Jones v. State

³²⁹ WATTS, J. The doctrine of laches, which is both an “affirmative defense” and an “equitable defense[,]” “ ‘applies whe[re] there is an unreasonable delay in the assertion of one [partyj’s rights and that delay results in prejudice to the opposing party.’ ” State Ctr., LLC v. Lexington Charles Ltd. P’ship, 438 Md. 451, 584, 586, 604 , 92 A.3d 400, 480, 491 (2014) (quoting Liddy v. Lamone, 398 Md. 233, 244 , 919 A.2d 1276, 1283 (2007)). We decide: (1) whether, generally, the doctrine of laches may bar the right to seek coram nobis relief, and whether, specifically, the doctrine of laches bars this petitioner’s right to seek coram nobis relief; if so, (2) when delay begins for purposes of determining whether the doctrine of laches bars the ability to seek coram nobis relief; and (3) whether, for purposes of determining whether the doctrine of laches bars coram nobis relief, prejudice involves only the State’s ability to defend against the coram nobis petition. We hold that: (1) the doctrine of laches may bar the right to seek coram nobis relief, and barred the petitioner’s right to seek coram nobis relief in this case; (2) for purposes of determining whether the doctrine of laches bars coram nobis relief, delay begins when the petitioner knew or should have known of the facts underlying the alleged error; and (3) for purposes of determining whether the doctrine of laches bars coram nobis relief, prejudice may involve not only the State’s ability to defend against the coram nobis petition, but also the State’s ability to reprosecute. BACKGROUND This case arose as a result of Corey Jones (“Jones”), Petitioner, having entered a plea of guilty to a drug offense in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City (“the circuit court”) in 1999 and thirteen years later, in 2012, filing a petition for coram nobis relief after being subject to sentencing as an armed career criminal 1 in the United States District Court for ³³⁰ the District of Maryland.

In bringing the petition for coram nobis relief, Jones contended that he pled guilty to an offense other than possession of heroin with intent to distribute, one of the predicate offenses to be used for his enhanced sentence in federal court. Specifically, on May 28, 1999, in the circuit court, in Case Number 299148035, the State charged Jones with distribution of heroin (Count I), use of a minor for the purpose of distributing heroin (Count II), possession of heroin with the intent to distribute (Count III), 2 and possession of heroin (Count IV). On September 14, 1999, the circuit court conducted a guilty plea proceeding. Jones’s guilty plea proceeding was conducted simultaneously with that of another individual, Charles Turner (“Turner”).

The transcript begins with the following statement by the prosecutor: ‘Your Honor, we have, I understand, agreements on State versus Charles Turner, 299092045.... [a]nd State versus Corey Jones, 299148034 and 035.” Jones’s counsel stated that she was both appearing on Jones’s behalf and “standing i[n]” for Turner’s counsel. 3 The prosecutor stated: “[W]e would be proceeding under Count II of the case ending in 035.... [s]ix years, suspending all but the first eighteen months, three years[’] probation.” 4 Count II of Case Number 299148035 was use of a minor for the purpose of distributing heroin. ³³¹ During the guilty plea colloquy, Jones’s counsel elicited the following information from Jones. 5 Jones was thirty-five years old, had completed the ninth grade, and could read and understand English. Jones was not under the influence of any drugs, alcohol, or medications that could have clouded his thinking. Jones had never been a patient in a mental hospital or under the care of a psychiatrist or psychologist. The prosecutor read a statement of facts, which we set forth below: With respect to Corey Jones, on April the 3rd, 1991,[ 6 ] at approximately 12:30 in the afternoon, Officer Shawn Johnson of Western District Baltimore City Police was in a covert position to walk the 1100 block of North Strieker Street in Baltimore City for suspected drug transactions when he observed the Defendant identified in the courtroom today as Mr. Corey Jones, and another individual later identified as a Juvenile, last name of Thompson, [and] a clear sandwich [bag] containing white objects.

Mr. Thompson then entered 1103 North Strieker Street and came back out to the street. Both individuals were heard yelling, “Rough rider, rough rider out.” An unidentified individual approached Mr. Thompson, the juvenile, and engaged in a brief conversation. Mr. Thompson then went back into the building of 1103 North Strieker, which was later identified as a vacant dwelling and gave the individuals a small white object in exchange for U.S. currency. After observing such actions two to three times, [0]ffi-cer Johnson believed he witnessed a narcotics transaction, called for an arrest team.

