Maryland case law › Johnson v. State

Johnson v. State

228 Md. App. 27 (2016) · Maryland Court of Special Appeals
Maryland Court of Special AppealsDisposition: AffirmedWoodward, J.✓ Good law
HoldingMichael Johnson was convicted by a Prince George's County jury of one count of stalking, ten counts of reckless endangerment, two counts of harassment, ten counts of harassment by electronic mail, and fifty counts of violating a protective order, receiving an aggregate sentence…

WOODWARD, J. Michael Johnson, appellant, was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County of one count of 32 stalking, ten counts of reckless endangerment, two counts of harassment, ten counts of harassment by electronic mail (“email”), and fifty counts of violating a protective order. As a result, the court imposed concurrent and consecutive sentences which, in the aggregate, totaled eighty-five years and ninety days’ imprisonment. On appeal, appellant raises the following questions, 1 which we have slightly reworded: 1. Did the trial court err by failing to merge appellant’s ten convictions for email harassment under Section 3-805 of the Criminal Law Article, which punishes a “course of conduct”? 2.

Did the trial court err by failing to merge appellant’s fifty convictions for violating a protective order into nine convictions, based on conduct occurring on nine separate days? 3. Did by trial court err by failing to merge two of appellant’s reckless endangerment convictions based on the conduct of posting material to Craigslist.org? 4. Did the trial court err by permitting the victim to testify in rebuttal to appellant’s prior convictions of assault and violation of a protective order? 5. Did the trial court err in admitting printouts of emails the victim said were sent by appellant? 33 For the following reasons, we shall answer these questions in the negative and, accordingly, affirm the judgments of the circuit court.

BACKGROUND Angelí Williams and appellant were married and in 2010 had a son together; they separated in the summer of 2010 and divorced in September 2011. In July 2010, Williams obtained a protective order against appellant. On February 27, 2011, appellant was arrested for violating the protective order. Appellant went to jail, but was released the same night.

On February 28, 2011, appellant attacked Williams as she was getting into her car; he was arrested for second degree assault, found guilty of violating the protective order and assaulting Williams, and sentenced to a year of imprisonment. On June 20, 2012, Williams could not log into her MSN email account. When she tried to reset her password, she noticed that the recovery email address listed was not hers, but instead was that of [email protected], appellant’s email address. That same day, three to four men came to Williams’s home and said they were responding to a sex ad on Craigslist.

One such man showed Williams the ad on his phone; the ad contained old pictures of Williams, her name and address, as well as an invitation for men to come to Williams’s home and have sex with her. Williams, who had not placed the ad, called 911. The police came to her home, but said that there was nothing they could do without proof of who created the ad. On June 21, 2012, Williams received messages from several of her friends on Facebook, asking Williams why she created another Facebook page.

Williams went on Facebook and saw the new page, which, like the Craigslist ad, contained old pictures of Williams, as well as her address and prices listed for various sex acts. Williams recognized that the pictures were from her hacked MSN email account. Also on June 21, 2012, Williams received an email message from Gmail notifying her that she had attempted to reset the password for her 34 email account. Williams notified Gmail that she had not attempted to reset her password.

On June 21, 2012, approximately forty men came to Williams’s home in response to sex ads. One of these men showed her the Craigslist ad to which he was responding. The ad read: This is real, rape me. I want some guys to knock on my door.

When I open it, smack me, push me down, rip my panties off, fuck me and leave me. No talking, just rape me and go. If your [sic] down, no emails, just come over, 7300 18th Ave, Apartment 202, Hyattsville, Maryland 20783, map quest it and come on over. Real men step up.

On June 23, 2012, as men were still coming to Williams’s home, Williams received emails from Mikejohnson516@yahoo. com, appellant’s email account. The first email read: “You having fun yet.” Williams replied: “Stop[ ] sending people to my house to have sex with my kids and me. That’s solicitation.” Appellant responded, “Don’t know what you’re talking about, but maybe we can work something out so I can make it stop for you.” Williams responded, “Maybe your probation officer can help me;” a condition of appellant’s probation was to have no contact with Williams. Appellant replied: 301-699-3644, Agent Jones, call when you’re ready, don’t see how that will stop your problem since I heard your address is posted on a lot of adult websites; and I think I could help you get them down.

But, if I’m not here, maybe they will stay up there. Whoever put them up there must not know it’s some crazy people out there. Be safe from leaving your house. Hope nobody hangs around, but, like I said, maybe we can work something out.

