Jones v. State

²¹⁸ COUCH, Judge. Maryland Code, Article 27, § .349, prohibits the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. 1 In this appeal, we must decide whether an automobile repairman is exempt from prosecution under this statute after he absconds with the owner’s car against that person’s express wishes. We hold that the automobile repairman in this case, petitioner William Jones, was properly charged with a violation of this offense, and affirm the conviction rendered below. On February 25, 1984, William Jones approached a longtime acquaintance, Paul Chester, in search of work.

Jones, a sometimes automobile mechanic, inquired as to whether Chester had a car in need of repair. Since Chester at that time owned a vehicle in the requisite condition, he assented to Jones’ proposition to fix the car. Jones accepted the keys to the automobile and promised to return the car in two hours time. It was agreed that Jones would repair the car either at his home or at his workplace.

Thus the legal relationship between Chester and Jones was that of bailor and bailee. Jones did not restore the car to Chester at the designated time. As the hours passed, Chester became increasingly worried about the loss of his automobile. He attempted to locate his vehicle by visiting Jones’ workplace and home.

These and other efforts proved futile. ²¹⁹ Finally, at approximately 6:00 P.M. that evening, Mrs. Chester, at her husband’s request, succeeded in reaching Jones at his home by phone. Mrs. Chester, with Mr. Chester standing with her, instructed Jones to cease further work on the car, and to remain at home until she and her husband were able to retrieve the vehicle. Fifteen minutes later, they arrived at Jones’ home only to find that Jones had once again vanished with the automobile. They proceeded to the local police station where Mr. Chester swore out a complaint for Jones’ arrest.

Jones was apprehended by police two days later at his place of business. He was charged with violating Section 349 of Article 27 and convicted in the District Court of Maryland sitting in Baltimore City. He appealed the determination of the District Court to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, where he was again convicted of the same offense after trial de novo before a jury. We granted certiorari in this case to decide whether proof of a trespassory taking was met.

Under the facts here we conclude we need not reach this issue because once the bailment was terminated and appellant took the vehicle, there indeed was a trespassory taking. Before analyzing the issue raised by Jones in this appeal, we briefly dispose of that which is not in dispute. Both parties agree that the relationship between Chester and Jones was that of bailor and bailee. They are correct in this admission.

Ordinarily, when one undertakes to repair an automobile, or any other good or chattel, for a consideration, the contract created between the parties is called a bailment for hire. Fox Chevrolet Sales v. Middleton, 203 Md. 158, 160-61 , 99 A.2d 731, 732 (1953); General Refining Co. v. Harvester Co., 173 Md. 404, 414 , 196 A. 131, 135 (1938). The owner of the bailed article in such a case is the bailor, and the repairman is the bailee. The bailee receives possession, but not title, to the bailed goods.

General Refining, 173 Md. at 414 , 196 A. at 135 . ²²⁰ Equally clear in this case is our role in interpreting the penal statute before us. We have declared in myriad decisions that the cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the real intent of the legislature. City of Baltimore v. Hackley, 300 Md. 277, 283 , 477 A.2d 1174, 1177 (1984); Cider Barrel Mobile Home Ct. v. Eader, 287 Md. 571, 583 , 414 A.2d 1246, 1253 (1980). We primarily determine the intent of the legislature by considering the language and terms of the enactment in their natural and ordinary signification.

Hackley, 300 Md. at 283 , 477 A.2d at 1177 . Where there is no ambiguity or obscurity in the language of the statute, the Court will not go beyond the verbiage of the enactment. Id. Another canon of statutory construction is that statutes are to be construed reasonably and with reference to the purpose for which the law was passed.

Cider Barrel, 287 Md. at 583 , 414 A.2d at 1253 ; State v. Fabritz, 276 Md. 416, 421 , 348 A.2d 275, 279 (1975). Where known, the Court examines the evils or mischief sought to be remedied as a further aid in the exegesis of the statute. Fabritz, 276 Md. at 421 , 348 A.2d at 279 . Penal statutes, as a general rule, are strictly construed.

Fabritz, 276 Md. at 422 , 348 A.2d at 279 . This precept, of course, does not mean that criminal enactments are construed in the narrowest possible light. See, e.g., United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 413 , 77 S.Ct. 397, 400 , 1 L.Ed.2d 430, 434 (1957). Indeed, all that is meant by the rule is that “courts will not extend the punishment to cases not plainly within the language used.” Fabritz, 276 Md. at 422 , 348 A.2d at 279 , quoting State v. Archer, 73 Md. 44, 57 , 20 A. 172 (1890).

Put another way, “it is the intention of the Legislature that governs in the construction of all statutes so that penal statutes, like other statutes, are to be fairly and reasonably construed and courts should not, by narrow and strained construction, exclude from their operation cases plainly within their scope and meaning. In the final analysis, in con ²²¹ struing any statute requiring construction, courts must consider not only the literal or usual meaning of words, but their meaning and effect in light of the setting, the objectives and purposes of the enactment, with the real intention prevailing over the literal intention even though such a construction may seem to be contrary to the letter of the statute.” (Citations omitted). Fabritz, 276 Md. at 422 , 348 A.2d at 279 . Results that are unreasonable, illogical or inconsistent with common sense are avoided whenever possible.

Id.; Cider Barrel, 287 Md. at 583 , 414 A.2d at 1253 . And “the circumstances existing and events occurring” when the statute is enacted may be examined when the language of the statute is ambiguous. Vournas v. Montgomery County, 300 Md. 123, 128 , 476 A.2d 705, 707-08 (1983). We now turn to the argument raised by petitioner in his appeal.

Jones contends, as he did unsuccessfully at trial below, that once he obtained possession of the automobile, that is, once Chester permitted Jones to drive the car away and repair it, Jones could not be convicted of its unauthorized use unless the original permission was obtained by fraud or trick. Under the facts as presented, however, it is clear that once Jones used the Chester vehicle after being told to stop work and leave the vehicle where it was, the bailment relationship came to an end; the use of the vehicle thereafter by Jones was against the will and consent of the Chesters. Thus Jones was not exempt from prosecution under § 349. We reach this conclusion by looking to the purpose for which the unauthorized use statute was passed.

Cider Barrel, 287 Md. at 583 , 414 A.2d at 1253 . Each of the chattels (except for motor vehicles and boats)