Innerbichler v. Innerbichler

ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION HOLLANDER, Judge. This appeal arises from the dissolution of the marriage of Nicholas R. Innerbichler, appellant, and Carole Jean Innerbi-chler, appellee. 1 After more than fourteen years of marriage, the parties were granted a divorce by the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, pursuant to an order dated July 27, ²¹⁴ 1998, and modified on January 13, 1999. Two aspects of the court’s orders are at the heart of this appeal: 1) the monetary award to appellee, in the amount of $2,581,864.75, which was based, in part, on the court’s determination that the appreciation in value of appellant’s 51% ownership interest in Technical and Management Services Corporation (“TAMSCO”) constituted marital property; and 2) the court’s award to appellee of monthly alimony of $8000.00 for five years, followed by indefinite monthly alimony of $6,000.00. Appellant noted a timely appeal to this Court, 2 posing several questions for our consideration, which we have rephrased slightly: I. Did the trial court err in granting the monetary award to appellee by: A. Improperly finding that the increase in value in TAMSCO was marital property?

B. Failing to consider the tax liabilities of TAMSCO? C. Improperly calculating the premarital value of TAM-SCO?

II

Did the trial court err in the manner in which it required payment of the monetary award?

III

Did the trial court err in its granting of alimony to appellee? For the reasons stated below, we conclude that the court erred only with respect to its valuation of appellant’s premarital interest in TAMSCO. For that reason, we shall vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. ²¹⁵ FACTUAL SUMMARY The parties were married on January 21, 1984, when Mr. Innerbichler (the “Husband”) was 41 years old and appellee (the “Wife”) was 33. Although appellant had been married twice before, it was appellee’s first marriage.

The parties have one child, Michelle Nicole, who was born on May 1, 1986. Appellant also has three adult children from prior marriages. In 1995, after eleven years of marriage, the Husband moved out of the marital home. 3 On September 12, 1995, he filed a Complaint for Limited Divorce, and the Wife filed a counter-suit, seeking an absolute divorce on the ground of adultery. Her suit was later amended in court to include a two -year separation as an additional ground for divorce.

Trial consumed almost eight days in January and February 1998, at which the court heard testimony from thirteen witnesses, including the parties; Raymond Grossman, an economist who testified for appellant as an expert in business valuation and appraised TAMSCO; Larry Stokes, an accountant for TAMSCO; William Bilawa, appellant’s business partner; Charles Smolkin, appellee’s vocational expert; Lawrence J. Eisenberg, an ERISA and pension benefits expert who testified for the Husband; and Douglas S. Land, an expert in the field of business valuation who testified for the Wife. Numerous exhibits were also admitted into evidence. The primary disputes centered on the fair market value of TAM-SCO, whether the appreciation in value of TAMSCO constituted marital property, and, if so, the value of the marital interest. At the time of trial, appellant was 55 years old and resided with his paramour in a home that he purchased for about $600,000.00 and financed with a mortgage and a loan from his business.

Appellee was a 47-year-old high school graduate who had completed one semester of college. The trial culmi ²¹⁶ nated in a divorce based on the parties’ separation of two years. What follows is a summary of the evidence adduced at trial pertinent to the issues raised on appeal. In October 1982, more than one year prior to the parties’ marriage, appellant co-founded TAMSCO with his friend and colleague, William Bilawa.

At the time, appellant was employed by Lockheed Corporation, and remained employed there until June 1983; in the evenings, appellant worked for TAMSCO. The company provides technical and management services to agencies of the federal government and to the private sector in various disciplines, including program management, integrated logistics support, software development, and data management. At the relevant time, appellant owned 51% of TAMSCO and Bilawa owned a 49% interest in the company. 4 When TAMSCO was founded, appellant was married to Barbara Innerbichler (“Barbara”). In 1983, as part of his divorce settlement with Barbara, appellant claimed that he waived his interest in the home that they occupied, allegedly worth about $300,000.00, in exchange for Barbara’s agreement to waive her claim to TAMSCO, which appellant contends was worth at least as much as the home. 5 In June 1983, about six months before appellant’s marriage to appellee, appellant submitted an application on behalf of TAMSCO to the United States Small Business Administration (“SBA”) to obtain “8(a) certification.” According to appellant, who is an Hispanic American, the “8(a) program” was established during the Nixon years to assist small businesses owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged persons.