The email exchanges continued; that same day, Williams filed a petition for a protective order against appellant and received a temporary protective order. She also called 911 and gave the police who responded a copy of the temporary order. The police said that they would attempt to serve appellant with such order. Williams received another email from appellant on June 24, 2012, which read: 35 Your life wasn’t meant to be normal.

You can try to be something you’re not, but your life has never been normal for 32 years, so why do you think it’s going to change. It’s okay to lie to other people like your life is something it’s not, but what about yourself? It will always catch up to you. This is how your life has been and always be.

Love always, bye Big Head. Men were still coming to Williams’s home at all hours of the day and night. Williams would tell the men that the ads were fake and ask what website had posted the ad; then she would contact that website and ask it to take down the ad. One ad posted on Blackplanet.com read: Hello, I’m Angelí.

I’m looking for sex and sex only. I swallow. I do anal and groups up to five guys at once. If you’re not in Maryland, DC or Virginia, please don’t bother me.

If you do live in the DMV, holla at your girl with that wet-wet and sloppy head. I live in Riggs Hill Condos, so if you close by, hit me up. Williams called 911 again on June 26, 2012, in an attempt to put a stop to the men responding to the ads. The police advised her to press charges for violation of a protective order, which she did the next day.

On June 29, 2012, the circuit court held a hearing on the final protective order. Williams showed the court the emails and ads. The court granted the final protective order and ordered appellant to not have any contact with Williams. On July 6, 2012, as men were still coming to Williams’s home, Williams received an email from riffraffshawn@yahoo. com.

Williams had a friend with the stage name of Riffraff Shawn that appellant knew, but Williams and Shawn never exchanged emails. The email said: “It will be about 25-40 folks comin over between now and Saturday, so keep doin you and givin your number out and suckin and fuckin. I will have you workin in no time.” A few hours later, Williams received a second email from the same address; it read: “Get a hotel room tomorrow and I will meet you there. Fuck me the whole 36 day and it will stop.

Don’t and there will be no peace for you. I will have folks comin over there until you move.” Williams, who suspected that the emails were coming from appellant, replied to the e-mail in the hopes that appellant would identify himself, and to figure out “how he could be set up” so that police could arrest him. Williams also called the police to ask them for help in catching appellant; she suggested that the police “book the hotel room and have him go there an[d] arrest him.” The police told Williams to file charges, which she did that day. Williams also bought a shotgun to protect herself and her four children from appellant.

Williams received additional emails from the riffraffshawn@ yahoo.com address on July 9, with further demands that Williams meet him at a hotel room. Williams replied, “Sure. I’ll do it. I don’t have a credit card or debit card though.” Although Williams had no intentions of meeting him, she had hoped that appellant would stop posting the ads, as men were still coming to her home.

On July 13, 2012, Williams received an email from the [email protected] email address with a new ad. The ad, which contained the same old photos of Williams that were from her hacked MSN email account, as well as her address, read: “Come over, looking for good dick.” That same day, Williams received additional emails from the riffraffshawn@ yahoo.com email address pressuring her to meet him at a hotel. When Williams refused, she received the following response: “It’s cool. I’m going on the kids[’] school website and post your ad for sex since it don’t matter.” Williams received another email on July 13 with the post on the school website, which contained the same pictures and read: Hi, my name is Angelí Mary Williams.

I’m the mother of [AC] and [CC] and I will have sex with there [sic] teachers in return for them getting passing grades. It can be for however long they attend the school and they get passing grades. I live at 7300 18th Avenue, Apartment 202, Hyattsville, MD 20783, and have done this at all there [sic] other 37 schools and don’t mind doing it here as well. Thank you, and hope we have a great year together.

On July 14, Williams received the following email: To whom may read this, the part of the investigation that leads to read this, I’m not sorry for the events that happened to Ms. Williams. All the chances to not let it get this far, but she refused to, so her blood is not on my hands. She should have known by now that all she had to do was one thing, and she played a joke with her own life. I know that you’re reading this after the fact and look at me as a monster, but maybe she wanted it this way.

That’s why she chose to play with her life. That being said, I want to say good-bye to my mother and father and kids. I love them very much. I was a man pushed into this, pushed to do this.

I hope Angell’s mom will take care of her kids after this; and I hope they will grow up and not make the same mistakes. Your life is not a game because you should always do all you can do. Too bad Angelí didn’t. Bye.

