Jackson v. Jackson

Marbury, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This case began when a petition and caveat to the alleged Last Will and Testament of Thomas J. Jackson, deceased, was filed in the Orphans’ Court for Montgomery County, Maryland, by his son, Andrew Jackson, appellant. After issues were framed they were transferred to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County for trial by jury, judge Mathias presiding. At the close of the caveator’s case the judge granted the motion of the caveatee, Helen T. Jackson, appellee, for a directed verdict sustaining the validity of the will, resulting in this appeal.

The deceased was born January 25, 1892, in Columbia, Tennessee. He was a lawyer and after serving for seventeen years in this capacity in the United States Army, beginning in the mid-1930’s he actively engaged in private practice in the District of Columbia and Maryland. Mr. Jackson appears to have continued his practice until late in 1961 or early in 1962, as evidenced by a letter dated January 12, 1962, in which he advised a client that he was “rather ill and discontinuing my ac ¹⁷² tive practice.” He was first married in 1919 to Raymonde Vereouter Jackson and two sons were born of that union before the marriage was terminated by divorce in 1926. These children were Andrew Jackson, the caveator, and John E. Jackson, his brother.

The decedent married Helen T. Jackson, the appellee-caveatee, in 1947. There was apparently no issue born of this marriage. The will involved here was dated April 25, 1962, and contains nine numbered, concise paragraphs. The language of the will indicates that it was prepared by an attorney.

The first paragraph revokes prior wills. The second paragraph directs the payment of debts, expenses of the testator’s last illness and funeral expenses. The third paragraph provides: “3. I give and bequeath to my son Andrew Jackson twenty (20) shares of American Telephone & Telegraph stock.” The fourth paragraph bequeaths and devises any real estate, and improvements, in the State of Alabama to John E. Jackson.

The fifth paragraph bequeaths and devises to Helen T. Jackson any real estate, with improvements thereon, within the States of Virginia, Maryland, Tennessee, and the District of Columbia. The sixth paragraph is a residuary clause, leaving all of the remaining real and personal property to Helen T. Jackson. The seventh paragraph provides that if anyone refuses to accept anything under the will, it is to be considered as part of the residue. The eighth paragraph provides that anyone attempting to contest this will shall receive nothing under it.

The ninth paragraph appoints Helen T. Jackson as executrix of the will, to serve without bond, and, if in case of her prior death or refusal to serve, that his son John E. Jackson serve as executor, likewise without bond. Mr. Jackson died July 19, 1965, leaving as survivors Helen T. Jackson, his wife, and two sons, John E. Jackson, and Andrew Jackson, the appellant here. The testator’s estate was valued at $156,121.35, as shown in the first account of the administratrix pendente lite, approved on May 29, 1967. The testator’s son, John E. Jackson, consented to the will being admitted to probate and requested that letters testamentary be granted to Helen T. Jackson, as executrix named in the will.

It was conceded at the trial that the will was properly executed. During the trial evidence was offered by the caveator ¹⁷³ bearing only upon the issues of undue influence and mental capacity of the testator. On this appeal the caveator concedes that no legally sufficient evidence was produced justifying the submission to the jury of the issue concerning undue influence. The sole issue involved here relates to the testator’s testamentary capacity.

The appellant first assigns error in the ruling of the trial court that certain military medical records from 1934 to 1960 were not admissible in evidence. These records were offered for the purpose of proving that the testator was not of sound mind at the time the will was executed but when counsel for the appellant offered these records for admission his proffer included the following: that the testator was admitted to an army hospital in 1934 for mental observation; that he was found fit and returned to duty; that he subsequently received a Section B discharge, which meant that he was not qualified to perform the duties assigned to him (but not giving reasons for lack of qualification) ; that in 1938 there was a diagnosis of arteriosclerosis and this was reaffirmed in 1950; that in 1957 he suffered a heart attack; and that in 1958 he underwent an operation for a resection in his leg and that at this time the presence of the arteriosclerotic condition was again confirmed. Even if admitted in evidence, none of these facts contained within the records would have shown that the testator was not of sound and disposing mind when the will was executed. Thus there could have been no prejudice in excluding them.

We do