’s correct. APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: And were there other people standing in that area, Officer? OFFICER CUSTEAD: Yes. APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: Can you tell the Court how many folks were in that area?

OFFICER CUSTEAD: Probably five or six other people. APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: Um-hmm. And was he standing in proximity to those persons? OFFICER CUSTEAD: Yes he was.

APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: And do you know what the relationship of [Jason] was to those persons that he was standing with? OFFICER CUSTEAD: No I do not. * * * APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: ... And so when you made the arrest why did you arrest him? OFFICER CUSTEAD: He was trespassing on the Housing Authority’s property after being duly notified not to do so. ⁴⁶⁴ APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: Do you know whether or not he was there at the invitation of any of the tenants?

OFFICER CUSTEAD: No. APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: Did you make an inquiry, sir? OFFICER CUSTEAD: No. Later, on re-cross, the court did not allow appellant’s counsel to ask Officer Custead whether, at the relevant time, Jason was doing anything illegal, “other than standing right there on [the] curb.” According to Officer Custead, when appellant was advised of his arrest, he “became argumentative and said you’re not going to fucking arrest me, you [are] not going to fucking arrest me.” When the officers asked appellant to put his hands behind his back, appellant refused. As Officers Cu-stead and Armstrong attempted to handcuff Jason, appellant “pulled his arms into his stomach very tightly.” Officer Custead testified that he and Armstrong then “took him to the ground.” According to Officer Custead, appellant “continued to resist and pull away” and it took approximately one-and-one-half minutes to subdue him. Officer Custead testified that, after the arrest was accomplished, Jason “had a trickle of blood coming from his nose.” In the defense case, Ham was again called as a witness.

During her testimony, Ham described the provisions of the Housing Authority’s standard lease agreement, although no lease agreement was introduced into evidence. The following colloquy ensued: APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: Now do the tenants, do you have a lease, a standard lease agreement with the tenants of the, respective of Housing Authority communities? HAM: Yes. APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: And is it correct to say that within the lease there’s a provision which indicates that the tenants do have a right to have visitors?

HAM: Yes. ⁴⁶⁵ APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: And if someone is visiting a person on that property, that’s a right pursuant to the contract between you, the Housing Authority, and the tenant? HAM: Yes. Ham further explained that the Housing Authority lease provides that “guests or visitors may be accommodated for a period up to two weeks.” When defense counsel questioned Ham about the status of minors living in the complex, she did not assert that resident minors had no right to invite guests to Sagner. The following colloquy is pertinent: APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: Now, with regard to the lease ... when you rent a unit does the lease provide, or does the lease provide for every member of the household?

HAM: Every authorized member of the household is listed on the lease. APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: Is on the lease. So those persons would have the same rights as the person who was actually paying the rent? HAM: It’s the adult member who’s actually the party to the lease.

APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: Um-hmm. Okay, but the other individual, if they have children they’re included on the lease as well? HAM: They’re listed as household members. APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: And they too have a right to have guests?

HAM: I don’t know if I can make that det, [sic] interpretation. The lease is between the listed tenant and the Housing Authority. On cross-examination, Ham testified that, pursuant to Housing Authority policy, a non-resident who had received a no-trespass notice would not be allowed to return to Sagner, regardless of the lease provision regarding guests. In that event, a no-trespassing notice “supersedes” the lease provision.

No written policy was introduced into evidence, howev ⁴⁶⁶ er. Nor did Ham explain whether or how the Housing Authority informed its tenants of the policy, or how the Housing Authority made known to its tenants that a particular person was banned from the property due to receipt of a no-trespassing notice. Brandon Morris, appellant’s cousin, also testified on behalf of Jason. He stated that, on September 22, 1997, he lived at the Sagner complex with his mother and brothers.

Moreover, Sagner had been his home for fourteen years. Nevertheless, the evidence did not reflect that Morris knew of the Housing Authority policy that automatically barred re-entry onto Sagner by any person who had received a no-trespassing notice. Morris further testified that Jason is both his cousin and his friend, and Jason was at Sagner as Morris’s guest when Jason was arrested. According to Morris, he and Jason, along with two other friends, were talking with one another when the police arrived.

The following colloquy is pertinent: APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: Now who else was standing on that comer if you recall? MORRIS: You mean with us [referring to Morris and appellant]? APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: Yeah, on that, on September 22 nd when Officer Armstrong and Officer Custead came? MORRIS: Me, Jason, Trevin and Shane.

APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: Okay, are all of you friends? MORRIS: Um-hmm. APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: And do you typically hang out there? MORRIS: Yes.

APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: And was he [Jason] a guest of yours on that day? MORRIS: Um-hmm. Morris’s description of Jason’s arrest differed significantly from the version recounted by Officer Custead. Morris stated: ⁴⁶⁷ The cops walked up and was talking to one another, a security guard, then they walked over to him and started talking to him, then Officer Armstrong I think walked up to him and tried to grab his arms and say you’re under arrest, but I don’t think Jason saw him.

Jason went like that, get off me. Then the guy came up behind him and kneed him in the stomach and started choking him. Then Jason spit out blood and passed out and then they dragged him to the other side of the cop car. That’s all I saw.

Jason testified in his own behalf. He explained that he had resided at Sagner with his mother for approximately ten years, and had moved from the complex in 1996. Jason recounted that, on November 28, 1996, he was returning from a visit to his cousin’s house 3 at 22 Sagner Court, when Officer Fry stopped him and gave him a no-trespass notice. Jason said: I came out my cousin’s house and I was on my way home, I walked up the steps and I saw a police car going up the hill, I saw the reverse lights come on and backed down the hill.

And he stopped me, asked where I lived at, I said 203 Hope Circle, and he said I was trespassing and wrote me a citation. And I wouldn’t sign it, and my cousin came out, and his mom. And she told me to sign it, so I just signed it. And I left.

Jason admitted that he had been served with another no-trespass notice almost a year later, during the early evening of September 22, 1997. But, the evidence did not reveal that Jason was aware of any Sagner lease provision or Housing Authority policy barring a non-tenant from ever entering the Sagner property because of such a notice. On cross-examination, Jason explained what he thought the no-trespass notice meant: THE PROSECUTOR: Now Mr. [D.], you’d been served with a no trespass notice in 1996, you knew what that meant, right? ⁴⁶⁸ APPELLANT: Yep. THE PROSECUTOR: You knew that meant not to come back on the property?

APPELLANT: No, they said I could come over as long as I’m visiting somebody. THE PROSECUTOR: And then you were told by Officer Custead that evening not to return to the property, you just heard your cousin say that, that you told him— APPELLANT: No, he was down, my cousin wasn’t at the police station with me. He told me and my father I could come back as long as I’m with somebody that lives over there. THE PROSECUTOR: You heard Officer Custead testify today he told you that’s not correct— APPELLANT: But that ain’t what he said.

THE PROSECUTOR: —he told you, excuse me? APPELLANT: But he did not say that. THE PROSECUTOR: Okay. So you’re telling me that what you heard Officer Custead say on the stand that you were not back, permitted back on Sagner property is not correct?

APPELLANT: Yep. THE PROSECUTOR: You’re telling me that what Officer Fry said that you were not permitted back on the property at Sagner, is not correct? APPELLANT: He said long, Officer Custead and Officer Fry said I could come back as long as I was with somebody that lives over there. * * * When he released me to my dad my dad asked him well am I allowed over there and he said as long as Fm with somebody that lives over there. (Emphasis added).

Additionally, appellant complained that when he was arrested on September 22, 1997, Officer Armstrong “grabbed his arms before he even said anything to [him].” Appellant ⁴⁶⁹ asserted: “I told him to get off me, 1 didn’t know who it was, I ain’t going to let nobody grab me.” At the conclusion of trial, appellant renewed his motion for acquittal, arguing, in part, that Jason had a right, under the Housing Authority lease, to be on the property as a guest of a tenant. In response, the State amplified its contention that the trespassing statute supersedes a tenant’s right under the lease to invite guests onto the property. The following colloquy ensued: THE PROSECUTOR: The law ... gives the Housing Authority special rights. The Housing Authority has been given the right through [Art. 27, § ] 577 to regulate what goes on.

And [Appellant’s counsel] may be right and in the future the law may be that all residents on Frederick Housing Authority property have the right to invite and keep on and to have on their property at all times, regardless of what the Frederick Housing Authority wants. I would submit to you that on the facts in this case that based upon the struggle for one and a half minutes and the fact that we have no testimony to rebut the same, that he was on Frederick Housing Authority property. And as the law remains right now, and as it was on that date, he had the right to be told to get off, although tenants may have the right, they are superseded by the Housing Authority’s right to also ban people from that property. And in this case on that occasion that’s what happened.

