Johnson v. CRIMINAL INJURIES COMPENSATION BOARD

¹⁰¹ MURPHY, Chief Judge. Ezra Johnson, appellant, filed a claim with the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board (the Board), appellee, seeking payment of medical and hospital expenses incurred as a result of injuries he sustained from gunshot wounds. The Board ultimately denied appellant’s claim. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City vacated the Board’s order and remanded for further proceedings.

Appellant argues that the circuit court should have simply reversed the Board’s decision and directed that the Board approve his claim. In support of that argument, he presents two questions for our review: I. Was the decision of the Board in denying the claim for compensation in error because it was not based upon facts supported by substantial evidence, or did the agency abuse its discretion in not approving payment for medical bills?

II

In judicial review, was the trial court bound by the agency record and therefore the court cannot act as an advisor to the agency to correct or reconstitute the agency proceedings by vacating an order at the request of the agency which is not an aggrieved party? For the reasons that follow, we shall affirm the judgment of the circuit court. Factual Background On August 11, 1999, appellant suffered multiple gunshot wounds that required medical treatment. Appellant filed a timely claim with the Board, seeking payment of medical bills in the amount of $32,641.80, none of which were covered by insurance or medical assistance. 1 Appellant’s claim included a ¹⁰² copy of the Baltimore City Police Department’s Incident Report, copies of his medical bills, 2 and a statement that he did not know the identities of his assailants.

Detective Nevins of the Baltimore City Police Department’s Homicide Unit investigated .the incident in which appellant was injured. The Board’s investigator was informed by Detective Nevins that (1) appellant was one of four people injured in this incident, (2) no suspects had been apprehended, (3) appellant was a “known” drug dealer, (4) the area in which the shooting occurred was the appellant’s “territory,” and (6) Detective Nevins believed that the shooting was “drug related.” Because of the information provided by Detective Nev-ins, the Board’s investigator recommended that the Board deny appellant’s claim. The Board’s decision included the following findings and conclusions: The claimant was struck by bullets fired by two unknown offenders who exited a car and opened fire. The police investigation revealed claimant was a known drug dealer and the area in which he was shot was his territory.

The police believe the shooting was drug-related. The incident was reported to law enforcement authorities on the same day. The claim was received by this Board on November 3, 1999. The offenders have not been identified.

As a result of this incident the claimant suffered multiple gunshot wounds. This claim has met the statutory requirement for timely reporting to and cooperation with law enforcement authorities, timely submission of an application to this Board for compensation, and cooperation with this Board and the investigative process.... This claim has been filed pursuant to the provisions of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act (Article 27, Sections 815-832, Annotated Code of Maryland). The Board has ¹⁰³ reviewed the claimant’s application for compensation and supporting documents and has directed an independent investigation of the circumstances surrounding the claim.

In arriving at its decision, the Board has considered the entire record, specifically including materials submitted by the claimant, the investigative reports, and all relevant exhibits. The Board also observes that, as required by the cited controlling statute, the burden of proof to establish the authenticity of all material elements of the claim rests with the claimant. To qualify for an award the claimant must prove that a serious financial hardship would ensue as a result of the criminal injury if an award is not made [Section 825(f)(1) J. In evaluating such hardship, among other factors, the Board is required by Section 825(d) of [the] statute to reduce any potential award by the amount of any other monies the claimant received from any other source as a result of the crime. If the monies received from other sources exceed the amount of a potential award, no award is payable by the Board. [See Williams v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, 307 Md. 606 , 516 A.2d 573 (1986) ]....

The Board concludes after reviewing the file, the evidence submitted, and after due deliberation that the claimant has not sustained the burden of proof that he is the innocent victim of a crime.... Wherefore, It is Ordered this 13th day of April, 2000, that the herein claim be disapproved, all subject to further order of this Board. The Board’s decision was accompanied by a letter offering appellant an opportunity to (1) submit any information not previously submitted, and (2) request a hearing. After receiving no response or additional information from appellant, the Secretary of Public Safety and Correctional Services rendered a final decision in which he approved the denial of appellant’s claim. 3 Appellant then sought judicial review of the Board’s ¹⁰⁴ decision. 4 During the judicial review hearing, the Honorable John Carroll Byrnes stated: I just think that it’s such a serious public policy issue on both sides of this.

I don’t mean to sound as if I think that the result is here is, is the only public policy question. The, [sic] you clearly have a public policy—the Legislature has already addressed it. It said no. So we don’t have an open question here of whether these folks who are involved in drug trafficking can claim victim funds.

