Johnson v. Maryland State Police

ELDRIDGE, Judge. The Maryland Tort Claims Act was enacted by Ch. 298 of the Acts of 1981, now codified at Code (1984, 1993 Repl.Vol.), §§ 12-101 et seq., of the State Government Article. The Act waives, to a large extent, state governmental immunity in tort and allows tort suits to be brought against the State under certain circumstances. As originally enacted, the Tort Claims Act included a requirement that, prior to filing suit, a claimant must file a claim with the State Treasurer.

By Chapter 538 of the Acts of 1985, the General Assembly amended the administrative claim requirement, and provided that, before instituting an action against the State under the Act, a claimant must submit a “written claim to the Treasurer or a designee of the Treasurer within 180 days after the injury to person or property that is the basis of the claim.” § 12-106(b)(l) of the State Government Article. Several cases concerning this ad ²⁸⁸ ministrative claim requirement have been before us recently. See Leppo v. State Highway Adminis., 330 Md. 416 , 624 A.2d 539 (1993); Lopez v. State Highway Admin., 327 Md. 486 , 610 A.2d 778 (1992); State v. Harris, 327 Md. 32 , 607 A.2d 552 (1992); Simpson v. Moore, 323 Md. 215 , 592 A.2d 1090 (1991). The present case concerns the application of the 180-day claim provision to minors.

Plaintiffs Kristine Johnson and Sherry Woffington sued the State for damages arising out of an automobile accident. Johnson was driving eastbound on Maryland Route 51, and Woffington was a passenger in her car. They allege that they were injured when, as Johnson was attempting to make a left turn off the roadway, a State Police vehicle, also traveling eastbound in response to a call, collided with their car. At the time of the accident, both Johnson and Woffington were sixteen years old.

The two minors, through their attorney, filed a notice of claim with the State Treasurer on September 14, 1987, some thirteen months after the accident. 1 Thereafter, they filed in the Circuit Court for Allegheny County a complaint for damages against the Maryland State Police as an agency of the State of Maryland. 2 The complaint stated that the action was brought pursuant to the Maryland Tort Claims Act. The State moved to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiffs failed to comply with the 180-day claim requirement set forth in the statute. 3 The circuit court granted the motion to ²⁸⁹ dismiss. After the court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration, the plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. We issued a writ of certiorari before argument in the intermediate appellate court, 325 Md. 115 , 599 A.2d 819 .

The plaintiffs mount a three-pronged attack on the circuit court’s dismissal of their case. First, they argue that the 180-day time limit for filing a claim under § 12—106(b)(1) was tolled during the plaintiffs’ minority. Second, the plaintiffs contend that, even if the time limit were not tolled, they “substantially complied” with the requirements of § 12—106(b). Third, they argue that, if there were no tolling, and if there were no substantial compliance with the 180-day claim filing requirement, then the requirement violates their state and federal constitutional rights.

I. The plaintiffs argue that under Code (1974, 1989 Repl. Yol.), § 5-201(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, the 180-day claim filing requirement was tolled during the plaintiffs’ minority. 4 They contend that it is unfair to hold minors, who lack “the standing of adults in our courts,” to “the same responsibility of an adult in filing a Notice of Claim.” (Plaintiffs’ Brief at 4). They point to § 12-102 of the State Government Article, calling for a broad construction of the Maryland Tort Claims Act in favor of injured parties, in support of this contention. Although they cite no Maryland cases, they rely on an Idaho case, Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho ²⁹⁰ 466, 716 P.2d 1238 (1986), which holds that Idaho’s general tolling statute for minors applies to the time period for filing a claim under Idaho’s Tort Claims Act.

Thus, the plaintiffs contend, Maryland’s general tolling statute for minors, § 5-201 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, should be applied to the 180-day requirement for filing a claim under the Maryland Tort Claims Act. Contrary to the plaintiffs’ argument, the Tort Claims Act’s administrative claim requirement is not a statute' of limitations. Instead, it is “a condition precedent to the initiation of an action under the Act.” Simpson v. Moore, supra, 323 Md. at 219 , 592 A.2d at 1092 . As we recently held in Waddell v. Kirkpatrick, 331 Md. 52, 60 , 626 A.2d 353, 356 (1993), the tolling provision in § 5-201 is inapplicable to “a condition precedent, as opposed to a statute of limitations.” Moreover, even if the 180-day claim requirement were considered a statute of limitations, the plaintiffs’ reliance on § 5-201 (a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article would be misplaced.

