In re Kaela C.

BATTAGLIA, J. Petitioner, Leslie C., seeks review of the Court of Special Appeals’s judgment affirming the Circuit Court of Frederick County’s order in which it adopted the recommendations and findings of a master prior to the expiration of the five-day period to file exceptions afforded by Maryland Rule 11 — 111(c). We granted certiorari in this case to answer the following questions: 1. Did the juvenile court err in entering an immediate order dismissing the CINA petitions without affording Petitioner an advance opportunity to file exceptions to the master’s findings and recommendations? 2. Did the juvenile court deprive Petitioner of her right to due process of law by dismissing the CINA petitions without affording her an advance opportunity to file exceptions to the master’s finding and recommendations? 3.

Did the Court of Special Appeals err in applying its decision to Petitioner, who could not have known of the basis for that court’s decision prior to appeal? In re: Kaela C, 388 Md. 673 , 882 A.2d 286 (2005). After the filing of briefs and oral argument, we issued an order requesting supplemental briefs and scheduling further proceedings on an additional issue: What is the effect, if any, on the pending appeal before this Court of the judicial proceedings that have been instituted in the State of California? We shall hold that the issues presented in Mrs. C.’s petition for a writ of certiorari are not moot because Mrs. C. continues to suffer collateral consequences from the circuit court’s order transferring custody of the children to Mr. C. and that the circuit court erred in adopting the master’s recommendations ⁴³⁶ prior to the expiration of the five days for filing of exceptions provided by Maryland Rule 11-111(c). 1 I. Background Petitioner, Leslie C.

(Mrs. C.), and Christopher C. (Mr. C.) are the biological parents of Kaela C., Gunner C., and Franklin C. Mr. and Mrs. C. were divorced in August, 2001, and Mrs. C. was awarded legal and physical custody of the children. On December 2, 2003, in response to allegations of abuse, the Frederick County Department of Social Services (“DSS”) removed all three children from Mrs. C.’s care, placed them in emergency shelter care 2 pursuant to its authority under Section 3-815(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, 3 and subsequently filed a petition with the Circuit Court for Frederick County seeking continued shelter care pursuant to Section 3-815(c) of the Courts and Judicial Pro ⁴³⁷ ceedings Article, 4 and a determination that the children were children in need of assistance (CINA). 5 Maryland Code (1973, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 3-815(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.

Both parents appeared before the circuit court, sitting as a juvenile court, for the shelter care hearing on December 8, 2003, and, while not admitting the allegations contained in the petition, agreed to the need for continued shelter care. Pursuant to Section 3-807(d)(3) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings, 6 the master recommended that the children be placed in licensed foster care pending an adjudicatory hearing, 7 that Mr. C. be granted extended, unsupervised ⁴³⁸ visitation, that Mrs. C. be granted supervised visitation, and that an updated family psychological evaluation be performed, and the trial judge immediately adopted those recommendations in the form of an order. The master held an adjudicatory hearing on March 3, 2004, at which Mrs. C., Mr. C., and the DSS all appeared with counsel, in addition to counsel for the children. Because the court-ordered family assessment had not been completed, the DSS requested that the disposition hearing 8 be postponed.

Before addressing DSS’s request, the master asked whether the parties had reached an agreement as to the facts alleged in the CINA petition: COUNSEL FOR MRS. C.: Ah, we’re not gonna contest the petition, Your Honor. We have some additional facts and information we want to proffer for the court by way of explanation. But we’re not admitting or denying the allegations.

THE MASTER: Okay. And [Counsel for Mr. C.]? COUNSEL FOR MR. C.: Your Honor, we are going to argue Courts and Judicial Proceedings 3 — 819(d),— THE MASTER: Russell G. 9 COUNSEL FOR MR.

C.: Yeah. Exactly. THE MASTER: And what about the allegations contained in the petition? What’s mom’s— —I mean dad’s position on that? ⁴³⁹ COUNSEL FOR MR.

C.: There is only one paragraph that applies to my client. It’s on, by, it’s on page five and it’s letter 0 and it basically says that my client cannot provide appropriate care for the three children due to his military obligations and frequent long absences and we don’t agree with that. We think that my client is able and willing to provide care for the children. THE MASTER: Okay. [Counsel for the Children]?

