Motor Vehicle Administration v. Lytle

HARRELL, Judge. I. Respondent in this case, Michael Patrick Lytle, was arrested for Driving While Intoxicated (DWI) and administered a breathalyzer test. The relevant statutory provisions establish a rebuttable presumption that the test results generated by certain breath test instruments administered by trained test technicians are accurate. That presumption may ⁴² be rebutted at an administrative evidentiary hearing by a showing that the specific instrument used to measure the subject’s breath was malfunctioning at the time of testing or that human error caused the test to generate an inaccurate result.

Respondent offered no evidence or arguments on either score before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) of the Maryland Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH”). Instead, he claimed generally that the type of machine used, the Intox EC/IR, had a plus or minus 0.01 range of accuracy and that that margin of error must be applied to his case, yielding a blood alcohol content (“BAC”) measurement below the then prevailing 0.10 benchmark for DWI. The specific issue before us is whether a general “margin of error” of the “accepted scientific range of accuracy” of the type of test instrument used must be applied to certified test results produced by a specific Intox EC/IR machine in a prima facie case of violating Maryland Code, Title 16, § 16-205.1(f) (8) (i) (4) (B). A. The Transportation Article of the Maryland Code, Title 16 (Vehicle Laws — Driver’s Licenses), Subtitle 2 (Cancellation, Refusal, Suspension, or Revocation), §§ 16-201 — 213 (1977, 1999 Repl.Vol. and 2000 Supp.), 1 § 16-205.1(b)(2) provides that ... if a police officer stops or detains any person who the police officer has reasonable grounds to believe is or has been driving or attempting to drive under the influence of alcohol ... the police officer shall: (i) Detain the person; (ii) Request that the person permit a test to be taken; and (iii) Advise the person of the administrative sanctions that shall be imposed for refusal to take the test,.... ⁴³ The type of testing authorized under § 16-205.1 is a test of breath or, under limited exceptions, a blood test to determine alcohol concentration. § 16-205.1(a)(1)(iv).

When the test is administered, the toxicologist’s reporting protocol is to reduce the readings of the test instrument to a reported result. The “test result” is generated when the operator takes the lowest of two or three readings and records the lowest result after it is rounded down to the second decimal place. Regulations of the State Toxicologist, Amendment 1, Section C(5) (1999). When a test results in a BAC of 0.10 or more at the time of testing, the police officer administering the test “shall ... personally serve an order of suspension on the person.” § 16-205.1(b)(3)(h).

The police officer then must send a sworn statement to the Motor Vehicle Administration (MVA) within seventy-two hours stating that the person submitted to the test and that the test indicated an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more at the time of testing. § 16 — 205.1(b)(3)(vii)(2). Under the statute, the sworn statement of the test technician or analyst is prima facie evidence of a test result of 0.10 or more. § 16-205.1(f)(7)(ii). The Intox EC/IR test machine is a “reliable indicator of the alcohol concentration of a person,” pursuant to the Code of Maryland Regulations (“COMAR”) 11.11.03.08B(6). The Transportation Article authorizes tests “subject to the provisions of §§ 10-302 through 10-309, inclusive, of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.” § 16-205.1(f)(8)(i)(4)(B).

Sections 10-304(a)(3) and (b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code require tests to be administered with “equipment approved by the toxicologist under the Postmortem Examiners Commission” and by a “qualified person” who “has received training in the use of the equipment in a training program approved by the toxicologist.” The protocols for testing procedures and the equipment approved by the toxicologist are contained in the Regulations of the Toxicologist (“Toxicologist’s Regulations”). 2 ⁴⁴ The accuracy of the breath test instruments is monitored both through diagnostic maintenance performed at least monthly on the Intox EC/IR test machine and through an internal standard test that is run before and after the administration of each test. Toxicologist’s Regulations, Sections HE, IIIC(3), Amendment 1, Section C(3). The monthly diagnostic test is conducted using a test solution that is 0.10% alcohol content. The results of the test must be between 0.095% and 0.105% or the test instruments must be removed from use until they are repaired to meet the required tolerance.

Toxicologist’s Regulations, Section IIA(7). The test instrument itself runs an internal standard test, generating an “STD” reading, at the beginning and end of each test. A valid test yields an STD reading between 0.090 and 0.110 pursuant to the regulations. Toxicologist’s Regulations, Amendment 1, Section C(3).