Williams continued to receive emails from the [email protected] email address on July 16, 2012, again pressuring Williams to book a hotel room and then threatening to kill her. One email read: The best part about it is with all the people coming to your house at random, you don’t know when it will be me. I started this plan a long time ago. The people in the building know all about the traffic you have had, people outside yelling your name.

They open the door for folks so when I come, it won’t even look strange, walk right up and kick the door in and you’ll see the rest. Another email read: I want to leave you alone and would have if you had got the room. And yes, I have changed. That’s why I’m trying to give you a chance, but I know you think I’m joking or just trying to bully you, but you will know that I’m for real when I tie you up and fuck you in the ass with a broom stick.

I’m not going to just kill you, but put you through pain first. That’s how I know the police will kill 38 me because I’m going to take my time with you, but enough with all the talk. See you soon. It’s okay.

I don’t expect to live through this anyway. (Emphasis added). Williams received another email that read: “I love it when I have the chance to prove my point. I swear on my grandmother’s grave you will die.

You can believe me or not unless your baby is superman and can stop bullets. See you soon.” Williams received another email that day that read: “You’ll wish you was back in your childhood getting raped, the things I’m going to do to you, then leave your dead raped body in the woods.” Williams called the police on July 16, 2012, after receiving an e-mail that stated “that he was outside my house ... come on to the balcony, I’ll shoot you from there.” Williams received additional emails from the riffraffshawn@ yahoo.com email address on July 17, 2012. One such email contained a video of someone being raped; the message read: “You should let the girls watch this so they will know what they got coming.” Later that day, Williams received another email asking: “Are the girls there? I could have them cherries busted before you get back.” On July 17, men were still coming to Williams’s home “at the same frequency” as they had earlier in the summer.

On July 18, 2012, Williams received more emails from the [email protected] email address; one such email referred to Williams as “Big Head,” appellant’s nickname for Williams, and was signed “Love you always, Your Mike.” On July 19, 2012, Williams received an email from the [email protected] email address that referred to Williams as “the mother of my child.” Another email Williams received that day from the [email protected] email address contained an ad with the same photos and Williams’s address, which read: “I’m a single parent looking to make some extra cash. I swallow. I do anal and groups.” The email stated: “I have printed out 250 of those and will be passing them all over the DMV, putting them in barber shops, metro stations, malls, gas stations, office buildings, strip clubs, 39 so be ready.” Around fifty men came to Williams’s home on July 19. On July 22, 2012, Williams received another email from the [email protected] email address that read: “I’m going to honk the horn.

I’m in the red truck.” At that point, Williams, who was inside her apartment, heard a horn honk. She went down to the landing of her apartment building and saw a red truck but could not see the driver’s face; Williams called 911. The police arrived and arrested the man in the truck, who was not appellant. According to Williams, approximately 400 men, “maybe more,” came to her home between June 20 and July 22, 2012.

Men came every single day during that span of time, and they would arrive at all hours of the day and night. Williams received no additional emails from the riffraffshawn@yahoo. com email address after early August 2012. On August 1, 2012, Prince George’s County police officers executed a search warrant for appellant’s mother’s home, which was the physical address associated with the IP address for the [email protected] email account. The police seized multiple computers, along with photo identifications of appellant, one of which was from the Maryland National Capitol Park and Planning Commission.

Appellant was not present at the time of the search. Appellant was arrested on August 14, 2012. A jury trial was held in the circuit court from June 10 through June 12, 2013. As previously stated, the jury convicted appellant of one count of stalking, two counts of harassment, ten counts of harassment by electronic mail, ten counts of reckless endangerment, and fifty counts of violating a protective order.

On July 18, 2013, the court sentenced appellant to a total of eighty-five years and ninety days’ incarceration, broken down as follows: • 1 count of stalking: 5 years, with credit for 351 days served • 1 count of harassment: 90 days, consecutive 40 • 1 count of harassment: 90 days, concurrent • 4 counts of reckless endangerment: 5 years, consecutive • 6 counts of reckless endangerment: 5 years, concurrent • 10 counts of harassment by electronic mail: 1 year, consecutive • 50 counts of violating a protective order: 1 year, consecutive Appellant filed a timely appeal on August 5, 2013. Additional facts will be presented as necessary to resolve the questions presented. DISCUSSION I. Merger of Email Harassment Convictions Appellant asserts that, because the statute prohibiting email harassment was amended in 2012 to add the language “course of conduct,” and his ten convictions were part of a single course of conduct, those convictions must merge. He contends, therefore, that the ten separate consecutive sentences he received for such convictions were illegal and necessitate a remand of his case for resentencing.