In order to qualify for such certification, the appli ²¹⁷ cant company must demonstrate reasonable prospects for business success as well as financial stability and viability. Moreover, the disadvantaged individual upon whom eligibility is based must own at least 51% of the applicant business. Appellee insists that TAMSCO was in its “embryonic stages” when the parties were first married. Ample evidence was presented at trial showing that TAMSCO was in its fledgling stage of development at the time of the marriage.

According to the 8(a) application, submitted in June 1988, TAMSCO was “a new business” with only two employees, and its operating equipment consisted of two electric typewriters, a bookcase, a file cabinet, a conference table, and chairs, having a total value of less than $2,000.00. Although appellant maintains in his brief that, at the time of TAMSCO’s 8(a) application, TAMSCO “had already completed contracts of significant value and had other contracts pending, all of which established its viability to the SBA,” the SBA application listed only two contracts that TAMSCO had completed in the preceding three years: a $18,000.00 contract commenced in February 1983 and a $6,000.00 contract completed in May 1983. The application also identified a contract of $131,000.00 and described it as “In Progress.” Further, the application reflected that financing was “generally unavailable” to TAM-SCO, either for working capital or long term loans, and noted that vendors would not extend “normal credit terms.” Moreover, TAMSCO operated from Bilawa’s kitchen until August 1984, when it opened its first office in Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. In addition, TAMSCO’s income tax return for 1983 revealed that the company had only $52,076.00 in gross receipts and $41,268.00 in assets.

On April 14, 1984, some 83 days after the parties’ marriage, TAMSCO obtained the desired 8(a) certification. It is undisputed that the 8(a) program enabled TAMSCO to obtain lucrative sole source government contracts, the first of which was awarded to TAMSCO in September 1984. TAMSCO grew rapidly after the award of the 8(a) certification. For fiscal year 1983, the company reported approximately $52,-000.00 in revenues, and $188,000.00 in revenues for fiscal year ²¹⁸ 1984.

By the end of fiscal year 1992, TAMSCO had been awarded contracts totaling $356,439,719. For 1995, TAMSCO generated revenues of $46 million and employed over 500 people. In 1996, TAMSCO earned $47,000,000.00 in revenues, followed by $51,000,000.00 for fiscal year 1997. From 1984 through 1989, approximately 85% of TAMSCO’s work related to 8(a) contracts, and from 1989 until 1993, approximately 75% of TAMSCO’s work derived from those contracts.

When TAMSCO left the SBA’s 8(a) program in 1993, it had already received approximately $356,000,000.00 in 8(a) revenue. By the time of the divorce trial, however, TAMSCO was no longer eligible to participate in the SBA’s 8(a) program, although it still had residual 8(a) business. According to appellant, because TAMSCO could no longer “pursue contracts in a non-competitive marketplace,” its business position had declined. Nevertheless, at the time of trial, appellant was earning in excess of $650,000.00 in annual salary.

Although appellant concedes that most of TAMSCO’s lucrative contracts were obtained and performed after his marriage to appellee, he maintains that neither TAMSCO nor the post-marriage appreciation in the company’s value constituted marital property. He argues that the company was created before the marriage and its success was directly linked to an Army contract awarded prior to the marriage. Appellant points out that, in October 1993, while the 8(a) application was still pending, TAMSCO was notified that it had “won” a non-8(a) contract with the Army, worth in excess of one million dollars. Thus, he claims that over 97% of TAMSCO’s government contracts were “traceable to contracts won at the company’s inception and prior to the marriage.” To support his position at trial, appellant submitted an exhibit depicting the success of TAMSCO as a “family tree,” with the 8(a) Army contract as the trunk.

