In Re Ricky B.

Gilbert, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. THE PREFACE Being practical is often a short answer to a long problem. Sometimes, however, the short answer results in unnecessary complications. This appeal involves an apparent pragmatic conclusion reached by a trial judge in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County which, while seemingly practical, is incorrect. 1 We shall, for the reasons hereinafter stated, reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

THE FACTS The record before us discloses that the appellant, Ricky B., then 15 years of age, was charged in a series of juvenile petitions, 2 and that he was also charged under an eighteen ⁶⁴⁷ (18) count indictment 3 for offenses not within the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court. See Md. Courts and Judicial Proceedings Code Ann. § 3-804 (d). It developed that the appellant sought what has been stylistically known as a “reverse waiver.” He asked the circuit court to waive exclusive criminal jurisdiction over him and to refer the rape and related charges to the juvenile court. Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 594A; Kennedy v. State, 21 Md. App. 234 , 319 A.2d 850 (1974).

At the same time the State, pursuant to Courts Art. § 3-817, requested the juvenile court to waive jurisdiction over appellant so that the State could subject Ricky B. to the full panoply of the criminal law. The “reverse waiver” and the “waiver” petitions were set for hearing before the same judge on the same day. As it happened the “reyerse waiver” was the first matter considered. The hearing judge concluded that the appellant was “well beyond the amenability of the Juvenile Court to treat, or rehabilitate” appellant.

He declined to waive jurisdiction to the juvenile court. No immediate appeal has been nor may be taken from that decision. In re Appeal No. 507, 34 Md. App. 440 , 367 A.2d 553 (1977). The hearing judge then turned his attention to the State’s request for waiver from the juvenile court to the circuit court.

The judge said: “Call the juvenile numbers, and I will do that summarily, ... which I think the law provides for. Having just ruled in the criminal matter ... that he [appellant] would not be waived back [s/c] to Juvenile Court, I now find in the juvenile matter, summarily, that he should be waived up to the adult ⁶⁴⁸ court, and I will sign such a waiver order in each case.” THE LAW By Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 594A (b) the Legislature has mandated that: “In making a determination as to waiver of [criminal] jurisdiction the [hearing] court shall consider the following: (1) Age of child; (2) Mental and physical condition of child; (3) The child’s amenability to treatment in any institution, facility, or program available to delinquents; (4) The nature of the alleged offense; and (5) The public safety.” When a “reverse waiver” hearing is held, the burden of demonstrating that the waiver should be exercised is carried by the party initiating it, i.e., the juvenile. Kennedy v. State, supra at 240. The five factors of Article 27, § 594A (b) are also found, mot á mot, in Courts Art. § 3-817 (d).

The only variance appearing in section 3-817 (d) from that of Art. 27, § 594A (b) is the legislative fia tin the former that the hearing court must consider the following “criteria individually and in relation to each other on the record.” 4 In re Johnson, 17 Md. App. 705, 712 , 304 A.2d 859, 863 (1973). There is no real difference between Courts Art. § 3-817(d) and Article 27, § 594A (b) insofar as the legislative direction as to how the factors are to be weighed is concerned. We made clear in Kennedy v. State, supra, that the weighing of the factors, whether they appear in the Courts Art. § 3-817(d) or Article 27, § 594A (b), is “similar.” 21 Md. App. at 240 . Yet, ⁶⁴⁹ there is a difference in the manner in which the two statutes are applied.

When a juvenile stands accused of one of those offenses expressly excluded from juvenile court jurisdiction, he or she carries the burden of establishing, under the five factors of Art. 27, § 594A (b), that the adult or criminal court should waive jurisdiction to the juvenile court. He or she must demonstrate to the hearing judge that the “reverse waiver” is “in the interest of the