The State responds that the email harassment statute’s unit of prosecution “is each series of acts over time that shows a continuity of purpose to annoy or alarm, that occurs after the person has been warned or asked to stop.” According to the State, “the sending of each series of harassing emails is a separate crime.” The State notes that the statute is modeled after the telephone misuse statute, and that this Court held that each of two separate incidences of repeated telephone calls constituted a distinct pattern of conduct. “The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time.” Md. Rule 4-345(a). The Court of Appeals has noted that “[w]e have consistently defined this category of ‘illegal sentence’ as limited to those situations in which the illegality inheres in the sentence itself; i.e., there either has been no 41 conviction warranting any sentence for the particular offense or the sentence is not a permitted one for the conviction upon which it was imposed and, for either reason, is intrinsically and substantively unlawful.” Bryant v. State, 436 Md. 653, 662-63 , 84 A.3d 125 (2014) (quoting Chaney v. State, 397 Md. 460, 466 , 918 A.2d 506 (2007)). Specifically, a court’s failure to merge a sentence renders the sentence or sentences actually imposed “illegal.” Pair v. State, 202 Md.App. 617, 624 , 33 A.3d 1024 (2011) (“A failure to merge a sentence is considered to be an ‘illegal sentence’ within the contemplation of [Rule 4-345].” (citation omitted)). Appellant was convicted under the 2012 version of the email harassment statute, Md.Code (2002, 2012 RepLVol., 2015 Cum.

Supp.), § 3-805 of the Criminal Law Article (“CL”) which provides: (a) Definitions. — (1) In this section the following words have the meanings indicated. (2) “Electronic communication” means the transmission of information, data, or a communication by the use of a computer or any other electronic means that is sent to a person and that is received by the person. (3) “Interactive computer service” means an information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including a system that provides access to the Internet and cellular phones. (b) Prohibited — (1) A person may not maliciously engage in a course of conduct, through the use of electronic communication, that alarms or seriously annoys another: (i) with the intent to harass, alarm, or annoy the other; (ii) after receiving a reasonable warning or request to stop by or on behalf of the other; and (iii) without a legal purpose.

(2) A person may not use an interactive computer service to maliciously engage in a course of conduct that inflicts 42 serious emotional distress on a minor or places a minor in reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury with the intent: (i) to kill, injure, harass, or cause serious emotional distress to the minor; or (ii) to place the minor in reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury. This Court considered the merger of convictions under a prior version of the email harassment statute in Donati v. State, 215 Md.App. 686 , 84 A.3d 156 , cert. denied, 438 Md. 143 , 91 A.3d 614 (2014). The earlier version of the statute did not contain language referring to the prohibited acts as “a course of conduct.” Nevertheless, Donati argued that “the unit of prosecution is the pattern of harassing e-mails, not the individual e-mails, and therefore, the circuit court imposed an illegal sentence by imposing separate, consecutive sentences for each conviction.” Id. at 723, 84 A.3d 156 (internal quotation marks omitted). In support of his argument, Donati contended, as appellant does here, “that amendments to C.L. § 3-805 in 2012, which explicitly prohibit a course of conduct, show the original intent that the unit of prosecution for email harassment is ... a pattern of harassment.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). We rejected Donati’s argument, holding that the unit of prosecution was each email sent. We explained: Pursuant to the language of the statute, the unit of prosecution is “the transmission of information or a communication.” Neither of these terms are defined in the statute, so we look to the dictionary definitions of these terms. Transmission is defined as “an act, process, or instance of transmitting.” Communication is defined as “an act or instance of transmitting,” “information communicated,” and “a verbal or written message.” Both terms contemplate one instance, i.e., a singular act.

When the General Assembly intends to make the unit of prosecution a course of conduct, it has made that intent clear. For example, two statutes in effect at the 43 time the email statute was enacted in 1989 specifically referred to “repeated calls” or a “course of conduct.” The legislature did not use this language in the statute prohibiting harassment by electronic mail. We agree with the State that the language of the statute here is unambiguous. Accordingly, it is not appropriate to infer a different meaning based on the legislative history.

