Jacobs v. Adams

BLOOM, Judge. We have consolidated these three cases because they present almost identical scenarios and legal issues. Each case arose from a motor vehicle collision in the District of Columbia, and in each case the parties were residents of Maryland when suit was filed. In two of the cases, motions for summary judgment were granted; in the third case, the circuit court granted a motion to dismiss.

The adjudication in each case was based upon a District of Columbia statute, referred to as the “No-Fault Insurance Law,” which, in effect, prohibited the maintenance of a civil action based on liability against any person with respect to injuries arising from motor vehicle accidents in the District of Columbia unless, inter alia, medical expenses of a victim exceed $5000. The circuit court ruled in each case that the law of the District of Columbia applied, thus barring the action. The plaintiff in each case noted a timely appeal. The Facts as Alleged and the Proceedings Below On November 10, 1983, appellant Karen Randolph Stephenson, driving her automobile on Harewood Road, N.E., Washington, D.C., brought it to a stop preparatory to making a left turn onto an intersecting street.

Appellee Peter Tseronis drove his car into the rear of the Stephenson vehicle, allegedly injuring Stephenson’s head, neck, and back. Asserting that Tseronis was negligent, she filed suit against him in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, seeking damages for medical expenses, lost wages, and pain and suffering as well as damage to her automobile. Stephenson stated in her answers to interrogatories that her medical expenses amounted to $540. Tseronis filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted.

The court denied Stephenson’s motion for reconsideration. ⁷⁸⁴ On November 11, 1983,. on Waterside Drive in Washington, D.C., appellant Philip Jacobs was injured when his car was struck by a car driven by appellee John L. Adams. Jacobs sued Adams in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. The parties agree that Jacobs’s medical expenses were less than $5000. The court granted Adam’s motion to dismiss.

(Although Jacobs was a resident of the District of Columbia at the time of the accident, he had moved to Maryland before he filed suit.) On December 5, 1983, in the District of Columbia, appellant Ranzeno Barnes was injured in a collision between his car and a vehicle driven by appellee Robert Cauthen. Barnes sued Cauthen in the District Court for Prince George’s County. Cauthen filed a demand for a jury trial, and the case was removed to the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. Barnes sought compensatory damages of $10,000.00, including $385.00 for medical expenses and $153.21 for lost wages.

Cauthen filed a motion for summary judgment which the court granted. In each case, recovery was denied because of the District of Columbia no-fault insurance law which, with certain exceptions, barred civil actions based on liability arising from motor vehicle accidents occurring in the District of Columbia. The courts below concluded that the law of the District of Columbia should apply because the accident occurred there and because the law at issue is substantive in nature. The District of Columbia No-Fault Law The no-fault law was designed to remedy a perceived deficiency in liability insurance coverage for motor vehicles and their operators in the District of Columbia.

This was accomplished by making no-fault insurance compulsory and by limiting lawsuits stemming from accidents to certain requirements. The statute was codified as Chapter 21 of the District of Columbia Code, specifically, D.C. Code Ann. §§ 35-2101 through 2113 (Cum.Supp.1985). It applied to all ⁷⁸⁵ accidents occurring in the District of Columbia on or after October 1, 1983. The purposes of the law were explained in § 35-2101, which stated that before the enactment of the new provisions persons injured in automobile accidents in the District of Columbia were unlikely to be compensated satisfactorily for their injuries because half of the victims did not qualify for benefits under existing policies, about 40 percent of the drivers in the District of Columbia did not have adequate insurance, and the average policy would pay only up to $10,000 per person per accident.

Compulsory no-fault insurance was deemed to be the solution to these problems. The details of the required insurance were set forth in § 35-2103, which specified what insurance had to be carried by resident and nonresident drivers in the District of Columbia. Section 35-2104, entitled “Benefits under required insurance,” generally provided that payments were to be made without regard to fault for all reasonable medical expenses, not to exceed $100,000, and for lost wages up to $2000 per month, not to exceed $24,000 and not payable after the death of the victim. To encourage compliance with the statute, § 35-2105 prohibited civil litigation over any injury which would be compensable under the no-fault insurance protection described.