The branches of the tree refer to numerous other contracts with the government, including the Coast Guard and the Air Force, which generated millions of dollars in revenue for TAMSCO. Although the Army contract ²¹⁹ was “awarded” on January 1, 1984, shortly before the parties’ marriage, performance of the Army contract did not begin until the summer of 1984, after the parties were married. At trial, appellant also maintained that he was not solely responsible for TAMSCO’s success. To the contrary, he asserted that both he and Bilawa were responsible for making many of the important corporate decisions.

Appellant also contends here, as he did below, that TAMSCO “flourished” as a result of many “external factors” unrelated to appellant, including the “dramatic increase in defense spending” and “the expanding defense industry during the Reagan Administration,” as well as the company’s 8(a) status. Nevertheless, the record includes substantial evidence establishing that appellant was the architect of TAMSCO’s growth. For example, appellant served as the President and Chief Executive Officer of TAMSCO from its inception and Bilawa reported to him. Moreover, a resolution adopted by TAMSCO’s Board of Directors affirmed appellant’s “total control of the day-to-day operation” of TAMSCO, with authority to give “final approval on all matters concerning the operation of the corporation.” Additionally, an Informal Action of the Board in July 1988 recognized appellant’s efforts and role in TAMSCO’s growth and financial stability.

Further, appellant acknowledged that he functioned as TAMSCO’s “quarterback” with respect to seeking and performing contracts. Indeed, in his trial testimony, appellant took credit for TAMSCO’s success, stating: “I’ve done a good job in listening to my people and taking that company where it should have gone.” At his deposition, about which appellant was questioned at trial, appellant described his role at TAM-SCO, stating: I am responsible for the day-to-day operation of the company, make major decisions with respect to what we are going to bid on, what we are not going to bid on, what we are going to market, how the various operations are going at a high level. ²²⁰ Appellant’s testimony on December 13, 1985, before the United States House of Representatives Committee on Small Business, was also admitted in evidence. There, appellant acknowledged that the By-Laws gave him “complete control of the corporation.” As corporate president, he recognized that his powers and duties included “control of all [TAM-SCO’s] business affairs and properties.” Further, appellant said: “As any manager and employee of TAMSCO or as my peers in the industry can attest, I always have maintained control of [TAMSCO’s] operation and retain, in all matters, final approval relative to operations.” Bilawa conceded at trial that appellant consistently made the final decisions regarding TAMSCO. He testified: If [decisions are] purely contractual issues, then normally I make them, where already under contract.

If they’re strategic, going off and pursue some new work or spend dollars to, to pursue our other work, proposal dollars, things like that, [appellant] and I normally discuss that together and usually with our staff. And finally, based on what the information is that we are, are looking at, [appellant] finally makes the decision, yes or no, up or down. As we noted, a central point of contention concerned the value of TAMSCO. Evidence was presented as to two disputes between TAMSCO and the IRS and their effect on TAMSCO’s value.

One dispute concerned the company’s 1990-1992 corporate income tax returns and the other involved its 401(k) plan. Because TAMSCO had mistakenly filed Subchapter C tax returns from 1985 through the fiscal year ending September 30, 1992, the IRS sought to terminate its status as a Subchap-ter S corporation. As of trial, the IRS had already issued tax deficiencies against TAMSCO in the amount of $2,000,000. Moreover, by the time of trial, TAMSCO had lost at least three administrative hearings, but it had not yet capitulated.

Instead, TAMSCO’s appeal to the United States Tax Court was pending, with a hearing set for February 19, 1998. Larry Stokes, TAMSCO’s accountant, testified as an expert. He ²²¹ said that if TAMSCO did not prevail, it could face a tax liability of almost nine million dollars, including interest and costs, for the years 1990-1997. The record contains correspondence authored by Lawrence Garr, Esquire, an attorney representing TAMSCO in the tax matter. 6 In a letter of March 15, 1996, written by Garr to Chevy Chase Bank, one of TAMSCO’s lenders, Garr stated, in pertinent part: The purpose of this letter is to provide you with the evidence and legal theories which will be provided to the IRS.

