Phillips v. State

Getty, J. This appeal requires us to determine whether a deoxyribonucleic acid (“DNA”) analysis conducted in accordance with the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (“FBI”) Quality Assurance Standards (“QAS”) qualifies for automatic admissibility under § 10-915 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJP”) of the Maryland Code, Petitioner Richmond Phillips argues that the DNA evidence is not admissible because the analysis was not performed in accordance with standards established by one of the two entities named in CJP § 10-915 (“DNA Admissibility Statute”), and because the methods of analysis that were used are not generally accepted as reliable in the relevant scientific community under Frye-Reed. 1 The trial court and the Court of Special Appeals agreed with Mr. Phillips that the DNA evidence did not qualify for ¹⁸⁵ automatic admissibility under § 10-915, but held that the evidence was nonetheless admissible under Frye-Reed. Mr. Phillips now challenges the latter conclusion, while the State challenges the former. For the reasons that follow, we hold that the DNA evidence was automatically admissible under CJP § 10-915. Accordingly, the trial court should not have conducted a Frye-Reed hearing to determine its admissibility, and we will not address Mr. Phillips’ contention that the trial court’s ruling at that hearing was erroneous.

BACKGROUND The State charged Mr. Phillips with the first-degree murders of his ex-girlfriend, Wynetta Wright, and their eleven-month-old daughter, Jaylin Wright, which took place on May 31, 2011. Wynetta died of a gunshot wound to the head. Her body was found in a park near the Hillcrest Heights Community Center in Prince George’s County. Jaylin died of hyperth-ermia as a result of being left in a hot vehicle for an extended period of time.

Her body was found in Wynetta’s car in a parking lot near the park. Mr. Phillips admitted to meeting with Wynetta in the park in the early morning hours of May 31, but denied any involvement in her death or Jaylin’s death. The police obtained DNA samples from the crime scenes, the victims, and Mr. Phillips, which were tested in June 2011 by forensic chemist Jessica Charak of the Prince George’s County Police Department Crime Laboratory (“Prince George’s County Laboratory” or “Laboratory”). Two samples are relevant to this appeal: a buccal swab 2 from Mr. Phillips, ¹⁸⁶ and a sample obtained from the steering wheel of Wynetta’s car.

Based on Ms. Charak’s analysis, she concluded that the steering wheel sample was consistent with Mr. Phillips’ DNA profile and, therefore, he could not be excluded as a contributor to the sample. Ms, Charak found that the steering wheel sample also contained genetic material from Wynetta, Jaylin, and at least two additional unknown contributors. Ms. Charak calculated that (<[t]he chances of selecting an unrelated individual from the random population who would be included as a possible contributor to the mixed DNA profile obtained from the evidence sample ... are approximately ... 1 in 2.93 million individuals in the African American population.” Prior to trial, Mr. Phillips filed a motion in limine to exclude the State’s DNA evidence and related expert testimony. Mr. Phillips argued that the Prince George’s County Laboratory’s methods of analyzing complex, low-template DNA 3 samples were not generally accepted as reliable in the relevant scientific community, and thus the evidence was inadmissible under Frye-Reed.

The State responded that the DNA evidence and related expert testimony were automatically admissible under CJP § 10-915, and thus a Frye-Reed hearing was not necessary to determine admissibility. The DNA Admissibility Statute in effect throughout Mr. Phillips’ proceedings provided that DNA evidence “is admissible to prove or disprove the identity of any person,” so long as certain conditions are fulfilled: (a) Definitions.— ¹⁸⁷ (1) In this section the following words have the meanings indicated. (2) “Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)” means the molecules in all cellular forms that contain genetic information in a chemical structure of each individual. (3) “DNA profile” means an analysis of genetic loci that have [sic] been validated according to standards established by: (i) The Technical Working Group on DNA Analysis Methods (TWGDAM); or (ii) The DNA Advisory Board of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

(b) In general.—A statement from the testing laboratory setting forth that the analysis of genetic loci has been validated by standards established by TWGDAM or the DNA Advisory Board is sufficient to admit a DNA profile under this section. (c) Purposes.—In any criminal proceeding, the evidence of a DNA profile is admissible to prove or disprove the identity of any person, if the party seeking to introduce the evidence of a DNA profile [complies with specified notice requirements]. CJP § 10-915 (1998) (emphasis added) (amended 2016). Ms. Charak’s report contained the following statement of validation: “The DNA profiles reported below were determined by procedures which have been validated according to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Quality Assurance Standards for Forensic DNA Testing Laboratories.” (Emphasis added.) The trial court conducted two hearings to determine the admissibility of the DNA evidence.