The person subject to detention may request an administrative hearing at the time his license is suspended or within a specified period thereafter. § 16-205.1(b)(3)(v). 3 If the person ⁴⁵ does not request an administrative hearing, then a sanction is imposed on the forty-sixth day after issuance of the order of suspension. A test result indicating an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more at the time of testing requires imposition of a forty-five or ninety day suspension of the driver’s license, depending on the number of prior offenses. § 16 — 205.1(b)(1)(i) and (ii). If there is an administrative hearing, the issues to be adjudicated are circumscribed by § 16-205.1(f)(7)(i): 1. Whether the police officer who stops or detains a person had reasonable grounds to believe the person was driving or attempting to drive while intoxicated, while under the influence of alcohol, while so far under the influence of any drug, any combination of drugs, or a combination of one or more drugs and alcohol that the person could not drive a vehicle safely, while under the influence of a controlled dangerous substance, in violation of an alcohol restriction, or in violation of § 16-818 of this title; 2.

Whether there was evidence of the use by the person of alcohol, any drug, any combination of drugs, a combination of one or more drugs and alcohol, or a controlled dangerous substance; 3. Whether the police officer requested a test after the person was fully advised of the administrative sanctions that shall be imposed, including the fact that a person who refuses to take the test is ineligible for modification of a suspension or issuance of a restrictive license under subsection (n)(l) and (2) of this section; 4. Whether the person refused to take the test; 5. Whether the person drove or attempted to drive a motor vehicle while having an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or m,ore at the time of testing; or 6.

If the hearing involves disqualification of a commercial driver’s license, whether the person was operating a commercial motor vehicle. (Emphasis added.) The sworn statement of the test technician is prima facie evidence of a test result of 0.10 BAC or more. The person contesting the test instrument reading may ⁴⁶ submit evidence that the test instrument used to measure his or her breath was “malfunctioning at the time of testing, or that human error caused the test to be inaccurate.” COMAR 11.11.03.08B(7). The Code of Maryland Regulations, 11.11.03.08B(5)—(7) (Hearings, Evidence), promulgated pursuant to § 12-104(b), provided in relevant part: (5) For the purpose of determining the accuracy of the test result indicating the alcohol concentration of the licensee, the following breath testing instruments shall be deemed reliable indicators of the alcohol concentration of a person: (a) Breathalyzer Model 900; (b) Breathalyzer Model 900A; (c) Intoximeter 3000; and (d) Intox EC/IR.

(6) There shall be a rebuttable presumption that the test result of a test of blood or breath indicating the alcohol concentration of the licensee is accurate. (7) The reliability of breath testing instruments approved in § B(5) of this regulation and the presumption established in § B(6) of this regulation may not preclude a licensee from demonstrating that the specific breath testing instrument used to test the alcohol concentration of the licensee was malfunctioning at the time of testing, or that human error caused the test result to be inaccurate. B. Lytle was stopped by Officer Dickey of the Anne Arundel County Police Department at approximately 10:50 p.m. on 11 March 2001 after the officer paced him traveling 70 m.p.h. in a posted 55 m.p.h. zone and watched him cross the shoulder lane marker five times and the center line four times. After stopping Lytle’s vehicle, Officer Dickey noticed the smell of alcohol emanating from Lytle’s breath.

The officer administered the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test to Lytle who displayed six clues of intoxication. Officer Dickey then administered two additional field sobriety tests to Lytle who dis ⁴⁷ played four signs of intoxication on the walk and turn test and three signs of intoxication on the one leg stand test. A preliminary breath test was administered and Lytle was arrested for driving while intoxicated and driving under the influence of alcohol. After arresting Lytle, Officer Dickey requested another breathalyzer test which resulted in a reading of 0.101 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.

A second test administered by the officer yielded a 0.105 reading. Consequently, Officer Dickey issued a Certification and Order of Suspension to Lytle. On 14 March 2001, Lytle requested a hearing before the OAH. The hearing was held before an ALJ on 12 June 2001.

The Motor Vehicle Administration (“MVA”) appeared at the hearing through its paper record of the certified test results. At the hearing, Lytle made a Motion for No Action and argued that the test result of 0.10 should be reduced below 0.10 because of the permissible variance of such test results arguably recognized in the Toxicologist’s Regulations. The ALJ took the matter sub cuña and granted Lytle ten days in which to file a Memorandum of Law supporting his position. Lytle postulated in his memorandum that the test results of 0.10 are insufficient to show that he was subject to the sanctions of § 16 — 205.1(b)(1).