THE COURT: Well let me probe that a little bit— I’m making this out of a whole thought, because none of this is before me, but I, it will help me to make a decision. This ⁴⁷⁰ young man has an aunt who lives in the premises, and the same facts, he’s got this notice, and I’ll say for the purposes of my hypothetical he has no connection with that at all, and he has a notice, but his aunt says come on over and I’m going to give you some milk and cookies, and he’s walked to her house, and that’s undisputed hypothetical, he’s walking to her house and he’s not at her door, he’s on the sidewalk in the complex, but before getting to her door. Now can he be arrested for trespass— THE PROSECUTOR: I’m sorry, Your Honor. As the law is written he can.

There, they, he was told on two separate occasions, do not come back to the property for any reason. THE COURT: So clearly then your argument is that this notice supersedes any invitation or, he might receive? THE PROSECUTOR: Yes, yes. Further, the court said: This case bothers me for a number of reasons____ I know this has further ramifications than my ruling. * * * I’m troubled by this because while [appellant’s counsel] legitimately argues that one should look out for the rights of individuals as should be the case, nobody is looking out for the rights in this case, or at least I’m not hearing any arguments and I’m not criticizing, but the people who live in this, these projects can’t plead their case.

If it’s a police state to arrest people who are on the premises who don’t live there, what kind of a state is it, I guess it’s an anarchist state when there can be no control of the premises. And that’s the policy issue behind, that I was nattering on about the last time, behind this statute. And there are legitimate issues on both sides. And so the police get stuck out there, ⁴⁷¹ try to do their jobs.

They don’t have a clue, because each time around they get ding-donged by whoever may be listed in the case, or these various interests. I am glad that there is a proceeding in effect that may clarify some of these things for all of us. Here’s how I’m going to handle this, and I do so reluctantly, I’m satisfied that there was authority in the police, I’ve said that, and I’m satisfied that notice was properly given. I’m also satisfied that Jason was in Sagner when the arrest occurred, and that he was hanging out with friends.

And as far as the wantonness, there’s no doubt in my mind that he was back there to, if there was ever a wanton trespass this is it. But what I’m not ready to rule on, and why I’m going to circle the wagons and take a pass for the moment, is that I am going to do some further review on this matter.... I’m not satisfied that I’ve done enough research or have enough background to be able to say that this article of § 2-577 supersedes the fundamental right of association.... I’m not even sure frankly how the right of association plays in this.

So while it’s unusual, and I truly reluctantly do it, I’m going to take this under advisement before I make a ruling. In its Opinion and Order of June 19, 1998, the court concluded: [T]he evidence shows that the respondent had proper notice that he was not to trespass in Sagner Complex, that he was in the Sagner Complex at the time of his arrest, and that he was in fact hanging out with his friends who live in the Sagner Complex. Moreover, the court rejected appellant’s constitutional claims, stating: The Supreme Court has recognized the constitutional protection of freedom of association as to privacy interests and as to the expression of free speech or religious principals [sic]. However, the court is persuaded that any infringement of any minimal right of association of the respondent ⁴⁷² in this case is not sufficient to invalidate the charge of trespass.

We will include additional facts in our discussion. Discussion I. Sufficiency of the Evidence — Trespass Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he committed the crime of trespass. He offers four reasons to support his position. First, appellant asserts that the State failed to prove that he was on property belonging to the Housing Authority at the time of the arrest.