First, the trial court held a hearing to determine whether the Prince George’s County Laboratory was in compliance with the DNA Admissibility Statute, which would render the evidence automatically admissible without the need for a Frye-Reed hearing. At this initial hearing, the trial court determined that the Laboratory was not in compliance with the Statute, and therefore the DNA ¹⁸⁸ evidence was not automatically admissible. Next, the trial court conducted a Frye-Reed hearing to determine whether the Laboratory’s methods of analysis were generally accepted as reliable within the relevant scientific community. The trial court concluded that the Laboratory’s methods satisfied this standard, and therefore the DNA evidence would be admissible at trial.

Mr. Phillips was tried before a jury beginning on January 14, 2013. The trial court admitted into evidence the analysis of the buccal swab and steering wheel sample, and Ms. Charak testified regarding her conclusions. On January 17, 2013, the jury convicted Mr. Phillips of the first-degree murders of Wynetta and Jaylin, and related charges. On March 22, 2013, the trial court sentenced Mr. Phillips to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.

Mr. Phillips appealed, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the convictions. Phillips v. State, 226 Md.App. 1, 4 , 126 A.3d 739 (2015). Mr. Phillips then petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, requesting review of whether the lower courts erred in holding that the DNA evidence was admissible under Frye-Reed. 4 , The State filed a conditional cross-petition, requesting review of whether the lower courts erred in holding that the DNA evidence did not qualify for automatic admissi ¹⁸⁹ bility under CJP § 10-915. 5 We granted both the petition and the cross-petition on March 25, 2016. Phillips v. State, 446 Md. 704 , 133 A.3d 1110 (2016).

STANDARD OF REVIEW The trial court’s determination that the Prince George’s County Laboratory was not in compliance with the DNA Admissibility Statute, to the extent that this is a factual finding, will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. See Bottini v. Dep’t of Fin., 450 Md. 177, 187 , 147 A.3d 371 (2016) (“We give due regard to the trial court’s role as fact-finder and will not set aside factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous.” (quoting Breeding v. Koste, 443 Md. 15, 27 , 115 A.3d 106 (2015))). However, “[w]hen the trial court’s decision involves an interpretation and application of Maryland statutory and case law, our Court must determine whether the [trial] court’s conclusions are legally correct.” Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Breeding, 443 Md. at 27 , 115 A.3d 106 ).

DISCUSSION Mr. Phillips argues that the trial court erred in admitting the DNA evidence at trial because the State did not establish at the Fry e-Reed hearing that the methods used by the Prince George’s County Laboratory in conducting its analysis are generally accepted as reliable within the relevant scientific community. Before we can address that argument, however, we must determine the threshold issue of whether Mr. Phillips was even entitled to a Frye-Reed hearing regarding the DNA evidence. In Maryland, scientific evidence can become admissible either by statute, “if a relevant statute exists,” or by ¹⁹⁰ establishing general acceptance in the relevant scientific community under Frye-Reed. Armstead v. State, 342 Md. 38, 54 , 673 A.2d 221 (1996).

Here, a relevant statute exists—the DNA Admissibility Statute, CJP § 10-915. The DNA Admissibility Statute provides that DNA evidence is admissible so long as certain notice requirements are met and the analysis is accompanied by “[a] statement from the testing laboratory setting forth that the analysis of genetic loci has been validated by standards established by TWGDAM or the DNA Advisory Board.” CJP § 10-915 (1998) (amended 2016). “When the General Assembly has enacted legislation rendering evidence admissible, ‘the only way to contest the validity of the underlying principles involved would be to argue that the statutes violate one’s right to due process of law.’ ” Armstead, 342 Md. at 57 , 673 A.2d 221 (quoting L. McLain, Maryland Evidence § 4.014(c), at 278 (1987 & 1999 Cum. Supp.)). Mr. Phillips has not argued before this Court that the DNA Admissibility Statute violates his right to due process. 6 Thus, if the DNA evidence offered by the State at Mr. Phillips’ trial satisfied the requirements of § 10-915, then Mr. Phillips was not entitled to a Frye-Reed hearing to determine its admissibility.