They demonstrate that TAMSCO never revoked its subchapter S election and its shareholders never filed shareholder consents consenting to any revocation. Based on the facts of this case, TAMSCO can demonstrate that its sub-chapter C status was not revoked or otherwise terminated in 1995 or any other year prior to the formation of its subsidiary in 1992. No court would hold otherwise. On March 20, 1997, Garr wrote another letter to Chevy Chase Bank, stating: “[W]e continue to be optimistic that the legal analysis set forth in our letter to you and in the ruling request which was attached to it is correct and that TAMSCO will ultimately prevail.” On September 12, 1997, Garr corresponded with Crestar Bank, another lender, enclosing copies of the 1996 and 1997 letters to Chevy Chase Bank.

Garr advised Crestar that it was “expressly authorized to rely [on the letters] as if they had been addressed to you, we are optimistic our legal argument will be sustained, either by concession or a favorable decision by the United States Tax Court.” Evidence was also adduced that the IRS had begun an audit of TAMSCO’s 401 (k) Plan for 1995. Lawrence Eisenberg, an ERISA and pension benefits expert, testified for TAMSCO as to that dispute. He said that, at the “high end of possibilities,” the IRS could disqualify TAMSCO’s 401 (k) Plan and impose liabilities of as much as $2,000,000.00. On the other ²²² hand, he opined that the “low end” of possibilities ranged between $200,000.00 and $250,000.00 in liability, with his “best estimate” of liability ranging between $200,000.00 and $500,-000.00.

Appellee did not present evidence to contradict Eisen-berg’s opinion, but suggested that, if the company is liable, it might pursue a claim to recover from the Plan’s administrator. Douglas Land, an expert in business evaluation who testified for the Wife, valued TAMSCO at between $8.3 million and $8.5 million. He also calculated the value of appellant’s 51% interest in TAMSCO at between $4,150,000.00 and $4,250,-000.00. Land did not reduce the fair market value of TAM-SCO due to the company’s disputes with the IRS, because the potential tax liabilities had “never been reflected on financial statements,” and the company “represented to the bank [that it] was not an issue that was going to be adverse to the company.” Raymond Grossman, an economist, testified as an expert for the Husband.

He estimated the present value of TAMSCO at $6,555,000.00. According to Grossman, TAMSCO’s value was adversely affected by the two disputes with the IRS. As to the Subchapter S matter, he claimed that TAMSCO had a potential tax liability of $3,233,000.00, which he assumed would occur in 1999. Grossman also testified to a projected liability of $709,000.00 as a result of the 401(k) dispute.

Moreover, he believed that TAMSCO suffered a “distinct lack of saleability. ...” After using alternative approaches to valuation, he said: “In my opinion, three million is the best number” for the fair market value of TAMSCO. Accordingly, he valued the Husband’s 51% interest in TAMSCO at $1,530,000.00. The following exchange is relevant. [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: [Y]ou heard the potential [liability] of the S corp is nine million, the potential of the 401-K is over two million. You didn’t subtract eleven million from the assets, did you? [MR.

GROSSMAN]: No. Based upon the estimates that we had for the impact of the IRS issue and 401-K and the timing of those processes as best it could be estimated, we ²²³ estimated an impact by the end of fiscal [year] 1999 and then present valued that. Appellee sought to establish that she had no prospects for lucrative employment. When the parties wed, appellee was employed in a secretarial capacity at the National Academy of Sciences, where she worked for five years prior to the marriage and almost two years thereafter. Her responsibilities included scheduling appointments, typing, answering phones, filing, and word processing.

