Roes v. State

Panel: Meredith, Arthur, James R. Eyler (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ. * Eyler, James R., J. ⁵⁷⁴ A jury in the Circuit Court for Caroline County convicted Appellant, Eric Roes, of two counts of abandoning a vessel, in this case, two houseboats, and two counts of littering in an amount exceeding 500 pounds. Appellant was sentenced to concurrent sentences of six months on all counts, all suspended, with two years of supervised probation. Appellant timely appealed and presents the following questions for our review: 1. Was the evidence sufficient to convict Appellant of abandoning a vessel? 2.

Was the evidence sufficient to convict Appellant of littering in an amount exceeding 500 pounds? 3. Was it proper to impose separate sentences for abandoning a vessel and littering? For the following reasons, we shall vacate appellant's sentences for abandoning a vessel, but otherwise affirm. ³⁰⁵ BACKGROUND In late 2015 and early 2016, Corporal Stephen Hunter, of the Department of Natural Resources Police, investigated numerous complaints concerning two sunken houseboats in the Choptank River near 11672 Greensboro Road, in Greensboro, Caroline County, Maryland. 1 Corporal Hunter phoned appellant, and asked him whether he owned the boats in question. Although appellant admitted that he owned the boat that was ⁵⁷⁵ tied to his pier, and registered in his name, he denied that he owned the second boat, named the "Laughing Loon," that was tied to a nearby tree upriver from appellant's pier.

Asked at trial about the condition of the Laughing Loon, Corporal Hunter testified that it was "in a state of disrepair um, if you walk down and look at the boat, when the tide's up it's half submerged. You can look down the sides um, the boats are starting to buckle out and rot and decay." Further, "when the water is out it sits in the mud, and when the water's up it's half submerged, still sitting on bottom, like it doesn't float at all." Testifying from a photograph of the vessel, Corporal Hunter continued: [S]o it's just sitting in the mud, but, and if you look around it's, if you look on the inside it's half full of mud and leaves and debris. It actually appeared to me likes [sic] it's sinking down into the mud of the river. You could observe when the tide's out there's you know a rusted motor block and the stern of the boat.

And just in general like I stated on the sides, I mean the actual hull itself is buckled and starting to come apart. Corporal Hunter further testified that appellant told him that an unidentified individual placed the Laughing Loon at its location. Appellant stated that this boat "hadn't really bothered him," therefore, he never reported it as abandoned. Corporal Hunter confirmed that the Department had received numerous complaints about the Laughing Loon.

Corporal Hunter was unable to find registration information, or any other indicia of ownership, for the Laughing Loon. As for the second boat tied to appellant's pier, Corporal Hunter testified that it was unnamed but appeared to be a Seagoing brand houseboat (Seagoing boat). A photograph of the boat, depicting its condition, was admitted into evidence at trial. Some time in February 2016, Corporal Hunter told appellant that he had fourteen (14) days to repair the Seagoing boat attached to his pier to get it into a "floating condition." Appellant agreed to comply with respect to that boat, ⁵⁷⁶ but did not make any agreement with respect to the Laughing Loon.

After expiration of the fourteen days, Corporal Hunter visited appellant in March 2016. Corporal Hunter testified: Um, the boat tied to Mr. Roes['s] pier the physical condition of the boat didn't seem to have changed, it was buoyant at the time um, through the hatches you could still see there was some water down in the bilge of the haul [sic], but I physical tested the boat at the stern and the bow and it was floating. It was buoyant. Corporal Hunter clarified, with respect to the Seagoing boat, that "I would call it buoyant but just the overall condition, you know going into the future, I wouldn't be surprised if it ended up sunk again." Asked to explain, the officer continued: ³⁰⁶ Um, based upon the prior times I observed the vessel, and the overall condition, you could see, it seems especially when I saw it even when it was floating there's still water in the haul [sic], any rainwater you get or any tide water that got in would just keep collecting and cause the boat to sink.