Id. at 724-25, 84 A.3d 156 (bold emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). As appellant correctly points out, the General Assembly added the language “a course of conduct” to the statute in 2012. 2012 Md. Laws, Chap. 42. Appellant thus argues that the statute as amended changes the unit of prosecution from each email sent to a “course of conduct.” Appellant’s argument still fails, because each of appellant’s ten email harassment convictions corresponds to each day that appellant sent a series of emails to Williams, thus constituting a separate course of conduct on each such day. We shall explain.

Donati makes clear that the email harassment statute was modeled after the telephone misuse statute. Id. at 726 , 84 A.3d 156 . This Court has held that the telephone misuse statute, despite its prohibition of “repeated calls,” allows for multiple convictions based on multiple, but distinct, series of “repeated calls.” See von Lusch v. State, 39 Md.App. 517, 525-26 , 387 A.2d 306 , cert. denied, 283 Md. 740 (1978). Writing for this Court in von Lusch, Judge Charles Moylan, Jr. wrote: The appellant takes umbrage at having been convicted upon two counts — charging violations of the statute on May 5 and May 11 respectively — rather than upon a single count.

The appellant points out, quite properly, that under the statute, each individual call is not a distinct offense. The statute is aimed rather at a pattern of “repeated calls.” What he fails to perceive is that even patterns (each embracing a complex of individual calls) may be in the plural. The evidence here was legally sufficient to establish one pattern of repetitive 44 calls on May 5 and again a distinct and separate pattern of repetitive calls on May 11. The appellant made a distinct flurry of calls on May 5.

Forty-three calls were placed within a seven-hour period. Ten of them actually reached Mr. Grollman. The appellant admitted that he dialed Mr. Grollman 43 times on May 5. He would announce to Mr. Grollman the time of day and would then “yell” out, “Flight overhead.” The appellant admitted that he knew that Mr. Grollman had a heart condition and that he (the appellant) “had hoped to wear him down.” A distinct episode occurred on May 11, six days later.

The calls were made on weekends. The appellant did not bother to see Mr. Grollman personally even though he lived but a block and a half away. He did not call Mr. Grollman at the Commissioner’s Office in the Court House during the working week. The May 5 calls were all made to Mr. Grollman’s residence.

The May 11 calls were made to Mr. Grollman at the store which adjoined his home. On May 11, fourteen calls were received by Mr. Grollman in one 25-minute period. The episodes were distinct and we perceive no error. Id.

(emphasis added). In the case sub judice, appellant was convicted of ten counts of violating the e-mail harassment statute for emails he sent to Williams on ten different days: June 24, July 6, July 9, July 13, July 14, July 16, July 17, July 18, July 19, and July 22, 2012. Unlike Donati, appellant was not convicted of violating the statute for each email that he sent to Williams. See Donati, 215 Md.App. at 722-23 , 84 A.3d 156 .

Similar to von Lusch’s distinct episodes of “repeated calls” on two different days, each day that appellant harassed Williams via a series of emails constituted a distinct “pattern” or course of conduct in violation of the e-mail harassment statute. See CL § 3-805; 39 Md.App. at 525-26 , 387 A.2d 306 . As a result, the circuit court properly imposed separate sentences for each of appellant’s convictions for e-mail harassment. 45 II. Merger of Convictions for Violating a Protective Order Appellant contends that, “because the jury instructions and verdict sheet created ambiguity” with respect to the conduct upon which the jury relied in convicting him of fifty counts of violating a protective order, appellant’s fifty convictions must merge into no more than nine for sentencing purposes, one for each day on which a violation of a protective order was found to have occurred.

He asserts that, under the rule of lenity, the ambiguity with respect to the basis for the jury’s verdicts must be resolved in his favor, and thus a remand of his case is required, with instructions that he be resentenced to no more than one year of imprisonment per day on which a violation of a protective order was committed. As an initial matter, the State responds that appellant failed to preserve this issue for appellate review, because, although appellant “argued that the violations should be limited by the days charged and not the number of emails, he did not assert as a basis for his claim that the [ ] jury’s verdict was unclear.” On the merits, the State argues that upon consideration of (1) the verdict sheet, (2) the trial court’s instructions to the jury, and (3) the prosecutor’s closing argument, the jury’s verdicts were not ambiguous, and thus appellant “is not entitled to the benefit of an ambiguity.” We first conclude that appellant’s issue is preserved, because, at the sentencing hearing, defense counsel raised the issue of the merger of the violation of protective orders for each of the nine days for which the jury convicted appellant. Although defense counsel did not utter the words “rule of lenity,” he clearly preserved the issue of merger of the convictions for violation of the protective order, and the trial court clearly decided the issue when it stated: “I don’t believe that anything technically merges.... Each violation of the protective order was exactly that, a separate and distinct email that occurred over the course of those eight [sic] days.” Because the issue was raised in and decided by the trial court, the issue is preserved for our review.