COUNSEL FOR THE CHILDREN: Thank you, Your Honor. That came as a surprise to me. If that’s the case, Your Honor, I, I think dad should be available for cross examination if he, he’s going to— Acknowledging that there was confusion among the parties, the master called a recess and asked the parties into her office to clarify the position of each regarding the CINA allegations and thereafter, on the record, summarized the state of the proceedings: THE MASTER: I believe in this matter, and counsel let me know if there’s any disagreement, mother and father are proceeding by an Alford type plea where they neither admit nor deny the allegations contained in the petition. However, they agree that those allegations, those same allegations would be the allegations presented by the [DSS] at a full adjudicatory hearing and that the court would find those allegations to be true or sustained by a preponderance of the evidence and that they would support a finding that the children are children in need of ... well, actually, we’re not gonna go that far to the CINA, to the CINA part.

Basically that the allegations would be true and thereafter that, that disposition would be continued for a time that will be further argued in open court. Is that your understanding, [Counsel for DSS]? COUNSEL FOR DSS: Yes, Your Honor. That’s what the [DSS] understood.

THE MASTER: And is that your understanding, [Counsel for Mrs. CJ? ⁴⁴⁰ COUNSEL FOR MRS. C.: Yes, Your Honor, and I just have a few facts I want to, some information I want to give the court. THE MASTER: Okay. And is that your understanding, [Counsel for MR.

C.]? COUNSEL FOR MR. C.: Yes, Your Honor. THE MASTER: And is that your understanding, [Counsel for the Children]?

And actually, the children have agreed to stipulate to the— COUNSEL FOR THE CHILDREN: That’s corrects THE MASTER: — allegations. COUNSEL FOR THE CHILDREN: That’s correct. THE MASTER: Okay. In, in this matter I will, in the, in the matter of the C. children I’ll note for the record that the social worker, mother and father are present, as are [DSS]’s attorney, mom’s attorney, dad’s attorney, and the children’s attorney.

I will note that the [DSS] and the children stipulated to the allegations contained in the petition and agreed that they were sufficient to determine that the children are children in need of assistance. I also will note that mother and father neither admitted nor denied the allegations contained in the petition. However, they did agree that those same allegations would be the allegations presented by the [DSS] at a full adjudicatory hearing and, and that those allegations would be proven by a preponderance of the evidence and support a finding that the children are children in need of assistance. Thereafter, based on that I will find that the allegations contained in the petition are true and sustained.

The circuit court subsequently adopted the master’s recommendations and issued an Order, within two days, finding that, the child and the [DSS] stipulated to the allegations contained in the [DSS]’s Petition, and mother and father neither admitted nor denied the allegations contained in the Petition; however, they agreed that had there been a full adjudicatory hearing in this matter, those same allegations ⁴⁴¹ would have been the allegations presented by the [DSS], and those same allegations would have been proven by a preponderance of the evidence and otherwise support a finding that the children are Children in Need of Assistance, and ... the Circuit Court for Frederick County, Maryland ... finds that the following facts as alleged in the petition are true and are sufficient to find that the children need or require the court’s intervention. The court ordered the children to remain in licensed foster care and scheduled the disposition hearing for March 17, 2004. 10 During the disposition hearing, Mr. C. requested, pursuant to Maryland Code (1973, 2002 RepLVoL), § 3-819(e) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, 11 that the CINA petition be dismissed and that custody of the children be transferred to him. He argued that the CINA petition did not allege that he had ever abused or neglected the children, but that he had been unable to take care of the children because of his enlistment in the United States Navy. Mr. C. contended that the ship that he was stationed on, the U.S.S. Ronald Reagan, was currently berthed in Virginia, but was being transferred to San Diego, California, where he was in the process of purchasing a house, and that once his ship was transferred, he would apply for, and be granted, shore duty to enable him to properly care for the children.

Mr. C. maintained that, if he was granted custody that day, he would be ⁴⁴² permitted to travel by air with the children. Mrs. C. opposed Mr. C.’s request on the basis that Mr. C.’s plans were conjectural and requested that the children remain in foster care so that she could continue working toward reunification with them. The master postponed ruling on these requests in order to give Mr. C. and his fiancee the opportunity to submit to psychological evaluations, to have Mr. C.’s fiancee undergo a background check, to allow Mr. C. to obtain documentation from the Navy affirming that he would be granted shore duty in California, and to give Mr. C. the opportunity to negotiate visitation arrangements with Mrs. C. On April 21, 2004, the parties appeared before the master for the conclusion of the disposition hearing at which time each of the parties was heard: COUNSEL FOR DSS: The, we felt that it was appropriate for the court to dismiss the CIÑA and place the child with the father. The court declined to do that and continued the dispositionary hearing until today and suggested or ordered that a number of things occur.

Some of those things I can report to the court have occurred. One is the addendum to the C. family assessment. I believe it’s been filed with the court in each of these cases. COUNSEL FOR DSS: We do believe that the case has been made against, not, I hate to use the word against, but in regard to Mrs. C. And therefore the court is required to apply Courts and Judicial, Section 3-819(e) and dismiss the CINA petition and provide, and provide custody to father.

