In Re Zephrin D.

⁷⁵⁷ ROSALYN B. BELL, Judge. Zephrin D., a juvenile, was found delinquent, and a judgment of restitution was ordered against his mother for damages to the vehicles he stole and for the cost of a rental car for the owners while their vehicles were being repaired. This appeal questions whether the trial court erred in including the cost of a rental car as a part of the restitution order. Zephrin was charged with stealing and defacing a 1984 Mazda automobile belonging to Jeffrey Wilson and a 1985 Mazda automobile belonging to Angela Sykes. 1 The facts provided to us in the record are minimal since Zephrin admitted his participation in these offenses.

Each victim submitted a Claim for Restitution listing the damages to his and her separate property and expenses incurred as a result of Zephrin’s unauthorized use of their vehicles. One of the expenses both victims listed was the cost of a rental vehicle used while their own cars were being repaired. Sykes listed the rental cost as $309.43. Wilson indicated that his insurance covered all of his rental cost except a $50 deductible that he paid.

The juvenile master recommended restitution against Zephrin’s mother in the amounts of $841.73 payable to Wilson and $536.14 payable to Sykes. These amounts included the costs of the rental cars. Pursuant to Rule 911(c), Zephrin filed exceptions to the juvenile master’s recommendations, challenging the restitution for the rental expense and requested a hearing on the record in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. At the hearing Zephrin’s counsel conceded Sykes’s rental cost as $309.43.

Neither party was able to obtain Wilson’s rental cost. The court denied the exception. On appeal Zephrin contests the inclu ⁷⁵⁸ sion of the cost of Sykes’s rental car in the restitution order. 2 Maryland Cts. & Jud.Proc.Code Ann. § 3-829 (1974, 1984 Repl-Vol.) governs the restitution available to victims of delinquent acts. The section provides in pertinent part: “(a) The court may enter a judgment of restitution against the parent of a child, or the child in any case in which the court finds a child has committed a delinquent act and during the commission of that delinquent act has: (1) Stolen, damaged, or destroyed the property of another; (2) Inflicted personal injury on another, requiring the injured person to incur medical, dental, hospital, or funeral expenses. “(b) Considering the age and circumstances of a child, the court may order the child to make restitution to the wronged party personally. “(c)(1) A judgment rendered under this section may not exceed: (i) As to property stolen or destroyed, the lesser of the fair market value of the property or $5,000; (ii) As to property damaged, the lesser of the amount of damage not to exceed the fair market value of the property damaged or $5,000; and (iii) As to personal injuries, inflicted, the lesser of the reasonable medical, dental, hospital, funeral, and burial expenses incurred by the injured person as a result of the injury or $5,000.” Appellant contends that special damages, or those out-of-pocket expenses that flow from the loss suffered but which are not necessarily expected, Gilbert, Gilbert & Gilbert, Maryland Tort Law Handbook § 25.1.1 (1986), are not within the plain meaning of subsection (c)(l)(ii).

The State argues that the purpose of the restitution statute is to ⁷⁵⁹ compensate victims of juvenile offenses and thus the Legislature intended subsection (c)(l)(ii) to be given its ordinary tort meaning to include special damages. The State also asserts that our decision in In re Appeal No. 321, 24 Md.App. 82 , 329 A.2d 113 (1974), is controlling. Since we agree with appellant that special damages are not recoverable under subsection (c)(l)(ii), we will consider each of the State’s arguments in turn. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 1.

Plain Meaning Under the common law in Maryland, absent proof of agency, parents are not vicariously liable for the wrongful acts of their minor children. In re: James D., 295 Md. 314, 317 , 455 A.2d 966 (1983). Section 3-829 alters this rule by imposing liability on the juvenile’s parent(s) where the child committed a delinquent act that caused injury to another. Exclusive of personal injury, the statute provides for some restitution to the victim where the juvenile either permanently deprived the victim of the property by stealing it or destroying it, or where the juvenile merely damaged the property.

Since the statute is in derogation of the common law, it must be strictly construed. Dillon v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 43 Md.App. 161, 166 , 403 A.2d 406 (1979). Section 3—829(c)(l)(ii) provides that “[a]s to property damaged,” recovery may be had for the “amount of damage” in a limited fashion. Appellant posits that since subsection (c)(l)(ii) expressly speaks “to property damaged,” only the amount for that actual property damage is recoverable.

Focusing on the phrase “amount of damage” in subsection (c)(l)(ii), the State argues that all amounts expended by a victim as a result of a delinquent act are recoverable. Were we to accept the State’s position, we would read the modifying phrase “[a]s to property damaged” out of the statute. “[A] statute, if reasonably possible, is to be read so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, ⁷⁶⁰ superfluous, meaningless, or nugatory.” Police Comm 'r v. Dowling, 281 Md. 412, 419 , 379 A.2d 1007 (1977). Since the phrase “ámount of damage” refers to the phrase “[a]s to property damaged,” the plain meaning of the language under subsection (c)(l)(ii) provides restitution only for actual physical damage to the property. To construe the phrase “amount of damage” in subsection (c)(l)(ii) to include special damages would create an inconsistency in the statute between subsections (c)(l)(i) and (ii).

Where the victim’s property is not recoverable because it was stolen or destroyed, the victim is limited under subsection (c)(l)(i) solely to receiving either “the lesser of the fair market value of the property or $5,000.” Special damages such as the cost of a rental vehicle, new license fees and higher insurance premiums are not available to these victims. Subsection (c)(l)(ii) differs from subsection (c)(l)(i) because it contains the additional phrase “amount of damage.” The State proffers that we should construe this phrase to provide compensation for both actual property damage and additional out-of-pocket loss. To do so, however, would grant broader recovery for additional expenses to the victim who needs only to repair his or her damaged property, while a similar recovery would not be available to the victim who must completely replace his or her stolen or destroyed property. This would be absurd and we should avoid imposing a construction on a statute that leads to results that are unreasonable, illogical or contrary to common sense.

Cider Barrel Mobile Home Court v. Eader, 287 Md. 571, 583 , 414 A.2d 1246 (1980). In conclusion, based on the plain meaning of subsection (c)(l)(ii), the phrase “amount of damage” excludes any out-of-pocket expenditure besides that for actual physical damage to the property itself. 2. The Statutory Scheme When construing one provision of a statute which is part of a statutory scheme, the legislative intent must be determined from the entire statute. Bridges v. Nicely, 304