See Md. Rule 8 — 131(a). 46 There are three grounds on which an individual’s convictions may be merged for sentencing purposes: “(1) the required evidence test; (2) the rule of lenity; and (3) ‘the principle of fundamental fairness.’ ” Carroll v. State, 428 Md. 679, 693-94 , 53 A.3d 1159 (2012) (quoting Monoker v. State, 321 Md. 214, 222-23 , 582 A.2d 525 (1990)). Appellant concedes that the required evidence test is not applicable in this case. With respect to the purpose and applicability of the rule of lenity, the Court of Appeals has explained: Two crimes created by legislative enactment may not be punished separately if the legislature intended the offenses to be punished by one sentence. It is when we are uncertain whether the legislature intended one or more than one sentence that we make use of an aid to statutory interpretation known as the rule of lenity.

Under that rule, if we are unsure of the legislative intent in punishing offenses as a single merged crime or as distinct offenses, we, in effect, give the defendant the benefit of the doubt and hold that the crimes do merge. Clark v. State, 188 Md.App. 185, 207-08 , 981 A.2d 710 (2009) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Monoker, 321 Md. at 222 , 582 A.2d 525 ). The Court of Appeals stated in Nicolas v. State, 426 Md. 385 , 408 n. 6, 44 A.3d 396 (2012): As Maryland case law indicates, the appropriate standard to apply when addressing a question of factual ambiguity in the context of merging convictions is to resolve the ambiguity in the defendant’s favor in a situation where it is impossible to know for certain the rationale of the trier of fact for finding the convictions entered against the defendant. See also Snowden v. State, 321 Md. 612, 619 , 583 A.2d 1056 (1991); State v. Frye, 283 Md. 709, 723-25 , 393 A.2d 1372 (1978); Cortez v. State, 104 Md.App. 358, 361 , 656 A.2d 360 (1995).

Because “[t]he burden of proving distinct acts or transactions ... falls on the State,” “when the indictment or jury’s verdict reflects ambiguity as to whether the jury based 47 its convictions on distinct acts, the ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the defendant.” Morris v. State, 192 Md.App. 1, 39 , 993 A.2d 716 (2010). Courts have looked to the charging document, jury instructions, verdict sheet, and evidence introduced at trial to determine whether ambiguity existed. See id. at 39-44 , 993 A.2d 716 . We agree with the State that the record in the instant case is not ambiguous.

First, the trial court explained the verdict sheet to the jury as follows: All right. Mr. Foreman, ladies and gentlemen, this case involves five different types of crime. However, you will receive a verdict sheet that has a total of 81 questions. The reason for that is there are charges that certain crimes were repeated multiple times over the course of certain days.

So, I think the verdict sheet is very logical. It starts with the offenses that cover the span of time between June 1st and July 22nd; and then it goes in chronological order for the dates the State alleges the Violations of the Protective Order, the Harassment, and Harassment by Electronic Mail. (Emphasis added). In addition, the court instructed the jury that the verdict sheet included several counts charging the same crimes because “certain crimes were repeated multiple times” and that the jury “must consider each charge separately and return a separate verdict as to each charge.” Then, in her closing argument, the prosecutor explained: Now July 6th, we’ve gotten the Protective Order.

Questions 22 through 38, they’re all charges of violating the Protective Order. You will see when you go through these email chains — it is important when you go through these chains to look at the emails. If you look at the times they’re sent, they are in there duplicate times. Some emails you are going to read, you look at times because sometimes when a reply is sent, it attaches that older email with it.

So you want to go through and really sort out how many 48 emails the defendant actually sent because he only gets charged one time per email. Okay. My count, I came up with 23 emails were sent that day when you go through the counts and the types of emails. There are 23 emails sent on July 6th.

Remember I said before for each email you find, one emails equals one count of guilty for Violation of a Protective Order. So, he sent 23. You are going to see he has 17 charges on that day for violating the Protective

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