And we would ask the court to do that today. And I would, I would add that the, I’m sure that somewhere in the record the, the children really want to be with their father and it’s really causing problems in keeping them in foster care. One child is probably gonna be removed today if, if not returned because of the behavior, and I think the [DSSj’s position is that that is directly attributable, I think it’s his? COUNSEL FOR THE CHILDREN: Yes. ⁴⁴³ COUNSEL FOR DSS: Working with that case.

His desire to be returned home or to be returned to his father. THE MASTER: Okay. [Counsel for Mrs. C.]. COUNSEL FOR MRS. C.: Ah, yes, Your Honor.

With respect to the [DSS]’s request, Your Honor, I think that’s precluded already by the court’s order of March 3rd. The, all parties agreed that the facts in the petition supported a finding of the children that were in need of assistance and that was agreed to on the record and signed by the Master and signed by [the trial judge] on March 5th. So there’s no way that the section cited by the [DSS] is, is applicable at this point. Barring the judge reversing this order.

But, so the children, the facts had been agreed to by the parties sufficient to support a finding of CINA against both parents. So Russell G. no longer applies. Your Honor, the father, again, I’ve subpoenaed the father. I’ve requested that the subpoena be continued to this hearing.

That he produce evidence of shore duty of his, any assignment other than to the U.S.S. Ronald Reagan. It is, I have not received any documentation to that effect. He’s still, he’s still single. He’s not married.

And he is, has shore duty until September of 2005. He’s not, it’s not possible for him to have these children. He has apparently intentions to marry somebody although that’s not mentioned in Dr. Weaver’s [ 12 ] report. The word marriage was not mentioned in that entire report or the addendum, to this Ms. O’Reilly.

And her extended family is in Oakland which is 12 hours from San Diego and she’s full-time Navy going to school full-time and she’s intending to take care of these children. Highly unrealistic. I think Dr. Weaver must have been, I don’t know what she was thinking, but the word marriage was not mentioned. Mr. C.’s either gonna do this on his own or he’s not gonna do it at all.

He may have some help here and there but I don’t think this court can rely on an engagement of some young lady that is in the Navy full-time ⁴⁴⁴ and subject to call to go to Iraq or wherever, going to school full-time as an aviation maintenance. Ah, it’s all very nice, but I don’t think this court can rely on that for giving him custody. He’s subject to the Family Care Regulations of the U.S. Navy which require him to designate someone to take care of the children should he be called up. He has as we know ship duty and feeling the world situation he could be called up at any minute.

He hasn’t designated anybody contrary to Navy regulations for these children. And we’ve subpoenaed that. We’ve asked him to produce it. He hasn’t and so he has no plan for these children, Your Honor.

He’s still stationed in Virginia and he’s in the process of buying a house in California, San Diego area with the prospect of the U.S.S. Ronald Reagan will ship out and go where her, via whatever, the Panama Canal to, to California and that he will be then stationed on ship duty in California. But that is yet to be produced and he’s apparently relayed some of these plans to Dr. Weaver. Your Honor, my client has entered into therapy with Dr. Rinehart. She’s visited regularly with the children.

She is doing everything she can to get her life together. She’s going to school online full-time at home. And she submitted a rebuttal to Dr. Weaver’s initial report detailing the mistakes that Dr. Weaver made in that. She’s working with her church and she wants to have an opportunity to reunite with these children, Your Honor, and I don’t see how this court could release these children to such an uncertain speculative arrangement.

The master also heard from Mr. C.’s counsel, who again requested that custody be transferred to him, pursuant to Maryland Code (1973, 2002 RepLVol.), § 3-819(e) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, because Dr. Weaver’s family assessment concluded that placement with Mr. C. would be in the children’s best interests. The children’s counsel agreed: [COUNSEL FOR THE CHILDREN]: If one refers to Dr. Weaver’s first report, Your Honor, she even interviewed dad and dad’s fiancee, she was pretty clear. She was really ⁴⁴⁵ unequivocal even at that time and she does refer to Gunner’s behavior. Emotionally regressed, developmentally delayed, severe behavioral problems.

I can tell you almost first hand that his behavior has deteriorated in the past week. He is in the foster home of the daughter to Judy, my assistant, (inaudible), and she’s on the phone about three times a day now. It’s, it’s deadly serious. It really is serious.

This little boy seems to have for some reason no respect for women and he does have respect for men. I’m hearing this from the foster parents and I’m relating it to the dad. I utterly, totally, Your Honor, support the [DSS]. What concerns me, and there’s been allusions to it just now and it, it’s taken all I can do to stop this happening, and that is the foster mother calling and DSS and saying this is too much to deal with.