On or about September 9, 2016, Corporal Hunter took more photographs of both vessels. As to the condition of both, he testified: The condition, I believe I went down when the water was higher, the boat at the pier was full of water and sunk: And the Laughing Loon that vessel was still in the same, or worsening condition, as prior occasions to, that I saw it. He further testified that the Laughing Loon remained "sitting in the mud, still sitting on bottom" and was "buckled out where you can show where the condition of the haul [sic] itself is buckled and starting to rot apart." Further, "parts of the boat have started to deteriorate and [were] falling off the sides," and it was possible to see "the scum line, or when the ah, the tide comes up." He also observed "mud and leaves [and] other stuff, you know sticks and twigs, and anything else you find in the river down inside the boat." As recently as December 2016, just a few months before trial, Corporal ⁵⁷⁷ Hunter confirmed that the Laughing Loon was still in the water in a state of disrepair. With respect to the Seagoing boat tied to appellant's pier, Corporal Hunter testified that, on or around September 9, 2016, at high tide, the boat was not "floating." A photograph showed that "water is over the bow.

And um, the overall condition is it's sitting on bottom." On cross-examination, Corporal Hunter agreed that this houseboat did not appear to have an engine. Officer Robert Karge, also with the Natural Resources police, testified that he also investigated this case and agreed that, from March to December 2016, both vessels in question were in a state of disrepair, meaning, "in a condition to where it's not going to be operable." On December 21, 2016, the railing for the Laughing Loon was falling off, and "water was seeping out of the interior with a lot of leaves and debris throughout the bottom," the scum line was high on the boat, and "pieces were obviously missing off the back, you can barely see an engine compartment from the back." And, the Seagoing boat, tied to the pier, was "full of water, and was inline with the ah ... the front of the vessel was inline with the waterline. Sitting on bottom." The two boats were located approximately 100 yards apart. Asked to further explain his observations, Officer Karge testified as follows: A: Both vessels, the water line, the Laughing Loon has remained on the bottom the entire time that we've seen it and observed it um, over my, last, more then [sic] a year.

The waterline continuously rises and falls with the tide, the sides of the vessel continually bow out further and there's different pieces missing every time I observe it. The vessel tied to the pier it was observed to have, it had a large crack um, on the low tide we couldn't see it during the high tide because it was full of water. But, during low tide it was visible and sitting on bottom as having a large gapping [sic] whole [sic] in the front um, and it has a scuz line above the actual hull itself showing where the water, you know over a period of time, extended period of time has ... has tarnished the paint. ⁵⁷⁸ Q: What ... sorry to interrupt, what is a scuz line? A: So, you can observe it on pilings things of that nature, so at high tide the tide levels ah, stay kind of constant and for a period of time all the water, bacteria, ³⁰⁷ and algae starting adhering to that specific object based on the high tide.

When the tide mark line goes down, then it's visible and it's off colored and it wouldn't be, you know the same appearance, on a white vessel you can see these due to discoloration from the white. It's going to be sometimes brown, sometimes red, sometimes green, it just depends. Officer Karge then identified a photograph of the Seagoing boat. He testified that this photograph, taken around the summer of 2016, depicted the following: So, in this picture, the photograph was taken from a vessel, a patrol vessel facing towards the property.

You can see where the front of the vessel is and it has a door on it. The waterline is above the actual deck itself, the lines are taunt [sic], or were loose at that time. You can see the off coloring just above the waterline that I was talking about, as well as on the pilings. You can see it's much darker towards the bottom where the tide line usually sits, which is indicative of a vessel that's been in this state or sitting in that condition with the tides rising and falling over a period of time.

Officer Karge agreed that, at one point in March 2016, the Seagoing boat was floating, but had not been observed afloat since then. He further testified that both boats had deteriorated and, at no point between March and December 2016, did they improve. On cross-examination, Officer Karge agreed that the fact that a boat was sunk was only one factor in determining whether the boat was "abandoned." On redirect, Officer Karge was then asked to explain what factors went into the determination that these boats were abandoned: Basically from the definition um, because it was found um, unattended in and upon the waters of the State, based on the condition, found in a condition of disrepair to constitute ⁵⁷⁹ a hazard or obstruction to the use of the waters of the State or present a potential health or environmental hazard based on the investigations done into numerous abandoned boats in the past, um, judging by the condition of these with the one up against the pier which the roof had blown off and was floating somewhere going down under water possible other pieces floating off of it, the Laughing Loon in a continuing state of disrepair with parts missing not knowing where those are, could possibly be a navigational channel but also in a state of disrepair of pieces missing, it's bowed out to the side, I'd say inoperable. Um, that would classify as [an] abandoned boat in the State of Maryland.