Therefore, we must first determine whether the DNA evidence introduced against Mr. Phillips qualified for automatic admissibility under CJP § 10-915. A The Parties’ Contentions and Lower Courts’ Rulings Mr. Phillips argues that the DNA evidence was not automatically admissible under CJP § 10-915 because Ms. Cha-rak’s report was not accompanied by a statement that the ¹⁹¹ analysis had “been validated by standards established by TWGDAM or the DNA Advisory Board,” as required by the Statute. Instead, the report was accompanied by a statement that the Prince George’s County Laboratory’s procedures had “been validated according to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Quality Assurance Standards for Forensic DNA Testing Laboratories.” Mr. Phillips asserts that this statement of validation is not sufficient for automatic admissibility under the Statute. The State responds that the DNA evidence was automatically admissible under CJP § 10-915 because Maryland law requires state forensics laboratories to adhere to the QAS for DNA testing.

See Md. Code, Pub. Safety § 2-503(b) (requiring state laboratories to comply with federal standards for inclusion in the Combined DNA Index System). The two entities named in the Statute no longer exist, and the QAS are now the relevant standards. Therefore, the State asserts, a statement of validation that the Prince George’s County Laboratory’s procedures had been validated according to the QAS should be sufficient for automatic admissibility under CJP § 10-915.

The trial court agreed with Mr. Phillips that the Prince George’s County Laboratory’s statement of validation was not sufficient for automatic admissibility under the Statute. Because TWGDAM and the DNA Advisory Board were no longer in existence at the time the Laboratory performed its analysis, the court found that TWGDAM’s successor, “SWGDAM[,] is now the entity that sets forth the standards for DNA testing.” The trial court then interpreted the Statute by “substituting” SWGDAM for TWGDAM, and held that compliance with SWGDAM guidelines was required for automatic admissibility under CJP § 10-915. The court found that SWGDAM had guidelines for interpreting complex DNA mixtures, which the Laboratory did not follow when it performed its analysis. Thus, the trial court held that the Laboratory’s compliance with the QAS was not sufficient for automatic admissibility under CJP § 10-915, and proceeded to conduct a Frye-Reed hearing to determine whether the DNA evidence ¹⁹² could be admitted at trial.

The trial court ultimately determined that the DNA evidence was admissible under Frye-Reed, and the State introduced Ms. Charak’s report and testimony at trial. Before the Court of Special Appeals, Mr. Phillips asserted that the trial court’s ruling on the State’s noncompliance with § 10-915 was correct, but challenged the trial court’s ruling on admissibility under Frye-Reed. In response, the State erroneously asserted that the trial court had found that the Prince George’s County Laboratory’s statement of validation was sufficient under the Statute, and therefore the court was precluded from even holding a Frye-Reed hearing to determine the admissibility of the DNA evidence. Neither party explicitly addressed how the appellate court should interpret § 10-915 in light of the fact that the two entities named in the Statute no longer exist.

The Court of Special Appeals framed the issue as “de-cid[ing] what to do with a statute that appears to be obsolete.” Phillips, 226 Md.App. at 3 , 126 A.3d 739 . The court then presented a lengthy discussion of how to deal with obsolete statutes, id. at 8-12 , 126 A.3d 739 , an examination of the legislative history of § 10-915, id. at 12-14, 126 A.3d 739 , and a comparison of the current and previous standards-setting bodies for DNA testing. Id. at 14-16 , 126 A.3d 739 . Following this analysis, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that a DNA analysis would be automatically admissible under § 10-915 if accompanied by a statement of validation “pursuant to standards promulgated by SWGDAM.” Id. at 15, 126 A.3d 739 .

In contrast, the court concluded that a DNA analysis conducted pursuant to the QAS would not be sufficient for automatic admissibility under the Statute. Id. at 16 , 126 A.3d 739 . In other words, the Court of Special Appeals agreed with the trial court’s interpretation of § 10-915, and held that the lower court was correct in holding a Frye-Reed hearing to determine the admissibility of the DNA evidence. Id.

The Court of Special Appeals then held, in agreement with the trial court, that the DNA evidence was admissible under Frye-Reed. Id. at 22, 126 A.3d 739 . Mr. Phillips petitioned this ¹⁹³ Court to review the lower courts’ rulings that the DNA evidence was admissible under Frye-Reed. The State filed a conditional cross-petition, seeking review of the lower courts’ interpretation of § 10-915.