We’re talking about things like this little boy undoing a safety belt while he’s sitting in a vehicle. He now has a special bus to take him to school because the bus driver just won’t put up with the behavior of this kid in the bus anymore. He, it’s beyond what a foster parent should have to put up with. And I don’t want him, Your Honor.

I go there quite often and it’s a great place if there’s nowhere else to go, but we’ve got a dad and from what I, I had a conversation with him outside and I, I think he’s got it together, Your Honor, that he will put, and I’ve been very serious with him about what he’s looking forward to and, and Dr. Weaver addresses that as well. Dad has got to be looking at ongoing therapy. But he comes out quite favorable in the, in the addendum to the report as does his fiancee. They do seem like responsible people.

These kids, Your Honor, need to go home. They need to go to their father where, is the place that Dr. Weaver recommended and, ah, and dad’s got this house. It looks like it’s (inaudible). And if he has to go back on a ship at some point there’s got to be something that I imagine the Navy will help him put in place in the way of day care.

This little boy needs some stability and foster care is not for him. I’m asking you to put the children in their father’s care, Your Honor. ⁴⁴⁶ Having heard all of the parties, the master reported her findings and recommendations: THE MASTER: In this situation I’ve had the opportunity to review all of the exhibits that have been submitted. I think this is a very difficult situation for everybody involved. I’m certain of that.

Dr. Weaver’s assessments generally recommend that the placement of the children be with their father and suggests that Mr. C. is available to care for the children. The Paragraph 0 in the [DSS]’s report says that, the language is that father is currently unavailable. Now currently is at the time the petition was filed or current, is currently unable to provide appropriate care for the children due to his military obligations and frequent long absences. Now today at disposition we’re presented with information that father is available to care for the children and we also have the suggestion or the recommendation on the part of dad and related concurrent to the child, I’m not giving a whole lot of weight to dad’s request because it’s sort of self-serving and, but that, that the children be placed with dad and I think that there has been credible evidence presented this afternoon that supports a placement of the children with dad.

So in this matter as to disposition I will find as follows. Based on the information that has been received subsequent to the adjudicatory hearing, I find that father, Christopher C., is available and is able and willing to care for the children. I find that Dr. Weaver has recommended the placement of the children with father and therefore pursuant to 3-819(e) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings, I believe that it is appropriate to find that the allegations in the [DSSj’s petition are really only sustained against mother and I think pursuant to that, based on all the information I am required to dismiss the petition. However, before dismissing the petition I will adopt the [DSSj’s recommendation that ...

Mr. C. be awarded physical and legal custody of the children. Mr. C. and his fiancee and the children participate in family therapy as soon as possible, immediately after relocation in California. That the children partici ⁴⁴⁷ pate in individual therapy immediately after their relocation. That a further visitation schedule be established.

That mother enjoy reasonable and liberal visitation with the children. That Mrs. C. participate in individual therapy and that Mr. C. seek special academic services for Gunner immediately, and I will dismiss the petition and I will prepare a report and recommendation as quickly as I can. COUNSEL FOR MR. C.: Your Honor?

THE MASTER: Yes. COUNSEL FOR MR. C.: I think you misspoke a little bit. You said 3-819(e).

Um, I think you meant 3-819(d) because that’s the one that we went under. THE MASTER: D? COUNSEL FOR MR. C.: Yes, Your Honor.

Because (e) talks about in the disposition remove a child from the child’s home. COUNSEL FOR MRS. C.: Your Honor, I just wanted to inform the court and all parties that we plan to take an exception to the court’s ruling so that placement of the children should not be changed until— THE MASTER: Hold— COUNSEL FOR MRS. C.: — final court orders— THE MASTER: — hold, hold on.

Let me finish this. It’s 3-819(e), [Counsel for Mr. C.]. COUNSEL FOR MR. C.: E, Your Honor?

THE MASTER: Yeah, you can look it up. That’s the, I’m relying on the Russell G.— COUNSEL FOR MR. C.: Oh, okay— THE MASTER: — situation— COUNSEL FOR MR. C.: — that’s fine.

THE MASTER: [Counsel for Mrs. C.], your comments are noted for the record. Thank you very much. COUNSEL FOR MR. C.: Okay.

THE MASTER: I’ll inform the court and what happens from here I don’t have a whole lot of control over. ⁴⁴⁸ COUNSEL FOR DSS: Your Honor, can we request that the court’s order, I forget the exact language and I know it’s questionable whether it can be done, but that the court’s order become an immediate order pending the exceptions hearing. THE MASTER: Actually I think I can do that. COUNSEL FOR MRS. C.: I, I would object to that, Your Honor.