They said no. The real question that’s unanswered is the, [sic] what the quality of the proof should be and this judge I suppose, maybe no one else but I[sic] made a little bit uncomfortable as a matter of constitutional due process that a result is based upon, solely upon double hearsay. You don’t have, in answering my own question of some minutes ago, the answer is no, there’s nothing in this record which can be seen or understood to be an interpretation by the administrative agency of this—of the characteristics of this shooting of that kind is an indicator of drug trafficking on the part of the victim. That’s absent from this. work.

What is present and the only thing present is a double hearsay. Now, can a reasonable. fact finder rely upon that? I suppose they can and that really is in a sense the Litman’s [sic] test but it’s a little troublesome that, somebody says oh, he’s a bad guy. Oh, okay.

There goes that compensation, you know. ¹⁰⁵ Okay. Then we’re in agreement. That’s, since we’re simply trying to clarify my expression that’s all I was doing there. So we’re not in disagreement on the principals [sic] of law but I am of a mind to remand this with a direction to conduct a hearing so that an evidentiary base can be presented and at that hearing I do believe that by implication the Legislature wants third parties to be engaged in this process so they should be entitled to participate in the hearing.

And with reference to the discretion argument, I’m not going to, I don’t want to place that in the order. I think that’s a legal issue that, with which we really don’t disagree. Judge Byrnes thereafter entered the following order: The decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board denying the claim of Ezra Johnson is hereby VACATED .... This case is hereby remanded to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board with instructions that the Board conduct an administrative hearing in this matter permitting all interested parties to participate, subject to the extent of their interests and standing, and upon notice to counsel for all such parties....

That upon review by the Secretary of the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services, the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board shall issue its decision following the hearing aforesaid.... This Court shall retain jurisdiction of this court case so as to review the decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board if Appellant so requests further judicial review. This appeal followed. 5 Standard of Review Judicial review of an administrative agency’s decision is authorized by Maryland. Code (1999 Repl.Vol.), section 10-222 ¹⁰⁶ of the State Government Article.

Under section 10—222(h), when exercising such review, the court may: (1) remand the case for further proceedings; (2) affirm the final decision; or (3) reverse or modify the decision if any substantial right of the petitioner may have been prejudiced because a finding, conclusion, or decision: (i) is unconstitutional; (ii) exceeds the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the final decision maker; (iii) results from an unlawful procedure; (iv) is affected by any other error of law; (v) is unsupported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in light of the entire record as submitted; or (vi) is arbitrary or capricious. Judicial review of an administrative agency’s decision differs markedly from judicial review of the decision of a trial court: In the latter context the appellate court will search the record for evidence to support the judgment and will sustain the judgment for- a reason plainly appearing on the record whether or not the reason was expressly relied upon by the trial court. However, in judicial review of agency action the court may not uphold the agency order unless it is sustainable on the agency’s findings and for the reasons stated by the agency. United Steelworkers v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 298 Md. 665, 679 , 472 A.2d 62, 69 (1984). “A court’s role is limited to determining if there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the agency’s findings and conclusions, and to determine if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law.” United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. People’s Counsel, 336 Md. 569, 577 , 650 A.2d 226, 230 (1994), see Bucktail, LLC v. County Council, 352 Md. 530, 552-53 , 723 A.2d 440 , 450 ¹⁰⁷ (1999). “A reviewing court is under no constraints in reversing an administrative decision that is premised solely upon an erroneous conclusion of law.” Prince George’s County v. Brown, 334 Md. 650, 658 , 640 A.2d 1142, 1146 (1994); see Catonsville Nursing Home, 349 Md. at 569, 709 A.2d at 753 (quoting Insurance Comm’r v. Engelman, 345 Md. 402, 411 , 692 A.2d 474, 479 (1997)); People’s Counsel v. Maryland Marine Mfg.

Co., 316 Md. 491, 497 , 560 A.2d 32, 34-35 (1989). Judicial review of the agency’s fact-finding does not involve an independent decision on the evidence. Catonsville Nursing Home, Inc. v. Loveman, 349 Md. 560, 569 , 709 A.2d 749, 753 (1998); Anderson v. Department of Pub. Safety & Correctional Servs., 330 Md. 187, 212 , 623 A.2d 198, 210 (1993).