Second, appellant maintains that he had a bona fide claim of right to be on the property, because he was a “guest” or an “invitee” of his cousin, who resided at Sagner, and Officer Custead told him at the time of his first arrest on September 22, 1997, that he could return to the property so long as he was with a Sagner resident. Third, appellant posits that the State failed to prove that his presence at Sagner was “wanton”, because his activity on the premises was not “ ‘characterized by extreme recklessness and utter disregard for the rights of others.’ ” Griffin v. State, 225 Md. 422 , 171 A.2d 717 (1961), rev’d on other grounds, 878 U.S. 130 , 84 S.Ct. 1770 , 12 L.Ed.2d 754 (1964)(quoting Dennis v. Baltimore Transit Co., 189 Md. 610, 616 , 56 A.2d 813 (1948)). Finally, citing United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 , 103 S.Ct. 1702 , 75 L.Ed.2d 736 (1983), appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient “under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution,” because the sidewalk in front of 153 Pennsylvania Avenue is a “public forum,” comparable to the sidewalk in front of the Supreme Court. In reviewing a sufficiency claim, we must determine “ “whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” State v. Stanley, 351 Md. 733, 749-50 , 720 A.2d 323 (1998)(quoting Bloodsworth v. State, 307 Md. 164, 167 , 512 A.2d 1056 (1986), in turn citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. ⁴⁷³ 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)); State v. Albrecht, 336 Md. 475, 479 , 649 A.2d 336 (1994); Harcum v. State, 121 Md.App. 507, 510 , 710 A.2d 358 (1998); Hagez v. State, 110 Md.App. 194, 203 , 676 A.2d 992 (1996); Snyder v. State, 104 Md.App. 533, 548-49 , 657 A.2d 342 , cert. denied, 340 Md. 216 , 665 A.2d 1058 (1995).

Weighing the credibility of the witnesses and resolving conflicts in the evidence are tasks left to the fact finder. Stanley, 351 Md. at 750 , 720 A.2d 323 ; Binnie v. State, 321 Md. 572, 580 , 583 A.2d 1037 (1991). Accordingly, our endeavor is not to determine if the verdict was in accord with the weight of the evidence, Stanley, 351 Md. at 750 , 720 A.2d 323 , but rather whether “the evidence, circumstantial or otherwise, and the inferences that can reasonably be drawn from the evidence, would be sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the guilt of the accused.” Hagez, 110 Md.App. at 204 , 676 A.2d 992 ; see Braxton v. State, 123 Md.App. 599, 657 , 720 A.2d 27 (1998). The State initially argues that Jason’s defense of a bona fide claim of right is not preserved because it was not asserted below.

That argument is unavailing. Although the thrust of appellant’s arguments below related to his constitutional right of association, we are satisfied that appellant adequately raised the issue of his bona fide status as a guest of a resident. In his motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the State’s case, Jason’s attorney argued that the State had failed to show “that he was not legitimately on the premises.” At the close of the evidence, appellant’s attorney renewed the motion for judgment of acquittal, stating: We have undisputed testimony that [Jason] was there as a visitor. They have a contract which says that the tenants have a right to have visitors of guests up to a two week period of time.

Testimony says that’s who he was with, he was with his friends, that he was invited there, and to do the things that people do, associating with people there. This is a right that he has. The right that the tenant has and a right that he has a guest to be there on those premises. ⁴⁷⁴ At the outset, we summarily reject appellant’s first contention because, in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence established that the second arrest occurred when appellant was on the Sagner property. We turn to consider the substantive issues presented here with regard to the statutory offense of trespass, codified at Art. 27, § 577.

At the time of the adjudicatory hearing on May 28,1998, the statute provided, in pertinent part: 4 (a) In general. — (1) Any person who remains upon, enters upon or crosses the land, premises or private property ... of any person or persons in this State after having been duly notified by the owner or his agent not to do so is considered guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction is subject to a fine not exceeding $500, or imprisonment not exceeding 3 months, or both. (2) The provisions of paragraph (1) of this subsection shall apply to property used as a housing project and operated by a housing authority or by another State public body, as those terms are defined under Article 44A of the Code, if a duly authorized agent of the housing authority or other State public body gives the required notification specified in paragraph (1) of this subsection. (3) This section may not be construed to include within its provisions the entry upon or crossing over any land where such entry or crossing is done under a bona fide claim of right or ownership of said land, it being the intention of this section only to prohibit any wanton trespass upon the private land of others. (Emphasis added).

Appellant’s second and third arguments, largely rooted in Art. 27, § 577(a)(3), are essentially two sides of the same coin. ⁴⁷⁵ Section 577(a)(8) excludes from the statute’s purview those situations when a person enters on property of another “under a bona fide claim of right ....”, and makes clear that conduct amounts to trespass only if it is “wanton.” Thus, the concept of “wanton” appears inextricably linked to the question of whether the accused trespasser had a “bona fide claim of right” with respect to the property at issue. Stated otherwise, it would seem that a trespass cannot be “wanton” if the alleged trespasser had a “bona fide claim of right” to enter onto the property. Construction of the statutory terms “bona fide” and “wanton” is our starting point. “ ‘The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.’ ” Board of License Commissioners for Charles County v. Toye, 354 Md. 116, 122 , 729 A.2d 407, 410 (1999) (quoting Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35 , 660 A.2d 423 (1995)); see also Roberts v. Total Health Care, Inc., 349 Md.499, 523, 709 A.2d 142 (1998); McGraw v. Loyola Ford, Inc., 124 Md.App. 560, 592 , 723 A.2d 502 , cert. denied, 353 Md. 473 , 727 A.2d 382 (1999). The statutory language is the primary source for ascertaining the Legislature’s intent.