Peter Tallie, appellant's neighbor, testified that, to the best of his knowledge, the houseboat tied to a tree, i.e. , the Laughing Loon, was on appellant's property. Tallie testified that he used to swim in the Choptank River near appellant's property and noticed the condition of the boats. On one occasion, Tallie asked about the condition of the Seagoing boat tied to appellant's pier, and appellant replied that he just needed to pump it out and that he was working on it. Tallie also testified that, in the approximately fifteen years that he lived near appellant, appellant never denied owning the two houseboats in question.

Another neighbor, Christian Curtis, testified that he first bought his property near appellant in April 2005. He was aware that appellant had a pier and owned two houseboats and a jet ski. Curtis then testified: Ah, there were, one houseboat was at the dock. The other one was about a hundred yards maybe or so, up river it was lashed to a tree; The houseboat that ³⁰⁸ was lashed to a tree used to be at the dock it was towed up there, we saw Mr. Roes bringing it up river, I say we, my wife and I. Um, and it was called, we remember the name was called the Laughing Loon we remembered it was from Washington, D.C, which my wife and I commented about because we are originally from that area.

And it was put at the dock and then that Laughing Loon is no longer at the dock, it's now up river, like I said it's lashed to tree. And there's a second ⁵⁸⁰ houseboat it doesn't have a name on it, it's now at the dock. This occurred around Summer 2006. I could well, I got ... yeah that sounds right.

Curtis testified that, when he originally saw the Laughing Loon, it was tied to appellant's pier. He saw appellant "working on it at one point, I think they were trying to get the engines running because I saw black smoke belching out of the back." After this, Curtis saw appellant tow the Laughing Loon and tie it to a tree. The Seagoing boat arrived soon thereafter, in approximately 2006. Curtis also saw appellant working on this second houseboat over time.

Christopher Voorhes, another neighbor, testified that, at one point, both houseboats were afloat, but neither had been afloat for several years. Voorhes confirmed that he had seen appellant on the Seagoing boat. He also testified that the Laughing Loon was towed to its present resting place in the mid-2000's. Appellant testified on his own behalf and admitted that the pier and the Seagoing boat tied to it were on his property.

Although he did not live at this location, appellant contended that he was "constantly working" on that boat, from March to December 2016. This included lifting it out of the water, fixing the keel, and pumping it out. He stated that he "had it floating pretty good for awhile." He admitted that, at a later point in time, the boat was sitting in the mud, "[b]ut it's in a good spot where, the mud kind of holds it there, until we swap the battery out and pumped it back out again." He also testified that "at this point we try to keep a good battery or two on it. And we're trying to hook a solar charger on the top." Appellant maintained that he did not own the Laughing Loon and did not know who did.

When asked whether the tree that the Laughing Loon was tied to was located on his property, appellant did not deny that it was, but replied, "it's very hard to say ...." Appellant then testified that, after he learned that the Department of Natural Resources would not remove the Laughing Loon, his wife got an estimate and they ⁵⁸¹ learned that it would cost between $6,000 and $10,000 to remove it. Appellant also testified that the Seagoing boat had been tied to his pier since approximately 2000, and the Laughing Loon appeared in around 2005 or 2006, after he built his pier. He agreed that, when this other person brought the Laughing Loon to the area, he may have docked it temporarily at his pier and he may have helped him work on it. On cross-examination, appellant was asked about repairing the Seagoing boat: Q. How much would it cost to fix the boat that is currently tied to your pier that you admit to owning?

A. Well, not much, I mean the big cost is getting it down in the river, having it pulled out, and put up on blocks, about a Thousand Dollars ($1,000) for that and maybe to really do a good job on the hull, another Thousand Dollars ($1,000). And there's things I'd like to do to it as well put some new windows in it, a new door, it needs a ³⁰⁹ paint job really bad. And tighten up the roof so it doesn't have any leaks. Q. But you haven't done that for all of the years that it's been there?

A. No, I've done a lot that boat is, you can ask my wife, keeps me busy and I don't get much, I spend way too much time working on that boat. The last couple years we just had another baby and it's taking away from it a little bit, and it went down. I just heard about it when the DNR police told me it was sunk I ran down there within fourteen days I had it floating again. So, they, that was their testimony if I ...