It then listed six exceptions to this restriction, one of which, § 35-2105(b)(6), permitted a civil action for liability to be brought by one who sustained medical expenses in excess of $5000. This subsection is the focal point of these three appeals. Section 35-2105 read as follows: (a) Restriction. — Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no person may maintain a civil action based on liability against any other person, with respect to an injury as to which personal injury protection benefits are payable under this chapter. (b) Exceptions to restriction. — The provisions of subsection (a) of this section do not apply if: ⁷⁸⁶ (1) A person may be liable for damages for any medical and rehabilitation expenses of a victim and any work loss of a victim in excess of the personal injury protection benefits available therefor under this chapter; (2) A person may be liable to the survivors of a victim for loss and noneconomic loss sustained as the result of death arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle and recoverable under applicable law; (3) A person may be liable for any loss and noneconomic loss arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle with intent to injure himself or herself or any other person; (4) A person may be liable for noneconomic loss, in accordance with otherwise applicable law, caused a victim and arising from the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle if the victim suffered an injury directly resulting in substantial permanent scarring or disfigurement; substantial and medically demonstrable permanent impairment which has significantly affected the ability of the victim to perform his or her professional activities or usual and customary daily activities; or a medically demonstrable impairment that prevents the victim from performing all or substantially all of the material acts and duties which constitute his or her usual and customary daily activities for more than 180 continuous days; (5) A person may be liable for any loss or noneconomic loss, in accordance with otherwise applicable law, if, at the time of the accident, that person is an owner of a motor vehicle involved in that accident and required insurance was not in effect with respect to that motor vehicle: 1 or ⁷⁸⁷ ( 6) A person may be liable for any noneconomic loss if medical expenses of a victim or his or her survivors exceeds $5000, inclusive of diagnostic x-ray costs.

This amount shall be adjusted annually to reflect changes in cost of living index, pursuant to rules issued by the Superintendent. 2 By contrast, Maryland’s no-fault insurance scheme imposes no restrictions on the rights of people involved in an accident to pursue litigation. Md.Ann.Code art. 48A, § 542 (1979) provides: “Nothing in this subtitle [35. Motor Vehicle Casualty Insurance — Required Primary Coverage] shall be deemed to affect the right of any person to claim and sue for damages or losses sustained by him as the result of a motor vehicle accident.” The Issues These contrasting provisions have fueled much of the controversy in these cases. Each of the appellants contends that the court below erred in applying the law of the District of Columbia, advancing various arguments in support of that contention.

They premise their first argument on the principle that the lex loci delicti applies only to the substantive law of the situs of the accident whereas the law of the forum governs with respect to procedural law. They then contend that the District of Columbia no-fault law barring actions for liability are procedural rather than substantive. Second, they argue that applying the District of Columbia no-fault law to these cases violates the public policy of Maryland. Appellants Jacobs and Stephenson also ⁷⁸⁸ contend that § 35-2105(b)(6) of the District of Columbia Code is unconstitutional.

We shall address these issues in seriatim. Motion to Dismiss Jacobs v. Adams Before we reach the substantive issues presented by these appeals, we must dispose of a motion to dismiss the Jacobs appeal. Adams moves to dismiss that appeal pursuant to Md. Rule 1035 b. 5. on the grounds that Jacobs’s record extract does not comply with the requirements of Md. Rule 1028. Md. Rule 1035 b. reads: “On motion of any party, an appeal may be dismissed for any one of the following reasons * * * 5.

The contents of the printed record extract do not comply with section b. of Rule 1028 (Printed Record Extract in Civil Cases).” Md. Rule 1038 b 1. provides as follows: The printed extract shall contain such parts of the record as may reasonably be necessary for the determination of the questions presented by the appeal, and shall include: (a) The judgment appealed from, together with the opinion or charge of the lower court, if any. (b) So much of the evidence, pleadings, or other parts of the record as is material to any question the determination of which depends upon the sufficiency of the evidence, pleadings or other matter contained in the record to sustain any action, ruling order or judgment of the lower court. In lieu of a separate record extract, Jacobs attached an appendix to his brief, which is permissible. This appendix, however, only contained portions of the D.C. Code, the Maryland Code, the U.S. Constitution, and a copy of a memorandum decision of the District Court for the District of Columbia in an unrelated case.

It did not contain a single portion of the record, nor did it contain either the judgment from which the appeal was taken or the pleadings upon which that judgment was based. Jacobs eventually filed a separate document captioned “Record Extract,” but ⁷⁸⁹ he filed it well past the time within which briefs and extracts are due under Md. Rule 1030 and he did so without leave of court. We will not accept the belated record extract under those circumstances. Adams’s motion is granted, and the appeal is dismissed.