Section 16 — 205.1(b)(1) provides in relevant part: (1) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, a person may not be compelled to take a test. However, the detaining officer shall advise the person that, on receipt of a sworn statement from the officer that the person was so charged and refused to take the test, or was tested and the result indicated an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more, the Administration shall: (i) In the case of a person licensed under this title: 1. For a test result indicating an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more at the time of testing: A. For a first offense, suspend the driver’s license for 45 days; ... ⁴⁸ Lytle argued that the “accepted scientific range of accuracy” for breath test results as stated in the Toxicologist’s Regulations is plus or minus 0.01. 4 Lytle contended therefore that his test results must be reduced by 0.01 to yield a result of 0.09, thus rendering the sanctions of § 16-205.1(b)(l) inapplicable. Relying on cases from other states, Lytle observed that some require particular test results as a basis for sanction and others require a specific alcohol content before sanctions may be imposed.

Lytle contended that Maryland law required that sanctions be imposed based on a specific alcohol content and not a particular test result, and therefore he was entitled to the benefit of the margin of error. On 20 June 2001, the ALJ issued an opinion concluding, as a matter of law, that the MVA failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Lytle had an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or greater at the time of testing. The ALJ’s reasoning began with the premise that the statute was written using the “alcohol content” standard. Noting that the language of § 16-205.1(b)(1), “or was tested and the result indicated an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more,” contained references both to the “test result” and “alcohol content” standards, the ALJ relied on § 16 — 205.1(f)(T)(i)(5) to reason that the Legislature intended the statute to employ the “alcohol content” standard.

Relying on § 16-205.1 (f)(7)(i), enumerating the issues that could be raised at an administrative hearing, and specifically § 16 — 205.1(f)(7)(i)(5), the ALJ emphasized that the test was: “[w]hether the person drove or attempted to drive a motor vehicle while having an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more at the time of testing.” (Emphasis added.) The administrative adjudicator rationalized that the exclusion of test result language from the statement of issues that could be raised at an administrative hearing indicated the Legislature’s intent to ⁴⁹ use alcohol content as the applicable standard. On this foundation, the ALJ concluded that it would “be patently unfair as well as a violation of due process not to consider and apply the margin of error, i.e. the accepted scientific range of accuracy, in [Lytle’s] case.” Furthermore, he concluded, again as a matter of law, that “[t]he MVA has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence, that the margin of error or the accepted scientific range of accuracy was factored into the calculation of the alcohol content of Mr. Lytle’s breath,” and therefore the MVA failed to prove that Lytle “drove or attempted to drive a motor vehicle ‘while having an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or greater at the time of testing’ ” as required by § 16-205.1(f)(7)(i)(5). The ALJ ordered that “no action” be taken against Lytle. On 9 August 2001, the MVA filed a Petition for Judicial Review with the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, pursuant to Maryland Code (1984, 2000 Repl.Vol.), State Government Article, § 10-222 (“the State Administrative Procedure Act”).

The Circuit Court was asked to consider whether the ALJ erred when he took into account the margin of error in establishing the accurate level of Lytle’s BAC breath result. Lytle reiterated in the Circuit Court the arguments he presented in the administrative proceeding. The MVA, now represented by counsel, argued that it was authorized to suspend a driver’s license based on a certified test result and was not required to litigate proof of an actual breath alcohol content level. The court affirmed the decision of the ALJ.

The Circuit Court, like the ALJ, was unable to find any Maryland case law providing guidance on the issue. The court relied upon an Alaska case urged by Lytle. In Haynes v. Alaska, 865 P.2d 758 (Alaska 1993), the Alaska Supreme Court held that the failure to apply the margin of error inherent in the type of testing device in favor of the person subject to license revocation was a violation of the due process rights afforded by both the federal and Alaska constitutions. The Circuit Court, agreeing with the analysis of the Alaska court, concluded that the margin of error “must be applied ⁵⁰ when determining the somewhat strict statutory standard of license revocation.” The MVA petitioned this Court to grant a writ of certiorari.

