In Re Lucas F.

GILBERT, Chief Judge. Seven year old Steven Wilson was brutally assaulted. As a result of that beating, he sustained a depressed fracture of the skull in addition to facial lacerations and abrasions of both knees. Despite being led on a false trail by Steven’s playmate, ten year old Lucas F., the police speedily concluded that Lucas was the assailant.

The District Court of Maryland for Montgomery County, sitting as a juvenile court, found that Lucas was a delinquent; it ordered him committed to the Alfred D. Noyes Children’s Detention Center. How those events occurred we now relate as we set the stage upon which this tragedy unfolded. ¹⁰⁰ Steven Leslie Wilson, Sr., the father of the injured boy, told the juvenile court that he returned home from work early in the afternoon of the day of the incident in order to “relieve the babysitter.” The sitter told Mr. Wilson that “Stevie” had been playing in the backyard with Lucas “and that she had told Stevie if he went any place to be home by 3:00.” Since Stevie was not in the yard and it was already half past that hour, the father looked “around the neighborhood” for his son. He even decided to check “the creek” area but did not find Stevie. He had just returned home when he saw Lucas pass the side door.

Lucas “proceeded to tell ... [Mr. Wilson] that ... [Lucas] and Stevie were playing at the creek and these big boys chased them with knives, and that he ran away and Stevie fell down and ... might be hurt.” Mr. Wilson, accompanied by Lucas, proceeded with dispatch to the creek. He saw his son’s crumpled body. He described his son as “kind of laying in ... an extended fetal position ... feet on the sand of the bank ... and his mouth in the water.” Stevie “was unconscious ... breathing very shallowly or not at all.” The police were summoned and Lucas supplied them with a description of what ultimately proved to be fictitious assailants. Lucas went so far as to assist the police artist in making composite sketches of the two mythical youths who allegedly were the culprits, but who were actually the products of Lucas’s imagination.

When Stevie regained consciousness, it was discovered that he suffered amnesia and was unable to recall the incident. Four days after the incident, Lucas was “picked up” as a runaway. He was transported to the Wheaton Police Station, and his mother was notified. She told the police that she would be at the station in approximately two hours.

Lucas’s attempt to “run away” focused the attention and suspicions of the investigating officers upon him. After questioning related to the assault, Lucas verbally admitted that he had fabricated the earlier story concerning ¹⁰¹ the two assailants. He said that Stevie was accidentally injured when he hit his head on the rocks while they were playing in the creek. Lucas was charged 1 and read his Miranda rights. 2 By that time his mother had arrived at the Wheaton station, but she was not informed that her ten year old son was being interrogated concerning the assault and battery of Stevie or that he had executed a waiver of his Miranda rights.

At the conclusion of a two-day trial in the District Court of Maryland for Montgomery County, sitting as a juvenile court, Lucas was found to be delinquent. On appeal to this Court, Lucas flails at the findings of the trial judge in a pentad of verbal barrages. He asserts: “1. [T]he court below erred in admitting the statement of a 10-year-old [who] was in police custody, where the statement was obtained (1) without giving Miranda warnings to the child or any accompanying adult and (2) on the basis of an improper inducement made to the child. 2. [T]he court below erred in admitting the statement of a 10-year-old child under police arrest without the presence of a parent or an attorney, where the child purportedly waived his constitutional rights by signing a police waiver form after a two minute explanation of rights by the police. 3. [T]he court below erred by refusing to permit or consider expert testimony for the respondent to challenge the competency of the 7-year-old alleged victim, where the expert was prepared to testify that the child had suffered a concussion and amnesia that rendered him unable to perceive or recall accurately the events surrounding his ¹⁰² injury, and where the expert had observed parental coaching of the alleged victim before the adjudicatory hearing. 4. [T]he trial court erred in refusing to recuse itself in light of the court’s acknowledged prehearing exposure to and reliance upon news media stories, ex parte communications by the sheriff’s office, and detailed knowledge of the findings and conclusions of the court Diagnostic Unit relating to Lucas, the incident, and his statements to police. 5. [T]he state sustained its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused 10-year-old had committed the wrongs alleged in the delinquency petition.” Miranda and the Ten Year Old Offender We view issues 1 and 2 as intertwined. We, therefore, shall consider both issues under the same general heading.

Initially, in any case involving a purported Miranda violation, a determination must be made as to whether the party was in custody at the time of interrogation. In Re: Shannon A., 60 Md.App. 399 , 483 A.2d 363 (1984). Miranda warnings are only required where there is a “custodial interrogation.” Miranda, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 . The Court of Appeals in Whitfield v. State, 287 Md. 124, 140 , 411 A.2d 415, 425 (1980), cert. dismissed, 446 U.S. 993 , 100 S.Ct. 2980 , 64 L.Ed.2d 850 (1980), said: “[T]he custody requirement of Miranda does not depend on the subjective intent of the law enforcement officer-interrogator but upon whether the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way or is placed in a situation in which he reasonably believes that his freedom of action or movement is restricted by such interrogation [Myers v. State, 3 Md.App. 534, 537 , 240 A.2d 288, 290 (1968).]” The Court opined that the particular sequence of events preceding and following interrogation may also be probative of custody. ¹⁰³ “[A court should look to] how the defendant got to the place of questioning—whether he came completely on his own, in response to a police request, or escorted by police officers.

Finally, what happened after the interrogation—whether the defendant left freely, was detained or arrested—may assist the court in determining whether the defendant, as a reasonable person, would have felt free to break off the questioning.” Whitfield, 287 Md. at 141 , 415 A.2d at 425 (citations omitted). Viewing the “factual setting surrounding the interrogation” in the present case, we hold that Lucas was significantly deprived of his freedom of action and was in custody within the meaning of Miranda . In the case of a juvenile, it is