In Re KEVIN T.

⁶⁷³ JAMES R. EYLER, J. (Retired, Specially Assigned). The Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, sitting as a juvenile court, found appellant, Kevin T. 1 to be involved in the delinquent acts of second-degree assault and participation in a criminal gang. Appellant was committed to “Level B” placement.

A timely appeal was filed, in which appellant presents the following questions for our review: 1. Did the juvenile court err in permitting testimony by Officer Daniel Lewis that after Kevin T. was taken into custody he “refused to make a statement”? 2. Was the evidence insufficient to sustain Kevin T.’s conviction for participation in a criminal gang under § 9-804(a) of the Criminal Law Article? For the reasons that follow, we shall answer (1) yes to the first question, but conclude that any error was harmless, and (2) yes to the second question.

Accordingly, we shall reverse, in part, the judgments of the circuit court. BACKGROUND In 2013, Austin R. was a student at High Point High School in Prince George’s County. Austin testified that, in April of 2013, appellant tried to fight him at school because of “run ins” that Austin previously had with the gang known as MS-13. On August 19, 2013, Austin was called into the security office of the school.

He was warned that members of MS-13 were planning to fight him. Later that day, appellant, who was accompanied by Michael C. and Darwin M., followed Austin on his way to class and yelled “Salvatrucha.” Austin responded “I don’t give an F who you are,” and continued walking to class. Appellant, Michael and Darwin continued to follow Austin. Austin testified that all three wanted to fight him, “one on one.” Michael said, “Let’s fight,” and threw a punch at Austin, but missed.

Austin then “just went at it” and began ⁶⁷⁴ to pummel Michael, hitting him at least 25 times. Michael continued to fight back. According to Austin, appellant and Darwin “noticed that [Michael] was getting seriously beat” by Austin, and “jumped in” to the fight, trying to grab Austin and throw him to the ground. Austin testified that he threw appellant and Darwin off him and to the ground.

School security then broke up the fight, and everyone was taken into a security office. Sergeant George Norris, who was called as the State’s expert on MS-13 gangs in the Maryland area, explained that MS-13 stands for Mara Salvatrucha, and that the goal of MS-13 is to be “the most powerful or most controlling gang” in the community. Sergeant Norris testified that the members of MS-13 achieve this goal “through fear, intimidation and violence.” He explained that MS-13 members shout out their gang name to announce who they are and intimidate others. Sergeant Norris stated that Michael C. and Darwin M. were members or associates of MS-13, and that appellant was “at the least associated with MS-13.” Michael C. was called as a witness for the defense.

He testified that he was involved in a fight with Austin on August 19, 2013, but that Austin initiated the fight, and no one else was involved. He denied being a member of a gang, and denied having friends that are members of MS-13. He stated that he did not believe that appellant was involved in any gang activity. Additional facts will be introduced in the discussion as they become relevant.

DISCUSSION 1. Refusal to Make Statement Officer Daniel Lewis, an investigator counselor at High Point High School, testified that on the day in question, he responded to a call for an altercation outside in the courtyard. After describing how he and several of the security assistants broke up the fight, the following exchange occurred: ⁶⁷⁵ [PROSECUTOR]: Did the [appellant] say anything to you regarding the fight? OFFICER LEWIS: No, he actually refused to make a statement. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection.

Request for mistrial. THE COURT: Overruled. Request for mistrial denied. [PROSECUTOR]: So he refused to make a statement? OFFICER LEWIS: Right, we— [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, move for mistrial.

THE COURT: What is the basis for that? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, he has every right to implement his Fifth Amendment Right. By the State bringing it that he has implicated his Fifth Amendment Right, that violates the right itself and so Your Honor, you are not — he is not receiving a fair trial and that he made no statement, that cannot be used against him. [PROSECUTOR]: And Your Honor, it is not being used against him in any way. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Then it is irrelevant. THE COURT: Overruled, objection, [sic] Appellant argues that the court’s actions in overruling the objection constituted reversible error because post-arrest silence is inadmissible as substantive evidence of a criminal defendant’s guilt. The State responds preliminarily that this argument was not properly preserved for appellate review, because appellant’s argument focuses only on inadmissibility of post-arrest silence, and there is no evidence in the record that appellant had been placed under arrest at the time he refused to make a statement.

The State posits that the refusal to make a statement appeared to occur at the time Officer Lewis was breaking up the fight and prior to any arrest. Therefore, according to the State, the issue is whether the court should have admitted evidence of appellant’s prearrest silence. That issue was not put before the juvenile court and not argued on ⁶⁷⁶ appeal. Alternatively, the State maintains that any error was harmless.

It would have been error for the court to admit the fact of appellant’s silence into evidence regardless of whether the refusal took place prior to his arrest (and in the presence of Officer Lewis) or afterward. As the State concedes, “prearrest silence in police presence is not admissible as substantive evidence of guilt under Maryland evidence law.” Weitzel v. State, 384 Md. 451, 461 , 863 A.2d 999 (2004). And, as appellant points out, “[p]ost-arrest silence is inadmissible as substantive evidence of a criminal defendant’s guilt, regardless of whether that silence precedes the recitation to the defendant of Miranda advisements.” Kosh v. State, 382 Md. 218, 220 , 854 A.2d 1259 (2004). Our review of the record indicates that it is unclear whether the refusal to make a statement took place before or after appellant was arrested.

Assuming the issue was properly preserved, we conclude that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. After Officer Lewis mentioned that appellant refused to make a statement, the prosecutor indicated to the court that said refusal was not being used against appellant in any way, and she made no attempt to draw an inference of guilt from appellant’s silence in closing argument. In addition, there is no indication that the court was influenced by or relied on the evidence of appellant’s refusal to make a statement in its ruling. In short, no inference was argued, and none was drawn.

See Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659 , 350 A.2d 665 (1976) (error will be harmless when reviewing court, upon independent review, is able to declare a belief beyond a reasonable doubt that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the verdict). 2. Sufficiency of the Evidence The Court of Appeals has explained the standard of review in juvenile delinquency cases as follows: In a criminal case, the appropriate inquiry is not whether the reviewing court believes that the evidence establishes ⁶⁷⁷ guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but rather, whether after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. We have applied the same standard of review in juvenile delinquency cases. Consistently, we have held that the judgment of the trial court will not be disturbed unless the trial judge’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous.

In re Anthony W., 388 Md. 251, 261 , 879 A.2d 717 (2005) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Appellant was charged with a violation of Md.Code Ann., Criminal Law Article (“C.L.”) § 9-804 (2002, 2012 Repl. Vol.), which provides: § 9-804. Participation in a criminal gang prohibited.

(a) Prohibited acts. — A person may not: (1) participate in a criminal gang knowing that the members of the gang engage in a pattern of criminal gang activity; and (2) knowingly and willfully direct or participate in an underlying crime, or act by a juvenile that would be an underlying crime if committed by an adult, committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal gang. C.L. § 9-801(c) defines the term “criminal gang”: (c) “Criminal gang” means a group or association of three or more persons whose members: (1) individually or collectively engage in a pattern of criminal gang activity; (2) have as one of their primary objectives or activities the commission of one or more underlying crimes, including acts by juveniles that would be underlying crimes if committed by adults; and (3) have in common an over or covert organizational or command structure. C.L. § 9 — 801(d) defines “pattern of criminal gang activity” as “the commission of, attempted commission of, conspiracy to ⁶⁷⁸ commit, or solicitation of two or more underlying crimes or acts by a juvenile ... provided the crimes or acts were not part of the same incident.” Finally, C.L. § 9 —