Upon departure from that job, her salary was $26,000.00. In September 1985, appellee began to work as TAMSCO’s personnel director, earning approximately $65,000.00 per year. Appellee worked full-time in that capacity for five years, and thirty hours a week once the couple’s child started school. Although the Wife had employees at TAMSCO who reported to her, she maintained that she was not qualified for the position she held at TAMSCO, and that others executed the functions she could not perform.

Thus, she asserted that she could not find employment comparable to her TAMSCO position. She also claimed that she suffered from carpal tunnel syndrome in both wrists, which prevented her from performing work as a secretary. Ms. Innerbichler explained that, in view of her lack of skills and her physical condition, she had decided to become a preschool teacher, a position for which she was also unqualified. Appellee presented testimony that it would take at least five years of education for her to obtain the requisite degree, at which time she would be 52 years of age and could expect to earn $26,000.00 per year, the same salary she was earning in 1985.

In an effort to justify her change of careers, appellee argued at trial that she was overcompensated by TAMSCO for her services. In 1991, appellee began psychological treatment for depression and, at the time of trial, she wTas taking Zoloft, a prescription medicine, for that condition. In addition to her work outside the home, appellee served as the primary caretaker for the couple’s home and child. Indeed, the trial judge ²²⁴ found that the Wife had “almost exclusive responsibility” for the home, the couple’s child, and for the care of appellant’s three other children.

By 1994, appellant had developed a serious gambling problem. He began a treatment program in April 1997 for a gambling addiction. Apparently, he has not gambled since then. The parties disagreed about the extent to which appellant’s gambling problem resulted in the dissipation of marital funds.

On July 27, 1998, the court issued a thorough and well-reasoned opinion and order. 7 The court awarded appellee monthly alimony of $8,000.00 for five years, based, in part, on appellee’s anticipated educational expenses. That was followed by an award of indefinite monthly alimony of $6,000.00, based on the court’s finding of an unconscionable disparity in income even if the Wife becomes as self-supporting as possible. Additionally, the court initially granted a monetary award to the Wife in the amount of $2,880,000.00. The monetary award was based largely on the court’s determination as to TAMSCO’s value.

The court expressly indicated that it found the testimony of the Wife’s expert as to TAMSCO’s value “more persuasive” than appellant’s expert. Based on the opinion of the Wife’s expert, the court concluded that TAMSCO had a fair market value of $8.3 million. The court also determined that appellant’s 51% ownership interest in TAMSCO was worth $4,233,000.00, and that appellant’s premarital interest in TAMSCO was worth $153,000.00. Additionally, the court found that the post-marriage “increase in value of TAMSCO is marital,” and that “the Husband’s share (51%) of the increased value of TAMSCO stock is marital,” because TAMSCO’s “success is attributable to a ²²⁵ large degree to the work efforts of the Husband throughout the marriage.” The court explained: “He was the president of the company and was more responsible for the mission and rating of TAMSCO than his partner.

He made the ultimate decisions on the contracts and was actively involved in making presentations to the early contracting parties which generated the value of TAMSCO.” The judge also relied on an informal action of TAMSCO’s Board of Directors in July 1988, which acknowledged that “without [appellant] and his personal efforts, the contracts, the past corporate growth and financial stability would not have been realized by the corporation.” Further, the court observed that TAMSCO earned less than $60,000.00 before the marriage, and that most of the “contracts which formed the basis of TAMSCO’s value were entered into after the marriage.” The court also found that the parties had substantial other marital property, worth almost $1.5 million. In calculating the value of the parties’ other marital property, however, the court rejected the Wife’s request to include appellant’s investment of almost $4 million dollars of marital funds to launch two business ventures, one known as “Sea-Mats” and the other referred to as “TRAMS.” Although appellant and his partner invested approximately $6.2 million in Sea-Mats, the court relied on Grossman, appellant’s expert, who testified that Sea-Mats had no present value and its future value was speculative. Therefore, the court rejected the Wife’s attempt to value the Husband’s interest in Sea Mats at its historical cost, which would have recognized the $3 million that had been invested by Mr. Innerbichler. Appellant and his business partner also invested approximately $1,200,000.00 in TRAMS.