We granted the petition to consider whether a certified and unrebutted 0.10 test result from a chemical breath test for alcohol was sufficient evidence of an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more mandating a driver’s license suspension under the administrative per se provisions of § 16-205.1. 371 Md. 261 , 808 A.2d 806 (2002). C. The MVA argues here that the language of § 16-205.1, and its related legislative history as well as that of the statutory scheme of which it is a part, authorize the MVA to impose license suspensions based solely on certified test results. The MVA further contends, as a matter of law, that it proved Lytle’s blood alcohol concentration inasmuch as he failed to submit any competent evidence to overcome the rebuttable presumption that the certified 0.10 test result in his case was accurate. The MVA maintains that a reading of the plain language of the statute and consideration of the overall statutory scheme reveal that § 16-205.1 is a “test result” statute.

The MVA reminds us that, to interpret Maryland’s motor vehicle laws, we must “ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature” in a reasonable statutory construction that is consistent with the “purpose, aim or policy of the legislature reflected in the statute.” MVA v. Gaddy, 335 Md. 342, 346-47 , 643 A.2d 442, 444 (1994). The ALJ’s interpretation of § 16-205.1 was incorrect therefore because his interpretation failed to construe subsection (f)(7)(i)(5) as part of a statutory scheme. Subsection (f)(7)(i), permitting challenge of “[w]hether the person drove or attempted to drive a motor vehicle while having an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more at the time of testing” at an administrative hearing, must be read together with subsection (f)(7)(h), establishing that “[t]he sworn statement of the police officer ... shall be prima facie evidence of a ⁵¹ test refusal or a test resulting in an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more at the time of testing,” to discern more accurately the legislative intent. When the two subsections are considered in tandem, the MVA suggests, it becomes clear that the Legislature intended a certified test result to be presumptive proof of a 0.10 BAC.

The MVA continues that the design of the § 16-205.1 administrative process reflects the Legislature’s intent to sanction drunk drivers based on test results. The purpose of the administrative per se provisions were to create an administrative system that would take “swift and certain action against drunk drivers.” Based upon recommendations of the Task Force on Drunk and Drugged Driving (“Task Force”), the Legislature rewrote § 16-205.1 in 1989 to create a new administrative system governing suspension of drivers licenses. See House Bill 556, 1989 Md. Laws ch. 284, § 1. One of the Task Force’s recommendations was to create an “administrative per se law” providing for the prompt suspension of a driver’s license belonging to a drunk driving suspect who “[s]ubmitted to the BAC test, and the results exceeded a statutorily defined limit.” MVA v. Shrader, 324 Md. 454, 460 , 597 A.2d 939, 941-42 (1991).

One of the purposes of the new statute, as declared in an amendment to the preamble of House Bill 556, was “establishing certain sanctions for certain test results.” (Emphasis added.) The statute was amended to create mandatory sanctions imposed “when the driver takes a test to determine alcohol concentration and fails the test.” Embrey v. MVA, 339 Md. 691, 698 , 664 A.2d 911, 914 (1995). The MVA also finds significant the Legislature’s failure to incorporate proposed amendments that would have allowed drunk driving suspects to conduct a mini-trial at their administrative hearings. The Legislature refused to adopt amendments which would have allowed a driver to compel attendance of the police officer or test technician at the hearings and, instead, retained the nature of an administrative per se hearing as one where “a sworn statement is prima facie evidence of a violation of § 16-205.1.” The MVA asserts that the Legislature, in the formulation of the regulatory scheme, must have ⁵² accounted for the accepted scientific range of accuracy of the approved breath testing instruments as the Legislature “is presumed to have had, and acted with respect to, full knowledge and information as to prior and existing law and legislation on the subject of the statute and the prior law.” City of Baltimore v. Hackley, 300 Md. 277, 283-84 , 477 A.2d 1174, 1177 (1984). The MVA also suggests that the Task Force heard testimony on the accuracy of breath testing machines such that it naturally follows that the Legislature was “well versed” in the accuracy of breath test machines when it nonetheless created the administrative per se law.

As noted supra, Lytle did not submit any evidence before the OAH to controvert the MVA’s certified test results, choosing instead to challenge the statutory procedure for calculating a certified test result. By relying on the Toxicologist’s Regulations, so the MVA’s argument goes, both Lytle and the ALJ acted improperly because there is no “statute that authorizes the toxicologist to establish evidentiary presumptions or to allocate the burdens of production and persuasion at an MVA suspension hearing.” Borbon v. MVA, 345 Md. 267, 275 , 691 A.2d 1328, 1332 (1997). Not only was it improper to rely on the Toxicologist’s Regulations as a source of authority, the ALJ misapplied those regulations. The MVA contends that the regulations do not support reducing Lytle’s test result by 0.10.

