Mayor of Baltimore v. Hackely

SMITH, Judge. We are faced in this case with the question of whether Baltimore City policemen, found by claims examiners “to be mentally or physically incapacitated for the further performance of the duties of [their] job classification in the employ of Baltimore City,” are “totally and permanently incapacitated for the further performance of the duties of [their] job classification in the employ of Baltimore City” when they are capable of performing some, but not all, of the duties of their job. We have two cases here. No. 33 is a consolidation of five administrative trials and appeals.

It reached the Court of Special Appeals. No. 49 involved only the case of William T. Wedemeyer. We granted certiorari in that case prior to consideration by the Court of Special Appeals. Each of the six appellees was employed as a policeman in Baltimore City.

It is conceded that each sustained injuries in the course of his employment and that these injuries were not caused by willful negligence on his part. Each of the appellees is able to perform some, but not all, of the duties of a policeman. 1 For example, claimant William ²⁸⁰ Hackley has performed clerical work since April 1980, when various employment-related knee injuries prevented him from continuing his duties as a patrolman. Claimant James Possidente has been on limited duty status since March 1977. At the time of his hearing before the claims examiner, he was working in the communications section.

As a result of his injuries, claimant Milton Wancowicz was placed on light duty, primarily as a desk clerk, in September 1975. Claimant Edward McCarthy has worked in the crime laboratory as an armorer since 1958, after receiving an injury in the line of duty. Claimant William Sprole was injured in August 1964 and has never returned to full police duties. He currently is employed in the area of building security.

Since January 1981, claimant William Wedemeyer has been placed on permanent light duty status and has worked as a courier in an interdistrict mail system. There was evidence that their superiors ordered claimants Possidente and Wancowicz to file for disability pensions. The controversy in this case surrounds the proper interpretation of Baltimore City Code (1976 Ed., 1979 Supp.) Art. 22, §§ 34(c) and 34(e), which state in pertinent part: ²⁸¹ “Section 34(c) Ordinary disability retirement benefit. Any member who has acquired five (5) or more years of service and who has been determined by a claims examiner to be mentally or physically incapacitated for the further performance of the duties of the member’s job classification in the employ of Baltimore City, and that such incapacity is likely to be permanent, shall be retired by the Board of Trustees on an ordinary disability retirement, not less than thirty (30) and not more than ninety (90) days next following the date of filing his application for ordinary disability retirement benefits.” “Section 34(e) Special disability benefits.

Any member who has been determined by the claims examiner to be totally and permanently incapacitated for the further performance of the duties of his job classification in the employ of Baltimore City, as the result of an injury arising out of and in the course of the actual performance of duty, without wilful negligence on his part, shall be retired by the Board of Trustees on a special disability retirement.” Each of these police officers filed an application for special disability benefits pursuant to § 34(e). 2 In each case the claims examiner determined that the applicant was incapacitated for the further performance of duties in his job classification. Nevertheless, each claims examiner concluded that each officer had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was totally and permanently incapacitated for the performance of the duties of his job classification because he was able to perform, and had been performing, the sedentary duties required of police officers. In other words, the claims examiners determined that because each police officer was partially but not totally incapacitated, each claimant qualified for ordinary rather than special disability benefits. In each instance the officers appealed to what is now the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.

In each case the court reversed the decision of the claims examiner. As we have indicated, No. 33 reached the Court of Special Appeals. That court said, in an unreported opinion, that it ²⁸² thought its opinion in Taylor v. City of Baltimore, 51 Md.App. 435, 445-50, 443 A.2d 657, 662-65 (1982), “to be dispositive of this appeal.” In Taylor , Judge Lowe noted, relative to §§ 34(c) and 34(e), that the court “fail[ed] to see where either section of the statute requires that the claimant be incapacitated from performing any work, other than that which is within his job classification.” 51 Md.App. at 445 , 443 A.2d at 662 (emphasis in original). The court determined that incapacity is an absolute term and that its meaning is the same within the context of either § 34(c) or § 34(e): “Nowhere does it appear, by express reference or by implication, that the legislative body intended to provide any benefit for a partially disabled person.

The criteria in both sections speak in absolutes. The test is whether he can or cannot perform ‘the duties of his job classification’. If he is ‘ “incapacitated” for the performance’ of these duties, he may qualify for either ordinary or special benefits, but unless he is so incapacitated, he qualifies for neither.” 51 Md.App. at 447 , 443 A.2d at 663-64 (emphasis in original). The court in Taylor concluded that the distinction between § 34(c) and § 34(e) lay in the criteria of eligibility for the pension: “[0]ne section allows tenured employees to retire when they are no longer able to perform their duties, while the other affords retirement benefits to those who suffer injuries in the performance of their hazardous jobs.” 51 Md.App. at 449 , 443 A.2d at 665 .