Like Sea-Mats, it was not financially profitable at the time of trial. Therefore, the court declined to recognize the $600,000.00 that had been invested for the Husband’s interest. Following post-trial motions, the court entered a revised order on January 28, 1999, in which it concluded that the total marital value of TAMSCO was $4,080,000.00. Further, it ²²⁶ determined that the total value of marital assets, including TAMSCO, equaled $5,576,280.50.

Exclusive of TAMSCO, the court found that appellee had $74,653.00 in property titled to her, appellant had property worth $1,367,991.50 titled to him, and the parties had $53,636.00 in joint property. After awarding appellee $104,804.50 as her share of appellant’s pension, the court recalculated the monetary award and reduced it to $2,581,864.75. The court then ordered appellant to make full payment of that sum over a five year period, without interest. Of that sum, $430,310.79 was due by July 27,1999.

We shall include additional facts in our discussion. DISCUSSION A. As we noted, the court determined that TAMSCO had a value of $8,300,000.00, and appellant’s 51% ownership interest amounted to $4,233,000.00. After deducting appellant’s premarital interest in TAMSCO of $153,000.00, the court arrived at the sum of $4,080,000.00 as the post-marital value of appellant’s 51% interest. In effect, the trial court attributed all of the appreciation to appellant’s efforts; 51% of that appreciation, corresponding to appellant’s ownership interest, represented marital property for purposes of the monetary award.

The court then concluded that appellee was entitled to half of the marital property; her share amounted to $2,788,-140.25. After deducting $104,804.50 for the pension transfer, and $74,653.00 for the marital property titled in appellee’s name, the court granted the Wife a monetary award of $2,581,864.75. Title 8 of the Family Law Article of the Maryland Code provides for the equitable distribution of marital property. “‘Marital Property’ means the property, however titled, acquired by 1 or both parties during the marriage.” F.L. § 8-201(e)(1). Pursuant to F.L. § 8-201(e)(3), marital property does not include property that is: (i) acquired before the marriage; ²²⁷ (ii) acquired by inheritance or gift from a third party; (iii) excluded by valid agreement; or (iv) directly traceable to any of these sources.

Property that is initially non-marital can become marital, however. See Brodak v. Brodak, 294 Md. 10, 26-27 , 447 A.2d 847 (1982). Moreover, the party who asserts a marital interest in property bears the burden of producing evidence as to the identity of the property. Noffsinger v. Noffsinger, 95 Md.App. 265, 281 , 620 A.2d 415 , cert. denied, 331 Md. 197 , 627 A.2d 539 (1993).

Conversely, “[t]he party seeking to demonstrate that particular property acquired during the marriage is nonmarital must trace the property to a nonmarital source.” Id. at 283 , 620 A.2d 415 ; see Golden v. Golden, 116 Md.App. 190, 205 , 695 A.2d 1231 , cert. denied, 347 Md. 681 , 702 A.2d 290 (1997) (recognizing that the increased value of property acquired during the marriage is marital property, unless it can be directly traced to a non-marital source). See also Harper v. Harper, 294 Md. 54, 69-70 , 448 A.2d 916 (1982). If a property interest cannot be traced to a nonmarital source, it is considered marital property. Noffsinger, 95 Md.App. at 281 , 620 A.2d 415 ; see Melrod v. Melrod, 83 Md.App. 180, 187 , 574 A.2d 1 , cert. denied, 321 Md. 67 , 580 A.2d 1077 (1990).

Under circumstances when the division of marital property by title is inequitable, the court may adjust the equities by granting a monetary award. See Long v. Long, 129 Md.App. 554, 579 , 743 A.2d 281 (2000) (recognizing that the judge has “all the discretion and flexibility he needs to reach a truly equitable outcome.”) In Ward v. Ward, 52 Md.App. 336, 339-40 , 449 A.2d 443 (1982), we explained the concept of the monetary award, stating: The monetary award is ... an addition to and not a substitution for a legal division of the property accumulated during marriage, according to title. It is “intended to compensate a spouse who holds title to less than an equitable portion” of that property.... What triggers operation of the statute is the claim that a division of the parties’ ²²⁸ property according to its title would create an inequity which would be overcomé through a monetary award.

