Mundell v. State

Horney, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. On appeal the defendant (Irvin Frederick Mundell), who was convicted of breaking into a barber shop with intent to commit a felony and with attempted larceny, contends: (i) that his statement to the police was not freely and voluntarily given; (ii) that his counsel did not have sufficient time to prepare his defense; and (iii) that the evidence was insufficient to show that he intended to commit a felony. In the early morning of November 17, 1964, as Corporal Curtis R. Nunn of the Anne Arundel County Police was patrolling the downtown area of Glen Burnie, he heard the breaking of glass. When he looked in the direction from which the sound came, he saw a man (later identified as the defendant) at the door of a barber shop breaking the glass out with a bottle.

On hearing the police car door slam, the defendant ran from the scene. The officer pursued and apprehended him, but not before several warning shots had been fired. Following treatment of the defendant at a hospital for an abrasion on his head received either as a result of falling as he was attempting to flee or of having been grazed by a bullet, he was released in the custody of another police officer. Eater, after he had been advised that he did not have to make a statement, that if he gave one it could be used against him and that he had a right ⁹³ to be “represented by a lawyer at anytime,” the defendant made a statement in which he admitted that he had broken and entered the shop with the intention of taking “everything [he] could get and a lot of cash * * * about $50' or $60 * * * [and go to] Massachusetts to see [his] brothers.” Prior to the breaking the defendant had worked in the barber shop.

At the trial the wife of the owner testified that $60 in cash and a lot of barber tools were in the shop when it was broken into. There was also evidence to the effect that the defendant appeared to be semiconscious at the time of arrest, that he was crying when he was about to be released from the hospital, that he was depressed and that he had been drinking. (1) The State met the burden of proving the voluntary character of the statement. The test in this case is not, as the defendant claims, whether he was frightened, hysterical, depressed and had been drinking, but whether his disclosures to the police were freely and voluntarily made at a time when he knew and understood what he was saying.

See Wiggins v. State, 235 Md. 97 , 200 A. 2d 683 (1964), cert. den. 279 U. S. 861 (1964). Also see Bryant v. State, 229 Md. 531, 185 A. 2d 190 (1962). Not only was the defendant advised of his right to remain silent and to see a lawyer and warned that any statement he made could be used against him, but the record is clear that he was rational and coherent during the time the statement was taken. In addition to this, it is apparent from the record that he made the statement freely and voluntarily and that no force, threats or promises were made to induce him to make it.

See Abbott v. State, 231 Md. 462 , 190 A. 2d 797 (1963). To the same effect, also see the more recent cases of Bean v. State, 234 Md. 432 , 199 A. 2d 773 (1964) and Campbell v. State, 240 Md. 59 , 212 A. 2d 747 (1965). The case at bar was tried before Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966) and Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U. S. 719 (1966) were decided. (2) The record indicates that the time counsel had to prepare the defense of his client was reasonable under the