B. Mootness After we granted certiorari on Mr. Phillips’ petition and the State’s cross-petition, Mr. Phillips filed a motion to dismiss the State’s cross-petition as moot. Mr. Phillips argues that this Court need not decide whether the Court of Special Appeals’ interpretation of § 10-915 is correct, because the version of the Statute that that court interpreted is no longer in effect. During the 2016 Legislative Session, the General Assembly passed an amendment to CJP § 10-915 so that the Statute now references the QAS, in addition to TWGDAM and the DNA Advisory Board, as providing the DNA testing standards that must be followed for automatic admissibility. See 2016 Md. Laws, ch. 570.

These changes to the statutory language were adopted directly in response to the Court of Special Appeals’ opinion below. The State maintains that its cross-petition is not moot because there is still an existing controversy between the parties—namely, whether the State’s DNA evidence was automatically admissible at Mr. Phillips’ trial under the previous version of § 10-915. In addition, the State notes that the amended Statute applies only prospectively to offenses committed on or after the effective date of October 1, 2016, see id. so this Court’s resolution of how to interpret the previous version could potentially affect “many, many other pending cases” involving DNA evidence. “A case is moot when there is no longer any existing controversy between the parties at the time that the case is before the [C]ourt, or when the [Cjourt can no longer fashion an effective remedy.” Green v. Nassif, 401 Md. 649, 654 , 934 A.2d 22 (2007) (quoting In re Kaela C., 394 Md. 432, 452 , 906 A.2d 915 (2006)). The Court does not issue advisory opinions, and thus moot cases are generally dismissed “without a decision on the merits.” Id. at 655, 934 A.2d 22 (quoting ¹⁹⁴ Dep’t of Human Res., Child Care Admin, v. Roth, 398 Md. 137, 143 , 919 A.2d 1217 (2007)).

Here, there is still an existing controversy between the parties. The controversy is whether the DNA evidence qualified for automatic admissibility at Mr. Phillips’ trial pursuant to the previous version of § 10-915. Because § 10-915 was recently amended to make explicit that compliance with the QAS is sufficient for automatic admissibility, the parties’ dispute over whether the Prince George’s County Laboratory’s compliance with the QAS was sufficient in this case would already be resolved if the offense had been committed on or after October 1, 2016. However, because the 2016 amendments to the Statute apply only prospectively, we still must determine whether the Laboratory complied with the previous version of the Statute, which was in effect at all times relevant to this proceeding: when the charged offenses occurred, when the Laboratory performed its analysis, during the pre-Frye-Reed hearing, and during Mr. Phillips’ trial.

Additionally, this Court can fashion an effective remedy by deciding the proper interpretation of the previous version of the Statute, and either affirming Mr. Phillips’ convictions or reversing them and remanding the case for a new trial (if we were to also decide that the DNA evidence was not otherwise admissible, and that any error in admitting it was not harmless). Because there is still an existing controversy between the parties, and the Court can fashion an effective remedy, we hold that the State’s cross-petition, regarding the proper interpretation of § 10-915 before it was amended in 2016, is not moot. Accordingly, Mr. Phillips’ motion to dismiss the State’s cross-petition as moot is denied. C. Compliance with CJP § 10-915 Next, we address the merits of the State’s contention that the lower courts erred in determining that the DNA evidence introduced against Mr. Phillips did not meet the requirements for automatic admissibility under the DNA Admissibility Stat ¹⁹⁵ ute.

As set out above, CJP § 10—915(b) provided that “[a] statement from the testing laboratory setting forth that the analysis of genetic loci has been validated by standards established by TWGDAM or the DNA Advisory Board is sufficient to admit a DNA profile under this section.” The Prince George’s County Laboratory’s analysis was accompanied by a statement that its procedures had “been validated according to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Quality Assurance Standards for Forensic DNA Testing Laboratories.” We must determine whether this statement of validation satisfies the requirement of § 10-915(b). Mr. Phillips maintains that the Prince George’s County Laboratory’s statement of validation is insufficient because it does not explicitly state that the Laboratory’s analysis had been validated by standards established by TWGDAM or the DNA Advisory Board. In fact, Mr. Phillips asserts, the Laboratory’s analysis could not possibly include such a statement because neither TWGDAM nor the DNA Advisory Board were in existence when the Laboratory performed its analysis in June 2011. The State counters that since TWGDAM and the DNA Advisory Board went defunct, state and federal law have required forensics laboratories to adhere to the QAS.