Both individuals were stopped. A clear sandwich bag was recovered inside the dwelling. 21 gelatin capsules of suspected heroin were inside. It appeared to the officer to be the ³³² same guy [sic] that he had seen Mr. Jones handing over to Mr. Thompson. $38 U.S. currency was found on Mr. Jones’[s] person; $10 U.S. currency was found on Mr. Thompson. The suspected controlled dangerous substance was subsequently tested and found to be a controlled dangerous substance, Schedule I, heroin.

I would submit the chemical analysis to the Court as State’s Exhibit 1. The circuit court found that the facts sufficed to support Jones’s guilty plea, entered a verdict of guilty, and sentenced Jones to six years of incarceration, with all but eighteen months suspended and with credit for time served, followed by three years of supervised probation. The circuit court stated explicitly: “I find then those facts are sufficient to support the plea.” During the guilty plea colloquy, Jones’s counsel had informed Jones and Turner that they were “each pleading guilty to a count of possession with intent to distribute.” In response, Jones stated, “[y]es, ma’am[,]” indicating that he understood that he was pleading guilty to possession of heroin with intent to distribute. The circuit court found that Jones’s guilty plea was “knowing and voluntary.” Nonetheless, the docket entries state that Jones pled guilty to use of a minor for the purpose of distributing heroin in Case Number 299148035, and that all three other charges, including possession of heroin with the intent to distribute, were dismissed or closed in Case Number 299148035.

At the conclusion of the guilty plea proceeding, Jones’s counsel advised Jones of his right to apply for leave to appeal within thirty days. Jones failed to move to withdraw his guilty plea, move for a new trial, apply for leave to appeal, move to set aside an unjust or improper verdict, or petition for post-conviction relief. On August 24, 2005, Jones pled guilty to violating the order of probation. 7 The circuit court sentenced Jones to three years of incarceration. 8 ³³³ On July 23, 2012, in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, Jones pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g)(1). Due, in part, to his 1999 conviction in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Jones was subject to a mandatory minimum of fifteen years of incarceration under 18 U.S.C. § 924 (e)(1), the statute known as the Armed Career Criminal Act.

But for this conviction, Jones would have been subject to a maximum of ten years of incarceration under 18 U.S.C. § 924 (a)(2). On October 9, 2012, Jones filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis in the circuit court. In the coram nobis petition, Jones contended that his 1999 guilty plea was involuntary because he had not been informed of the elements of the offense or nature of the charge to which he pled guilty; Jones argued that the transcript of the guilty plea proceeding left unclear whether he had pled guilty to use of a minor for the purpose of distributing heroin or possession of heroin with the intent to distribute. On November 27, 2012, the State filed a response to the coram nobis petition in the circuit court.

In the response, the State contended that the doctrine of laches barred Jones from seeking coram nobis relief; alternatively, the State argued that Jones’s 1999 guilty plea was voluntary. On December 7, 2012, the circuit court conducted a hearing on the coram nobis petition. The State called as a witness Officer Johnson, the officer who had seen Jones on April 3, 1999 (the day of Jones’s arrest). 9 Officer Johnson testified that, after reviewing the statement of charges 10 and an “of ³³⁴ fense report” he had prepared in connection with the case, he had no independent recollection of Jones or the arrest. Officer Johnson testified that he had looked for, but could not find, the folder from the Baltimore Police Department for Jones’s case.

In an order dated January 18, 2013, the circuit court granted the coram nobis petition. The State appealed, and, in an opinion dated November 25, 2014, the Court of Special Appeals reversed, holding that the doctrine of laches barred the coram nobis petition. See State v. Jones, 220 Md.App. 238, 242 , 103 A.3d 745, 748 (2014). On January 12, 2015, Jones filed in this Court a petition for a writ of certiorari in which he raised the following two issues: (I) “Did the Court of Special Appeals err when it held that the doctrine of laches barred [ ] Jones from seeking coram nobis relief?”; and (II) “Was [] Jones’[s] guilty plea neither knowing nor voluntary ... ?” In an order dated March 27, 2015, this Court granted the petition.