Catonsville Nursing Home, Inc. v. Loveman, 349 Md. 560, 570, 709 A.2d 749 (1998); Allied Vending, Inc. v. City of Bowie, 332 Md. 279, 306 , 631 A.2d 77 (1993). “[W]here the statutory language is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a definite and simple meaning, courts normally do not look beyond the words of the statute itself to determine legislative intent.” Toye , at 122, 729 A.2d at 410 . In order to ascertain the Legislature’s intent, “the Court considers the language of an enactment and gives that language its natural and ordinary meaning.” Montgomery County v. Buckman, 333 Md. 516, 523 , 636 A.2d 448 (1994); see Lewis v. State, 348 Md. 648, 653 , 705 A.2d 1128 (1998); Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. v. Dir. of Fin., 343 Md. 567, 578 , 683 A.2d 512 (1996); McGraw, 124 Md.App. at 592 , 723 A.2d 502 ; Carroll County Ethics Comm’n v. Lennon, 119 Md.App. 49, 67 , 703 A.2d 1338 (1998). Moreover, we endeavor ⁴⁷⁶ to “avoid constructions that are illogical, unreasonable, or inconsistent with common sense.” Degren v. State, 352 Md. 400, 417 , 722 A.2d 887 (1998); Lewis v. State, 348 Md. 648, 654 , 705 A.2d 1128 (1998); Frost v. State, 336 Md. 125, 137 , 647 A.2d 106 (1994).

Black’s Law Dictionary defines the term “bona fide’.’ as “[i]n or with good faith; honestly, openly, and sincerely; without deceit or fraud.” Black’s Law Dictionary 177 (6th ed.1990); see Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 91 , 660 A.2d 447 (1995)(referring to Black’s Law Dictionary in interpreting the phrase “bona fide organization”). In Griffin, 225 Md. at 429 , 171 A.2d 717 , the Court defined the term “wanton” in Art. 27, § 577: Although there are almost as many legal definitions of the word “wanton” as there are appellate courts, we think the Maryland definition, which is in line with the general definition of the word in other jurisdictions, is as good as any. In Dennis v. Baltimore Transit Co., 1948, 189 Md. 610 , 56 A.2d 813, 817 , as well as in Baltimore Transit Co. v. Faulkner, 1941, 179 Md. 598 , 20 A.2d 485 , it was said that the word “wanton” means “characterized by extreme recklessness and utter disregard for the rights of others.” The unambiguous statutory language is consistent with the history of the statute. At common law, “[tjrespass to private property is not a crime ... unless it is accompanied by, or tends to create, a breach of the peace.” Griffin v. State, 225 Md. at 428 , 171 A.2d 717 ; see In Re Appeal No. 631, 282 Md. 223, 226 , 383 A.2d 684 (1977)(collecting cases).

Thus, “criminal trespass is for the most part a statutory creation.” In Re Appeal No. 631, 282 Md. at 226 , 383 A.2d 684 . When Blackstone catalogued criminal “Offences Against Private Property” in his Commentaries on the Laws of England, he did not include the crime of trespass; he limited his discussion to the crimes of larceny, malicious mischief, and forgery. See 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 229-247 (1768). ⁴⁷⁷ What is now Art. 27, § 577 was originally enacted by the General Assembly in 1900, and codified at Art. 27, § 21A of the 1888 Code. See 1900 Md. Laws, Chap. 66.