Therefore, the State concludes, although the DNA Admissibility Statute does not explicitly mention the QAS, the Laboratory’s compliance with those standards should be deemed sufficient for automatic admissibility of the DNA evidence. The trial court found as a matter of fact, and the Court of Special Appeals agreed, that TWGDAM and the DNA Advisory Board were no longer in existence when the Prince George’s County Laboratory performed its analysis in June 2011. See Phillips, 226 Md.App. at 8, 15 , 126 A.Sd 739. The trial court also found as a matter of fact, and the Court of Special Appeals agreed, that the Scientific Working Group on DNA Analysis Methods, or SWGDAM, is the successor entity to TWGDAM.

Id. at 14 , 126 A.3d 739 . Then, after examining the legislative history of the DNA Admissibility Statute, the Court of Special Appeals determined “that the legislature intended to create a statute that would track cutting-edge ¹⁹⁶ DNA science and ensure automatic admissibility only if the DNA techniques complied with the standards promulgated by the most rigorous standards-setting body available.” Id. Next, the Court of Special Appeals compared SWGDAM guidelines for DNA testing to the QAS, just as the trial court had done. Id.

The intermediate appellate court noted that while SWGDAM guidelines represent “rigorous standards for cutting-edge DNA technology,” id. at 15 , 126 A.3d 739 , the QAS are simply “older protocols that are ‘good enough.’ ” Id. at 16 , 126 A.3d 739 . The Court of Special Appeals then concluded (as had the trial court) that while a DNA analysis conducted in accordance with SWGDAM guidelines would be sufficient for automatic admissibility under the Statute, one that was conducted in accordance with the QAS was not. Id. at 15-16 , 126 A.3d 739 . Therefore, the Court of Special Appeals held that the Laboratory’s statement of validation was not sufficient under CJP § 10-915(b).

Id. at 16, 126 A.3d 739 . The arguments from both Mr. Phillips and the State, as well as the conclusions of the trial court and the intermediate appellate court, appear to be premised on a misunderstanding of the evolution of TWGDAM, SWGDAM, the DNA Advisory Board, and the QAS, and the relationship between these entities and the DNA Admissibility Statute. In order to resolve this confusion, we will examine the interrelated histories of these standards-setting bodies, and view them in the context of the legislative history of the DNA Admissibility Statute. In doing so, we begin by setting forth this Court’s well-established rules of statutory construction.

This Court provides judicial deference to the policy decisions enacted into law by the General Assembly. We assume that the legislature’s intent is expressed in the statutory language and thus our statutory interpretation focuses primarily on the language of the statute to determine the purpose and intent of the General Assembly. We begin our analysis by first looking to the normal, plain meaning of the language of the statute, reading the statute as a whole to ensure that no word, clause, sentence or ¹⁹⁷ phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory. If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we need not look beyond the statute’s provisions and our analysis ends.

Occasionally we see fit to examine extrinsic sources of legislative intent merely as a cheek of our reading of a statute’s plain language. In such instances, we may find useful the context of a statute, the overall statutory scheme, and archival legislative history of relevant enactments. Douglas v. State, 423 Md. 156, 178 , 31 A.3d 250 (2011) (quoting Evans v. State, 420 Md. 391, 400 , 23 A.3d 223 (2011)). The General Assembly enacted CJP § 10-915 in 1989 to eliminate the need for costly Frye-Reed hearings in every case for which the State sought to admit DNA evidence.

Armstead, 342 Md. at 57 , 673 A.2d 221 . Rather than continually relitigating whether DNA evidence had achieved “general acceptance in the relevant scientific community” under Frye-Reed, § 10-915 provided that DNA evidence is automatically admissible, so long as certain conditions are met. Id. at 58, 673 A.2d 221 . The 1991 version of the Statute specifically allowed for the automatic admissibility of DNA evidence that was analyzed according to the restriction fragment length polymorphism (“RFLP”) method.

CJP § 10-915 (1991) (amended 1997). But by 1997, the RFLP method had become outdated, and was superseded by a new technique called the polymerase chain reaction (“PCR”) method. Jud. Proc.

Comm., Bill Analysis: House Bill JpH (1997). Because the 1991 Statute specified only that DNA evidence analyzed using RFLP was automatically admissible,