See Jones v. State, 442 Md. 194 , 112 A.3d 373 (2015). DISCUSSION A. Contentions Jones contends that the circuit court was correct in concluding that the doctrine of laches did not bar his ability to pursue coram nobis relief. Jones does not dispute that the doctrine of laches may preclude an individual’s ability to pursue coram nobis relief and may be used as an affirmative defense; instead, Jones argues that the doctrine of laches does not apply in this case. As to unreasonable delay, Jones asserts that, for purposes of determining whether the doctrine of laches bars his ability to seek coram nobis relief, calculation of any delay begins from the date on which the petitioner is able to file a facially valid coram nobis petition.

Accordingly, Jones maintains that, here, his delay began on October 1, 2012, when Md.Code Ann., Crim. Proc. (2001, 2008 RepLVol., 2015 Supp.) (“CP”) § 8-401 (“The failure to seek an appeal in a criminal case may not be construed as a waiver of the right to file a petition for writ of ³³⁵ error coram nobis.”) became effective. Until then, Jones would not have been able to file a facially valid coram nobis petition because he had never applied for leave to appeal, and thus may have been deemed to have waived his right to file a coram nobis petition in light of Holmes v. State, 401 Md. 429, 431 , 932 A.2d 698, 699 (2007) (“[A] presumption that an individual waives his right to file a petition for a writ of error coram nobis arises if the individual, after entering a guilty plea and having been informed of his right to file an application for leave to appeal, does not file an application for leave to appeal.”). 11 Under Jones’s theory, his delay lasted only eight days (from October 1, 2012 to October 9, 2012).

Alternatively, Jones contends that his delay began on July 23, 2012, when he pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in federal court, as, until then, he would not have been able to file a facially valid coram nobis petition because he had not been facing significant collateral consequences from his 1999 conviction. Under Jones’s alternative theory, his delay lasted less than three months (from July 23, 2012 to October 9, 2012). Next, Jones argues that, even if his delay began in 1999 (when he pled guilty to a drug offense), the thirteen-year delay was not unreasonable because: (1) nothing in the record indicates that he knew of his right to petition for post-conviction relief; (2) nothing in the record indicates that he knew that the circuit court had erred in finding his guilty plea voluntary until he spoke with the lawyer who represented him in his federal case; and (3) he lacked an incentive to challenge his guilty plea because he received a relatively light sentence. As to prejudice, Jones asserts that, for purposes of determining whether the doctrine of laches bars his right to seek ³³⁶ coram nobis relief, prejudice involves only the State’s ability to defend against the coram nobis petition and not the State’s ability to reprosecute the case.

Alternatively, Jones maintains that, even if prejudice also involves the State’s ability to reprosecute, Jones’s delay did not prejudice the State because: (1) the State failed to prove that it used due diligence to search for evidence in Jones’s case; and (2) the State could offer the offense report that Officer Johnson had completed as a past recollection recorded under Maryland Rule 5-802.1(e). Alternatively, Jones contends that, even if the State met its burden to prove that his delay prejudiced the State, the doctrine of laches should not apply because: (1) his guilty plea was involuntary; (2) he is facing collateral consequences; and (3) he has served the sentences for his 1999 conviction and his violation of probation. The State responds that the circuit court erred in concluding that the doctrine of laches did not bar the coram nobis petition. As to unreasonable delay, the State contends that, for purposes of determining whether laches bars the ability to seek coram nobis relief, delay begins when “the petitioner knew or should have known of the [alleged] error[.]” More specifically, the State argues that delay begins when the petitioner becomes aware of the facts underlying the alleged error, regardless of when the petitioner becomes aware of the possible legal remedies for the alleged error.

