Johnson v. State

Per Curiam. The appellant, Arthur Johnson, was tried in the Criminal Court of Baltimore under one indictment charging him with arson, and seven indictments charging him with murder. He was tried by the court, sitting without a jury, and was found guilty of arson and guilty of murder in the first degree under all of the seven indictments for murder. He received a sentence of twenty years in the Maryland Penitentiary for arson and life imprisonment under each indictment for murder, the first two sentences to run consecutively and the remaining five to run concurrently.

From these judgments and sentences, he has now appealed to this Court. On his appeal he raises two contentions: (1) that the principles laid down in Miranda v. Arizona should be applied to this case; (2) that the trial court erred when it ruled that the appellant’s statement had been given voluntarily. On December 1, 1964, a fire occurred at 2631 E. Oliver Street, Baltimore City, which claimed the lives of seven small children. Thereafter, members of the Baltimore City Fire and Police Departments conducted an investigation to determine its origin.

This investigation ultimately led them to a person ²¹⁹ known as “Chum,” who was later identified as the appellant. It had been established that three gallon cans of gasoline had been used to accelerate the fire, and that the gasoline had been purchased at a Shell gas station not far from the scene of the blaze by one Kennard Smith, a resident of the house that had been destroyed and the father of the seven children who perished in it. Appellant was with Smith at the time. After appellant was arrested he was placed in a line-up and identified by two people, Alice Dubose, a lady who had seen the appellant in the company of Kennard Smith shortly before the fire when he came to her home with Smith who borrowed a dollar to buy the gasoline, and George H. Moore, the gas station attendant, who stated that about 3 :30 a.m.

Smith and the appellant came to the gas station and he sold them three gallons of gas which was placed in three Prestone cans which they had found on the premises. Smith paid for the gas, which cost .730, and after giving him the change they left. One took two cans and the other picked up one can. After his arrest appellant was questioned by the police and signed a confession admitting his complicity in the arson.

In his confession he stated that after he and Smith had gotten the gas from the Shell station they had gone to Smith’s wife’s home on Oliver Street. They first went to the back of the house where Smith poured one of the cans on the steps and around the doorway and then lit it and set it afire. Then they walked around to the front of the house, each carrying a can. When they got to the front, Smith threw his can through the front window, lit a match, and set that afire.

Somebody came to the front door and Smith spoke to him. Whoever it was went back inside the house, and appellant threw the can of gasoline he had in the vestibule, and they both left and caught a cab to South Baltimore where they separated. He stated that prior to arriving at the house Smith had told him he was going to kill his wife. Seven children were burned to death in the fire.

When the case was called for trial, appellant’s counsel entered a plea of not guilty generally and not guilty by reason of insanity. The trial judge found the defendant was sane at the time of the commission of the crime and sane at the time of trial. The State attempted to introduce appellant’s confes ²²⁰ sion in evidence, but defense counsel challenged its voluntariness. After the taking of testimony on this issue, the lower court held it to be voluntary and the statement was admitted in evidence.

I In his first contention appellant contends that the principles laid down in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), should be applied to this case. He admits that the Supreme Court has held in Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U. S. 719 , 86 S. Ct. 1772 , 16 L. Ed. 2d 882 (1966), that Miranda standards shall not apply to cases heard prior to June 13, 1966, but argues that a State Court is not prohibited from extending greater constitutional safeguards than those minimally