When the agency is acting in a fact-finding or quasi-judicial capacity, we review its decision to determine “whether the contested decision was rendered in an illegal, arbitrary, capricious, oppressive, or fraudulent manner.” Department of Natural Resources v. Linchester Sand & Gravel Corp., 274 Md. 211, 224 , 334 A.2d 514, 523 (1975); see Goodwich v. Nolan, 343 Md. 130, 148 , 680 A.2d 1040, 1049 (1996); Weiner v. Maryland Ins. Admin., 337 Md. 181, 190 , 652 A.2d 125, 129 (1995). “A reviewing court, be it a circuit court or an appellate court, shall apply the substantial evidence test to the final decisions of an administrative agency....” Baltimore Lutheran High Sch. Ass’n v. Employment Sec. Admin., 302 Md. 649, 662 , 490 A.2d 701, 708 (1985); see State Highway Admin, v. David A. Bramble, Inc., 351 Md. 226, 238 , 717 A.2d 943, 949 (1998); Anderson, 330 Md. at 212 , 623 A.2d at 210 ; Bulluck v. Pelham Wood Apts., 283 Md. 505, 511-12 , 390 A.2d 1119, 1123-24 (1978). In this context, “ ‘[substantial evidence,’ as the test for reviewing factual findings of administrative agencies, has been defined as ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion[.]’ ” Bulluck, 283 Md. at 512 , 390 A.2d at 1123 (quoting Snowden v. Mayor of Baltimore, 224 Md. 443, 448 , 168 A.2d 390, 392 (1961)); see Catonsville Nursing Home, 349 Md. at ¹⁰⁸ 569, 709 A.2d at 753 ; Caucus Distribs., Inc. v. Maryland Sec. Comm’r, 320 Md. 313, 323-24 , 577 A.2d 783, 788 (1990). “We are also obligated to ‘review the agency’s decision in the light most favorable to the agency,’ since their decisions are prima facie correct and carry with them the presumption of validity.” Catonsville Nursing Home, 349 Md. at 569 , 709 A.2d at 753 (quoting Anderson, 330 Md. at 213 , 623 A.2d at 210 ; Bulluck, 283 Md. at 513 , 390 A.2d at 1124 ).

I. Appellant argues that the circuit court should not have remanded his claim to the Board for further fact finding because (1) the Board did not request that relief until after Judge Byrnes concluded that the Board’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence, and (2) the administrative record permitted no conclusion other than the conclusion that the Board must pay appellant’s claim. We disagree. The circuit court’s authority to remand is not dependent upon (1) a party’s request for that relief, or (2) the legal sufficiency of the evidence contained in the administrative record. The Criminal Injuries Compensation Act was adopted in 1968 as a remedial measure designed to provide monetary benefits to offset some of the economic losses sustained by victims of crime.

See Criminal Injuries Compensation Board v. Gould, 273 Md. 486, 495-96 , 331 A.2d 55 (1975); see also Gossard v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, 279 Md. 309, 310 , 368 A.2d 443 (1977)(“the General Assembly undertook to provide a measure of financial assistance in specified circumstances to innocent victims of crime and their dependents”). Since the funds to be disbursed under the Act were public funds, the Act was adopted with statutory prerequisites for monetary awards. See Gould, 273 Md. at 498 , 331 A.2d 55 . The eligibility prerequisites of the Act require that a claimant not be “... criminally responsible for the crime upon which a claim is based or an accomplice of that person ...,” § 819(b). 6 The Board is also required by § 825(e)(l)(i) 7 to ¹⁰⁹ “... determine whether, because of the victim’s conduct, the victim of the crime contributed to the infliction of the victim’s injury, and the Board members shall reduce the amount of the award or reject the claim altogether, in accordance with this determination.” If a claimant “... initiated, consented to, provoked, or unreasonably failed to avoid a physical confrontation with the offender or ...” was “... participating in a criminal offense at the time of the injury inflicted,” he may not receive an award pursuant to § 825(e)(3). 8 In the case at bar, the Board concluded that appellant “... has not sustained the burden of proof that he is the innocent victim of a crime.” No Maryland appellate court has decided who bears the burden of proving whether the petitioner did or did not contribute to his or her injuries.

To answer this question, we examine the language of Md.Code (2001), Crim. Proc. § 11-810, 9 which provides: ¹¹⁰ (a) In general.—(1) The Board may make an award only if the Board finds that: (i) a crime or delinquent act was committed; (ii) the crime or delinquent act directly resulted in: 1. physical injury to or death of the victim; or 2. psychological injury to the victim that necessitated mental health counseling; (iii) police, other law enforcement, or judicial records show that the crime or delinquent act or the discovery of child abuse was reported to the proper authorities within 48 hours after the occurrence of the crime or delinquent act or the discovery of the child abuse; and (iv) the victim has cooperated fully with all law enforcement units. (2) For good cause, the Board may waive the requirements of paragraph (l)(iii) and (iv) of this subsection. (b) Serious financial hardship.—Unless total dependency is established, family members are