Thus, the State maintains that Jones’s delay began in 1999 (when Jones pled guilty and knew of the facts underlying the alleged error). The State asserts that, here, Jones’s thirteen-year delay was unreasonable because: (1) in 1999, the circuit court sentenced Jones to six years of incarceration, with all but eighteen months suspended, followed by three years of supervised probation, thus incentivizing Jones to challenge his 1999 conviction; (2) in 2005, the circuit court sentenced Jones to three years of incarceration for violating the order of probation, thus further incentivizing Jones to challenge his 1999 conviction; and (3) the reason for the coram nobis petition was the fact that Jones committed another crime (namely, being a felon in possession of a firearm). As to prejudice, the State asserts that, for purposes of determining whether laches bars the ability to seek coram ³³⁷ nobis relief, prejudice involves not only the State’s ability to defend against the coram nobis petition, but also the State’s ability to reprosecute; accordingly, here, Jones’s thirteen-year delay prejudiced the State because: (1) convicting Jones again is effectively impossible; and (2) in any event, the State must establish simply that it is in a less favorable position than it was before, and the State has established as much because Officer Johnson, the State’s only eyewitness, had no independent recollection of Jones and could no longer find the folder from the Baltimore Police Department for Jones’s case. The State maintains that Jones’s thirteen-year delay also prejudiced the State’s ability to defend against the coram nobis petition because the recording (and, by extension, a full transcript) of Jones’s guilty plea proceeding is unavailable.

B. Standard of Review An appellate court reviews without deference a trial court’s conclusion as to whether the doctrine of laches bars a party’s filing. See State Ctr., 438 Md. at 585 , 92 A.3d at 480 (“In reviewing whether the doctrine of laches bars [the plaintiff]s’ claims, we review the Circuit Court’s determination without deference.” (Citing Liddy, 398 Md. at 248-49 , 919 A.2d at 1287 )). 12 ³³⁸ C. Coram Nobis Relief A convicted petitioner is entitled to relief through the common law writ of error coram nobis if and only if: (1) the petitioner challenges a conviction based on “constitutional, jurisdictional[,] or fundamental” grounds, whether factual or legal; (2) the petitioner rebuts the “presumption of regularity [that] attaches to the criminal case”; (3) the petitioner “fac[es] significant collateral consequences from the conviction”; (4) the issue as to the alleged error has not been waived or “finally litigated in a prior proceeding, [absent] intervening changes in the applicable law”; and (5) the petitioner is not entitled to “another statutory or common law remedy” (for example, the petitioner cannot be incarcerated in a State prison or on parole or probation, as the petitioner likely could then petition for post-conviction relief). Rivera v. State, 409 Md. 176 , 191 n. 6, 973 A.2d 218 , 227 n. 6 (2009) (quoting Skok v. State, 361 Md. 52, 78-80 , 760 A.2d 647, 661-62 (2000)). One possible ground for a coram nobis petition is an allegedly involuntary guilty plea.

See Skok, 361 Md. at 70 , 760 A.2d at 657 . Recently, in State v. Smith, 443 Md. 572, 576 , 117 A.3d 1093, 1096 (2015), this Court addressed waiver of the right to seek coram nobis relief, and held that CP § 8-401 applies retroactively, such that the petitioner did not waive the right to pursue coram nobis relief by failing to file an application for leave to appeal; we further held that the petitioner did not waive the “right to pursue coram nobis relief by not moving to withdraw her guilty plea or filing a petition for post-conviction relief when those avenues of relief were available to her.” Our discussion of CP § 8-401 focused on whether the statute applied retroactively; as to that point, we held: In summary, CP § 8-401 is both procedural and remedial, and it does not impair any vested right of the State to the “finality” of its judgments of conviction. Moreover, the General Assembly did not express an intent to limit the applicability of the statute to those coram nobis petitions filed after October 1, 2012. Accordingly, CP § 8-401 applies to all “cases pending in court when the statute be ³³⁹ comes effective.” Applying CP § 8-401 to Smith’s coram nobis action, which was pending in court on October 1, 2012, we hold that Smith did not waive her right to coram nobis relief by failing to file an application for leave to appeal.