THE MASTER: Okay. [Counsel for Mr. CJ, [Counsel for the children], do you wish to be heard? COUNSEL FOR MR. C.: Ah, we support the [DSS]’s position, Your Honor. COUNSEL FOR THE CHILDREN: As do I, Your Honor.

THE MASTER: I will recommend in light of the imminent necessity to remove Gunner from his home, pursuant — and pursuant to Maryland Rule 9-208(h)(2) as well as the CINA provision of Courts and Judicial Proceedings which indicate that when the placement of the child is changed, the Master can recommend the, ah, can recommend that the court adopt that recommendation immediately. I will also recommend that my ... that the recommendations be adopted immediately. But certainly counsel would be entitled to a hearing on that and that will conclude these matters. Two days later the circuit court adopted the master’s recommendations, which had been submitted in writing, and issued the following Order: FOUND, that father, Christopher C., is available, willing and able to care for the children; and FOUND, that Dr. Weaver has recommended the placement of the children with their father; and FOUND, that the children are not children in need of assistance for the following reasons: The children’s father is available, able and willing to care for the children; and FOUND, that the children have poorly adjusted in their placements in foster care and it is in their best interests to be placed with their father immediately; and ⁴⁴⁹ FOUND, that Gunner’s current foster care placement is jeopardized due to his poor behavior and his immediate placement with his father is in his best interests; and FOUND, that extraordinary circumstances exist pursuant to Md. Rule 9-208(h)(2) that justify the entry of an immediate Order in light of the children’s poor adjustment to foster care and the jeopardy of Gunner’s currently placement.

The circuit court therefore ordered transfer of legal and physical custody of the children to Mr. C., who immediately took them to California. 13 Immediately thereafter, Mrs. C. noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals contending that the circuit court deprived her of her right to file exceptions to the master’s recommendations within five days as provided by Maryland Rule 11-111(c) by adopting the recommendations two days after the master entered her findings. The Court of Special Appeals, although noting that the circuit court had erroneously relied upon Maryland Rule 9-208(h)(2) to immediately adopt the master’s recommendations, determined that the circuit court had the authority to do so under Maryland Rule 11-115(b)’s provision stating “a commitment recommended by a master ... may be implemented in advance of court approval.” In so holding, the Court of Special Appeals relied upon Section 3-801(h) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article’s definition of the word “commit” as “to transfer custody.” Maryland Code (1974, 2002 Rep. Vol.), § 3-801(h) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. The Court of Special Appeals also held that the circuit court’s immediate adoption of the master’s recommendations did not preclude Mrs. C. from filing exceptions.

Further, the intermediate appellate court determined that, based upon the master’s statement on the record that her recommendations would be immediately effective pending the exceptions hearing, Mrs. C. could not claim that she was misled into believing that the court’s ⁴⁵⁰ immediate adoption of the recommendations precluded her from filing exceptions. Therefore, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. During the pendency of her appeal, Mrs. C. also filed an action for Registration of Out>-of-State Custody Decree in the Superior Court of California, County of San Diego, pursuant to Section 3443 of the California Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. 14 On October 22, 2004, pursuant to California Code (1999), Section 3410 of the Family Code, 15 Judge Halgren of the Superior Court of California contacted the presiding judge in Frederick County, Maryland, and the judges agreed that the State of California would assume jurisdiction over the custody and visitation issues of the C. children, without prejudice to Mrs. C.’s pending appeal in Maryland. Judge Halgren thereafter conducted a custody hearing and issued an order stating: The court has reviewed and considered the parenting plan submitted by Family Court Services.

That report previously had been provided to the parties. The court also has consulted with Frederick County (Maryland) Circuit Court Judge ..., the judge presiding in the matter of the [C. ⁴⁵¹ Children].... Letters summarizing those consultations have been provided to the parties. The court then iterated that California had jurisdiction over the custody and visitation issues for the C. children, and, having reviewed the parties’ filings and heard oral arguments, awarded both legal and physical custody of the children to Mr. C. and granted supervised visitation of all the children to Mrs. C. On April 23, 2005, during a supervised visit with the children, Kaela C. was injured during Mrs. C.’s attempt to intervene in a fight among the children.

Another Superior Court Judge, Judge Kutzner of the California Superior Court issued a new visitation order on June 28, 2005, suspending Mrs. C.’s visitation rights, and stating: This court has reviewed and considered the May 19, 2005 supplemental report submitted by Family Court Services, the May 18, 2005 letter submitted by Child Protective Services, the findings in the related case involving these parties by the Frederick County Circuit Court for the State of Maryland and the published decision on that case by the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, the filings in this court by the parties, and the arguments and testimony presented at the hearing. Shortly after Mrs. C.’s visitation rights were suspended in California she petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari.