Q. Yet, both of those boats were sinking between March of 2016 and December 2016? A. That was after we got, we were allowed fourteen days to get it floating. And they said everything was fine and all the charges were dropped. I thought that was the end of it.

And then shortly thereafter, we had it floating it, the crack got further down, and we had to go back in a few times and fix that crack. And I'm sure it's going to get done ⁵⁸² ever better, so we don't have future problems. We intend on pulling it out, my boat out, I've already had that lined up. Appellant denied that, from March to December 2016, the Seagoing boat was underwater, testifying that he thought it was afloat most of the time, and that, if not, he pumped it out.

But, he agreed that "I haven't really had a chance to do the repairs a hundred percent. So, hopefully I can get it out of the water, I'll get that repaired and I won't have these problems anymore. That's my goal." Appellant also stated that he knew someone who owned a marina two miles downriver and that this person had a crane that could put the boat on a trailer. When asked by the prosecutor why he had not pursued that before, appellant replied, "[w]ell we really never asked him before." We shall include additional detail in the discussion that follows.

DISCUSSION I. Appellant first contends that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of abandoning the Seagoing boat that was tied to his pier on the grounds that it was not "unattended" as defined by Section 8-721 of the Natural Resources Article. The State disagrees, asserting that the jury could properly decide that this houseboat had deteriorated to the point where it was abandoned under the applicable statutes. 2 In sufficiency cases, we ask " 'whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.' " Grimm v. State , 447 Md. 482 , 494-95, 135 A.3d 844 (2016) (quoting Cox v. State , 421 Md. 630 , 656-57, 28 A.3d 687 (2011) ); accord ⁵⁸³ Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307 , 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). When making this determination, the appellate court is not required to determine "whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Manion , 442 Md. 419 , 431, 112 A.3d 506 (2015) (emphasis in original) (quoting Dawson v. State , 329 Md. 275 , 281, 619 A.2d 111 (1993) ). Rather, it is the trier of fact's task to weigh the evidence, and the appellate court will not second guess the determination ³¹⁰ of the trier of fact "where there are competing rational inferences available." Manion , 442 Md. at 431 , 112 A.3d 506 (quoting Smith v. State , 415 Md. 174 , 183, 999 A.2d 986 (2015) ).

Generally, our standard of review has two basic components: (1) the "essential elements" of the crime; and, (2) whether the State has met its burden of production. Considering the "essential elements" on appeal involves an interpretation of Maryland statutory and case law. In such instances, we "must determine whether the lower court's conclusions are legally correct under a de novo standard of review." Rodriguez v. State , 221 Md. App. 26 , 35, 108 A.3d 438 (citations omitted), cert. denied , 442 Md. 517 , 113 A.3d 625 (2015). With respect to the burden of production, this Court has explained: In a criminal case, no issue is more important than whether the State has satisfied its burden of production.

The concern is with production, as a matter of law, and not with persuasion, as a matter of fact. The appellate assessment of the burden of production is made by measuring the evidence that has been admitted into the trial objectively and then determining whether that body of evidence is legally sufficient to permit a verdict of guilty. In a jury trial, a motion for a judgment of acquittal at the end of the entire case initiates the examination of the satisfaction of the burden of production. If that burden of production is not satisfied, the trial judge is wrong, as a matter of law, for denying the motion and for allowing the case even to go to the jury. ⁵⁸⁴ Chisum v. State , 227 Md. App. 118 , 130, 132 A.3d 882 (2016) ; see also Burns v. State , 149 Md. App. 526 , 547, 817 A.2d 885 (2003) ("Our concern is with whether [the trial judge] was correct, as a matter of law, in allowing the case to go to the jury.

What the jury then did with the evidence is, on this issue, beyond our purview"). Section 8-725.1(a) of the Natural Resources Article provides that "A person may not abandon, as defined in § 8-721 of this subtitle, any vessel upon any waters of the State." Md. Code (1973, 2012 Repl. Vol) § 8-725.1(a) of the Natural Resources ("Nat. Res.") Article.

In turn, and pertinent to our discussion, Nat. Res. § 8-721 provides: (a) In this section, "abandoned or sunken vessel" means any vessel that: * * * (5)(i) Has been found adrift or unattended in or upon the waters of the State, and is found in a condition of disrepair as to constitute a hazard or obstruction to the use of the waters of the State or presents a potential health or environmental hazard; ... Nat. Res. § 8-721.