Section 5-201(a), by its terms, applies only “to a limitation under Subtitle 1 of this title.” The 180-day claim requirement is not contained in subtitle 1 of title 5 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Instead, it is contained in subtitle 1 of title 12 of the State Government Article. The Idaho case cited by the plaintiffs, Doe v. Durtschi, supra, does not persuade us to reach a contrary result. The case is readily distinguishable from the case at bar.

The Idaho Legislature, shortly before the Idaho Supreme Court’s Durtschi decision, specifically made the Idaho general tolling statute applicable to administrative claim requirements. The majority of the court in Durtschi was persuaded that the statutory change controlled the claim requirement in the case before it. The Maryland Legislature has not, in any way, indicated that the Maryland general tolling statute should be applicable to the Tort Claims Act’s 180-day claim requirement. ²⁹¹ Accordingly, we hold that the running of the 180-day administrative claim period, provided for in the Maryland Tort Claims Act, is not subject to the tolling provisions of § 5-201 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.

II

The plaintiffs argue that there was substantial compliance with the 180-day claim requirement and that, therefore, the circuit court erred in dismissing their complaint. The plaintiffs point out that the State created several reports of the accident, that the State interviewed the plaintiffs immediately after the accident, and that the State unsuccessfully prosecuted Johnson for an alleged traffic violation. The facts relied on by the plaintiffs might show that the State suffered no prejudice as a result of the plaintiffs’ failure to comply with the administrative claim requirement. Nevertheless, the plaintiffs’ argument confuses “substantial compliance” with “lack of prejudice.” In Simpson v. Moore, supra, 323 Md. at 218-229 , 592 A.2d at 1091-1096 , this Court specifically held that an action under the Maryland Tort Claims Act was barred by a failure to comply with the 180-day requirement, even though the State may have suffered no prejudice from the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the requirement. 5 As to substantial compliance itself, even assuming arguendo that it would suffice, there was no substantial compliance here.

The plaintiffs have not pointed to any facts which would support their claim of substantial compliance. The plaintiffs did not undertake in any way to provide the State with notice of their claim; they rely solely on the State’s own ²⁹² efforts in acquiring information about the incident. As we stated in Simpson, supra, 323 Md. at 228 , 592 A.2d at 1096 , “[t]he doctrine of substantial compliance has no application to an outright failure to comply.” Even if the doctrine of substantial compliance is applicable to the 180-day claim filing requirement, an issue which we do not decide today, substantial compliance requires more than a mere lack of prejudice to the State.

III

In light of our resolution of the plaintiffs’ tolling and substantial compliance arguments, we are obliged to address the plaintiffs’ constitutional assertions. First, they argue that the 180-day claim requirement “arbitrarily created two classes of injured parties, namely those injured by government torts and those damaged by private torts,” in violation of their right to equal protection of the laws. (Plaintiffs’ Brief at 8). Second, they contend that the claim requirement, as applied to minors, denies them a remedy in the courts as guaranteed by Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.

Finally, they assert that the application of the claim requirement deprives them of a property right without due process of law. A. The plaintiffs do not contend that the challenged classification created by the 180-day claim requirement of the Tort Claims Act is subject to strict scrutiny or heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. See generally Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 353-370 , 601 A.2d 102, 108-113 (1992). Instead, the plaintiffs maintain that the classification has no rational basis.

The plaintiffs cite a Nevada case, Turner v. Staggs, 89 Nev. 230 , 510 P.2d 879 , cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1079 , 94 S.Ct. 598 , 38 L.Ed.2d 486 (1973), as support for this proposition. In addition to the Nevada case cited by the plaintiffs, cases from a few other jurisdictions have held that notice of claim ²⁹³ requirements for suing the government, where there is no similar requirement for suing private entities, fail the rational basis test and therefore violate constitutional guarantees of equal protection. See, e.g., Reich v. State Highway Department, 386 Mich. 617 , 194 N.W.2d 700 (1972); O’Neil v. City of Parkersburg, 160 W.Va. 694 , 237 S.E.2d 504 (1977). See also Hunter v. North Mason High School, 85 Wash.2d 810 , 539 P.2d 845, 850-851 (1975).