II

Discussion A. Mootness The first issue we are called upon to resolve is whether the case at bar has been rendered moot by California’s assumption of jurisdiction over the matters of custody and visitation with the C. children. Mrs. C. contends that a case is moot when there no longer exists a controversy between the parties so that the court cannot provide an effective remedy. She argues that this case is not moot because the circuit court’s April 23, 2004 order sustaining the CINA allegations against Mrs. C. and transfer ⁴⁵² ring custody of the children to Mr. C. continues to affect Mrs. C.’s custodial rights in California and that, were this Court to remand the case for further proceedings, she would be able to challenge the master’s finding by filing exceptions in the circuit court. Mrs. C. points out that the fact that this controversy is still alive in Maryland is evidenced by the California court’s recognition that its resolution of custodial and visitation issues should not prejudice the ongoing proceedings in the Maryland courts.

Conversely, the DSS argues that this case is moot because the circuit court could not grant Mrs. C. any relief were we to remand this case for further proceedings. The DSS maintains that the California court has since granted Mr. C. custody through its own proceedings, and the propriety of the California court’s orders cannot be reviewed by a Maryland court. Finally, the DSS maintains that the circuit court also should not endeavor to maintain concurrent jurisdiction with the California court because that would be contrary to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. Accordingly, the DSS argues that only the California courts can provide Mrs. C. proper relief.

A case is moot when there is no longer any existing controversy between the parties at the time that the case is before the court, or when the court can no longer fashion an effective remedy. Hammen v. Baltimore County Police Dept., 373 Md. 440, 449 , 818 A.2d 1125, 1131 (2003); J.L. Matthews, Inc. v. Maryland-Nat’l Capital Park and Planning Comm’n, 368 Md. 71, 96 , 792 A.2d 288, 302 (2002); In re Michael B., 345 Md. 232, 234 , 691 A.2d 1309, 1310 (1997); Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 250 , 674 A.2d 951, 954 (1996). Because we do not sit to give advisory opinions, we generally order that moot actions be dismissed without a decision on the merits. In re Rosa A. Riddlemoser, 317 Md. 496, 502, 506 , 564 A.2d 812, 815 (1989).

Where there might be some effects from the trial court’s decision in a moot case we vacate the judgments below and order that the trial court dismiss the action. See, e.g., Hammen, 373 Md. at 457-58 , 818 A.2d at ⁴⁵³ 1135-36 ; Robinson v. Lee, 317 Md. 371, 380 , 564 A.2d 395 (1989); State v. Peterson, 315 Md. 73, 82, 90 , 553 A.2d 672, 677, 681 (1989); Attorney General v. Anne Arundel County School Bus Contractors Ass’n, 286 Md. 324, 330 , 407 A.2d 749, 753 (1979). Where, however, it seems apparent that a party may suffer collateral consequences from a trial court’s judgment, the case is not moot. Toler v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 373 Md. 214, 219 , 817 A.2d 229, 232 (2003) (holding that issue of whether petitioner’s driver’s license was wrongly suspended was not moot, despite the fact that the suspension period had ended and his full driving privileges had been restored, because of potential collateral circumstances the initial suspension could cause); see also In the Matter of A.K., 360 N.C. 449 , 628 S.E.2d 753 (2006) (holding that adjudication of petitioners’ daughter as a neglected child was not moot even after full custody of the daughter was returned to the petitioners because of the collateral consequences the adjudication may have on the petitioners’ credibility); Williams v. Ragaglia, 261 Conn. 219 , 802 A.2d 778 (2002) (holding that judgment revoking petitioner’s special foster care license was not moot regardless of the fact that petitioner was later granted full custody of the foster children because the judgment could have collateral consequences with regards to her future ability to be a foster parent); In re A.V., 176 Vt. 568 , 844 A.2d 739, 741 (2003) (holding that question of whether child was in need of care and supervision (“CHINS”) was not moot, despite the fact that the child was no longer within the statutory age parameters for being considered a CHINS, where the lack of parental supervision continued to have collateral consequences on child’s ability to function in the world); In re Hatley, 291 N.C. 693 , 231 S.E.2d 633, 634-35 (1977) (determining that issue of whether petitioner was wrongly involuntarily committed to a mental institution was not moot even though the commitment order had since expired because of the commitment’s potential adverse collateral legal circumstances).