Id. at 594-95, 117 A.3d at 1106-07 (citation omitted). As to the doctrine of laches and coram nobis relief, in Holmes, 401 Md. at 487 , 932 A.2d at 733 (Raker, J., dissenting), Judge Raker stated that the doctrine of laches may bar coram nobis relief. D. Doctrine of Laches The doctrine of laches, which is both an “affirmative defense” and an “equitable defense!,]” “ ‘applies whe[re] there is an unreasonable delay in the assertion of one [party]’s rights and that delay results in prejudice to the opposing party.’ ” State Ctr., 438 Md. at 584, 604, 586 , 92 A.3d at 480 , 491 (quoting Liddy, 398 Md. at 244 , 919 A.2d at 1283 ). Laches’s purpose is to protect “against stale claims!.]” State Ctr., 438 Md. at 585 , 92 A.3d at 480 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

The party that asserts laches has the burden of proving laches by a preponderance of the evidence. See Lopez v. State, 205 Md.App. 141, 175 , 43 A.3d 1125, 1144-45 (2012) (“[T]he party asserting the defense, the State, must show by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) there was an unreasonable or impermissible delay in asserting a particular claim; and, (2) that the delay prejudiced the State.”), vacated on other grounds, 433 Md. 652 , 72 A.3d 579 (2013). Whether laches applies depends on an evaluation of each case’s particular circumstances. See State Ctr., 438 Md. at 590 , 92 A.3d at 483 (“There is no inflexible rule as to what constitutes, or what does not constitute, laches; hence!,] its existence must be determined by the facts and circumstances of each case.” (Citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). “The passage of time, alone, does not constitute laches!, and] is simply one of the many circumstances from which a determination of what constitutes an unreasonable and unjust ³⁴⁰ ifiable delay may be made.” Id. at 590 , 92 A.3d at 483 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

For laches’s purposes, “[prejudice is ‘generally held to be any[ ]thing that places the [opposing party] in a less favorable position.’ ” Id. at 586 , 92 A.3d at 481 (quoting Liddy, 398 Md. at 244 , 919 A.2d at 1284 ); see also State Ctr., 438 Md. at 586 , 92 A.3d at 480-81 (“ ‘For the doctrine of laches to be applicable, there must be a showing that the delay in the assertion of a right worked a disadvantage to another[.]’ ” (Quoting Liddy, 398 Md. at 244 , 919 A.2d at 1284 ) (brackets omitted)). In State Ctr., 438 Md. at 610, 483-84 , 92 A.3d at 495, 419 , this Court held that laches barred claims against developers and State agencies for alleged violations of the State Procurement Law. This Court stated: “In determining whether a delay is unreasonable, we must analyze (i) when, if ever, the claim became ripe (ie., the earliest time at which [the plaintiffs] were able to bring their claims); and (ii) whether the passage of time between then and when the [plaintiffs] filed the complaint was unreasonable.” Id. at 590 , 92 A.3d at 483 . Addressing the first prong, this Court concluded that some of the plaintiffs’ claims became ripe more than four-and-a-half years before the plaintiffs sued; other claims became ripe approximately a year-and-a-half before the plaintiffs sued; and still other claims became ripe approximately half a year before the plaintiffs sued.

See id. at 483, 603 , 92 A.3d at 418, 490-91 . Addressing the second prong, this Court stated: Laches bars [the four-and-a-half-year-old] claims---- The State was open and transparent with the entire “unique” procurement process. The local newspapers covered the matter extensively. If the announced process was illegal, [the plaintiff]s could have—and should have—brought their complaints on that score to court sooner than they did---[Significant motivations of [the plaintiffjs appear to be a “desire to stave off competition.” Their initial objections to the [State Center] Project stemmed from the selection of the Master Developer, which was announced publicly by [the governor ... more than three years prior to [the plaintiffjs’ filing of the Original Complaint----[T]he moti ³⁴¹ vations of the parties matter and indicate that [the plaintiff]s’ delay in bringing their claims was unreasonable and unjustified.

Id. at 606, 608, 92 A.3d at 492, 494 . Finally, this Court concluded that the delay prejudiced the defendants, stating: To allow the [plaintiffls to bring the claim at the stage in the development when they did caused the State and Developers to waste substantial public funds, if there were any merit in [the plaintiffls’ substantive claims. Although we recognize a taxpayer’s interest in the State complying with the competitive bidding and other requirements set forth in the [State] Procurement Law, when obliged to do so, the taxpayer cannot delay bringing suit in such a way that would cost the taxpayers even more money if the complaining taxpayer was right. Id. at 609, 92 A.3d at 494 .