(Internal citation omitted). When a party petitions for a monetary award, the trial court must first' follow a three-step procedure. Md.Code (1984, 1999 Repl.Vol.), §§ 8-203, 8-204, 8-205 of the Family Law Article (“F.L.”). See Ware v. Ware, 131 Md.App. 207, 213 , 748 A.2d 1031 (2000); Doser v. Doser, 106 Md.App. 329, 349-50 , 664 A.2d 453 (1995).

First, for each disputed item of property, the court must determine whether it is marital or nonmarital. F.L. §§ 8-201(e)(1); 8-203. Second, the court must determine the value of all marital property. F.L. § 8-204.

Third, the court must decide if the division of marital property according to title will be unfair; if so, the court may make a monetary award to rectify any inequity “created by the way in which property acquired during marriage happened to be titled.” Doser, 106 Md.App. at 349 , 664 A.2d 453 ; see F.L. § 8-205(a); Dobbyn v. Dobbyn, 57 Md.App. 662, 679 , 471 A.2d 1068 (1984). In doing so, the court must consider the statutory factors contained in F.L. § 8-205(b). Ware, 131 Md.App. at 213-14 , 748 A.2d 1031 ; Doser, 106 Md.App. at 350 , 664 A.2d 453 . F.L. § 8-205(b) states: (b) Factors in determining amount and method of payment or terms of transfer. — The court shall determine the amount and the method of payment of a monetary award, or the terms of the transfer of the interest in the pension, retirement, profit sharing, or deferred compensation plan, or both, after considering each of the following factors: (1) the contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the well-being of the family; (2) the value of all property interests of each party; (3) the economic circumstances of each party at the time the award is to be made; (4) the circumstances that contributed to the estrangement of the parties; (5) the duration of the marriage; ²²⁹ (6) the age of each party; (7) the physical and mental condition of each party; (8) how and when specific marital property or interest in the pension, retirement, profit sharing, or deferred compensation plan, was acquired, including the effort expended by each party in accumulating the marital property or the interest in the pension, retirement, profit sharing, or deferred compensation plan, or both; (9) the contribution by either party of property described in § 8-201(e)(3) of this subtitle to the acquisition of real property held by the parties as tenants by the entirety; (10) any award of alimony and any award or other provision that the court has made with respect to family use personal property or the family home; and (11) any other factor that the court considers necessary or appropriate to consider in order to arrive at a fair and equitable monetary award or transfer of an interest in the pension, retirement, profit sharing, or deferred compensation plan, or both.

The standard of review governing the court’s determination as to marital property is relevant here. Ordinarily, it is a question of fact as to whether all or a portion of an asset is marital or non-marital property. Findings of this type are subject to review under the clearly erroneous standard embodied by Md. Rule 8-131(c); we will not disturb a factual finding unless it is clearly erroneous. Noffsinger, 95 Md.App. at 285 , 620 A.2d 415 (citation omitted); Hollander v. Hollander, 89 Md.App. 156, 175 , 597 A.2d 1012 (1991).

Md. Rule 8-131(c) states: When an action has been tried without a jury, the appellate court will review the case on both the law and the evidence. It will not set aside the judgment of the trial court on the evidence unless clearly erroneous, and will give due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. See Oliver v. Hays, 121 Md.App. 292, 305-06 , 708 A.2d 1140 (1998); Nicholson Air Servs., Inc. v. Board of County ²³⁰ Comm’rs, 120 Md.App. 47, 66-67 , 706 A.2d 124 (1998). When the trial court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, the findings are not clearly erroneous.