Cf. In the Interest of I.S., 278 Ga. 859 , 607 S.E.2d 546, 549 (2005) (holding that issue of whether trial court erroneously determined children to be “deprived” was moot because the parents ⁴⁵⁴ retained custody of the children and failed to show that they suffered any adverse collateral consequences resulting from the determination). Whenever the courts of two or more states are embroiled in custody proceedings 16 the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, or its successor, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act, is implicated. Thus, to determine whether the issues raised by Mrs. C. are moot, we first must explore the relevant provisions of these acts.

The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act was promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners On Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) in 1968 to address both the increased mobility of individuals and the negative results of that mobility, namely the rampant kidnaping of children by parents looking to relitigate custody determinations in a more favorable forum, a tactic known as “seize and run.” Unif. Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 9 U.L.A. 262-65 (1999); Catherine F. Klein, Leslye E. Orloff, Hema Sarangapani, Border Crossings: Understanding the Civil, Criminal, and Immigration Implications for Battered Women Fleeing Across State Lines with Their Children, 39 Fam.L.Q. 109, 114-15 (2005); Christopher L. Blakesley, Child Custody-Jurisdiction and Procedure, 35 Emory L.J. 291 , 293-97 (1986). The Act serves several purposes, specifically: It limits custody jurisdiction to the states where the child has his home or where there are other strong contacts with the child and his family... .It provides for the recognition and enforcement of out-of-state custody decrees in many instances.... Jurisdiction to modify decrees of other states is limited by giving a jurisdictional preference to the prior ⁴⁵⁵ court under certain conditions....

Access to a court may be denied to petitioners who have engaged in child snatching or similar practices____Also, the Act opens up direct lines of communication between courts of different states to prevent jurisdictional conflict and bring about interstate judicial assistance in custody cases. 9 U.L.A. 111 (1979). By 1981 the Act had been adopted by all fifty states and the District of Columbia. UCCJEA, prefatory note 1. Maryland adopted the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act in 1975.1975 Md. Laws Ch. 265, § 2.

In 1997, NCCUSL promulgated the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act, revisory of the earlier Act, to provide stronger guidelines for determining which state has original jurisdiction, continuing jurisdiction, and modification jurisdiction 17 over a child custody determination. 18 UCCJEA, prefatory note 1. California adopted the revised Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act (the California UCCJEA) in 1999, making it applicable to the California proceedings in this case. 1999 Cal. Stat. Ch. 867. The revised Act was not adopted in Maryland until 2004, however, and is only applicable to cases filed to establish or modify child custody on or after October 1, 2004. 2004 Md. Laws Ch. 502.

Because the case before us was initiated in Maryland in 2003, it falls under the guidelines of the original Maryland Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (“Maryland UCCJA”). ⁴⁵⁶ Under Section 9-204 of the Maryland UCCJA, a court has jurisdiction to enter a custody determination by “initial decree” 19 or “modification decree” 20 if: (1) this State (i) is the home state of the child at the time of commencement of the proceeding, or (ii) had been the child’s home state within 6 months before commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this State because of the child’s removal or retention by a person claiming custody or for other reasons, and a parent or person acting as parent continues to live in this State. Maryland Code (1999), Section 9-204(a)(l) of the Family Law Article. “Home state” is defined as the state in which the child, immediately preceding the time involved, lived with the child’s parents, a parent, or a person acting as parent, for at least 6 consecutive months, and in the case of a child less than 6 months old, the state in which the child lived from birth with any of the persons mentioned. Periods of temporary absence of any of the named persons are counted as part of the 6-month or other period. Maryland Code (1999), Section 9-201(f) of the Family Law Article.

When issuing a custody decree, however, basic tenets of due process first must be followed; namely, parties must be afforded notice and an opportunity to be heard, as set forth by Section 9-205 of the Maryland UCCJA: Before making a decree under this subtitle, reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard shall be given to the contestants, any parent whose parental rights have not been previously terminated, and any person who has physical custody of the child. If any of these persons is outside this ⁴⁵⁷ State, notice and opportunity to be heard shall be given pursuant to the Maryland Rules. Maryland Code (1999), Section 9-205 of the Family Law Article (emphasis added). 21 The requirement of due process also dictates whether the Maryland decree is binding on the parties, as Section 9-212 evidences: A custody decree rendered by a court of this State which had jurisdiction under § 9-204 of this subtitle binds all parties who have been served in this State or notified in accordance with the Maryland Rules of Procedure, or who have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court, and who have been given an opportunity to be heard. As to these parties, the custody decree is conclusive as to all issues of law and fact decided and as to the custody determination made unless and until that determination is modified pursuant to law, including the provisions of this subtitle.