Similarly, in Liddy, 398 Md. at 236 , 919 A.2d at 1278-79 , this Court held that laches barred claims against a political candidate, the State Administrator of Elections, and the State Board of Elections based on an assertion that the candidate was ineligible for election under the Constitution of Maryland. The plaintiff sued nearly four months after the candidate filed his certificate of candidacy; more than one month after the candidate won the primary election; and just eighteen days before the general election. See id. at 236-38 , 919 A.2d at 1278-80 . This Court noted: “[T]he [plaintiffl’s dilatory challenge ... could have been brought long before not just the general election[,] but the primary election as well.

The [plaintiff]’s challenge, in fact, could have been brought at any time after [the candidate]’s [] filing of his certification of candidacy.” Id. at 253 , 919 A.2d at 1289 . This Court concluded that the unreasonable delay 13 prejudiced the State Board of Elections because it had “insufficient time to reprogram, ³⁴² install, and test voting machines, and to redesign, reorder, reprint, and distribute absentee and provisional ballots[.]” Id. at 254 , 919 A.2d at 1290 . This Court concluded that the unreasonable delay also “prejudiced the electorate as a whole” because “[t]he relief sought by the [plaintiff], ie.[,] the removal of [the candidate]’s name from the ballot, or, in the alternative, signs being posted to indicate [the eandidate]’s ineligibility to voters, would have caused a great deal of uncertainty in the entire election process.” Id. at 254 , 919 A.2d at 1290 . By contrast, in Frederick Rd.

Ltd. P’ship v. Brown & Sturm, 360 Md. 76, 80, 117-18 , 756 A.2d 963, 965, 985-86 (2000), a legal malpractice case, this Court held that a trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the ground of laches because “an issue of fact exist[ed] as to whether the [plaintiffs] had notice of a malpractice cause of action or fraud on the part of the” defendants. This Court stated: For a delay to constitute laches, the delaying party must have had notice of a right or cause of action. Therefore, laches cannot be imputed to a party who, through no fault of his or her own, is ignorant of facts giving rise to a cause of action and has, as a consequence, failed to assert it. Id. at 118 , 756 A.2d at 985 -86 (citing Berman v. Leckner, 193 Md. 177, 185 , 66 A.2d 392, 395 (1949)).

In turn, in Berman, 193 Md. at 185 , 66 A.2d at 395 , this Court stated: [I]t is an essential element of laches that the party charged with it should have had knowledge or the means of knowledge of the facts creating [the party’s] right or cause of action. Laches cannot be imputed to a party who has been justifiably ignorant of the facts creating [the party’s] right or cause of action, and has consequently failed to assert it. Thus, in suits alleging fraud, time begins to run, not from the perpetration of the fraud, but from its discovery. Mere lapse of time will not bar a defrauded party’s right to relief while [the party] remains ignorant of the fraud and has no knowledge of facts which would lead a [person] of ordinary prudence to its discovery. ³⁴³ (Citations omitted). 14 E. Analysis 1.

Applicability of the Doctrine of Laches Here, we first address an important preliminary matter. Jones does not dispute that the doctrine of laches may bar the right to seek coram nobis relief in general, but rather asserts that the doctrine of laches does not act as a bar in his case. Lest there be any doubt, however, we hold that the doctrine of laches may bar the right to seek coram nobis relief. Accord Moguel v. State, 184 Md.App. 465, 471 , 966 A.2d 963, 967 (2009) (“[T]he doctrine of laches is a defense to a petition for writ of error coram nobis action filed for the purpose of challenging a criminal conviction.”); Holmes , 401 Md. at 487 , 932 A.2d at 733 (Raker, J., dissenting) (“Laches is a valuable tool for the trial [court] in evaluating a petition for coram nobis.”).

In other words, we unequivocally hold that the doctrine of laches may, as an affirmative defense in a coram nobis action, bar an individual’s ability to seek coram nobis relief. 2. Assessment of Unreasonable Delay To assess whether the doctrine of laches bars an individual’s ability to seek coram nobis relief, a court first determines whether the individual unreasonably delayed before filing the petition for coram nobis relief; if so, the court next determines whether the unreasonable delay prejudiced the opposing party. See State Ctr., 438 Md. at 586 , 92 A.3d at 481 (“[Generally, we must analyze whether, (1) in the context of an equitable claim, (2) there was an unreasonable delay in the filing and, if so, (3) whether there was any prejudice.”). In assessing whether the party unreasonably delayed before ³⁴⁴ filing, the court first ascertains the length of the delay, then decides whether the delay was unreasonable.