The toxicologist already had taken into account the general scientific accuracy of the test in his reporting protocol by, first, taking the lowest of two or three readings as the “test result;” and, second, reporting the lowest test result only after it is rounded down to the second decimal place. Thus, the standards contained in the Toxicologist’s Regulations support the accuracy of the Intox EC/IR test instrument and therefore do not provide a basis for impeaching Lytle’s test results. The MVA concludes, therefore, that the ALJ misinterpreted the accepted scientific standards to reach his result and acted outside the scope of his authority by disregarding the statutory prima facie case. ⁵³ Lytle, in addition to maintaining his earlier arguments, contends that the MVA’s appellate arguments were waived and are not properly before this Court because they were not raised at the administrative hearing. Lytle argues that because the MVA appeared at the administrative hearing only through its paper test results and did not present any arguments, the arguments the MVA now makes before this Court are waived based on our decision in Brodie v. MVA, 367 Md. 1 , 785 A.2d 747 (2001) (stating that “in an action for judicial review of an agency’s decision, ordinarily, a reviewing court may not pass upon issues presented to it for the first time on judicial review and that are not encompassed in the final decision of the administrative agency”).

If the merits need to be reached, the decision of the ALJ, as Lytle sees it, is presumptively valid and must be reviewed in a light favorable to him. See Mehrling v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 871 Md. 40 , 65, 806 A.2d 662, 677 (2002); Young v. Anne Arundel County, 146 Md.App. 526, 568-69 , 807 A.2d 651 ,(2002). As to the language of the statute, he contends that it focuses on alcohol content and not test results.

Lytle suggests that if § 16-205.1 permits him to challenge the “alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more at the time of testing,” acceptance of the MVA’s contention that the Legislature intended reliance solely on the “certified test results” would “ameliorate” this right. Such an interpretation of the competing clauses would render one of them “superfluous, meaningless, or nugatory.” In order to “harmonize” the relevant provisions of the statute, he urges that it must be interpreted as favoring alcohol concentration and not test results. Referring to portions of the Floor Report, Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, House Bill 556 (1989), stating that the proposed administrative per se law requires imposition of sanctions when “the person takes the test and has a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10 or greater,” Lytle interprets that to mean that the Legislature intended the statute to be an “alcohol content” statute. Further supporting his interpretation, Lytle points to a statement from the preamble of Senate Bill 108 and House Bill 3 of the 2001 Session of the ⁵⁴ Maryland General Assembly (2001 Md. Laws ch. 4 & 5) which lowered the alcohol concentration threshold to 0.08: “For the purpose of ... reducing the level of alcohol concentration for a certain administrative offense that results in the suspension of a driver’s license under certain circumstances.” On the basis of this, Lytle concludes that the amended statute is an alcohol content statute and states that “it strains the imagination to believe that in 1989 the legislature intended for ‘test results’ to be the standard, and then in 2001, without discussion, it changed its mind and made ‘alcohol concentration’ the standard.” Lytle claims case law support from other jurisdictions.

In addition to the Alaska case discussed supra, he finds succor from Nebraska, Nebraska v. Bjornsen, 201 Neb. 709 , 271 N.W.2d 839 (1978); Washington, Washington v. Keller, 36 Wash.App. 110 , 672 P.2d 412 (1983); Ohio, Ohio v. Prestier, 7 Ohio Misc.2d 36 , 455 N.E.2d 24 (1982); and Hawaii, Hawaii v. Boehmer, 1 Haw.App. 44 , 613 P.2d 916 (1980). These cases, he contends, require the application of the scientific margin of error to test results produced by breathalyzer instruments, absent statutory direction to the contrary. Finally, Lytle observes that he has a property right in his driving privilege that may not be suspended without the protections of due process. He argues that the second of three factors applicable to administrative procedural due process analysis under Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893, 903 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18, 33 (1976), “the risk of erroneous deprivation of such [property] interest through the procedure used,” is violated, and consequently he is deprived of his property right, when the results of the Intox EC/IR test are used without taking into account the 0.01 margin of error.