These cases represent a distinct minority view. 6 The majority of courts, on the other hand, have held that notice of claim requirements under Tort Claims Acts do not violate equal protection principles. 7 Some courts reason that ²⁹⁴ because a State may constitutionally choose not to allow any suits against itself, “the legislature’s permission to sue in tort a previously immune sovereign can reasonably be accompanied by such terms and provisions as the legislature wishes to impose upon that right.” Budahl v. Gordon & David Assoc., 287 N.W.2d 489, 493 (S.D.1980). See also Parton v. City of Huntsville, 362 So.2d 898 (Ala.1978) (upholding a 6-month administrative claim requirement); Fritz v. Regents of University of Colorado, 196 Colo. 335 , 586 P.2d 23 (Colo.1978) (upholding a 90-day requirement); McCann v. City of Lake Wales, 144 So.2d 505 (Fla.1962) (upholding a 30-day requirement); Faucher v. City of Auburn, 465 A.2d 1120, 1125 (Me.1983) (upholding a 180-day deadline which could be excused for good cause shown). Other courts have conducted a traditional equal protection analysis, using the level of scrutiny appropriate to the impor ²⁹⁵ tance which the court attached to the right involved. The vast majority have used the rational basis test, because no suspect or “quasi-suspect” class was created and no “fundamental” or “important” right was implicated.

These cases have held that the claim requirement at issue had a rational basis and thus did not violate equal protection principles. See, e.g., Parton v. City of Huntsville, supra; Tammen v. County of San Diego, 66 Cal.2d 468 , 58 Cal.Rptr. 249 , 426 P.2d 753 (1967) (100-day deadline); Fritz v. Regents of University of Colorado, supra; Sadler v. New Castle County, 524 A.2d 18 (Del.Super.1987), aff'd, 565 A.2d 917 (Del.1989) (one year deadline); Newlan v. State, 96 Idaho 711 , 535 P.2d 1348 , appeal dismissed, sub nom. Agost v. Idaho, 423 U.S. 993 , 96 S.Ct. 419 , 46 L.Ed.2d 367 (1975) (120-day deadline); King v. Johnson, 47 Ill.2d 247 , 265 N.E.2d 874 (1970) (6-month deadline); Batchelder v. Haxby, 167 Ind.App. 82 , 337 N.E.2d 887 (1975) (60-day deadline); Faucher v. City of Auburn, supra; Campbell v. City of Lincoln, 195 Neb. 703 , 240 N.W.2d 339 (1976) (one year deadline); Espanola Housing Authority v. Atencio, 90 N.M. 787 , 568 P.2d 1233 (1977) (upholding a one year statute of limitations for suits against the state, as opposed to a three year statute of limitations for suits against private defendants); Reirdon v. Wilburton Bd. of Educ., 611 P.2d 239 (Okl.1980) (120-day deadline); Brown v. Portland School Dist. No. 1, 48 Or.App. 571 , 617 P.2d 665 (1980), rev’d on other grounds, 291 Or. 77 , 628 P.2d 1183 (1981) (180-day deadline); Budahl v. Gordon & Davis Assoc., supra (60-day deadline); City of Waco v. Landingham, 138 Tex. 156 , 157 S.W.2d 631 (1941) (30-day deadline); Sears v. Southworth, 563 P.2d 192 (Utah 1977) (one year deadline); Yotvat v. Roth, 95 Wis.2d 357 , 290 N.W.2d 524 (1980) (90-day deadline).

In addition, one jurisdiction concluded that an important right was at stake and therefore used an “intermediate” standard of review. In Herman v. Magnuson, 277 N.W.2d 445 (N.D.1979), the North Dakota Supreme Court upheld that state’s 90-day claim requirement even under this more stringent standard. ²⁹⁶ We agree with those cases holding that administrative claim requirements, in statutes waiving state governmental tort immunity, do not violate equal protection principles. Whether,. and to what extent, there should be state governmental immunity from tort suits has long been regarded as the prerogative of the Maryland General Assembly. See Austin v. City of Baltimore, 286 Md. 51, 54-58 , 405 A.2d 255, 257-259 (majority opinion), 286 Md. at 67-70 , 405 A.2d at 263-265 (concurring and dissenting opinion) (1979).

The constitutionality of the principle of state governmental immunity was upheld in Jekofsky v. State Roads Comm’n, 264 Md. 471 , 287 A.2d 40 (1972). See also State v. B. & O. R.R. Co., 34 Md. 344, 374 (1871), aff'd, 21 Wall. 456 , 22 L.Ed. 678 (1875). By enacting the Maryland Tort Claims Act, the General Assembly chose to allow some tort suits against the State. As the full application of sovereign immunity does not violate the federal and state constitutions, this partial or conditional waiver of sovereign immunity, retaining the same classification between victims of public torts and victims of private torts, but with less onerous consequences, does not violate constitutional equal protection principles.

Moreover, the 180-day claim requirement meets the rational basis test. As the State points out, the State is involved in a much greater range of activities giving rise to potential tort suits than most private defendants. The 180-day administrative claim requirement allows the State to predict its potential tort liability more accurately, so that it may enact a more accurate annual budget. In addition, the claim requirement enables the