See id. at 590 , 92 A.3d at 483 (“In determining whether a delay is unreasonable, we must analyze (i) when, if ever, the claim became ripe (i.e., the earliest time at which [the plaintiff]s were able to bring their claims); and (ii) whether the passage of time between then and when the [plaintiff]s filed the complaint was unreasonable.”). Thus, a court’s first task is to determine when the delay began. Here, the parties sharply disagree about when delay begins for purposes of determining whether the doctrine of laches bars a petitioner’s ability to seek coram nobis relief. Jones contends that delay begins when a petitioner may file a facially valid coram nobis petition.

The State responds that delay begins when the petitioner knew or should have known of the facts underlying the alleged error. We agree with the State and hold that, for purposes of the doctrine of laches, delay begins when a petitioner knew or should have known of the facts underlying the alleged error—in this case, in 1999, on the date of the guilty plea proceeding. This Court’s precedent compels the conclusion that delay begins when the petitioner knew or should have known of the facts underlying the alleged error. See Frederick Rd.

Ltd. P’ship, 360 Md. at 118 , 756 A.2d at 986 (“[L]aches cannot be imputed to a party who, through no fault of his or her own, is ignorant of facts giving rise to a cause of action and has, as a consequence, failed to assert it.” (Citing Berman, 193 Md. at 185 , 66 A.2d at 395 )); Berman, 193 Md. at 185 , 66 A.2d at 395 (“[I]t is an essential element of laches that the party charged with it should have had knowledge or the means of knowledge of the facts creating [the party’s] right or cause of action.”); State Ctr., 438 Md. at 590 , 92 A.3d at 483 (“In determining whether a delay is unreasonable, we must analyze [ ] when, if ever, the claim became ripe (i.e., the earliest time at which [the plaintiffs] were able to bring their claims)[.]”); State Ctr., 438 Md. at 606, 608 , 92 A.3d at 492, 494 (“The local newspapers covered the matter extensively. If the announced pro ³⁴⁵ cess was illegal, [the plaintiffs could have—and should have— brought their complaints on that score to court sooner than they did____[T]he selection of the Master Developer ... was announced publicly by [the g]overnor[.]”). Our conclusion—that delay begins when an individual knew or should have known of the facts concerning the alleged error—furthers laches’s purpose of protecting “against stale claims[.]” State Ctr., 438 Md. at 585 , 92 A.3d at 480 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). An alleged error comes into existence as soon as the facts underlying the alleged error occur; for example, here, the alleged error came into existence as soon as the allegedly deficient guilty plea proceeding occurred in 1999.

By the time that Jones filed the coram nobis petition in 2012, the alleged error was thirteen years old—ie., stale. Additionally, this conclusion furthers the public’s interests in accurately and promptly resolving allegations of error and maintaining the finality of convictions. The sooner an alleged error is brought to the trial court’s attention, the sooner the trial court can accurately resolve the allegation of error and provide the petitioner with a remedy, if needed, and the sooner the State can prepare for a reprosecution if needed. Over time, memories (such as those of eyewitnesses to a crime) fade and evidence (such as a recording of a guilty plea proceeding) disappears; thus, delay in raising an alleged error impairs both the State’s ability to defend against the allegation of error and the State’s ability to reprosecute.