Spivey v. Harris, 64 Md.App. 619 , 498 A.2d 281 (1985); Weston International Corporation v. Woodlawn Supermarkets, Incorporated, 44 Md.App. 390 , 408 A.2d 781 (1979); Kemp-Pontiac-Cadillac, Incorporated v. S & M Construction Company, Incorporated, 33 Md.App. 516 , 365 A.2d 1021 (1976). If it gives Jacobs any solace, he would have been unsuccessful with respect to all of the issues he raised, as is evident from our disposition of the same issues raised by the other appellants. The Applicable Law Maryland has received many invitations to retire the rule of lex loci delicti in favor of “more progressive” theories but has consistently declined them. The Court of Appeals carefully considered the problem in White v. King, 244 Md. 348 , 223 A.2d 763 (1966), and made it clear that lex loci delicti is in full force in Maryland.

In White , two Maryland residents were injured in Michigan when the driver of their car, also a Maryland resident, fell asleep at the wheel. When the injured parties sued the driver in a Maryland court, the driver contended that the Michigan guest statute prohibited any suit against him. The Court agreed with the driver and concluded that the passengers were barred from suit, even in Maryland. The Court said, “This Court has consistently followed the rule that when an accident occurs in another state substantive rights of the parties, even though they are domiciled in Maryland, are to be determined by the law of the state in which the alleged tort took place.” Id. at 352 , 223 A.2d 763 .

The Court examined some of the concepts proposed to replace lex loci delicti, such as the “grouping of contracts,” the “center of gravity,” or the “best practical result” doctrine, including the argument that the lex loci rule is ⁷⁹⁰ illogical because where an accident occurs is just as fortuitous as the happening of the accident in the first place. Id. at 352-53, 223 A.2d 763 . While it acknowledged the deficiencies of the old rule, the Court found that the benefits outweigh them, observing: In what we have said, we do not intend any implication that lex loci delicti is, in general, in our opinion, an unjust rule. Hardship may result in a particular case, but that, unfortunately, is true under any general legal principle.

Certainty in the law is not so common that, where it exists, it is to be lightly discarded. We recognize the force of the countervailing arguments, but in the present state of the law, we leave any change in the established doctrine to the Legislature. Id. at 355, 223 A.2d 763 . The Court recently confirmed the continued vitality of this rule in Hauch v. Connor, wherein it said, “Since White, we have continued to adhere to the rule of lex loci delicti." 295 Md. 120, 124 , 453 A.2d 1207 (1983).

Under the doctrine of lex loci delicti, the law of the District of Columbia should apply to this case insofar as it governs the substantive rights of the parties. The question remains, however, as to whether the provisions of the D.C. no-fault insurance law, particularly those of § 35-2105, are substantive or procedural, since it is not disputed that the forum will always apply its own law to matters that are purely procedural. That rule is easier to state than to apply, for the classification of a law as procedural or substantive has been the rub in many conflicts cases. We have no doubt that the District of Columbia would consider its no-fault law to be substantive; the question now is whether Maryland should reach a contrary conclusion.

A logical resolution to this problem was suggested by Professors William Richman and William Reynolds, who said, “Forum interest and convenience ... should dictate the classification of an issue as ‘procedural.’ Put differently, if neither the forum’s interest nor judicial convenience is ⁷⁹¹ involved, no reason exists to treat the problem as ‘procedural.’ ” W. Richman and W. Reynolds, Understanding Conflict of Laws, 116 (1984). 3 We agree. There is no reason to classify an issue as procedural, and hence controlled by the law of the forum, unless it affects the manner in which the forum administers justice. If the law of the state wherein an accident occurred does not grant the affected parties the right to bring a suit, then there is no need for the application of any procedural laws. It is only after the rights of parties have been established by the laws of the situs that the forum may determine how those rights shall be exercised.

To categorize as procedural the law of another jurisdiction which created and defined the legal rights that accrued within its territory would render that law impotent. This we shall not do. It is not for us to allow a cause of action where none is permitted by the law of the situs. The District of Columbia, through the provisions of § 35-2105, had declared that no action existed under the facts of these cases.

It did not restrict, limit,