Appellant's contention is that the Seagoing boat was not "unattended" under the statute. This argument was presented to the trial court at the end of the State's case-in-chief: Number five, has been found adrift or unattended or in and upon the waters of the State. A vessel, it's clearly not adrift. The testimony is that this is tied to the dock.

Unattended does not apply to a boat that is tied to a dock, that is ah, that is registered and that has had people working on it. That's not unattended, it's not adrift. It's also not a hazard or an obstruction to the use of the waters because it's at a dock. A dock is not navigable water.

It is not public navigable water. There's been no testimony as to health or environmental hazard. For those reasons I would ask you to grant a motion for judgment of acquittal as to the boat at ⁵⁸⁵ the pier, as Mr. Roes cannot ³¹¹ abandon his own boat on his own property. The State responded, in part: The Defendant has clearly, which has been seen by, heard in the testimony, he's been the only person um, he has been in control of these boats.

Both of which have been at his pier and they've moved, and they both are in a state of disrepair. They are both not fixed. Further: [W]e have testimony from the Natural Resource Officer that the boat that ended up at the Defendant's pier, the [S]eagoing boat was deteriorated with pieces falling off it. And that constitutes a potential health hazard and that's where Statute 8-725.1 abandonment of the vessel.

And Your Honor also the State would like to be heard just a little bit more briefly. Um, the boat was, after listening to the testimony it was clear that both boats were unattended between the dates that the State is charging with. Which is March 2016 to December 2016, there is no testimony that the Defendant worked on the boat from March 16 th ... March 2016 to December 2016.

At this point, defense counsel interrupted and the following ensued: [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That's just false he stated, one of the witnesses stated to the contrary. THE COURT: One of the witnesses said I believe that he saw there were some work being done on the boat attached to the pier. [PROSECUTOR]: But not during the dates that ... THE COURT: No, it wasn't during the, it was prior to March of 2016. [PROSECUTOR]: And both ... both boats have been sunk since ... since March 2016 through December 2016. That's the date that the State's is talking about.

The boats are clearly a hazard when you have two very experienced officers talking about the environmental hazard when ⁵⁸⁶ there's pieces of the boat falling off. You have people kayaking in the river, swimming in the river and pieces of large houseboats falling off, such as the roof that was testified. Each witness has said that the tree was on the Defendant's property. And the State would rest with that.

Argument on the defense motion for judgment of acquittal concluded as follows: [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Um, pieces falling off of it, there was no testimony as to any kind of any environmental impact from pieces falling off of it. We don't have any expert telling us what happens if a piece of some certain material falls in the water, and what kind of environmental impact that might have. There was no testimony as to anyone possibly being of interest or any type of safety issue. This is all supposition and hypothetical.

This whole case is suppositional and hypothetical. It's the boat was obviously not, the boat at the pier was obviously not unattended if it was floated it one point, it did not float itself. It was pumped out. It's not unattended; And Your Honor someone is allowed to leave their boat at their dock and not touch it.

I have a boat in Annapolis right now, that I'm not touching, it's not abandoned. It's, I mean that's an asinine argument. THE COURT: Well, if it was falling apart, if it was sunk, if it was sitting on the bottom of the river, you're saying that wouldn't be ... [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: It's tied to the dock and it's registered. THE COURT: There's more to it then [sic] that. ³¹² [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I don't think there is.

THE COURT: Well, I do. All right, I'm going to deny the motion at this time. Ah, you can, I have to explain, but you all know I have to look at the evidence in the light most favorable to the State when I rule on this motion. It may be renewed at the end of the case if the Defense wishes to do so.