See Holmes, 401 Md. at 487 , 932 A.2d at 733 (Raker, J., dissenting) (“Laches ... can prevent the [State] from being unfairly prejudiced by evidentiary destruction resulting from long, unexcused delay.” (Citation omitted)). In assessing the applicability of the doctrine of laches, it is appropriate to consider the public’s interests in accurately and promptly resolving allegations of error and maintaining the finality of convictions; thus, in determining whether laches bars an individual’s ability to seek coram nobis relief, a court considers how its decision will affect the public. See State ³⁴⁶ Ctr., 488 Md. at 609, 92 A.3d at 494 (“To allow the [plaintiff]s to bring the claim at the stage in the development when they did caused the State and Developers to waste substantial public funds, if there were any merit in [plaintiffls’ substantive claims.”); Liddy, 398 Md. at 254 , 919 A.2d at 1290 (An unreasonable delay “prejudiced the electorate as a whole” because “the relief sought by the [plaintiff], ie.[,] the removal of [the candidatej’s name from the ballot, or, in the alternative, signs being posted to indicate [the candidatej’s ineligibility to voters, would have caused a great deal of uncertainty in the entire election process.”); accord Blanton v. United States, 94 F.3d 227, 231 (6th Cir.1996) (“[SJound policy dictates that coram nobis claims be brought as early as possible to prevent the suffering imposed by illegal convictions and to prevent the government from being prejudiced in its efforts to reprosecute meritorious cases.”); Bartz v. State, 740 So.2d 1243, 1245 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1999) (“[T]he policy rationale for allowing a laches defense is important[—]to acknowledge the finality of convictions at some point which, in turn, will foster confidence in the judicial system.” (Citations omitted)). Finally, our conclusion is equitable.

Laches is an “equitable defense[,]” State Ctr., 438 Md. at 604 , 92 A.3d at 491 (citation omitted), and it is only fair to require a petitioner to bring an alleged error to the trial court’s attention without unreasonably delaying after the time at which the petitioner knew or should have known of the facts underlying the alleged error. To hold otherwise would encourage the inequitable result of allowing a petitioner to refrain from challenging an alleged error until doing so suits the petitioner’s interests of avoiding a harsher penalty for having committed a new offense. This case’s circumstances provide a prime example of this scenario. In 1999, the State charged Jones with four crimes, at least two of which (use of a minor for the purpose of distributing heroin and possession of heroin with the intent to distribute) each carried a maximum term of incarceration of twenty years.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Jones pled guilty to a drug offense; the circuit court sentenced Jones to six years of incarceration, with all but eighteen months sus ³⁴⁷ pended and with credit for time served, followed by three years of supervised probation; and the other charges were closed or dismissed. At oral argument, Jones’s counsel contended that Jones lacked an incentive to challenge his guilty plea because he received a relatively light sentence. 15 Thus, Jones did not move to withdraw his guilty plea, move for a new trial, apply for leave to appeal, move to set aside an unjust or improper verdict, or petition for post-conviction relief, even though the nature of the challenge—that his plea was allegedly not voluntary—was known to him at the time. Jones did not challenge his guilty plea until after he had served his sentence (i.e., gotten the benefit of the plea agreement), served a sentence for violating probation, and was subject to an enhanced federal sentence because of yet a later federal crime due in part to his 1999 conviction thirteen years later. It would be absurd to essentially reward Jones for committing a new crime by allowing him to now challenge his thirteen-year-old conviction, and seek to invalidate his bargained-for plea agreement, on the ground that, thirteen years later, he contends that he did not understand the elements of the offense to which he pled guilty.

In determining whether laches bars a party’s filing, it is appropriate to consider a petitioner’s motivation for not challenging an alleged error until doing so suits the petitioner’s interests. See State Ctr., 438 Md. at 608 , 92 A.3d at 494 (“[Significant motivations of [the plaintiffjs appear to be a ‘desire to stave off competition.’ ... [T]he motivations of the parties matter and indicate that [the plaintiff]s’ delay in bringing their claims was unreasonable and unjustified.”). Contrary to Jones’s contention, our conclusion is consistent with—and, indeed, supported by—Smith, 443 Md. at 589, 594-95 , 117 A.3d at 1103-04, 1106-07 , in which this Court held that ³⁴⁸ CP § 8-401 16 applies retroactively to coram nobis petitions that were pending when CP § 8-401 became effective. In Smith , this Court did not address any issue as to the doctrine of laches.

See Smith, 443 Md. at 587 n. 5, 117 A.3d at 1102 n. 5 (“The State’s contention that the doctrine of laches bars Smith from obtaining coram nobis relief was not ‘raised in or decided by’ the Circuit Court or addressed by the Court of Special Appeals. Because the issue is not preserved for appellate review, we do not address it.” (Citing Md. R. 8-131(a))). Indeed, in Smith , concerning waiver, this Court approvingly quoted Judge Raker’s dissent in Holmes. See Smith, 443 Md. at 609-10 , 117 A.3d at 1115 (“To hold with the