In its Reply Brief, the MVA argued that Lytle is incorrect to assert that failure to apply the margin of error test is a violation of his due process rights. Procedural due process requires “only that a licensee be informed of the evidence on which the agency is relying and be given a chance to rebut such evidence.” Plumer v. Maryland, 915 F.2d 927, 931 (4th ⁵⁵ Cir.1990). The use of a certified test result does not deny Lytle a meaningful hearing in the constitutional sense because he had the opportunity to testify and otherwise attempt to rebut the test result at his administrative hearing. The MVA asserts that this Court, in Moon v. State, 300 Md. 354 , 478 A.2d 695 (1984), condoned the Legislature’s declaration that breath test results are reliable evidence and therefore the suspension of driver’s licenses based upon certified test results satisfies the constitutional requirement that the statutory scheme be free from unwarranted risk of an erroneous outcome.

In reply to Lytle’s waiver argument, the MVA asserts that its right to judicial review is preserved because it is a party aggrieved by the AL J’s decision. The errors of law urged by the MVA for appellate review are “expressly ‘encompassed in the final decision’ of the ALJ.” Brodie, 367 Md. at 4 , 785 A.2d at 749 . It was appropriate for the MVA to appear at the hearing on its paper submission because hearings under § 16-205.1 were intended by the Legislature to be “informal and summary in nature,” MVA v. Richards, 356 Md. 356, 377 , 739 A.2d 58, 70 (1999), and “permit the MVA’s case to be made in most instances from a documentary record.” Borbon, 345 Md. at 283 , 691 A.2d at 1336 . The MVA submitted a prima facie case to the ALJ when it submitted the certifications of the police officer and the test operator.

II

A. Lytle is incorrect in his assertion that the MVA is not entitled to have this Court consider its arguments. The State APA, § 10-222(a)(1), provides that “a party who is aggrieved by the final decision in a contested case is entitled to judicial review of the decision.” Section 10-222(f)(1) provides that “judicial review of disputed issues of fact shall be confined to the record.” The dispute in this case is purely one of law. The MVA asks us to determine whether a certified, unrebutted 0.10 test result from a chemical breath test for alcohol is ⁵⁶ sufficient evidence of an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more mandating a driver’s license suspension under the administrative per se provisions of § 16-205.1. Our conclusion will be reached by determining the legislative intent and interpreting the relevant statutory provisions.

The grounds relied on by the agency are identical to the issues the MVA raises here. The ALJ determined that the statute required consideration of the margin of error because the statute is a “alcohol content” statute and the MVA argues before us that the statute does not require consideration of the margin of error because it is a “test result” statute. The MVA’s arguments are properly before this Court. B. A court reviewing a decision of an administrative agency 5 generally is limited to determining whether there was substantial evidence on the record as a whole to support the agency’s findings of fact and whether the agency’s conclusions of law were correct.

MVA v. Atterbeary, 368 Md. 480, 490-91 , 796 A.2d 75, 81-82 (2002). To determine whether an agency’s decision is supported by substantial evidence the reviewing court must exercise deference towards an agency’s fact-finding and determine only “whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have reached the factual conclusion the agency reached.” Bd. of Physician Quality Assurance v. Banks, 354 Md. 59, 68 , 729 A.2d 376, 380 (1999) (quoting Bulluck v. Pelham Wood Apts., 283 Md. 505, 512 , 390 A.2d 1119, 1123 (1978)). We further noted that “[e]ven with regard to some legal issues, a degree of deference should often be accorded the position of the administrative agency,” and “an administrative agency’s interpretation and application of the statute which the agency ⁵⁷ administers should ordinarily be given considerable weight by reviewing courts.” Banks, 354 Md. at 69 , 729 A.2d at 381 . The issue in the present matter, the interpretation of § 16-205.1, presents a pure question of law.

See Maryland Code (1984, 1999 Repl.Vol.), State Gov’t Article, § 10-222(h)(3). C. The result in this case turns on the intent of the Legislature. Our analysis begins with the language of the statute as the primary source of legislative intent. When the language is clearly consistent with the apparent purpose of the statute and the result is not absurd, we have held that no further inquiry into legislative intent is required.

See Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 366 Md. 295, 301 , 783 A.2d 667, 670 (2001); Degren v. State, 352 Md. 400, 417 , 722 A.2d 887, 895 (1999). Beyond plain meaning, the purpose of the statute may be ascertained by examining the Legislature’s statement of a statute’s purposes, and courts may consider other “external manifestations” or “persuasive evidence” indicating the legislative intent. State v. Jones, 340 Md. 235, 262 , 666 A.2d 128, 141 (1995); Eldridge v. State, 329 Md. 307, 312 , 619 A.2d 531, 534 (1993). The language of a statute cannot be divorced from its context.