The canons of statutory construction are well settled and begin with the "cardinal rule" that requires us to "ascertain ⁵⁸⁷ and effectuate the intent of the Legislature." Jamison v. State , 450 Md. 387 , 396 n.9, 148 A.3d 1267 (2016) (citation and quotation omitted). To that end, "we first examine the plain language of the statute, and if the plain language of the statute is unambiguous and consistent with the statute's apparent purpose, we give effect to the statute as it is written." Id. ; see also Hurst v. State , 400 Md. 397 , 417, 929 A.2d 157 (2007) ("Unambiguous language will be given its usual, ordinary meaning unless doing so creates an absurd result") (citing MVA v. Shepard , 399 Md. 241 , 254, 923 A.2d 100 (2007) ). Moreover, "[w]e begin by looking to the plain language of the provision with a goal of 'discern[ing] the legislative purpose, the ends to be accomplished, or the evils to be remedied by a particular provision, be it statutory, constitutional or part of the Rules.' " Fuller v. Republican Cent. Comm. of Carroll Cnty. , 444 Md. 613 , 629, 120 A.3d 751 (2015) (quoting Davis v. Slater , 383 Md. 599 , 605, 861 A.2d 78 (2004) ).

Further, "we do not read statutory language in a vacuum, nor do we confine strictly our interpretation of a statute's plain language to the isolated section alone. Rather, the plain language must be viewed within the context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs, considering the purpose, aim, or policy of the Legislature in enacting the statute." Williams v. Peninsula Reg'l Med. Ctr. , 440 Md. 573 , 580-81, 103 A.3d 658 (2014) (quoting Lockshin v. Semsker , 412 Md. 257 , 275-76, 987 A.2d 18 (2010) ). When Nat.

Res. § 8-725.1 was originally added in 1977, the statute prohibited the following: "(a) a person may not wilfully abandon or wilfully cast adrift any vessel upon any waters of the State." 1977 Md. Laws, ch. 511, § 1 (H.B. 1041). In 1985, "wilfully" was deleted. As recorded in the Laws of the State of Maryland, the amended statute read as follows: "(a) A person may not [wilfully] abandon [or wilfully cast adrift], AS DEFINED IN § 8-721, any vessel upon any waters of the State." 1985 Md. Laws, ch. 670, § 1 (H.B. 1004). The purpose of removing the wilful element was stated as "changing the ⁵⁸⁸ misdemeanor offense of abandonment of a vessel from a crime of specific or willful intent to a crime of general intent." Id.

According to the Maryland Laws, Section 8-721 was added and provided, in pertinent part: (a) In this section "abandoned vessel" means any vessel: (3) That has been found adrift or unattended in or upon the waters of the State, OR AND is found in such disrepair as to constitute a hazard or obstruction to the use of the waters of the State or presents a potential health or environmental hazard." 1985 Md. Laws, ch. 670, § 1 (H.B. 1004). The purpose of the law was to authorize the Department of Natural Resources (the "Department") "to seize and remove 'abandoned vessels' and to delegate this authority to any county." Fiscal Note, House Bill 1004 (Department of Fiscal Services 1985). Notably, in 1985, the Department estimated that it removed an average of 51 boats per year at a total cost of $58,000. Id.

According to the Committee Report from ³¹³ the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee: Presently, the Department of Natural Resources has found it difficult to remove abandoned vessels and enforce specific provisions of the State Boat Act which impose penalties on owners who abandon vessels in State waters. The chief reason is that existing legislation contains language which uses the term "willful". It is difficult to prove "willfulness" since proof of "willfulness" must include an admission or a witness to the act. Summary of Committee Report, Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, House Bill 1004 (State Boat Act-Abandoned Vessel) (1985).

The Department explained its support for expansion of the law because "existing legislation contains language that makes it difficult to prove intent (willfully), time restrictive in length of time in abandonment (6 months), and difficulty in proving ownership." Bill Report, Department of Natural Resources, H.B. 1004-3 rd (March 28, 1985). And: ⁵⁸⁹ The Department is of the opinion that there will be several positive impacts as a result of this legislation. (See attachment form Natural Resources Police). HB 1004 will correct the described enforcement problems and will act as a deterrent in the indiscriminate abandonment of vessels on the waters of the State.

It will also define specific terms and establish procedures whereby the Department will have the authority to remove abandoned vessels from State waters in a more timely and efficient manner. In addition, it will allow the Department to reclaim removal costs, estimated to be $25,000.00 per year, from boat owners whose vessels are presently being removed at State expense. Bill Report, Department of Natural Resources, H.B. 1004-3 rd (March 28, 1985); see Attachment, Natural Resources Police, Department of Natural Resources (Ref: HB 1004) ("From the standpoint of the Natural Resources Police one of the major problems in enforcing the abandoned boat law has been the difficulty in proving liability .... Another equally serious problem has been the difficulty in