Of particular importance here, the original manifestation of Maryland’s trespassing statute contained language virtually identical to that now found in Art. 27, § 577(a)(3). The 1900 Act read as follows: Any person or persons who shall enter upon or cross over the land, premises or private property of any person or persons in this State after having been duly notified by the owner or his agent not to do so, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof before some justice of the peace in the county or city where such trespass may have been committed, be fined by said justice of the peace not less than one nor more than one hundred dollars, and shall stand committed to the jail of said county or city until such fine and costs are paid; provided, however, that the person or persons so convicted shall have the right to appeal from the judgment of said justice of the peace to the Circuit Court of the county or city where such trespass was committed, at any time within ten days after such judgment is rendered; and provided, further, that nothing in this Act shall be construed to include unthin its provision the entry upon or crossing over any land where such entry or crossing is done under a bona fide claim of right or ownership of said land, it being the intention of this Act only to prohibit wilful and wanton trespass upon the private land of others. 1990 Md. Laws, Chap. 66 (emphasis added). The statute’s requirement that the putative trespasser’s conduct be “wanton” stands in marked contrast to the tort of trespass. In Baltimore Gas and Elec.

Co. v. Flippo, 348 Md. 680, 690-91, 705 A.2d 1144 (1998), the Court of Appeals said: It is a well-settled rule in this State that an action for trespass to real property may be maintained “whether the defendant committed the trespass unwittingly ... or willfully and wantonly.” Atlantic [& George’s Creek Consol.] Coal Co. [v. Maryland Coal Co.], 62 Md. [135] at 143 [(1884)] (noting that a trespass is committed even when a trespasser makes a mistake regarding the title or boundaries of his ⁴⁷⁸ land and mines coal on an adjoining neighbor’s property thinking he is on his own property); see also Gore [v. Jarrett], 192 Md. [513] at 516, 64 A.2d [550] at 551 [(1949)] (noting that a trespass may be committed unwittingly by a person who believes he or she has title to land); Barton Coal Co. [v. Cox], 39 Md. [1] at 29-30 [(1873)] (noting that every trespass is an injury whether willful or not even if the defendant honestly believed it was mining its own coal and inadvertently committed a trespass); Scott [v. Bay], 3 Md. [431] at 443 [(1853)] (noting that trespass was the proper remedy where the defendant had blasted rocks on his property causing rocks to be thrown onto the premises of the plaintiff and that it was immaterial whether the defendant committed the act willfully or not). Thus, in a civil context, “[e]very un-authorized entry upon the property of another is a trespass which entitles the owner to a verdict for some damages.” Patapsco Loan Co. v. Hobbs, 129 Md. 9, 15 , 98 A. 239 (1916)(quoting Gusdorff v. Duncan, 94 Md. 160, 169 , 50 A. 574 (1901)). Prosser and Keeton explain further: The intent required as a basis for liability as a trespasser is simply an intent to be at the place on the land where the trespass allegedly occurred. The distinction to be made is between accidental and intentional entries. * * * The defendant is liable for an intentional entry although he has acted in good faith, under the mistaken belief, however reasonable, that he is committing no wrong.

Thus, he is a trespasser although he believes that the land is his own, or that he has the consent of the owner, or the legal privilege of entry; or although the defendant is a child too young to understand that what he is doing is wrong. The interest of the landowner is protected at the expense of those who make innocent mistakes. W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, § 13 at 73, 74-75 (5th ed.1984). ⁴⁷⁹ Surely, more is required in the criminal arena. The General Assembly’s original use of the term “wilful and wanton” indicates to us that the offense of misdemeanor trespass was meant to be a general intent crime that is not coextensive with conduct actionable in tort.

The language of Art. 27, § 577(a)(3), crafted nearly a century ago, foreshadowed a statement from the Model Penal Code regarding the mental intent element of criminal trespass, quoted with approval in Warfield v. State, 315 Md. 474 , 554 A.2d 1238 (1989): The knowledge requirement is designed primarily to exclude from criminal liability both the inadvertent trespasser and the trespasser who believes that he has received an express or implied permission to enter or remain. Warfield, 315 Md. at 499 , 554 A.2d 1238 (quoting 2 Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 221.2 comment (2)(a), at 88 (1980)). See Green v. State, 119 Md.App. 547, 559-60 , 705 A.2d 133 (1998). Applying the plain meaning of the terms “wanton” and “bona fide” to the facts of this case, and considering the origin of the statute, we are satisfied that Jason had a bona fide claim of right to enter Sagner as a guest of a resident, and thus he did not act wantonly.

We explain further. At the time of the second arrest, Officer Custead primarily focused on Jason’s presence on the Sagner property. Officer Custead admitted that when he was dispatched to Sagner for the second time on September 22, 1997, he planned to arrest Jason if he was “on the property.” Further, it appears to us that appellant was found to have committed a trespass based on the following: 1) Jason was present on the Sagner property; 2) he was not a