Ryan v. Thurston, 276 Md. 390, 392 , 347 A.2d 834 (1975); Sea Watch Stores Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Council of Unit Owners of Sea Watch Condominium, 115 Md.App. 5, 31 , 691 A.2d 750 , cert. dismissed, 347 Md. 622 , 702 A.2d 260 (1997). With respect to the ultimate decision regarding whether to grant a monetary award and the amount of such an award, a discretionary standard of review applies. Alston v. Alston, 331 Md. 496, 504 , 629 A.2d 70 (1993); Ware, 131 Md.App. at 214 , 748 A.2d 1031 ; Gallagher v. Gallagher, 118 Md.App. 567, 576 , 703 A.2d 850 (1997); Doser, 106 Md.App. at 350 , 664 A.2d 453 .

This means that we may not substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder, even if we might have reached a different result. As we noted earlier, the trial court made several critical findings as to TAMSCO, including that the appreciation of TAMSCO constituted marital property because the company’s dramatic success was “attributable to a large degree to the work efforts” of appellant. For purposes of calculating the monetary award, the court also concluded that 51% of that appreciation, corresponding to appellant’s ownership interest in the company, was marital property. As we previously observed, appellant contends that the court erred in finding that TAMSCO constituted marital property.

He argues that “TAMSCO was brought into the marriage as an established, flourishing non-marital asset. By the time the parties married, the ground work had already been laid to make TAMSCO a success.” In addition, the Husband quarrels with the court’s decision to attribute the appreciation of TAMSCO solely to his efforts. He maintains that TAM-SCO’s growth was the result of the efforts of many people as well as several other factors, such as the thriving defense industry. In his view, “[t]his is a classic case of being in the right place at the right time.” Moreover, appellant complains that the court should not have treated 51% of the appreciation ²³¹ as marital property, merely because he owned 51% of the company.

Appellant asserts that the court was required to ascertain the precise portion of TAMSCO’s increase in value for 'which appellant was responsible, and that only the portion attributable to his work efforts could qualify as marital property. The court was not clearly erroneous in rejecting appellant’s claim that TAMSCO was entirely non-marital property. Although it is undisputed that TAMSCO was created before the marriage, the evidence that we summarized earlier supported the court’s conclusion that TAMSCO’s value soared after the marriage. For example, when TAMSCO submitted its application for SBA 8(a) certification in June 1983, it had only completed a $13,000.00 contract and a $6,000.00 contract, and a $131,000.00 contract was in progress.

Moreover, TAM-SCO owned little in the way of tangible property. At the time of the marriage, the business had only two full-time employees and operated from Bilawa’s kitchen. TAMSCO received its 8(a) certification after the marriage, and all of the 8(a) contracts were performed during the marriage. By the time TAMSCO graduated from the SBA Section 8(a) program in 1993, it had received over $356,000,000.00 in Section 8(a) revenue, placing it among the top 10 such firms nationally.

Appellant also challenges the court’s decision to treat all of the appreciation as marital property. He relies on the court’s own acknowledgment that appellant was merely responsible, “to a large degree” (and thus not entirely), for the increased value. On the other hand, appellant also seems to suggest that the court miscalculated the monetary award, because it did not find that all of the appreciation was marital property. We are of the view that the court found that all of TAM-SCO’s appreciation constituted marital property, and it attributed all of the appreciation to appellant’s work efforts.

After comparing the financial status of TAMSCO before and after the marriage, the court focused on the extent of appellant’s role in the corporation and his work efforts on behalf of ²³² TAMSCO, concluding that “the increase in value of TAMSCO is marital----” (Emphasis added). Significantly, the court did not qualify its statement by saying words to the effect that some of the increase or part of the increase in value is marital. The common sense construction of the court’s pronouncement is that it determined that all of the appreciation was marital. Moreover, notwithstanding the court’s statement that appellant was responsible “to a large degree” for TAMSCO’s success, we are satisfied that the court did not err, on the record before it, when it attributed all of the appreciation to appellant’s efforts for purposes of calculating the monetary award.

It follows that