Notwithstanding its recognition that the requisite degree of ■incapacity was the same for both § 34(c) and § 34(e), the court in Taylor held that a policeman was entitled to special disability benefits when he could no longer perform the rigorous duties of his job classification. 51 Md.App. at 448 , 443 A.2d 657 . In Adams v. Board of Trustees, 215 Md. 188 , 137 A.2d 151 (1957), the Court stated that its role in reviewing the ²⁸³ decision of an administrative agency is limited to a determination of whether the agency’s decision was arbitrary or capricious. 215 Md. at 193-94 , 137 A.2d at 154-55 . Given this limited power of review, courts primarily determine whether the agency’s conclusion either was supported by sufficient evidence, see Board of Trustees v. Ches, 294 Md. 668, 679 , 452 A.2d 422, 427-28 (1982), and Board of Trustees v. Rollins, 269 Md. 722, 726 , 309 A.2d 758, 760-61 (1973), or was based on an erroneous construction of the law, see Frank v. Baltimore County, 284 Md. 655, 658 , 399 A.2d 250, 252-53 (1979), and Director of Finance v. Alford, 270 Md. 355, 363-64 , 311 A.2d 412, 417 (1973). Obviously, in this case, the Court is concerned with whether the claims examiners have construed correctly the meaning of the word “incapacity” as it appears in Art. 22, §§ 34(c) and 34(e).

We set forth a number of the rules for statutory construction in Police Commissioner v. Dowling, 281 Md. 412, 418-19 , 379 A.2d 1007, 1010-11 (1977), giving citations for each of the statements there made. We summarize those rules now. The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and carry out the real legislative intent. In determining that intent, the Court considers the language of an enactment in its natural and ordinary signification.

A corollary to this rule is that if there is no ambiguity or obscurity in the language of a statute, there is usually no need to look elsewhere to ascertain the intent of the General Assembly. Further, a court may not insert or omit words to make a statute express an intention not evidenced in its original form. Moreover, the legislative body is presumed to have had, and acted with respect to, full knowledge and information as to prior and existing law and legislation on the subject of the statute and the policy of the prior law. Finally, absent a clear indication to the contrary, a statute, if reasonably possible, is to be read so that no word, clause, sentence, or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless, or nugatory.

Similar expressions are found, among other cases, in Hurst v. V & M of ²⁸⁴ Virginia, 293 Md. 575, 578, 446 A.2d 55, 56-57 (1982); Smelser v. Criterion Ins. Co., 293 Md. 384, 388-89 , 444 A.2d 1024, 1027 (1982); Rome v. Lowenthal, 290 Md. 33, 41 , 428 A.2d 75, 79 (1981); Baltimore Bldg. & Constr. Trades v. Barnes, 290 Md. 9, 15 , 427 A.2d 979, 982 (1981); and Department of State Planning v. Hagerstown, 288 Md. 9, 14-15 , 415 A.2d 296, 299 (1980). From our earlier quotations of the statutes in question, which we placed in parallel columns for purposes of comparison, it will be noted that the following differences exist: the provision in § 34(e) relative to injury arising out of and in the course of actual performance of duty without willful negligence on the part of the officer, which it is conceded is met here, and the requirement in § 34(c) relative to prior service.

The other difference between the two is that § 34(c) requires a determination that the individual is “mentally or physically incapacitated for the further performance of the duties of the member’s job classification in the employ of Baltimore City” while § 34(e) requires a determination that the person is “totally and permanently incapacitated for the further performance of the duties of his job classification in the employ of Baltimore City .... ” Resolution of this case turns on whether the disparate language in the two sections mandates a different requisite degree of incapacity or merely a different source of disability. The police officers point to the fact that § 34(g)(2) states: “A disability retiree may, without reduction of his retirement allowance, earn annually an amount, hereinafter referred to as ‘earnings,’ equal to the rate of the annual compensation being paid currently to-persons in the same grade and stép as the retiree was at the time of his retirement, plus the amount of any longevity payments currently being paid for the length of service the retiree had at the time of his retirement, said rate of compensation plus longevity payments, if any, hereinafter referred to as ‘base amount’.” ²⁸⁵ The ordinance then goes on to provide the basis for reduction of the benefits once a given amount is earned. From this the officers argue that the legislative body contemplated that one drawing special disability benefits did not necessarily have to be incapable of performing every type of duty within a particular job classification. The City contends that a member of the Police Employees’ Retirement System, who is capable of performing some of the duties within his job classification, is not “totally and permanently incapacitated for the further performance of the duties of his job classification” so as to be entitled to special disability benefits.

It notes that being a policeman is a multifaceted occupation and that a police officer still may be useful even though he is unable to perform every duty to which he might be assigned. In these cases, each officer is capable of performing desk or clerical duties and thus, it is argued, is not totally incapacitated within the meaning of the statute. On its face the statutory language of § 34(e) supports this position: the relevant modifier of incapacity is the word “totally” not the phrase “further performance of duties.” Thus, the City contends one is totally incapacitated only if he cannot perform any of the duties that fall within the broad description of a police officer’s job. Before discussing the meaning of the term “incapacity” in the Baltimore City Code with respect to police officers who are able to perform light duty assignments only, it is necessary to delineate several factors which appear in the records of these cases.

First, there is no evidence that any claimant was classified as other than a police officer while filling a light duty position. Second, the placement of these claimants on light duty apparently did not result in either a decrease in salary or a loss of seniority, as compared with other officers of