Maryland Code (1999), Section 9-212 of the Family Law Article (emphasis added). 22 ⁴⁵⁸ These two Mainland provisions are almost identical to Sections 4 23 and 12 24 of the UCCJA, after which they were modeled. The comments to Section 4 of the UCCJEA reinforce the importance of adherence to the due process requirements of notice and an opportunity to be heard: This section lists the persons who must be notified and given an opportunity to be heard to satisfy due process requirements. ... Strict compliance with section[ ] 4 ... is essential for the validity of a custody decree within the state and its recognition and enforcement in other states under sections 12,18, and 15. UCCJA, § 4 comment (emphasis added), as do the comments to Section 12: This section deals with the intra-state validity of custody decrees which provides the basis for their interstate recognition and enforcement.

The two prerequisites are (1) jurisdiction under section 3 of this Act and (2) strict compli ⁴⁵⁹ anee with due process mandates of notice and opportunity to be heard. UCCJA, § 12 comment (emphasis added). Assuming due process has been afforded all parties, once an initial custody decree has been issued by a Maryland court, parties may enroll that determination in a sister state. In California, that enrollment is controlled by Section 3443 of the California UCCJEA, which provides in relevant part: (a) A court of this state shall recognize and enforce a child custody determination of a court of another state if the latter court exercised jurisdiction in substantial conformity with this part or the determination was made under factual circumstances meeting the jurisdictional standards of this part and the determination has not been modified in accordance with this part.

California Code (1999), Section 3443 of the Family Code. 25 Section 3443, identical to Section 303 of the UCCJEA, also requires that due process have been afforded the parties to the initial custody proceeding. In promulgating Section 303, NCCUSL explained that: This section is based on Section 13 of the UCCJA which contained the basic duty to enforce. The language of the original section has been retained and the duty to enforce is generally the same. UCCJEA, § 303 comment.

Comments to Section 13 26 of the UCCJA in turn state: ⁴⁶⁰ Recognition is accorded to a decree which is valid and binding under section 12.... Under this interpretation a state is permitted to recognize a custody decree of another state regardless of lack of personal jurisdiction, as long as due process requirements of notice and opportunity to be heard have been met. UCCJA, Section 13 comment (emphasis added). Thus, a prerequisite for enforcing a sister state’s custody decree is that all parties were afforded both proper notice and an opportunity to be heard during the proceedings leading up to that decree.

See In re Termination of Parental Rights to Thomas J.R., 262 Wis.2d 217 , 663 N.W.2d 734, 741 (2003) (acknowledging that in order for a custody determination issued by one state to be valid and recognized by a sister state, the parties must have been afforded notice and an opportunity to be heard); Arkansas Dep’t of Human Serv. v. Cox, 349 Ark. 205 , 82 S.W.3d 806 , 811 n. 1 (2002) (“[Ujnder the UCCJEA, no child-custody determination order may be enforced in a foreign state if there was no notice and an opportunity to be heard when the child-custody determination order was issued in the rendering state. The UCCJEA streamlines the process of obtaining enforcement of child-custody determinations in foreign states, but it does not dispense with due process.”); Houtchens v. Houtchens, 488 A.2d 726, 731 (R.I.1985) (declining to defer to Texas’s simultaneous proceedings because the Texas proceedings “were not in substantial conformity with the due-process requirements of notice and opportunity to be heard”); Roundtree v. Bates, 630 P.2d 1299, 1302 (Okla.1981) (“The [UCCJA] declares that full effect must be given a valid out-of-state decree if the due process requirements of notice and opportunity to be heard have been met.”). ⁴⁶¹ Once the Maryland decree has been enrolled in a sister state, modification jurisdiction over that decree is controlled by that state’s modification statute. In this case, that statute is Section 3428 of the California UCCJEA, which provides: Except as otherwise provided in Section 3424, a court of this state may not modify a child custody determination made by a court of another state unless a court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial determination under paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 3421 and either of the following determinations is made: (a) The court of another state determines it no longer has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under Sections 3422 or that a court of this state would be a more convenient forum under Section 3427. (b) A court of this state or a court of the other state determines that the child, the child’s parents, and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in the other state.

California Code (1999), Section 3423 of the Family Code. Section 3423 was modeled after Section 203 of the UCCJEA, comments to which emphasize that: [This section] prohibits a court from modifying a custody determination made consistently with this Act by a court in another State unless a court of that State determines that it no longer has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction ... or that this State would be a more convenient forum____The modification State is not authorized to determine that the original decree State has lost its jurisdiction. UCCJEA, Section 203 comment. Thus, under Section 3423, a California court cannot modify a Maryland custody determination unless Maryland determines that it no longer has continuing jurisdiction.

The Maryland UCCJA has a similar provision, Section 9-214(a). 27 The pur ⁴⁶² pose behind this prohibition against modification is to prevent