Atkinson v. State, 331 Md. 199, 212 , 627 A.2d 1019, 1025 (1993). As we stated in Kaczorowski v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 514 , 525 A.2d 628, 632 (1987), even where the language of the statute is plain, its meaning is controlled by its context. In short, the statutory language must be construed in light of and governed by its context within the overall statutory scheme. In re Keith G., 325 Md. 538, 542 , 601 A.2d 1107, 1109 (1992).

An appellate court may consider evidence such as a bill’s title and function paragraphs, amendments that occurred as it passed through the Legislature, and its relationship to earlier and subsequent legislation to ascertain the Legislature’s goal in enacting the statute. Harris v. State, 331 Md. 137, 146 , 626 A.2d 946, 950 (1993). ⁵⁸ Lytle argues that the language of § 16-205.1 is ambiguous and that recourse to the legislative history reveals that the statute was intended to be an “alcohol content” statute, rather than a “test result” statute. He supports his argument primarily on the basis that if the statute were construed that “test results” triggered sanctions under § 16-205.1, it would render the language of § 16-205.1(f)(7)(i)(5) “superfluous, meaningless, or nugatory.” Lytle also uses portions of the Floor Report regarding H.B. 556 of 1989 to support his argument, in particular a passage stating: [t]his bill adopts an ‘administrative per se’ law requiring the suspension of an individual’s driver’s license if the person is detained by police for driving or attempting to drive while intoxicated ... and the person: (1) refuses to take the test ...; or (2) the person takes the test and has a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10 or greater. Lytle’s reliance on the Floor Report is misplaced.

The excerpt he relies on does not state that a person’s license will be suspended based on his alcohol content; rather it provides that suspension will occur on the basis of a test result indicating a certain level of BAC. The emphasis is on the BAC, but only as measured by the test instrument. Lytle’s fixation on the language contained in § 16 — 205.1(f)(T)(i)(5), “[w]hether the person drove or attempted to drive a motor vehicle while having an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more at the time of testing,” focuses on a discrete portion while ignoring its overall context. The phrase “at the time of testing” would be surplusage if alcohol content was determinative.

If alcohol content was determinative, the statute would use the words “alcohol content,” instead of “alcohol concentration.” Blood alcohol concentration is a specific term of measurement and use of that term refers to test results rather than the alcohol content of the person’s blood stream. Our examination of the pertinent statutory language, its place in the statutory scheme, and even the relevant legislative history reveals a result opposite that reached by Lytle. Lytle’s argument is based on snippets of language shorn from their contextual roots. It is clear that the Legislature intend ⁵⁹ ed to create an administrative per se law imposing “certain sanctions for certain test results.” The stated purpose of the statute and the deliberate crafting of the regulatory scheme indicate that the statute was intended to create expedient procedures that swiftly would impose penalties for drunk driving irrespective of any parallel potential criminal processes or penalties.

To this end, Petitioner correctly observes that the Legislature created an administrative system that focused on test results as a basis for sanctions. The administrative procedures promulgated by the MVA pursuant to § 12-104(b) emphasize the purposes of the overall statutory scheme that includes § 16-205.1. The Code of Maryland Regulations establishes extensive procedures for checking the accuracy of the test instruments employed to implement § 16-205.1. The administrative procedures and instrument maintenance guidelines further demonstrate the intent that the swift and certain action taken be predicated on test results.

Sections 16-205.1(f)(7)(i) and (ii) are self-evident of this: (7)(i) At a hearing under this section, the person has the rights described in § 12-206 of this article, but at the hearing the only issues shall be: 1. Whether the police officer who stops or detains a person had reasonable grounds to believe the person was driving or attempting to drive while intoxicated, while under the influence of alcohol, while so far under the influence of any drug, any combination of drugs, or a combination of one or more drugs and alcohol that the person could not drive a vehicle safely, while under the influence of a controlled dangerous substance, in violation of an alcohol restriction, or in violation of § 16-813 of this title; 2. Whether there was evidence of the use by the person of alcohol, any drug, any combination of drugs, a combination of one or more drugs and alcohol, or a controlled dangerous substance; 3. Whether the police officer requested a test after the person was fully advised of the administrative sanctions that ⁶⁰ shall be imposed, including the fact that a person who refuses to take the test is ineligible for modification of a suspension or issuance of a restrictive license under subsection (n)(l)